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On the Chronology of Óláfr Tryggvason and Volodimer the Great: The Saga's Relative Chronology as a Historical Source

OMELJAN PRITSAK

In memory of my dear Scandinavian friends
Agnete Loth and Jón Helgason

I.1.

Óláfr Tryggvason played an exceptional role in Norwegian history as the ruler who introduced Christianity in his land, yet he has never been the subject of a monograph by modern historians, Norwegian or foreign.[1] Even the date of his birth has remained a controversial question[2] for which, it seems, scholars have lost hope of finding a definite answer.

The situation, fortunately, is not that bleak. Óláfr Tryggvason was highly respected by Icelanders—for centuries the guardians of the Old Norwegian past—because they regarded him as their baptizer. At least four complete sagas devoted to him have come down to us. Although their information is often repetitious, they do at times complement each other. And some of the

[1] There are only three biographical articles on Óláfr Tryggvason (hereafter OT), two of them brief: Alexander Bugge, "Sandhed og Digt om Olav Tryggvason," *Aarbøger*, 1910, pp. 1–34; Halvdan Koht, "Olav Trygvason, 968–1000," in *Norsk Biografisk Leksikon*, ed. A. W. Brøgger and Einar Jansen, vol. 10 (Oslo, 1947), pp. 413–14; and Gerard Labuda, "Olaf Trygwason," *SSS* 3, pt. 2 (1968): 471–72. See also Siegfried Beyschlag, *Konungasögur* (Copenhagen, 1950), pp. 180–202, and Per Sveaas Andersen, *Samlingen av Norge og kristningen av landet 800–1130* (Handbok i Norges Historie, 2) (Bergen, 1977), pp. 102–9. For full citations of abbreviations used in the footnotes, see the List of Abbreviations at the end of the article.

[2] The dates given in the scholarly literature for OT's birth vary from 950 to 968 (969). Some examples:

950–952	= Arkadij Ljaščenko, "Saha" (1926), pp. 14–15;
963	= Alexander Bugge (1910; see fn. 1), p. 5;
ca. 965	= Erma Gordon, *Olafssaga* (1938), pp. 86–87;
968	= Konrad Maurer, *Die Bekehrung des Norwegischen Stammes zum Christenthume*, vol. 2 (Munich, 1856), pp. 523–24;
	= Halvdan Koht, "Olav Trygvason" (1947; see fn. 1), p. 43;
968 (969)	= Bjarni Aðalbjarnarson, introduction to his edition of Snorri Sturluson, *Heimskringla* I (*IF* 26) (Reykjavík, 1941), p. CXXXVI;
between 963 and 968	= Gerard Labuda, "Olaf Trygwason" (1968; see fn. 1), p. 471.

In 1938 Erma Gordon stated, with some desperation, "Wie man sieht, ist es fast unmöglich festzustellen, in welchem Jahre Olaf zur Welt kam"; *Olafssaga*, p. 37.

Icelandic data on Óláfr Tryggvason can be synchronized with other sources, such as skaldic poetry, Adam of Bremen, and, above all, the English and Old Rus' annals.

The four sagas about Óláfr Tryggvason are the following:

1) *Óláfs saga Tryggvasonar*, by Oddr Snorrason (hereafter *OsT*), a work of the Benedictine Þingeyrar monastery in northern Iceland. One can assume, with good reason, that Oddr compiled his saga in Latin, circa 1190. It survives in an early thirteenth-century Old Icelandic translation, but its best manuscript (AM 310, 4to = *A*) was copied in Norway toward the end of the thirteenth century.[3]

2) *Óláfs saga Tryggvasonar* is the longest (28,019 words) single saga in the first volume of the *Heimskringla* (hereafter *Hkr*) of Snorri Sturluson (1179–1241). The *Heimskringla* was written down in Iceland between 1220 and 1230; the basic manuscript is the so-called *Kringla*, which has been preserved in two copies from the early eighteenth century (AM 35, fol., and Sth 18, fol. = *K*).[4]

3–4) The encyclopedic collection which scholars call *Óláfs saga Tryggvasonar en mesta* (hereafter *OsTm*) was probably compiled around 1300 by the Þingeyrar monk Bergr Sokkason,[5] who was later (from 1322) the abbot of the other Icelandic Munka-þverá Monastery. It exists in two redactions: AM 61, fol. (Icelandic, from the fourteenth century; basic text);[6] and *Flateyjarbók* (hereafter *Flat*; Icelandic MS., ca. 1380–1394).[7] But this encyclopedic work incorporated to a great degree an older Icelandic translation of the second Þingeyrar *Óláfs saga Tryggvasonar*, originally written in

[3] For a general presentation, see Ólafur Halldórsson, "Óláfs saga Tryggvasonar," *KHL*, 12 (1967), cols. 551–53. On Oddr's *OsT*, see Gordon, *Olafssaga*; Bjarni Aðalbjarnarson, *Om de norske kongers sagaer* (Oslo, 1937), pp. 55–85; Jan de Vries, *ALG*, vol. 2 (Berlin, 1967), pp. 242–45; Kurt Schier, *Sagaliteratur* (Stuttgart, 1970), p. 24. In quoting Oddr's *OsT* I use the edition by Finnur Jónsson, *Saga Óláfs Tryggvasonar af Oddr Snorrason munk* (Copenhagen, 1932).

[4] On Snorri's *OsT*, see Aðalbjarnarson's introduction to his edition of the *Hkr* I (see fn. 2). I quote this edition of *Hkr*. See also the English translation by Lee M. Hollander, *Heimskringla: History of the Kings of Norway* (Austin, Texas, 1964). See also Schier, *Sagaliteratur*, pp. 26–27.

[5] See Schier, *Sagaliteratur*, p. 25.

[6] On *OsTm*, see Lars Lönnroth, "Studier i Olaf Tryggvasons saga," *Samlaren* (Uppsala), 84 (1963): 54–94. When quoting the saga below, I use the edition by Ólafur Halldórsson, *Óláfs saga Tryggvasonar en mesta*, 2 vols. (Copenhagen, 1958, 1961). The English translation, with my emendations, is based on the edition by John Sephton, *The Saga of King Olaf Tryggavason* (London, 1895).

[7] *Flateyjarbók. En samling af Norske Konge-sagaer*, vol. 1, ed. Carl Richard Unger and Guðbrandur Vigfússon (Christiania, 1860). On the different Óláfr Tryggvason sagas, see Rudolf Simck and Hermann Pálsson, *Lexikon der altnordischen Literatur* (Stuttgart, 1987), pp. 128, 262–63, and 270–71.

Latin circa 1200 by the monk Gunnlaugr Leifsson (d. 1218/1219). Fortunately, the chapter on Óláfr's chronology in *OsTm* has been correctly recognized by Bjarni Aðalbjarnarson as going back to Gunnlaugr's original work.[8]

I.2.

Oddr Snorrason, the first Icelandic biographer of Óláfr Tryggvason, stated that he found in the material existing during his time (ca. 1190) two versions of the chronology of Óláfr Tryggvason (hereafter OT): one established by Ari inn fróði (1067–1148), the father of Icelandic historiography in the vernacular; and the other written by some anonymous "learned men."

In checking the veracity of both versions, Oddr Snorrason sided with that by the anonymous authors. He provided only Ari's summation, without giving the components of his presentation. Here are both Oddr's text and its translation:[9]

25. Þat finnz i frasogn Ara hins	It was found in the record of events (*fráso̧gn*)
froða oc eru þeir fleire er þat	of Ari inn fróði—and most [scholars]
sanna at Olafr T. s hafi ij uetr	affirm it—that Óláfr Tryggvason was
haft oc XX þa er	XX and II [= 22] years old when
hann com i land.	he came to the country [Norway] and
oc tok riki	took the state.
en hann reð firir v. uetr	And he ruled for V [= 5] years.
En þo eru þeir sumir menn fróðir	But there are some learned men
er sua vilia segia	(*menn fróðir*) who would stipulate
oc þui trua at sua se at	and believe that he [OT] was
hann hafi haft ij uetr oc XXX vetra	XXX and II [= 32] years old when he
er hann tok rikit.	took the state [of Norway].
oc þat scal nu sanna huersu þeir telia.	It will now be shown how they count.
Þat segia þeir þa er Tryggui konungr	They say that when King Tryggvi,
faþir hans var ueginN at Olafr var	his father, was killed, Óláfr was
þa i moður quiði oc	still in [his] mother's womb and was
var fóddr þat.	born in that [year].
oc var einn uetr með moður feþr	Then he was for one year in hiding

[8] Aðalbjarnarson, *Sagaer*, pp. 85–135. See the critical remarks by Anne Holtsmark, "Om de norske kongers sagaer: Opposisjonsinnlegg ved Bjarni Aðalbjarnarsons doktordisputas 23 September 1936," *Edda* (Oslo), 38 (1938): 145–64.

[9] Oddr, *OsT*, ed. Jónsson, pp. 88–90. On Oddr's reckoning, see Svend Ellehøj, *Studier* (Copenhagen, 1965), pp. 71–73.

sinum oc moður með leynd.	with his mother at his maternal
	grandfather's.
Oc siþan for hann austr i	From there he fared east in
Suiþioð. a fund Hakonar	Sweden to stay with Hákon
gamlu firir motgangi	gamli because of enmity on
Hakonar j. oc	the part of Hákon jarl and
Gunnhilldar.	Gunnhildr.
oc for þa um eyði	He fared there over deserted
merkr oc scoga. oc var þar	marshland and forest and stayed
ij uetr með Hakoni gamla.	there with Hákon gamli for II [= 2] years.
oc er hann for brot þaðan þa	When he departed from there he
var hann þrevetr.	was three years old.
Oc er hann for skiferðum oc	Then he was on a sea voyage and was
hann var hertakiN	taken in captivity [by the Ests]—
er hann ætlaði i Garða	he intended [to travel] to Garðr
þa tocu heiðnir menn	[= Novgorodian Rus']; the heathens
	[Ests]
þau oc hafðu i sinu	captured him and held him
valldi oc var hann i þessi	in their power; he was in such
anauð vi uetr.	bondage for VI [= 6] years.
En i Gorðum austr	Then he stayed in Garðar east
oc austrholfunni veri hann xi ar.	[Novgorod] and in the East for XI
	[= 11 < *IX = 9; see pp. 13, 23] years.
En i Vinðlandi	Then [he stayed] in Wendland
iij uetr.	for III [= 3] years.
oc þa for hann til Danmerkr	Then he fared to Denmark
oc til Irlandz. Oc tok þar	and Ireland; also he was
helga skirn af abota	baptized [at the Isle of Scilly] by an abbot
Þeim er fullr var af helgum anda.	and filled with the Holy Spirit.
oc i Uestrlondum	Then he [was] in the Westlands
var hann ix ár.	for IX [= 9] years.
Oc eptir þat for hann af	And afterwards he departed from
Englandi	England [to assume rule in Norway];
oc hafði þa ij uetr	he was then thirty
hins fiorþa tigar.	and II [= 32] years old.

Before proceeding on to the next text, we need to correct one mistake made by the copyist of *OsT*—an emendation important to our problem. Oddr supposedly states that Ari allotted twenty-two years to OT before his return to Norway. In 1853, Peter Andreas Munch, in his first edition of Oddr's saga (from the codex Sth 18, mbr. 4to = *S*), had already suggested

that Ari's "XX and ij" should be corrected (following *Ágrip*[10]) to "XX and vij," or twenty-seven.[11] This correction has also been accepted—quite rightly—by recent scholarship.[12] I might add that one quotation in *OsTm* from Ari's work clearly states that Ari reckoned the year 968 as that of OT's birth,[13] and therefore the suggested emendation is correct (i.e., 995 - 968 = 27).

I.3.

Gunnlaugr Leifsson decided that his saga would be more effective if he did not follow Oddr, who merely quoted the elements computed by two schools of scholars; rather, he presented this material in the guise of an oratory,[14] namely, as the speech about his odyssey that OT delivered before the assembly known as "Thing." Here is this disguised list:[15]

105 . . . En er Eiriks s(ynir) hǫ́fðo	But when the sons of Eiríkr succeeded
riki tekit. þa suiku þeir TryGva	to the kingdom, they dealt treacherously
konung foður minn ok drapu	with my father King Tryggvi, and slew

[10] On *Ágrip* see below, p. 14.

[11] *Saga Olafs konungs Tryggvasunar. . . af Odd Snorresøn* (Christiania, 1853), p. 91.

[12] See Aðalbjarnarson, *Sagaer*, p. 43, and Ellehøj, *Studier*, p. 72.

[13] *OsTm*, ed. Halldórsson, 1: 95–96: "Þa voro liðnir fra falli Hakonar Aþalsteins f(ostra), .xv. uetr at sǫ́gn Ara prestz Þorgils sonar. en fra falli Sigurþar Hlaða j(arls) .xiij. uetr. Þa var Olafr TryGva s(on) .vij. uetra ok hafði hann þa .iiij. uetr uerit í utlegð aa Eist landi. en tua i Suiþioð með Hakoni gamla" [The Battle (at Línfjord between Haraldr gráfeldr Eiríksson and Gull-Haraldr Knútsson) was fought fifteen (.xv.) years after the death of Hákon Aðalsteinsfóstri Haraldsson (i.e., in 975 [960 + 15]; see *Ann R*, ed. Storm, p. 104), according to the reckoning of priest Ari Þorgilsson, and thirteen (.xiij.) years after the fall of Sigurðr jarl of Hlaðir (i.e., 975 [962 + 13]; see *Ann R*, ed. Storm, p. 104). Óláfr Tryggvason was then seven (.vij.) (incorrect—O.P.) years old; he had been in exile for four (.iiij.) (incorrect—O.P.) years in Estland, after his two (= *tua*) years in Sweden with Hákon gamli].

The editor, Ólafur Halldórsson, adopted two incorrect numbers here: "seven" and "four." For the first figure, both AM 54, fol., and *Flat* have the correct forms: the first has "viij" and the second has the fully spelled-out *atta*, "eight" (see also *Flat*, ed. Unger and Vigfússon, 1: 85). The incorrect number "four" = .iiij. came about as a substitution for *.iv., which was a copyist's error: iv < vi: 4 + 2 cannot result in "7," but 6 + 2 does equal "8." In order to obtain the year 968 for OT's birth, Ari, whose starting point was the year 975, counted back "8" on his fingers from that year: 975, 974, 973, 972, 971, 970, 969, 968 = 8. The later writer introduced his own "correction," realizing that 975 - 968 was not 8 but 7. Ellehøj, *Studier*, p. 72, quotes this passage from *OsTm* but does not comment on it. I dwell here on the passage, since a correct analysis of it allows us insight into Ari's methods of computation. On Ari, see the general presentation in Gabriel Turville-Petre, *Origins of Icelandic Literature* (Oxford, 1967), pp. 88–108. On Ari's work and his chronological method, see Ólafia Einarsdóttir, *Studier* (Stockholm, 1964), pp. 13–314, and Ellehøj, *Studier*, pp. 15–84.

[14] See James E. Knirk, *Oratory in the Kings' Sagas* (Oslo, 1981).

[15] *OsTm*, ed. Halldórsson, 1: 241–42; the English translation is based on Sephton, *Saga*, pp. 149–50, with my own emendations. Cf. fn. 6. See also *Flat*, ed. Unger and Vigfússon, 1: 240–41.

hann ítrygð at raði
Gvnnhilldar moþur siNar
þa er ek var ímoður kuiði.
Sv hin sama Gvnnhilldr
setti margar gilldrvr með sinni
slægð at veiða mik ok af
lifi taka þegar ek var fæddr.
Var Astriðr moðir mín ok ek
enn fyrsta uetr leyniliga
aa Ofro stóðum með Eiriki
foðvr hennar.
En fyrir vm sat ok vęlræði
GuNhilldar treystiz hann eigi
at hallda okkr lengr her
ilandi.
for moþir min þa með mik
hvlðu hófdi ok helldr
faa tækliga avstr i Sviþioð.
þar duóldumz vit .ij. aar
jvtlegð með Hakoni gamla.
Hefði Gvnnhilldr þa fangit mik
með svik ræðum fyrir sína
sendi menn ef sa goði maðr
Hakon gamli hefði eigi
halldit mik með valldi
ok hófðing skap fyrir hennar
eptir sokn fyrir sakir
vínskapar við Eirik moþur foþur
minn.
Þvi nærst þa er ek var
þreuetr.
forvm vit moðir min or Sviþioð
skipferði ok ætlaðum austr i
Garða Riki aa fvnd Sigurðar
broður hennar.
þa maettv ver vikingum ok
vórum hertekin ok selld mansali.

en svmt foroneyti ockart drepit.
skilði þar með okkr moþur
minni sva at ek sa hana
alldri siþan. Ek var þa selldr
við verði sem aðrir mans menn.
var ek .vi. vetr i þeiri aa
navð aa Eist landi.

him in time of truce, on the advice
of their mother Gunnhildr;
I was still in [my] mother's womb.
The same Gunnhildr
in her cunning laid many snares
to take me and deprive me
of life as soon as I was born.
My mother Ástríðr and I
were in hiding, the first year of my life
in Oprostaðir with her father
Eiríkr.
But because of the lying in wait and
the devices of Gunnhildr, he did not dare
to keep us any longer
in the country.
My mother, disguised and dressed
poorly
took me eastwards into Sweden.
There we dwelt two years
in exile with Hákon gamli.
Gunnhildr would have seized me
treacherously by her emissaries,
if that good man
Hákon gamli had not
saved me from her pursuit
by his power and authority,
because
of his friendship with Eiríkr,
my mother's father.
Then when I was
three years old
my mother and I sailed from
Sweden, intending to go east
to Garðaríki [= Novgorod] and
visit her brother Sigurðr.
There [on the voyage] we met with Vikings
and were taken captive and sold into
bondage,
some of our company being slain.
My mother and I were separated,
so that I have never since
beheld her. I was then sold
for money, like other bondsmen.
Six years I remained in bondage
in Estland,

þar til er Sigurðr moþur	until Sigurðr, my mother's brother,
broðir minn leysti mik þaðan.	ransomed me thence,
ok flutti mik þaðan með ser austr	and took me with him eastwards to
i Garða Riki. þa var ek .ix. vetra	Garðaríki [Novgorod], I being then nine years old.
Aðra. ix. uetr var ek i Górðum.	Nine other years I lived in Garðar,
enn i vtlegð. þo at fyrir mann	still an exile, though I was maintained
doms sakir goðra hofþingia	in comfort by the humanity
væra ek þar vel halldinn.	of kind rulers.
þar næst var ek aa Vínd landi .iij. vetr.	Three years I then passed in Wendland.
en .iiij. fyrir vestan haf	and [the next] four years in the Western
i hernaði.	Sea [in the British Islands] as a freebooter.

I.4.

Snorri Sturlson does not give a chronological list in his *OsT*, not even, like Gunnlaugr, one in disguise; however, in the appropriate chapters, he supplies data about the duration of OT's stays in relative chronological order. These are—interestingly enough—in agreement with those of Gunnlaugr:

(chap. 6) . . . þá hafði hon verit tvá	By then she [Ástríðr] had been two
vetr með Hákoni gamla	years with Hákon gamli.
Óláfr var þá þrevetr.[16]	Óláfr was then three years old.
(chap. 6) . . . Óláfr var sex vetr á	Óláfr stayed six years in
Eistlandi í þessi útlegð.[17]	Estland as an exile.
(chap. 8) . . . Óláfr var níu vetra,	Óláfr was nine years old
er hann kom í Garðaríki, en dvaldisk	when he came to Garðaríki [Novgorod] and
þar með Valdamar konungi aðra	lived then with King Volodimer
níu vetr.[18]	another nine years.
(chap. 29) Óláfr Tryggvason var	Óláfr Tryggvason had been
þrjá vetr á Vinðlandi.[19]	three years in Wendland.
(chap. 30) . . . Óláfr Tryggvason	Óláfr Tryggvason passed
var fjóra vetr í hernaði	four years harrying,
síðan er hann fór af	after [leaving] Wendland,
Vinðlandi, til þess er hann	and before he arrived at
kom í Syllingar.[20]	the Isles of Scilly.

[16] *Hkr*, ed. Aðalbjarnarson, 1: 230; cf. English trans. (with my emendations): Hollander, *Heimskringla*, p. 147.
[17] *Hkr*, ed. Aðalbjarnarson, 1: 230; cf. English trans.: Hollander, *Heimskringla*, p. 147.
[18] *Hkr*, ed. Aðalbjarnarson, 1: 232; cf. English trans. (with my emendations): Hollander, *Heimskringla*, p. 149.
[19] *Hkr*, ed. Aðalbjarnarson, 1: 263; cf. English trans.: Hollander, *Heimskringla*, p. 169.
[20] *Hkr*, ed. Aðalbjarnarson, 1: 265; cf. English trans. (with my emendations): Hollander, *Heimskringla*, p. 170.

I.5.

The anonymous work *Ágrip af Nóregs konunga sǫgum* (Summary of the sagas [stories] of the kings of Norway) is the only Norwegian vernacular synoptic history from the twelfth century. It was written—like Oddr's work—circa 1190, but in Norway.[21] The only preserved manuscript is in an Icelandic hand and was copied in the first half of the thirteenth century (AM 325 II, 4to).[22]

Although *Ágrip*, being a summary, does not contain a special saga on OT, its Norwegian data (in addition to those taken from the Icelandic sources), and especially some chronological information, nevertheless deserve special attention.

First of all, *Ágrip* (like the *Historia Norwegiae*)[23] relates two versions of Tryggvi's death: one (the Norwegian version) ascribes it to his own yeomen and the other maintains that it was due to the wickedness of Queen Gunnhilldr and her sons.[24]

16. En til ríkis eftir	After Hákon jarl['s death in 995]
Hókon iarl steig Óláfr Tryggvason	Óláfr Tryggvason ascended to the throne and
ok tígnaþi sik konungs nafni	assumed the name of king in
í Nóregi, er ættar rétt átti af	Norway, for which he had lawful
Haraldi hárfagra, þvíat Óláfr	claim through Haraldr hárfagri, because
hét sunr Haralds, er faþir var	Haraldr's son was Óláfr, who was father of
Tryggva, er of daga Gunhildar	Tryggvi, who [Tryggvi] assumed
suna tók konungs nafn ok	the name of king during the days of Gunhildr's
vald á Raumaríki ok var þar	sons and ruled in Raumaríki. And an end was

[21] On *Ágrip*, see Gustav Indrebø, "Aagrip," *Edda* (Christiania), 17 (1922): 18–65; Aðalbjarnarson, *Sagaer*, pp. 1–54; Ellehøj, *Studier*, pp. 197–276. Cf. also Torfinn Tobiassen, "Ágrip af Nóregs konunga sǫgum," *KHL*, 1 (1956), cols. 60–61.

[22] I quote here from the edition by Finnur Jónsson, *Ágrip af nóregs konunga sǫgum* (Altnordische Saga-Bibliothek, 18) (Halle a.d. Saale, 1929). A new "standardized" edition was published by Bjarni Einarsson in 1984 (see the List of Abbreviations). See also the Norwegian translation by Gustav Indrebø, revised by Arnt Løftingsmo and prefaced by Bjarne Fidjestøl, *Ågrip or Noregs kongesoger* (Norrøne Bokverk) (Oslo, 1973).

[23] The anonymous *Historia Norwegiae* was written in Latin by a Norwegian either between 1152–1163 or between 1195–1198; see Anne Holtsmark, "Historia Norvegiae," *KHL*, 6 (1961), cols. 585–87. See also: Aðalbjarnarson, *Sagaer*, pp. 1–55; Ellehøj, *Studier*, pp. 142–74; and Jens Th. Hansen, *Omkring Historia Norwegiae* (Det Norske Videnskaps-Akademi i Oslo, Avhandlinger, II. Hist-Filos., Klasse 1949, no. 2) (Oslo, 1949).

The text was published by Gustav Storm in *Monumenta Historica Norvegiae*, vol. 1 (Christiania, 1880), pp. 69–124; the passage in question is on pp. 110–11.

[24] *Ágrip*, ed. Jónsson, pp. 18–19 = ed. Einarsson, p. 19.

tekinn af lífi á Sótanesi	put to his life in Sótanes.
ok er þar heygþr ok kalla	And he was buried there in a how. People
menn þar Tryggvareyr.	call it the Cairn of Tryggvi.[25]
En aftak hans segia eigi	Not all present his [Tryggvi's] slaying
allir einom hætti, sumir kenna	in the same manner; some attribute it
búǫndom, at þeim þótti yfirboþ	to the yeoman (*bœndr*) who were angry
hans hart ok drǫ́po hann á þingi.	because of his [Tryggvi's] harsh rule
	and killed him at a Thing.
sumir segja, at hann	The others say that he intended to make an
skyldi gera sætt viþ fǫþorbró-	agreement with the sons of his father-
þorsuno sína, ok tóko þeir hann	brother, but they killed him
af meþ svikom ok illræþom Gun-	due to treason and wickedness on the
hildar konungamóþor, ok trúa því	part of the queen mother Gunhildr, and
flestir.	that [second version] most people believe.

Some details concerning the second version are given in § 9:[26]

Haraldr gráfeldr gerþi fǫr	Haraldr gráfeldr fared to
at Tryggva brœþrung sínom	Tryggvi, his cousin, and
ok drap hann, en Þórólfr lúsa[r]skegg	killed him. But Þórólfr lúsa[r]skegg
hlióp undan síþan meþ Óláf,	fled from there with Óláfr,
son Tryggva konungs.	son of King Tryggvi.

Ágrip adhered to the Norwegian tradition, which maintained that OT was three years old at the time of his father's death and that he was sent away because of the civil war:[27]

17. En aftir fráfall hans	After the death [of Tryggvi], fled
þa flýþi Æstríþ, er Tryggvi	Æstríðr, whom Tryggvi had married
hafþi fengit á Upplǫndom,	in [Norwegian] Uppland, away with the
braut til Orkneyia meþ Óláfi	three-year-old Óláfr, her and Tryggvi's
þrévetrom,	son,
syni sínom ok Tryggva.	
at forþask bæþi fláræþi	in order to escape danger from both
	the deceit
Gunnhildar ok suna hennar ok	of Gunnhildr and her sons, and
Hókonar iarls, er ǫll kipþosk þá	Hákon jarl, all of whom
enn um Nóreg, þvíat eigi vǫ́ro	struggled with one another for
þa enn synir Gunhildar af lífi	Norway, since [at that time] the sons
	of Gunnhildr
teknir.	had still not been killed.
Ok kom hon til Orkneyia	She [Ástríðr] arrived in the Orkneys

25 On the Cairn of Tryggvi, see *Hkr*, ed. Aðalbjarnarson, 1: 214, fn. 2.

26 *Ágrip*, ed. Jónsson, p. 13 = ed. Einarsson, p. 13.

27 *Ágrip*, ed. Jónsson, p. 19 = ed. Einarsson, pp. 19–20.

meþ þrimr skipsǫgnom.[28]	with three ships' crews.
En meþ því at eigi mátti leynask	Since it was impossible to hide her voyage
ferþ hennar ok mart kunni til svika	and many betrayals could happen,
gerask, þa sendi hon barnit á	she sent her child with her [trusted]
braut meþ manni þeim, er sumir	man whom some call
kalla Þórólf lúsarskegg	
sumir	Þórólfr lúsarskegg and others
loþskeggi, ok hafþi	
hann barnit á launungo á braut	Lopskeggi, and he brought the child
til Nóregs ok flutti meþ miklom	[with him] with great danger to
ótta til Svíþióþar.	Sweden.

The Norwegian author of *Ágrip* (and of the *Historia Norwegiae*, as will be noted later) uses the proper name Hólmgarðr (= Novgorod) and also relates that the center of the Estonian pirates was the island of *Eysýsla* (Ösel/Saaremaa).[29] Ástríðr, of course, did not travel to Novgorod, and there are no traces of a piratic novella of the hellenistic type containing only fantastic personal names:[30]

17 (cont.) Ok ór Svíþióþ	And from Sweden he [Þórólfr] intended
vildi hann fara til Hólmgarþs,	to fare to Hólmgarðr [Novgorod], since
þvíat þar var nokkvot ætterni hans.	there [there] was some kindred of his [OT's].
En þá kvǫ́mo Eistr at skipi því,	And then the Ests raided the ship,
er hann var á, ok var sumt	he [OT] was on her; some [passengers]
drepit af, en sumt hertekit,	were killed and some taken captive.
fóstri hans drepinn, en hann	His foster-father was killed, and he [OT]
hertekinn fyr ey þeiri, er	was taken to the island called
heitir Eysýsla, en síþan seldr	Eysýsla [Ösel] and there he [OT] was
í nauþ.	sold in bondage.

From § 18 we learn that Óláfr was twelve years old when he was released from bondage and taken to Novgorod, where he was able to revenge the death of his foster-father Þórólfr:[31]

18. En guþ, er þetta	But God, who had chosen that child
barn hafþi kosit til stórra hluta,	for great deeds,
stilti honom til lausnar meþ þeim	arranged liberation in this manner

[28] See also *Historia Norwegiae*, ed. Storm, p. 111.
[29] *Historia Norwegiae*, ed. Storm, p. 113.
[30] *Ágrip*, ed. Jónsson, p. 19 = ed. Einarsson, p. 20. On the traces of a piratic novella, see Lars Lönnroth, *European Sources of Icelandic Saga Writing* (Stockholm, 1965), pp. 17–18; see also L. Lönnroth, "Studier i Olaf Tryggvasons Saga," *Samlaren* 84: 54–94. Unfortunately, I cannot deal with those interesting problems here.
[31] *Ágrip*, ed. Jónsson, p. 20 = ed. Einarsson, p. 20.

hætti, at maþr kom til Estlandz sendimaþr konungs af Hólmgarþi, er var sendr at taka skatt af	in that a man came to Estland, a *legatus*[32] (*sendimaðr*) from the king of Hólmgarðr [Novgorod] to gather tribute (*skatt*)
landino ok var frændi barnsins, ok leysti frænda sinn ok hafþi til Hólmgarþs, ok var hann þar	from the land. He was a relative of the child; he released his relative [OT] and took him to Hólmgarðr [Novgorod]. He [OT] stayed there
umb hríþ, svá at ekki var margra manna vitorþ á hans ætterni.	for a while, but not many people knew about his [royal] descent.
En þá er hann var XII. vetra gamall,[33] þá gerþisk svá til, at um dag nekkvern á torgi, þá kendi hann í hendi manni øxi þá, er Þórólfr hafþi haft, ok leitaþi eftir atburþom, hvé honom hefþi sú øx komit, ok varþ af hins ansvǫrom sannfróþr, at þat var bæþi øx fóstra hans ok svá bani, ok tók øxina ór hendi honom ok drap þann, er þangat hafþi, ok hefndi svá fóstra síns.	And when he was twelve years old it happened that one day at the marketplace (*torg*) he recognized in the hand of a man the ax which had belonged to Þórólfr, and he inquired about the circumstances, in which manner he had obtained that ax. From his answers, he [OT] deduced both that the ax was his foster-father's and that he was his killer. And he [OT] took the ax from his hands and slew him who brought it thither, and [in this way] he [OT] revenged his foster-father.

Another anonymous synoptic history of the Norwegian kings—this one written in Latin—the *Historia Norwegiae* (or its Latin predecessor?), whose date of composition is still the subject of scholarly debate,[34] draws upon the same type of Norwegian sources as does *Ágrip*. It contains the same information about the age of OT in Novgorod:[35]

Hic cum esset circiter XII [= 12] annorum, in medio foro Holmgardiae paedagogum suum viriliter vindicavit, et inaudita ultio vix deodennis pueri illico auribus regiis intonuit; unde regi praesentatur, a quo demum filius adoptatur.

This time interval (twelve years), the traditional age of maturation, deserves to be taken seriously. Thus, Óláfr Tryggvason's favorite skald, Hallfrøðr Óttarsson vandræðaskáld (b. ca. 917; d. 1007), bears witness that his hero began his harrying expeditions out from Novgorod when he was twelve years old. The testimony in question is expressed in the poet's *Óláfs*

32 This is the Latin translation of the term in the *Historia Norwegiae*, ed. Storm, p. 113.
33 The designation "twelve" refers to OT's age when he arrived in Novgorod.
34 See fn. 23 above.
35 *Historia Norwegiae*, ed. Storm, p. 113.

drápa, which was recited in 996:[36]

1\. Tolf vas elds at aldri
ýsetrs hati vetra
hraustr þás herskip glæsti
Hǫrða vinr ór Gǫrðum.

Twelve years was
the arm who shuns
when he—the friend of the Hǫrðar—
launched his warship out of Garðar
[Novgorod].

Whereas the Icelandic authors are unsure whether the queen in Novgorod was Volodimer's mother or wife and give the queen the imaginary proper name of *Allógíá*, *Ágrip* gives her only the general designation of queen (*dróttning*):[37]

18 (cont.) En þar var
mannhelgr mikil ok miklar
viþlǫgor viþ manz aftak,
ok fekk hann þat til ráþs,
at hann hlióp á hald
drótningarinnar, ok meþ bœn
hennar ok af því, at
hvatligt þótti vera verkit manni
XII. vetra gǫmlom at vinna,
ok af því at sannlig þótti
hefndin vera, þá þá hann
miskunn af konunginom, ok
tók síþan at vaxa vitorþ
of hann ok svá metorþ
ok alt yfirlæti.
En síþan er á leiþ á
stundina, þá var honom
fengit liþ ok skipastóll,
ok fór hann bæþi á eitt
land ok ǫnnor lǫnd ok
heriaþi, ok aukoþo flokk hans
brátt Norþmenn ok Gautar
ok Danir, ok vann nú
stórvirki ok aflaþi sér
meþ því frægþar ok
góþs orþlags.

There was there [in Novgorod] a great
inviolability of person and a great fine for
slaying a man.
And he [OT] found an escape in running
for the queen's protection.
And because of her request,
and because of the boldness of the action
of a man of 12 years of age,
and because of the justness
of the revenge, he [OT] then
received mercy from
the king. And from that time
his renown started growing, and
also his esteem
and all honor.
And after some time passed, he
was given a retinue (*liþ*) and
a fleet,
and he [OT] fared now to one
land, now to another land, and
harried [there]. And soon his [OT's]
host was increased with the
Norsemen, Gautar, and Danes. And now
he was performing great deeds
and in this way he [OT] procured for
himself glory and good reports.

[36] See O. Pritsak, *The Origin of Rus'*, vol. 1, *Old Scandinavian Sources other than the Sagas* (Cambridge, Mass., 1981), p. 272.
[37] *Ágrip*, ed. Jónsson, p. 20 = ed. Einarsson, pp. 20–21. See also fn. 66 below.

Finally, the author of *Ágrip* gives Óláfr's age when he returned to Norway as twenty-seven; it is possible that the figure was not the result of his own reckoning but was taken directly from Ari's authoritative work (see above, pp. 10–11):[38]

19... Hann hafþi vii. vetr	He [OT] was 20 and 7 [27] years old
ok XX., er hann kom í Nóreg,	when he came to Norway,
ok á þeim v. vetrom,	and for 5 years
er hann bar konungs nafn	he bore a king's title
í Nóregi.	in Norway.

I.6.

Although the "Icelandic Annals" were composed late—according to their editor, Gustav Storm, in about 1280, in the Skálaholt bishopric—and their information up to 1160 was based extensively on the sagas, their dates concerning Óláfr Tryggvason are of interest to us in our study, especially since the learned monks, following Ari's example, transformed the dates given in the relative chronology of their sources into those of the Christian Era. I limit myself here to a few quotations from the *Annales Regii* (ca. 1300; hereafter *Ann R*), the most important collection for the period in question:[39]

968. Dráp Godrǫdar konvngs Biarnar sonar ok Trygg[v]a konvngs Óláfs sonar. Fóddr Óláfr Trygg[v]a sonr.	Killing of King Guðrǫðr Bjarnarson and King Tryggvi Óláfsson. Birth of Óláfr Tryggvason.
971. Óláfr Trygg[v]a sonr hertekinn til Estlanndz.	Óláfr Tryggvason taken captive in Estland.
977. Óláfr Trygg[v]a sonr kom í Garðaríki.	Óláfr Tryggvason came to Garðaríki [Novgorod].
986. Óláfr Trygg[v]a sonr fór ór Garðaríki.	Óláfr Tryggvason departed from Garðaríki [Novgorod].
993. Óláfr Trygg[v]a sonr skírðr í Syllingvm.	Óláfr Tryggvason baptized in the Isles of Scilly.
995. Vpphaf ríkis Óláfs Trygg[v]a sonar í Nóregi.	The beginning of the kingship of Óláfr Tryggvason in Norway.
1000. Fall Óláfs konvngs Trygg[v]a sonar.	The fall of King Óláfr Tryggvason.

38 *Ágrip*, ed. Jónsson, p. 22 = ed. Einarsson, p. 22.

39 *Islandske Annaler indtil 1578*, ed. Gustav Storm (Christiania, 1888), pp. 104–5. Concerning the dependence of the Icelandic annals on the sagas, see Einarsdóttir, *Studier*, pp. 293–326.

I do not deal with the chronology of OT's rule in Norway here since a special study on that subject exists: Bjørn Magnússon Ólsen, "Kronologiske bemærkninger om Olaf Tryggvasons regeringshistorie," *Aarbøger*, 1878, pp. 1–58.

II.1.

Before analyzing the texts set forth in the previous section, it is necessary to elaborate on the methodology applied in a chronological study.

Time is man's basic concept for marking the duration of conscious experience. It comprises the occurrences of events and the intervals between them. The events and the intervals together relate to both personal happenings and to "public"—i.e., "historical"—ones.[40]

There are two systems for reckoning events. The first is relative chronology, or what Ólafia Einarsdóttir calls "popular chronology";[41] this has been universally used, since it is rooted in the cyclical thinking of the non-abstracting mind. The second is absolute chronology, or what Ólafia Einarsdóttir calls "learned chronology";[42] it is artificially created after the human mind discovers the abstract linear concept of time.

Whereas in relative chronology dating is reckoned by *time intervals* ("x years *after/before/since* the event y"), in absolute chronology an abstract *time scale* is developed: i.e., individual years from a definite starting point are numbered consecutively and called an era.

I prefer the term "relative chronology" to its synonym "popular chronology," since the notion of "popular" in this context is usually associated with "the way in which the primitive peoples calculated time."[43] The use of "relative chronology" has never been restricted to "primitive" peoples; on the contrary, it has been (and still is) the universally natural way for all men to reckon the passage of time. Even today, we (including specialists in absolute chronology) usually say "x years elapsed after/before/since the death/birth/ascendence of y (kings, parents, children, pets, etc.)," "during the war of x," "x years after we moved to place y," etc. Only when it is necessary to present a "public," i.e., "official," version of private occurrences do those of us who live in societies using the linear concept of time in public life synchronize our personal relative chronology with absolute chronology and use a time scale of our society, such as the Christian Common Era.

[40] On chronology, see N. H. Nicolas, *The Chronology of History* (London, 1838); F. K. Ginzel, *Handbuch der mathematischen und technischen chronologie*, 3 vols. (Leipzig, 1906–1914); M. P. Nilsson, *Primitive Time-Reckoning. A Study in the Origins and First Development of the Art of Counting Time among the Primitive and Early Culture Peoples* (Skrifter utgivna av Humanistiska Vetenskapssamfundet i Lund, 1) (Lund, 1920); J. F. Schroeter, *Haandbog i kronologi*, 2 vols. (Oslo, 1926).

[41] Einarsdóttir, *Studier*, p. 143; *folkelig kronologi*, p. 349.

[42] Einarsdóttir, *Studier*, p. 143; *lærd kronologi*, p. 349.

[43] Einarsdóttir, *Studier*, pp. 144, 349.

The feature typical of relative chronology is its durability, based on the fact that each single segment (time interval) is perceived as a finished, independent unit. Its simple structure (e.g., "we lived x years in the city of y") makes it easy for human beings to retain and recall data at will.

Every mentally healthy human being remembers to the end of his or her days the time intervals between important personal events as they are dated in relative chronology. By contrast, even educated members of the most progressive societies who constantly use absolute dating in their public life often make mistakes when they present events from their personal life in terms of absolute chronology.

II.2.

The transition from pre-Christian *oral* literature to Christian *written* literature throughout Europe—including Norway and Iceland—made it necessary to synchronize the simple time intervals given in relative chronology with the Christian Era. In this effort the great Icelandic scholars of the twelfth century, especially the founding fathers of Old Icelandic historical science, Sæmundr Sigfússon inn fróði (1056–1133) and Ari Þorgilsson inn fróði (1067–1148), found support in the absolutely dated events in the history of the old Christian centers (Rome, Constantinople), as well as in the history of neighboring Christian countries, in particular, England.

A quotation from Ari's *Íslendingabók* illustrates this:[44]

. . . en Gizurr byskup andaðisk þremr tegum	Thus Bishop Gizurr died thirty days later
nátta síðarr í Skálaholti á enum þriðja	[after Þorlakr Rúnólfsson was made his successor] in Skálaholt
degi í viku <V> Kalend. Junii.	on the third day of the week, on the fifth day before the Calends of June (= May 28).
Á því ári enu sama obiit	In that same year, Pope Paschal II died
Paschalis secundus páfi fyrr en	[January 21] before the bishop Gizurr [i.e., before May 28];
Gizurr byskup ok Baldvini Jór-	Baldwin king of Jerusalem [April 2];
salakonungr ok Arnaldus patriarcha	Arnulf, patriarch of Jerusalem [April 15];
í Híerúsalem ok Philippus	Philip, king of the Swedes
Svíakonungr, en síðarr et sama	and, later [i.e., after May 28] the

44 *Íslendingabók. Landnámabók*, ed. (with notes) by Jakob Benediktsson (*IF*, 1, pt. 1) (Reykjavík, 1968), pp. 25–26.

sumar Alexíus Grikkjakonungr;	same summer, Alexius [Comnenus; August 15],
þá hafði hann	emperor of the Greeks; at that time he
átta vetr ens fjórða tegar	
setit at stóli	had occupied the throne at Constantinople
í Miklagarði.	for thirty-eight years [1081–1118].
En tveim vetrum síðarr	But two years thereafter, there was a
varð aldamót.	turn in the lunar cycle.
Þa hǫfðu þeir Eysteinn	Then Eysteinn and Sigurðr had been
ok Sigurðr verit sjautján	seventeen years kings of Norway
vetr konungar í Norvegi	[since 1103]
eptir Magnús fǫður sinn Óláfsson	after their father Magnús Óláfsson,
Haraldssonar. Þat vas tuttugu	son of Haraldr. It was 120 years
vetrum	
ens annars hundraðs eptir fall	after the fall of
Óláfs Tryggvasonar, en fimm	Óláfr Tryggvason, 250 years
tegum ens þriðja hundraðs	after the slaying of
eptir dráp Eadmundar	Edmund, king of England,
Englakonungs, en sextán vetrum	and 516 years after the death
ens sétta hundraðs eptir	of Pope Gregory [I; 590–604]
andlát Gregóríus páfa, þess	who, as is said, introduced Christendom
es Kristni kom á England,	in England.
at því es talit es.	
En hann andaðisk á ǫðru	But he [Gregory I] died in the second year
ári konungadóms Fóku	of the reign of the [Byzantine] emperor
keisara, fjórum vetrum ens	Phocas [602–610], 604 years
sjaunda hundraðs eptir burð	after the birth of Christ according
Krist at almannatali.	to the common era.
Þat verðr allt saman tuttugu	That makes altogether
ár ens tolfta hundraðs.	1120 years.[45]

II.3.

In analyzing the placement and structure of the time intervals in the relative chronology occurring in the above-quoted passages, it becomes clear that some are repeated in several texts, whereas others are omitted. From this we

[45] "The three years 870, 1000, and 1120 in the 'Book of the Icelanders' [*Íslendingabók*] thus appear to have been chosen for arithmetical reasons as the nearest round years after the dates of the three principal events of the Book [of the Icelanders]: the first settlement of Iceland, the introduction of Christianity, and Bishop Gissur [=Gizurr] Ísleifsson's death. None of the three events which Ari has attached directly to these years—the murder of King Edmund in 870, Olaf Tryggvason's fall in 1000, and the end of a lunar cycle in 1120—belong to the history of Iceland; but Ari has endeavored to attach to the three years events known to his readers." Einarsdóttir, *Studier*, p. 345.

can deduce that time intervals can be extracted from the texts and studied separately.

In addition to the time intervals, there are also *summations*, which can be either partial (e.g., OT was nine years old [= 3 + 6] when he arrived in Novgorod), or general (e.g., OT was twenty-seven years old when he became king of Norway). The partial summation may or may not be a product of the original source, whereas the general summation is made by the compilers.

Keeping this in mind, one arrives at two starting points and at the following inventory of nine time intervals and six summations—three partial and three general:

Starting Points

A. OT was three years old when his father was killed (*Ágrip*);
B. OT was born posthumously (*Ari[46] > Oddr, *Hkr*, *OsTm*).

Inventory of Time Intervals

1. OT *born after his father's death,[47] spent one year with his maternal grandfather (*Ari > Oddr, *Hkr*, *OsTm*);
2. OT stayed two years with Hákon gamli in Sweden (*Ari > *OsTm*, Oddr, *Hkr*, *OsTm*);
3. OT spent six years in Estnish captivity (*Ari [> *OsTm*], Oddr, *Hkr*, *OsTm*);
4. OT resided in Garðr/Garðaríki for nine years (*Hkr*, *OsTm*);
5. OT spent three years in Wendland (Oddr, *Hkr*, *OsTm*);
6. OT harried in the North Sea for nine years (Oddr);
7. OT was active in the British Isles for four years, until his baptism on the Isles of Scilly (*Hkr*, *OsTm*; cf. *Orkn*[48]);
8. *OT was active in the British Isles for two years after his baptism (*Ann R*);[49]

[46] The asterisk before Ari's name indicates that this is quoted from Oddr's *OsT* rather than from the original work by Ari, which has not come down to us.

[47] The notion that OT was born after his father's death was subsequently added by clerics to the simple time interval.

[48] *Orkneyinga saga*, ed. Finnbogi Guðmundsson (*IF* 34) (Reykjavík, 1965), p. 25: "Oluff Tryggesøn vaar fire Aar udi Kriig i Vesterlandene, effterat hand kam fra Vindland. . . ." [Óláfr Tryggvason spent four years looting in the British Isles, after his return from Wendland. . . .].

[49] The *Ann R* (and other annals) had already synchronized the data of the intervals, so that there one finds A.D. 993 as the date of OT's baptism and 995 as that of his return to Norway. Cf. p. 19.

9. OT was king of Norway for five years (Theodoricus,[50] *Ágrip*, Oddr, *Ann R*; cf. *Kristnisaga*[51]).

Inventory of Summations

a) Partial

I. OT was three years old (1 + 2) when he left Hákon gamli and was captured by the Ests (*Hkr*, *OsTm*, *Ann R*);

II. OT was twelve years old (10 + 2) when he arrived in Garðr/Novgorod (*Ágrip*; cf. *Historia Norwegiae* and the skald Hallfrøðr Óttarsson);[52]

IIa. OT was eight years old in 975 when he left Estland; he stayed for two years with Hákon gamli and for six years in Estland (*Ari > *OsTm*);

IIb. OT was seven years old in 975 (*OsTm*);

IIc. OT was nine years old when he arrived in Garðr/Novgorod (*Hkr*, *OsTm*, *Ann R*);

III. OT was eighteen (9 + 9) years old when he left Garðr (*Ann R*).

b) General

IV. OT was twenty-five years old when he was baptized (*Hkr*, *OsTm*, *Ann R*);

V. OT was twenty-seven years old when he became king of Norway (*Ari > Oddr; *Ágrip*, *Ann R*);

Va. OT was thirty-two years old when he became king of Norway (Oddr);

VI. OT was killed in the year 1000, after five years of rule in Norway (Ari, *Islendingabók*; *Ann R*; cf. Theodoricus and Adam of Bremen).[53]

III.1.

The first question to be solved is: was OT born after his father's death or was he three years old when his father was slain?

[50] Theodoricus was a Norwegian monk who, ca. 1180, wrote in Latin the synoptic *Historia de antiquitate regum Norwagiensium*. On this work, see Anne Holtsmark, "Historia de antiquitate regum Norvagensium," *KHL*, 6 (1961), cols. 583–85.

Theodoricus's work was published by G. Storm in his *Monumenta historica Norvegiae*, vol. 1 (Christiania, 1880), pp. 3–68; the passage in question is on p. 23: "De morte Olavi filii Tryggva. Quinto ergo anno regni Olavi filii Tryggva, qui et ultimus fuit. . . ."

[51] On *Kristnisaga* by Sturla Þorðarson (1214–1284), see Magnús Már Lárusson, *KHL*, 9 (1964), col. 356. I am quoting from the edition by Guðni Jónsson, *Íslendinga sögur*, vol. 1 (Reykjavík, 1953), p. 273: "Þá hafði hann [OT] verit konungr at Nóregi fimm vetr" [then he was king over Norway for five years].

[52] See above, p. 17.

[53] Adam of Bremen, *Gesta Hammaburgeneis ecclesiae Pontificum* (ca. 1073–1076), ed. Werner Trillmich and Rudolf Buchner, in *Quellen des 9. und 11. Jahrhunderts zur Geschichte der Hamburgischen Kirche und des Reiches* (Berlin [1961]), p. 276.

All Icelandic works relate the first variant; only the Norwegian *Ágrip* relates the second. This is not the only instance when the summation, despite its brevity, either has more information than the Icelandic sagas or presents two versions—one Icelandic and one Norwegian—of one event.

A feature typical of the Icelandic presentation is its hagiographic character. One can but agree with James E. Knirk that

> the historical distortion was strengthened by literary efforts in Iceland where clerical circles may have wanted this "Apostle of the North" [OT] to be their patron saint. Although Oddr [the first Icelandic biographer of OT—O.P.] concedes in his prologue that his protagonist was never canonized, the work has hagiographic trappings, blending biblical and legendary material with fairy-tale motifs, romance, and heroic legend. The tale of Ástríðr's flight with the infant Óláfr parallels the flight of Mary and Joseph with the baby Jesus, while the queen mother Gunnhilldr's pursuit is a realization of the "evil stepmothers" of folklore.[54]

One can also accept Arkadij Ljaščenko's suggestion that Oddr's saga was inspired by the sagas of St. Óláfr, that is, like Óláfr Haraldsson (St. Óláfr),[55] the hero was made to be a posthumous child. There is no legitimate reason to doubt that the Old Norwegian tradition of OT persevered in the twelfth century. The Old Norwegian historical work *Ágrip* is superior to the later (12th–13th cen.) Icelandic tradition and its hagiographic recastings.

OT was apparently born at the home of his maternal grandfather Eiríkr at Oprostaðir in Jaðarr.[56] The surname *bjóðaskalli* would indicate that Eiríkr was originally from **Bjóðar* in Southern Hǫrðaland. This hypothesis, expressed by Erik Henrik Lind,[57] is corroborated in a skaldic strophe (quoted above) in which the special relationship of OT to Hǫrðaland is expressed: there he is called *Hǫrðavinr* 'friend of the Hǫrðar'.[58]

Three years later, Tryggvi Óláfsson, OT's father, was killed near Sótanes in Ranríki; he had ruled over both Ranríki and Vingulmǫrk.[59] Here, again, there is no reason to doubt that the slayers of Tryggvi were his own yeomen, as *Ágrip* noted.

54 Knirk, *Oratory in the Kings' Sagas*, p. 172.

55 Ljaščenko, "Saha," p. 15.

56 The compilers of the *OsT* had the information that OT was sent to the Norwegian Uppland to live with his grandfather, who was named Eiríkr a Oprostǫðum. From this they—being Icelanders—deduced (incorrectly!) that Oprostaðir was located in Uppland.

57 See Aðalbjarnarson's commentary, *Hkr* 1 (*ÍF* 26): 225.

58 See Hallfrøðr Óttarsson's *Óláfs drápa*, on p. 17 above.

59 See *Hkr*, ed. Aðalbjarnarson, 1 (*ÍF* 26), p. 151: "Tryggva gaf hann Ranríki ok Vingulmǫrk" [He (Hákon Aðalsteinfostri) gave to Tryggvi Ranríki and Vingulmǫrk].

That slaying occurred during an uneasy time. Hákon Aðalsteinsfóstri, king of Norway, died;[60] his place was taken by the sons of his brother Eiríkr and their mother Gunnhilldr, the daughter of the Danish king Gormr. She was able to enlist the military support of her brother, the Danish king Haraldr blátǫnn Gormsson. There can be no doubt that some groups opposed the new rulers. This kind of dislike is manifest in the tradition preserved by the Icelandic hagiographic school in Þingeyrar, which spiced it up a bit. As a result, Gunnhilldr received "special treatment" in the Icelandic sagas. As stated by Halvdan Koht:

> The Icelandic family sagas give us from this period of her [Gunnhilldr's] life a picture of an amorous old woman, preferring, of course, Icelanders as her lovers, and using her witchcraft to prevent them from deceiving her. The Kings' Sagas continue to represent her as a most wicked-minded woman who incites her sons to kill off all local chieftains, their rivals.[61]

It seems, then, that Eiríkr bjóðaskalli had good reason to leave the western coast and to find a quieter atmosphere in the Norwegian Uppland at Skaun (modern Stange),[62] east of the lake Mjǫrs. There, the child OT spent his first year.

Next, Eiríkr sent his grandson to his friend Hákon gamli in Sweden, where OT stayed for two years;[63] the latter time period was already known to Ari inn fróði.[64] By then, OT was already six years old, and it was decided to take him to his relative in Hólmgarðr (Novgorod).

This analysis shows that one must follow time intervals 1 and 2, as well as summation I, though with the dating of OT's birth to follow the death of his father excluded as a possibility.

The next time interval (no. 3), the six years of OT's captivity, confirms the above computation, since several sources (among them a skaldic strophe) independently confirm that OT was twelve years old when he came to Novgorod. And, since he stayed there for nine years (time interval 4), he must have left Novgorod at the age of twenty-one years.

60 To accommodate the dating of OT's birth to follow the death of his father, the Icelandic clerics separated two events which happened in the same year: the fall of King Hákon (for which *Ann R* has the date 960; see *Islandske Annaler indtil 1578*, ed. Storm, p. 104) and the fall of Tryggvi Óláfsson (for which *Ann R* has the date 968; ibid.). But *Ágrip* puts the fall of King Hákon and that of Tryggvi in the same chapter (chap. 9; ed. Jónsson, pp. 12–13).

61 Halvdan Koht, *The Old Norse Sagas* (New York, 1931), p. 125.

62 See Aðalbjarnarsson's explanations in his index to *IF* 26 (*Hkr* 1), p. 398a, s.v. "Skaun, austan fjalls í Noregi."

63 It was an Old Norse custom to send young boys to stay with grandparents and with friends of grandparents; see Peter Godfrey Foote and David M. Wilson, *The Viking Achievement* (London, 1970), p. 116.

64 See fn. 13.

III.2.

We now reach the point at which it is possible to synchronize the data of the Old Norse relative chronology with those of the Old Rus' sources and, through them, with the common era.

OT must have come to Novgorod *before* A.M. 6485 (A.D. 977). In that year Volodimer (Valdimarr) of Novgorod was forced to flee "beyond the sea," since his older brother, Jaropolk, had assumed all sovereignty and become the sole ruler of Rus'.[65]

But the *terminus ante quem* for OT's arrival in Rus' must have been the year 969, since Volodimer's "mother" (actually, grandmother) Ol'ga,[66] who took OT under her protection, died on 11 July 969.[67] The arithmetical equation is 977 - 9 = 968. Although the *Pověst' vremennyx lět* notes that Svjatoslav divided his realm among his sons officially only in 6478/970,[68] the de facto division must have taken place in 6475/967, when Svjatoslav

[65] See the Old Rus' Primary Chronicle, *Pověst' vremennyx lět* (hereafter *PVL*), ed. D. S. Lixačev, vol. 1, pp. 53–54.

[66] As stated above (p. 18), *Ágrip* mentions only one older female ruler in Novgorod. He does not give her name, since it remained unknown in the Old Norwegian tradition. Thus, *Ágrip* simply calls her *dróttning* 'queen' (*Ágrip*, ed. Jónsson, p. 20 = Einarsson, p. 20). Oddr, on the other hand, needed a clairvoyant person who would foretell the birth of the future "Baptizer" of Norway and Iceland. Hence, from the *dróttning* of the tradition, he created two personages: one became the nameless clairvoyant mother of Valdamarr (*OsT*, ed. Jónsson, p. 20); the other was styled as Allógíá, Valdamarr's *dróttning* (*OsT*, ed. Jónsson, p. 23). The "rationalistically minded" Snorri rejected the story of the clairvoyant mother; he refers to only one *dróttning*, but he calls her Allógíá, the name created by Oddr (*Hkr*, ed. Aðalbjarnarson, 1: 231). Gunnlaugr Leifsson or the editor of the *OsTm* or both, while retaining Oddr's dichotomization, represented Allógíá as Valdamarr's wife (*kona*; *OsTm*, ed. Halldórsson, 1: 80).

The Old Norse tradition regarded the *dróttning* of Novgorod as "the wisest of all women" (*allra kuinna vitrost*; see Oddr, *OsT*, ed. Jónsson, p. 27). This characterization is very similar to the description of Ol'ga in the *PVL*: *bě mudrějši vsěx čelověk* [she was the wisest of all human beings] (*PVL*, ed. Lixačev, 1: 75, s.a. 987). I concur with scholars who identify the *dróttning* of Novgorod of the Old Norse tradition with Ol'ga: e.g., Friedrich (Fëdor A.) Braun, "Das historische Russland im nordischen Schrifttum des X–XIV. Jahrhunderts," *Festschrift Eugen Mogk* (Halle a.d. Saale, 1924), pp. 176–78; Ljaščenko, "Saha," pp. 16–21; Elena A. Rydzevskaja, "Legenda o knjaze Vladimire v sage ob Olafe Trjuggvasone," *Trudy Otdela drevneruskoj literatury AN SSSR* (hereafter *TODRL*), 2 (1935): 13; Gordon, *Olafssaga*, p. 70. But any attempts to compare etymologically the name Ol'ga (< Old Norse, Helga) with Allógíá (see, e.g., Braun, "Das historische Russland") must be rejected, since Allógíá was artificially created—along with other exotic names like *Klerkon, Klerkr, Reas, Recon*—by Oddr to fit the tenor of his piratic novella.

[67] See D. S. Lixačev's commentary to his edition of the *PVL*, 2: 315. I must disagree with Gordon's statement: "Ich halte diese ganze Geschichte von dem Aufenthalt Olafs in Russland für eine Verwechslung mit der Geschichte von dem Aufenthalt Magnus des Guten in Russland. . . ." (*Olafssaga*, pp. 72–73).

[68] *PVL*, ed. Lixačev, 1: 49–50; Eng. trans.: Samuel H. Cross, *The Russian Primary Chronicle: Laurentian Text* (Cambridge, Mass., 1973), p. 87.

embarked on his complicated and lengthy Bulgarian campaign.[69] There is no serious reason to doubt that Volodimer was already residing in Novgorod in 968.

This means that OT's stay in Rus' must be dated between 968 and 977. That result leads us to the determination of OT's year of birth. Since—as we have seen—he was twelve years old when he arrived in Novgorod, he must have been born in 956 (968 - 12 = 956).

Three years later, in 959, the sons of Eiríkr and Gunnhilldr, led by Haraldr gráfeldr, came to power in Norway. OT's father, Tryggvi Óláfsson, was killed in that crucial year, when—according to *Ágrip*—OT was three years old (starting point A).

The next time interval (no. 5) is the three-year period that OT spent "in Wendland." The duration of three years (977–980) is significant because it corresponds to the number of years (three) that Volodimer of Novgorod, foster-father of OT, was forced to spend in exile.[70] One can assume that OT and Volodimer went abroad together to find refuge.

III.3.

Where would they go? At that time, the Old Norse term *Vinðland* referred to the territories ruled by the West Slavonic princes. Our knowledge of the political situation in the territories east of the river Elbe is limited. Nevertheless, it is possible to present a general overview.

In the last decades of the tenth century, there were essentially five Wendish political centers.

The most western maritime territory (later eastern Holstein) was ruled by the princes of Wagria, who separated from the Obotriti in about the middle of the tenth century. Their capital was Stargard/Aldinburg (modern Oldenburg in Holstein), which in 968 became the first bishop's see in Wendland.[71]

The territory east of Wagria, between the middle Elbe and the eastern part of the Lübecker Bucht, was ruled by the Obotriti. Their capital was the twin city of Michelenburg-Zuarina (modern Mecklenburg-Schwerin).[72]

69 *PVL*, ed. Lixačev, 1:47–48 (s.a. 6475 and 6476); Eng. trans.: Cross, pp. 84–85.

70 Symptomatically, the years 6486/978 and 6487/979 are marked in the *PVL* as "empty years": *V lěto 6486. v lěto 6487* (ed. Lixačev, 1:54). Only under s.a. 6488/980 does there occur the story of Volodimer's return to Rus'.

71 See Jerzy Strzelczyk, "Wagria, Wagrowie," *SSS* 6 (1977):293–96; idem, "Stargard wagryjski," *SSS* 5 (1975):395–99.

72 See Gerard Labuda, "Obodrzyce," *SSS* 1 (1968):440–41; idem, "Związek obodrzycki," *SSS* 7, pt. 1 (1982):180–91; Jerzy Nalepa, "Mechlin (Mecklenburg)," *SSS* 3, pt. 1 (1967):188–89; Lech Leciejewica, "Swarzyn (niem. Schwerin)," *SSS* 5 (1975):495–96.

Between the territory of the Obotriti and the Oder River lived the Weletabi/Wilzi, who were then ruled by princes of the tribe of Stodorani. Their center was the town of Brenna (later Brandenburg).[73]

Situated on an island at the mouth of the Oder was the city-republic of Volin/Jumne (Old Norse, Jóm), then the greatest city in the western Baltic,[74] with approximately 10,000 inhabitants.[75] Volin symbolized the "Varangians," as Constantinople did the "Greeks," in the designation "the route from the Varangians to the Greeks."[76] Both Novgorod and Kiev became important because they were located along the route from Volin to Constantinople.

Around 960, Mesico/Dagone[77] (= Dag-r) *iudex* (963–992), the prince of Gniezno (located at the basin of the river Warthe, the eastern tributary of the Oder), began organizing his realm, which would later be known as Poland.[78]

Two Wendish rulers of that period had close dynastic ties with the Scandinavian kings: Mistavoj, the ruler of the Obotriti (ca. 967–990), was the father of Tófa, who was married to the Danish king Haraldr blátǫnn (ca. 945–984; d. 986). We know this from her runic stone inscription.[79]

On the other hand, the famous Sigríðr in stórráða was the daughter of Mesico.[80] During the period under discussion, she was wed to the king of

[73] Gerard Labuda, "Wieleci," *SSS* 6 (1977): 430–36; Jerzy Strzelczyk, "Stodoranie (Hawolanie)," *SSS* 5 (1975): 420–23.

[74] See Adam of Bremen (ca. 1073–1076): ". . . nobilissima civitas Iumne celeberrimam prestat stacionem Barbaris et Grecis, qui sunt in circuitu. . . . Est sane maxima omnium, quas Europa claudit, civitatum, quam incolunt Sclavi cum aliis gentibus, Grecis et Barbaris. . . . Urbs illa mercibus omnium septentrionalium nationum locuples nihil not habet iocundi aut rari"; *Gesta*, ed. W. Trillmich and R. Buchner (Berlin, 1961), p. 252.

[75] See Lech Leciejewicz, "Wolin, gród i wyspa," *SSS* 6 (1977): 561–64, esp. p. 562b.

[76] There was communication by boat between Volin (Jumne) and Novgorod; the passage took fourteen days. The information is provided by Adam of Bremen: ". . . Ab ipsa urbe [Jumne] vela tendes XIIII cimo die ascendes ad Ostrogard Ruzziae [= Novgorod]," *Gesta*, ed. Trillmich and Buchner, p. 254. Cf. Pritsak, *The Origin of Rus'*, vol. 1, p. 220.

[77] *Dagome* is a scribal error from **Dago-ne*. Scholarly literature on the subject was given by Brygida Kürbisówna, "Dagome iudex," *SSS* 1 (1962): 311–12. See, especially, R. Holtzmann, "Böhmen und Polen im 10. Jahrhundert," *Zeitschrift des Vereins für Geschichte und Altertum Schlesiens* (Breslau), 52 (1918): 18–36.

[78] The origin of Mesico/Dagr (963–992) is still a mystery. His "Slavic" (Piast) genealogy, which occurs first in the chronicle of the so-called Gallus (ca. 1112–1116), is certainly an artificial construct.

[79] Sønder Vissing I, Tyrsting hd., Århus amt. *Danmarks Runeindskrifter*, ed. Lis Jacobsen and Erik Moltke (Copenhagen, 1942), no. 55.

[80] The princess who married first Eiríkr inn sigrsæli and later Sveinn tjúguskegg was undoubtedly the daughter of Mesico/Dagr; she was also the unnamed sister of the Polish Bolesław I (992–1025), since the contemporary writer Thietmar of Merseburg clearly testified (ca. 1013–1014) to that: "Hos [Haraldr, 1014–1018, and Canute the Great, 1014–1035] peperit ei Miseconis filia ducis, soror Bolizlavi successoris eius et nati" (*Chronicon*, ed. R.

Uppsala, Eiríkr inn sigrsæli (ca. 957–995); her second husband was the Danish king Sveinn tjúguskegg (984–1014).

The sagas on OT name another Wendish king, Búrizláfr, who had three daughters; one of these (Geira) was taken as a wife by OT himself.[81]

Who was this Búrizláfr? Some scholars have tried to identify him as Mesico's son Bolesław,[82] but this attempt should be rejected. Bolesław was born in 967;[83] only ten years of age by 977, he could hardly have had a daughter who was then of marriageable age.

The *Landnamabók* contains a strange genealogical entry dated to the reign of the king of Uppsala, Eiríkr inn sigrsæli. It is so odd that artificial construction is most unlikely; some verity must lie behind it. The text runs as follows:[84]

Gormrr hét hersir ágætr í Svíþjóð; hann átti Þóru, dóttur Eiríks konungs at Uppsǫlum. Þorgils hét	There was a famous man in Sweden called Gormr. He married Þóra, daughter of Eiríkr, king of Uppsala. They had

Holtzmann and W. Trillmich [Berlin, 1957]), p. 396.

The Old Norse tradition, however, calls her Sigríðr in stórráða and claims that she was the daughter of the famous Swedish Viking Skǫglar-Tósti (see, e.g., *Hkr*, ed. Aðalbjarnarson, 1:215).

Since the publication of J. Steenstrup's *Venderne og de Danske* (Copenhagen, 1900), p. 65, scholars have rejected the Old Norse tradition; see Gerard Labuda, "Swiętosława, Sygryda Storráda, Syritha," *SSS* 5 (1975):588–89.

It seems to me that it is possible to find a compromise solution. Sigríðr was Mesico's daughter, born before 966, by a previous marriage (in 966 he married—for political reasons—the Czech princess Dobrava). Mesico's first wife was Skǫglar-Tósti's daughter; since after 966 Sigríðr lived with her grandfather, the Old Norse tradition, which did not remember Mesico, made the grandfather the father. The Swedish roots and Danish career of Skǫglar-Tósti, who took Danegeld in England in 991 (see Pritsak, *The Origin of Rus'*, vol. 1, pp. 343, 392), would explain Sigríðr's choice of husbands (a Swede and a Dane), which, for a Polish princess without Scandinavian connections, cannot be explained.

Sigríðr was a contemporary of OT and was probably also born in 956, i.e., ten years before her father's second marriage. Mesico, whose career as a ruler was first noted in 963, must have been born ca. 935. If he married Sigríðr's mother in 955, when she was probably about fifteen years old, she would, therefore, have been born ca. 940. We can then assume that Skǫglar-Tósti was born between 920 and 925; since he died about 991, that would mean he had lived approximately seventy years, not an unusual age for the time.

81 I see no reason to reject this tradition.

82 See, e.g., Aðalbjarnarson in his note 1 to *Hkr*, 1:253. The name *Búrizláfr*, however, reflects the Slavonic **Borislav*; note, e.g., the name of the Galician Ukrainian town *Boryslav* (<personal name).

83 See Oswald Balzer, *Genealogia Piastów* (Cracow, 1895), pp. 37–43.

84 *Landnamabók*, ed. Jakob Benediktsson, pt. 2 (*IF* 1:2) (Reykjavík, 1968), p. 236. This genealogy was also included in the *OsTm*; see ed. Halldórsson, vol. 2 (Copenhagen, 1961), p. 180. As part of *Þattr Suada ok Arnors Kellingarnefs*, it is to be found in *Flat*, ed. Unger and Vigfússon, 1:436, and in *Íslendinga sögur*, ed. Guðni Jónsson, vol. 8 (Reykjavík, 1953), p. 340.

son Þeira,	a son called Þorgils,
hann átti Elín, dóttur Burisláfs	who married Elín, daughter of Burisláfr,
konungs ór Gǫrðum austan ok	king of Garðar in the east, and
Ingigerðar, systur Dagstyggs	Ingigerðr, sister of Dagstyggr,
risa konungs.	the king of the giants.

Burisláfr (= Búrizláfr) is styled here as "konungr ór Gǫrðum," or "king of Garðar." Usually, *Garðar* is used in the Old Norse sagas to designate Kievan Rus', but it is a "movable term," and was originally used for Frisian Dorestad, the first great city encountered by the Norse Vikings.[85] I submit that in the text above Garðar stands for the maritime center Stargard (modern Oldenburg in Holstein), the capital of Wagria. It seems that Garðar = Stargard occurs in the extant *Hrómundar saga*, which mentions King Óláfr who ruled over Garðar in Denmark (*sá konungr réð fyrir Görðum i Danmörk, er Óláfr hét*).[86] Stargard, as the center of Christian Holstein, came under Danish sovereignty during the last decades of the twelfth century.[87] Burisláfr of Stargard in Wagria must have been a Christian since in 968, as mentioned above, the first Wendish bishopric was established in his city.[88]

The name of his daughter Elín is certainly a version of the Christian Helen.

Dagstyggr as a personal name is rare in Old Norse, yet two persons with that name appear in the *Sturlunga saga*.[89] The name is composed of two elements, the well-known personal name *Dagr* and the appellative *styggr*. *An Icelandic-English Dictionary* explains the compound as "day-shy, shunning light."[90]

Mesico appears (as mentioned above) as *Dagone* (= *Dagome*) *iudex* in his famous donation charter to St. Peter, circa 990. Although this designation has been interpreted differently, it would seem—and our passage from the *Landnamabók* confirms the notion—that *Dagone* is a Latinized form of the Old Norse *Dag-r*.[91] Mesico/Dagone, *rex* of the "Sclavie qui dicuntur

85 See Pritsak, *The Origin of Rus'*, vol. 1, pp. 177, 231.

86 See Pritsak, *The Origin of Rus'*, vol. 1, p. 140.

87 See Strzelczyk, "Stargard wagryjski," *SSS* 5 (1975): 395–99.

88 See Adam of Bremen, *Gesta*, ed. Trillmich and Buchner, pp. 244, 246; Helmold of Bosau, *Chronica Slavorum* (ca. 1163–1172), ed. Heinz Stoob (Darmstadt, 1963), pp. 66, 68.

89 See the index in Guðni Jónsson's edition of *Sturlunga saga: Annálar og nafnskrá* (Reykjavík, 1953), p. 224a: Dagstyggr Jónsson and Dagstyggr Þórðarson.

90 *An Icelandic-English Dictionary*, by R. Cleasby, G. Vigfússon, and W. A. Craigie, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1957; reprinted 1969), p. 601a.

91 See Holtzmann, "Böhmen und Polen" (fn. 77); Albert Brachmann, "Die Anfänge des polnischen Staates," in *Gesammelte Aufsätze* (Weimar, 1941), pp. 159–61; Ulrich Noack, *Nordische Frühgeschichte und Wikingerzeit* (Munich, 1941), p. 283.

Licicaviki," appears suddenly in 963[92] as a very sophisticated politician, uniting large territories under his sway. This extraordinary talent would merit the surname "the king of the giants."

It is reasonable, therefore, to hypothesize that Ingigerðr, the wife of Burisláfr of Wagria, was the sister of Mesico/Dagr of Poland. The clan of Mesico held marital ties with other Slavic dynasties; Mesico himself was married in 965 to Dobrava, the daughter of the Czech prince Boleslav I (935–971); their son Bolesław took for a wife, in 987, the Wendish (Obotriti?) princess Emenilde.[93] The two clans also had in common their "Swedish connection" (see above, p. 24).

It is also hardly a coincidence that the rulers of both the Wagri and the Poles first appear on the historical scene at approximately the same time (between 950 and 960). Most likely, they initiated their actions jointly.

Two other circumstances corroborate that OT's Wendland was one of the Baltic Slavic lands. The first is OT's and Búrizláfr's involvement in the affairs of Jómsborg,[94] which suggests the nearness of their operational base to that city. The second is Volodimer/Valdemarr's genealogy. The *Pověst' vremennyx lět* clearly states that his maternal grandfather was a certain Mal''k'' Ljubečanin, i.e., Mal''k'' from Ljubeka,[95] the Obotriti port town, later called Lübeck in German.

[92] The contemporary witness was Widukind of Corvey, who wrote his *Rerum gestarum Saxonicarum* in 967/968; see the edition by Albert Bauer and Reinhold Rau, *Quellen zur Geschichte der sächsischen Kaiserzeit* (Darmstadt, 1971), pp. 170, 172, 174. The name *Licicaviki* has remained a puzzle; see Gerard Labuda and Stanisław Urbańczyk, "Licicaviki," *SSS* 3, pt. 1 (1967): 56.

[93] Balzer, *Genealogia Piastów*, pp. 38–43; Halina Modrzewska, "Dąbrówka," *SSS* 1 (1962): 44; idem, "Emnilda," *SSS* 1 (1962): 454.

[94] I cannot dwell on the problem of Jómsvíkingar here.

[95] *PVL*, vol. 1, ed. Lixačev, p. 49 (s.a. 970): "Volodimer'' bo bě ot'' Maluši ključnicě Ol'ziny; sestra že bě Dobryn'', otec' že bě ima Mal''k'' Ljubečanin'', i bě Dobryna uj Volodimeru" [For Volodimer was the son of Maluša, the housekeeper of Ol'ga; she also was the sister of Dobrynja: their father was Mal''k'' Ljubečani (= of Ljubeka), and Dobrynja was thus the uncle of Volodimer]. As proven by Aleksej A. Šaxmatov, *Maluša* was the derived form of the Old Norse personal name *Málmfríðr*; according to the *PVL*, Mal''frěd' (< Malmfríðr) died in 1000 (ed. Lixačev, vol. 1, p. 88). See Šaxmatov, *Razyskanija o drevnejšix russkix letopisnyx svodax* (St. Petersburg, 1908), pp. 375–77. Interestingly enough, Volodimer's great-great-great-grandson Haraldr-Mstislav, who married Kristín, the daughter of the Swedish king Ingi I, named one of his daughters Málmfríðr; she was married to the Norwegian king Sigurðr Jórsalafari Magnússon; see Snorri, *Hkr* 3 (*IF* 28), ed. Aðalbjarnarson (Reykjavík, 1951), p. 258.

The conclusion to be drawn from this investigation is that both OT and Volodimer found refuge in the lands of the Wagri-Obotriti.

III.4.

Having hired a sufficient number of Varangian mercenaries, Volodimer returned to Rus' in 980 and wrested power from Jaropolk.[96] But, for some unknown reason, Óláfr did not accompany his former foster-father.[97] Indeed, he quit the Baltic Sea altogether and began his harrying career on the southern shores of the North Sea.[98] His skald Hallfrøðr Óttarsson names at this juncture the lands of Saxony, Frisia, and Flanders.[99] Time interval 6 gives the figure of nine years for the duration of that activity—i.e., OT harried in the North Sea between 981 and 989.

He then transferred his activity to the British Isles, in particular to England, where he was active for four years prior to his baptism on the Isles of Scilly (time interval 7; i.e., 989–993) and two years thereafter (time interval 8; 993–995). OT's activity in England, well-documented in the English sources, has been sufficiently researched, so I shall not dwell on it here.[100]

In 995 OT returned to Norway to rule as king;[101] five years later (time interval 9; the year 1000) he was killed in a battle against the united fleets of the kings of Denmark and Sweden.

Born in the year 956, OT was forty-four when he died. This computation can be corroborated if one totals summation I and all nine time intervals: $3 + (1 + 2 + 6 + 9 + 3 + 9 + 4 + 2 + 5) = 44$.

IV.

In addition to establishing a chronology for the pre-royal period of OT's life, and, in particular, to determining the year of his birth, this study has yielded some results which, it is hoped, can be applied generally to saga studies. These results are the following:

96 *PVL*, ed. Lixačev, vol. 1, pp. 54–56; Eng. trans.: Cross, pp. 178–80.

97 I have made some suggestions regarding this in *The Origin of Rus'*, vol. 2 (in preparation).

98 According to the Þingeyrar hagiographers (Oddr et al.), OT did return to Rus' to play the decisive role in that land's conversion to Christianity. But that supposed activity of OT, like his encounters after his physical death in the Svǫld battle (A.D. 1000), are not the subject of historical inquiry. On this see Ljaščenko, *Saha*, esp. pp. 9–10, and Elena A. Rydzevskaja, "Legenda o knjaze Vladimere v sage ob Olafe Trjuggvasone," *TODRL* 2 (1935), esp. pp. 13–18.

99 "Óláfsdrapa (996)," strophes 6–7, ed. Finnur Jónsson, *Den Norsk-Islandske Skjaldedigtning*, vol. 1, pt. A, *Tekst efter Håndskrifterne* (Copenhagen, 1908), pp. 157–58 = Ernst A. Kock, *Den norsk-isländska skaldediktningen*, vol. 1 (Lund, 1946), p. 81.

100 See Sir Frank Stenton, *Anglo-Saxon England*, 3rd ed. (Oxford, 1971), pp. 375–80.

101 The literature is given in fn. 1.

1) The saga can have more than one starting point in presenting the life of its hero; in the *OsT* there are two starting points, the one secular (*Ágrip*) and the other hagiographic (Oddr, *Hkr*, *OsTm*).

2) The time intervals given in the sagas are reliable. If differences occur, they can usually be explained as normal copyist's errors, e.g., XI instead of IX in Oddr's text; iiij = iv instead of vi in *OsTm*; and *atta* = viij confused with vij in *OsTm* and *Flat*.

3) The summations by the compilers are usually unreliable since they depend on two arbitrary choices made by the compiler: the starting point and the time intervals selected for his purpose.

4) None of the compilers of the *OsT* introduced *all* of the time intervals relevant to the life of OT. Oddr used seven time intervals (nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9), whereas Snorri (*Hkr*) and *OsTm* both used the same six time intervals (nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7). Oddr omitted intervals 7 and 8, whereas Snorri and *OsTm* made use of intervals 7 and 4.

5) None of the authors of the sagas devoted to OT made use of time interval 8; this was utilized solely by the compiler of the *Ann R*.

6) All the Icelandic authors have the same starting point (the "hagiographic"), apparently initiated by Ari, who also established the exact date of OT's death (summation VI).

In his summation, however, Ari (and, strangely enough, Oddr) used the secular criterion (summation V)—"OT's age when he became king of Norway"—while the other authors of *OsT* were guided by the religious standard (summation IV)—"OT's age when he was baptized."

7) OT, as a fully developed "hagiographic" hero, was certainly the creation of the Þingeyrar school. Only the Norwegian author of *Ágrip*, though a cleric himself, retained valuable information from the pre-hagiographic period: the circumstances of OT's birth, his first three years of life, and why and by whom Tryggvi, OT's father, was killed. But in the latter case, he was already quoting, side by side, the second version—that elaborated in the Þingeyrar monastery.

8) Snorri, apparently for literary reasons, disregarded the historically reliable data of *Ágrip*. The "romantic" circumstances of OT's birth and death of his father were too precious to be replaced by the "rationalistic" stories of *Ágrip*. He, therefore, developed starting point B. For the same artistic considerations, Snorri replaced time intervals 6 and 8 with time interval 7. So as not to destroy completely his readers' illusion that OT might have lived past his fall in the year 1000, Snorri omits summation VI and an exact date for OT's death.

9) To deal with the chronological problems of the sagas, scholars must first establish a full catalogue of starting points, time intervals, and summations relating to a given hero. The requisite next step is to establish a relative chronology for the time intervals (if this is not fully given in the sagas themselves) and to check the data with other sources. Finally, these relative dates must be synchronized with absolute chronology according to the Christian Era.[102]

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[102] I wish to express my thanks to Dr. Margaret Cormack for her reading of this article and for her useful suggestions regarding my translations from Old Icelandic.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Aarbøger = *Aarbøger for nordisk Oldkyndighed og Historie*. Copenhagen, 1866–.

Aðalbjarnarson, *Sagaer* = Bjarni Aðalbjarnarson, *Om de norske Kongers sagaer* (Det Norske Videnskaps-Akademi i Oslo, Skrifter, II. Historisk-filosofisk klasse, 1936, no. 4). Oslo, 1937.

Ágrip, ed. Jónsson = *Ágrip af nóregs konungu sǫgum*, ed. Finnur Jónsson (*Altnordische Saga-Bibliothek*, 18). Halle a.d. Saale, 1929.

Ágrip, ed. Einarsson = *Ágrip af nóregskonunga sǫgum. Fagrskinna-nóregs konunga tal*. Bjarni Einarsson gaf út. (*IF*, 29). Reykjavík, 1984.

Ann R = *Annales Regii*, ed. Gustav Storm in *Islandske Annaler indtil 1578*. Christiania, 1888.

Einarsdóttir, *Studier* = Ólafia Einarsdóttir, *Studier i kronologisk Metode i tidlig Islandsk Historieskrivning* (Bibliotheca Historica Lundensis, 13). Stockholm, 1964.

Ellehøj, *Studier* = Svend Ellehøj, *Studier over den ældste norrøne Historieskrivning* (Bibliotheca Arnamagnaeane, 26). Copenhagen, 1965.

Flat = *Flateyjarbók*.

Gordon, *Olafssaga* = Erma Gordon, *Die Olafssaga Tryggvasonar des Odd Snorrason*. Berlin, 1938.

Hkr = Snorri Sturluson, *Heimskringla*.

IF = *Íslenzk fornrit*. Reykjavík.

KHL = *Kulturhistorisk Leksikon for nordisk Middelalder fra Vikingetid til Reformationstid*, 22 vols. Copenhagen, 1956–1978.

Ljaščenko, "Saha" = Arkadij Ljaščenko, "Saha pro Olafa Trihvasona j litopysne opovidannja pro Ol'hu," *Ukrajina* 18, no. 4 (1926): 3–22.

OsT = *Óláfs saga Tryggvasonar*.

OsTm = *Óláfs saga Tryggvasonar en mesta*.

OT = Óláfr Tryggvason.

PVL = *Pověst' vremennyx lět*.

SSS = *Słownik starożytności słowiańskich*. Breslau, 1961–; in progress.

de Vries, *ALG* = Jan de Vries, *Altnordische Literaturgeschichte*, 2 vols. Berlin, 1964–1967.

Ivan Vyšens'kyj's Conception of St. John Chrysostom and his Idea of Reform for the Ruthenian Lands*

HARVEY GOLDBLATT

The idea of reform[1] is a dominant motif in the thought and writings of Ivan Vyšens'kyj,[2] the Orthodox monk from the Ruthenian lands who passed

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1 My discussion of the "idea of reform" and its impact on the basic parameters of Ivan Vyšens'kyj's thought is grounded in large measure on the definitions and approach provided in Gerhart B. Ladner's enormously erudite work, *The Idea of Reform. Its Impact on Christian Thought and Action in the Age of the Fathers* (Cambridge, Mass., 1959). In his book Ladner elucidates three basic aspects in the history of the reform idea (as distinct from other ideas of renewal) which appear to be of central importance for early Christian and medieval thought. "These three facets of the idea of reform are: the return to Paradise, the recovery of man's lost image-likeness to God, and the representation on earth of the heavenly Basileia" (p. 63). For the purpose of the present study, noteworthy in Ladner's presentation are: (1) the conception of the church fathers regarding the mystical recovery of the lost resemblance to God and the belief that the restoration of purity is essential for man's reformation or reassimilation to the image of God; (2) the importance given to the theme of monasticism as a vehicle for the Christian idea of reform; (3) the special significance attached to the rule over the passions and the concept of ἀπάθεια for the ideology of kingship (βασιλεία); and (4) the view that "there was one great exception to the eastern Christian development of Basileia ideology here described: the thought and life of St. John Chrysostom" (pp. 125–26). Ladner concludes his illuminating comments on Chrysostom's pastoral and homiletic efforts, as follows: "Nothing could be less 'Eusebian' than [Chrysostom's] conception of the Kingdom of God on earth and it is not surprising that John Chrysostom perished as a martyr for Christian ethical principles in resistance to an unholy alliance of corrupt Church dignitaries with the irresponsible heirs of the Constantinian-Theodiosian Empire. Chrysostom's heroic effort to reform the urban society of the nascent Byzantine Empire can hardly be called successful" (p. 129).

2 On the life and writings of Ivan Vyšens'kyj, see N. F. Sumcov, "Ioann Vyšenskij (Južnorusskij polemist načala XVII st.)," *Kievskaja starina* 11 (1885): 649–77; I. P. Žytec'kyj (Žiteckij), "Literaturnaja dejatel'nost' Ioanna Višenskogo," *Kievskaja starina* 29 (1890): 494–532; I. Franko, *Ivan Vyšens'kyj i jeho tvory* (Lviv, 1895) (cited after Ivan Franko, *Zibrannja tvoriv u p'jatdesjaty tomax*, vol. 30 [Kiev, 1981], pp. 7–211); A. Kryms'kyj (Krymskij), "Ioann Vyšenskij, ego žizn' i sočinenija," *Kievskaja starina* 50 (1895): 211–47 (cited after A. Ju. Kryms'kyj, *Tvory v p'jaty tomax*, vol. 2 [Kiev, 1972], pp. 380–455); J. Tretiak, *Piotr Skarga w dziejach i literaturze Unii brzeskiej* (Cracow, 1912), esp. pp. 233–87; M. S. Voznjak, *Istorija ukrajins'koji literatury*, vol. 2, *Viky XVI–XVIII* (Lviv, 1921), pp. 125–70; M. Hruševs'kyj, *Istorija ukrajins'koji literatury*, vol. 5 (Kiev, 1927), pp. 284–352; I. P. Eremin, *Ivan Višenskij. Sočinenija* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1955), pp. 223–335; I. P. Eremin (Jer'omin), *Ivan Vyšens'kyi. Tvory* (Kiev, 1959), pp. 3–39; P. K. Jaremenko, *Ivan Vyšens'kyj* (Kiev, 1982); V. O. Ševčuk, *Ivan Vyšens'kyj. Tvory* (Kiev, 1986), pp. 3–18; I. Z. Myc'ko, "Čar arxivnyx sviddčen'. Materialy do biohrafij slavetnyx publicystiv," *Žovten'*, 1987, no. 3, pp. 90–96; A. I. Pašuk, *Ivan Vyšens'kyj—myslytel' i borec'* (Lviv, 1990). For a bibliography of

almost all his adult life on Mt. Athos, the leading center of Eastern Christian spirituality, in the age of the ideological struggle between the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation. In his "epistles," composed and sent from the "holy Athonite mountain" to "all pious people living in Little Rus' in the Polish Kingdom,"[3] Vyšens'kyj provided not merely a denunciation of the Protestant and above all Catholic Reformations but his own vision of what we might call an "Orthodox-Ruthenian reform." By "Orthodox-Ruthenian reform" is meant a suggestion of renewal which had as its aim not only a far-reaching conversion of Christian man and the Church, according to their original images, but also the wholesale reform of Christian society in Rus' and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.[4] It is thus true that Vyšens'kyj advanced a conception that went beyond the "monastic and individual realizations of the idea of reform,"[5] but it is equally true that, in his struggle against what he saw as the organized forces of the malevolent spirit which pervaded not only Rus' but "all ends and parts of Christendom,"[6] he offered precisely the monastic way of life as the

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Ivan Vyšens'kyj, see, *inter alia*, L. E. Maxnovec', comp., *Ukrajins'ki pys'mennyky: Biobibliohrafičnyj slovnyk*, vol. 1 (Kiev, 1960), pp. 230–36; Jaremenko, *Ivan Vyšens'kyj*, pp. 118–40.

3 See, for example, the initial words to the title of the *Knyžka Ioanna mnixa Višenskoho* (Book of monk Ivan Vyšens'kyj): "Knyžka Ioanna mnixa Višenskoho ot svjatyja afonskia hory v napominanie vsîx pravoslavnyx xristian...v Maloj Rossii v koronî polskoj žitelstvujuščim..." (7.2–6). (Here and elsewhere in this study, Vyšens'kyj's writings are cited according to I. P. Jer'omin's 1955 edition [pp. 7–220]. In all references to this publication, the first numeral indicates the page, while the second number gives the line.) The term "Little Rus'," which first occurs in Byzantine terminology around 1300, was linked to the metropolitan see of "Kiev, Halyč and all Rus'" that had been established for the Orthodox Church in Ukraine and Belorussia under the jurisdiction of the patriarch of Constantinople. The title was used in contradistinction to the term "Great Rus'," which designated the metropolitinate of "Moscow and all Rus'," that is, the autocephalous Russian Church which emerged as a consequence of Constantinople's temporary acceptance of union with Rome in 1439. However, in the complex situation which developed after the Union of Lublin in 1569, with its resulting political separation of Ukrainians and Belorussians, and the Synod of Brest in 1596—when the majority of Orthodox bishops agreed to a union with Rome and the Uniates were recognized as the only legal Ruthenian Church—it appears that Vyšens'kyj's use of the designation *Malaja Rossija*, in contrast with the term *Velikaja Rossija* (192.4–16), refers not to a specific geopolitical entity or ecclesiastic jurisdiction but to all Orthodox faithful in the "Polish Kingdom" (*Korona Polskaja*) who affirmed their allegiance to the spiritual and cultural heritage of Rus'. See F. Sysyn, *Between Poland and the Ukraine. The Dilemma of Adam Kysil, 1600–1653* (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), pp. 26–29 and (for the relevant bibliography) pp. 248–50.

4 Cf. the title to chapter 4 of the *Knyžka*: "Tobî, v zemli zovemoj polskoj, meškajučomu vsjakoho v''zrasta, stanu i preloženstva narodu ruskomu litovskomu i ljadskomu, v rozdîlenyx sektax i vîrax rozmaityx, sej hlas v slux da dostiže" (45.2–5).

5 Ladner, *The Idea of Reform*, p. 4.

6 Note the opening words to the introduction of the *Knyžka*: "Posylaju vam terminu o lži, kotoraja nad istinnoju u vašej zemli carstvuet, i boh ot vsîx storon i častij xristianstva xulitsja duxi ž lukavii podnebesnii (k nim že bran', po Pavlu) v xristijanstvî našem vladîjut, otnjudu že

exemplary Christian way and only true agent of restoration and salvation for Christian society at large. As shall be shown below, a peculiar interpretation of St. John Chrysostom's idea of Christian reform in general, and of monasticism in particular, played a vital role in his quest for a fair measure of perfection in the world.[7]

There is little doubt that the conception of reform Vyšens'kyj expounded in his writings aimed to rely exclusively on the authority of the church fathers and the dogmatic teachings of Orthodoxy. Nor is there any question that his affirmation of the contemplative life as a vehicle for the Christian idea of reform depended on a tradition of monastic piety and method of theologizing which Vyšens'kyj understood not in the specific context of fourteenth-century debates regarding a practice of devotion and prayer that became known as "hesychasm"[8] but as an indissoluble part of a continuous sacred heritage, that is, an essential component of Orthodox doctrine that could not be rejected or altered.[9] The basic parameters of Vyšens'kyj's reformist ideology can thus be properly evaluated only if his allegedly "hesychast orientation"[10] is linked not to a specific mystical trend or religious controversy of the late Byzantine age[11] but rather to a tradition of

za nevîrie i besplodie naše popuščeni esmo v zapustînie z našeju prav"slavnoju vîroju" (7.12–16). On the importance of the initial lines of the introduction—in particular, the reference to St. Paul (Eph. 6.12)—for the semantic structure of the entire work, see H. Goldblatt, "Godlike 'Simplicity' *versus* Diabolic 'Craftiness': On the Significance of Ivan Vyshens'kyi's 'Apology for the Slavic Language,'" in *Living Record: Essays in Memory of Constantine Bida*, ed. I. Makaryk (Ottawa, 1992), pp. 3–22.

[7] The possible dependence of Vyšens'kyj's thought on the writings or authority of John Chrysostom, as well as any typological correspondences between them, has been treated to date only in the most perfunctory way. See, for example, D. S. Nalivajko, "Ukrajins'ke literaturne barokko v jevropejs'komu konteksti," in *Ukrajins'ke literaturne barokko*, ed. O. V. Myšanyč (Kiev, 1987), pp. 58–59.

[8] See J. Meyendorff, "Is 'Hesychasm' the Right Word? Remarks on Religious Ideology in the Fourteenth Century," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 7 (1983): 447–56.

[9] On the mystical traditions of Byzantine Orthodoxy, their role in shaping hesychast theology of the fourteenth century, and the significance of the hesychast movement among the Orthodox Slavs, see in particular M. Iovine, "The History and the Historiography of the Second South Slavic Influence," (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1977), pp. 93–107; H. Goldblatt, *Orthography and Orthodoxy. Constantine Kostenečki's Treatise on the Letters*, Studia Historica et Philologica, 16 (Florence, 1987), pp. 3–39.

[10] The precise connection between hesychast doctrine and literary practice among the Orthodox Slavs continues to engender serious discussion, if not outright controversy; see, most recently, M. Hébert, "Hesychasm, Word Weaving, and Slavic Hagiography: The Literary School of Patriarch Euthymius," 2 vols. (Ph.D. diss., Brown University, 1992).

[11] See Ju. V. Pelešenko, "Deščo pro tradyciji u tvorčosti Ivana Vyšens'koho," in *Ukrajins'ke literaturne barokko*, ed. O. V. Myšanyč (Kiev, 1987), pp. 131–43; G. Grabowicz, "The Question of Authority in Ivan Vyšens'kyj: A Dialectics of Absence," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 12/13 (1988/1989): 782–83. Although commentators long have adduced both external and internal evidence to prove Vyšens'kyj's hesychast credentials, the detailed study of his relation-

spirituality whose origins could be traced back to the very establishment of Christian monasticism in the fourth century[12] and whose techniques—as well as the theological speculation linked with its practice—the authorities of Orthodox Christendom continuously had considered vital in the struggle against diabolical cunning[13] and in the concomitant ascent toward that vision of God which was the true contemplation.[14]

Nonetheless—and notwithstanding specific references in his writings to such defenders of Eastern Christian spirituality as Basil the Great, John Chrysostom, Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite, Isaac the Syrian, John Climacus, Symeon the New Theologian, and Gregory of Sinai[15]—it would be a mistake to evaluate the structures of Vyšens'kyj's thought solely in terms of the direct impact exerted by the particular teachings of the church fathers.[16] Indeed, rather than seeking out occasional evidence of specific patristic sources for his mode of thinking, it seems more appropriate, instead, to elucidate a set of formal coincidences, that is, to give primary attention to a study of literary types. Such an emphasis on the typological correspondences between the writings of the church fathers and Vyšens'kyj's oeuvre in no way aims to suggest that the reformist ideology elaborated in the age of the fathers did not provide the foundation for all

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ship to hesychasm remains a desideratum; see H. Goldblatt, "Isixasts'ka ideolohija u tvorčosti Ivana Vyšens'koho," *Filosofs'ka i sociolohična dumka* (forthcoming). On the history and significance of the hesychast movement in the Ruthenian lands—in particular the role played by Jov Knjahynyc'kyj—see S. Senyk, "L'Hésychasme dans le monachisme ukrainien," *Irénikon* 62 (1989): 172–212. It is noteworthy that hesychast devotional practices and doctrine appear to have left their mark not only on the defenders of the Ruthenian Orthodox heritage but on such fervent supporters of the Uniate cause as Josaphat Kuncevyč; see S. Senyk, "The Sources of the Spirituality of St. Josaphat Kuncevych," *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 51 (1985): 425–36.

12 As John Meyendorff ("Is 'Hesychasm' the Right Word?," pp. 447–48) has noted, "Since the fourth century, the term ἡσυχία was used to designate the contemplative monastic way of life. According to Evagrius Ponticus, 'quietude' (ἡσυχία) is 'the joy of the true monk' and implies 'life in the desert.' St. Gregory of Nyssa speaks of 'hesychasts' (ἡσυχασταί) who 'isolate themselves for forty years from human society.'"

13 On the monastic notion of self-perfection as a constant battle against the devil, see T. Špidlík, *La Spiritualità dell'oriente cristiano* (Rome, 1985), pp. 201–29; G. Maloney, *Russian Hesychasm. The Spirituality of Nil Sorskij*, Slavistic Printings and Reprintings, 269 (The Hague and Paris, 1973), pp. 73–78; J. B. Russell, *Satan. The Early Christian Tradition* (Ithaca and London, 1981), esp. pp. 149–85; Goldblatt, "Godlike 'Simplicity' *versus* Diabolic 'Craftiness.'"

14 Goldblatt, *Orthography and Orthodoxy*, pp. 3–4.

15 These are the spiritual authorities cited by Vyšens'kyj in the *Pozorišče myslennoe* ("Spiritual Spectacle"), his last extant work and the object of special concern for the present study.

16 It is important to distinguish here between the question of direct influence and the possible relevance of the "classical" *auctores* and *auctoritates* of Orthodox Christendom as components of a literary canon that may have provided Vyšens'kyj with a stockroom of exegetical schemes, conceptual clichés, and thematic-stylistic commonplaces.

subsequent attempts to reach perfection for the entire *Christianitas*, not only through the early and later Middle Ages, but through the Renaissance, the Protestant and Catholic Reformations, and beyond. As Ladner has pointed out, although "the history of man can be seen as a sequence of new beginnings,... it is not surprising that early Christendom should have impressed its own character on the universal idea of renewal and that specific Christian expressions of it should have had an appreciable influence on subsequent developments in civilization ever since."[17]

Nor should Vyšens'kyj's steadfast allegiance to the tradition of Orthodox spirituality and the church fathers lead us to conclude that he was merely a retrograde "apologist for ignorance,"[18] spiritually distant from and totally at variance with the mainstream of Ruthenian cultural trends, and that his writings remained essentially unaffected by the distinctive characteristics of Reformation and Counter-Reformation models and patterns of thought. In the first place, as Sister Sophia Senyk recently has reminded us, it is incorrect to suggest that the houses and communities of Mt. Athos, where Vyšens'kyj spent most of his adult life, stood in isolation from the confessional and intellectual controversies that were taking place in the Ruthenian lands of the period.[19] We should also remember that, even after he had embraced the contemplative life on Mt. Athos, Vyšens'kyj continued to follow closely events in the Ruthenian lands. All his extant writings, though mostly written on the "holy mountain," were produced in conscious response to a particular crisis or perceived ordeal in the Ruthenian lands. We should not forget, moreover, that it was Vyšens'kyj who—owing to his reputation for erudition among the Athonite monks—was entrusted with the difficult task of responding to the frontal assault launched against the Ruthenian Orthodox cultural heritage by Piotr Skarga in his polemical treatise, *On the Administration and Unity of God's Church under One Shepherd*, which had been reissued in Cracow in 1590.[20]

17 Ladner, *The Idea of Reform*, p. 1.

18 The formula "apologiste de l'ignorance" was first introduced in reference to Vyšens'kyj by Antoine Martel (*La langue polonaise dans les pays Ruthènes: Ukraine et Russie blanche, 1569–1667*, Travaux et mémoires de l'université de Lille, n.s., Droit et lettres, 20 [Lille, 1938], pp. 259–66). Cf. G. Grabowicz, *Toward a History of Ukrainian Literature* (Cambridge, Mass., 1981), pp. 37–38.

19 Senyk, "L'Hésychasme dans le monachisme ukrainien."

20 See Eremin, *Ivan Višenskij*, pp. 316–20. Piotr Skarga's *O rządzie i jedności Kościoła Bożego pod jednym Pasterzem i o greckim od tej jedności odstąpieniu*, the revised version of a treatise which first appeared in print in Vilnius in 1577 (*O jedności Kościoła Bożego...*), was dedicated to the newly crowned King Sigismund III Vasa (1587–1632). Scholars generally accept the view that Vyšens'kyj's *Kratoslovnyi otvît Feodula and Začapka mudraho latynika z hlupym rusinom* were written in direct response to the 1590 edition of Skarga's treatise. On the impact (both direct and indirect) of Skarga's writings on Vyšens'kyj, see Tretiak, *Piotr Skarga*,

In the second place, we should not underestimate the possibility that the structures of Vyšens'kyj's thought may have been conditioned by the influences and counter-influences that marked late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century Ruthenian culture. More specifically, there are cogent reasons to believe that his oeuvre, which many scholars continue to see as the expression of an eminently "medieval" mode of literary consciousness and a total rejection of the "new learning" that ostensibly characterized intellectual life in the Ruthenian lands of the period, may indeed reflect ideas emanating from the Protestant Reformation[21] as well as certain principles spread and enunciated by the Catholic Counter-Reformation.[22] There is no question that the well-entrenched historiographic vision which informs us that the writings of Ivan Vyšens'kyj, the patriotic defender of Orthodox spirituality, never betray the influence of the "tools" employed by his Protestant—and especially Catholic—adversaries is in need of wholesale revision.[23]

Vyšens'kyj's cultural legacy, therefore, must be investigated not only in light of the Orthodox Slavic heritage that helped shape his ideology, but also against the backdrop of Ruthenia's direct exposure to, and involvement in, the cultural life of the multinational Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Consequently, any examination of those aspects of his thought that appear to rely on the spiritual tradition of Orthodoxy can neither disregard the complex matrix of ideas characteristic of the confessional and ideological conflict between the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation nor ignore those aspects of humanist scholarship that played a fundamental role in the doctrinal disputes between the Protestant and Catholic Reformations. These considerations thus not only apply to Vyšens'kyj's eschatology, with its overwhelming vision of persecution and general apostasy, his search for self-perfection, with its requirement for the solitude of the desert, and his exaltation of the primitive church and apostolic poverty, with its negation of the existing social order. They also refer to the issues of "sacred

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pp. 233–87; Eremin, *Ivan Višenskij*, pp. 295–96, 316–25. For Skarga's arguments against the "Slavic language" ("ięzyk Słowieński"), see part 3, section 5 of the work, as published in P. Gil'tebrandt, *Pamjatniki polemičeskoj literatury v zapadnoj Rusi*, vol. 2 (=Russkaja istoričeskaja biblioteka, 7) (St. Petersburg, 1882), cols. 482–88, esp. cols. 485–87.

21 See Franko, *Ivan Vyšens'kyj*, pp. 7–8, 323–24; M. Hruševs'kyj, *Istorija Ukrajiny-Rusy*, 10 vols. (reprinted New York, 1954–57), 6:399–421; V. N. Peretc, "Ivan Vyšenskij i pol'skaja literatura XVI veka. Issledovanija i materialy po istorii starinnoj ukrainskoj literatury XVI–XVIII vekov, 1," *Sbornik Otdelenija russkogo jazyka i slovesnosti* 101, no. 2 (1926): 15–47; Ševčuk, *Ivan Vyšens'kyj*, pp. 6–8.

22 Peretc, "Ivan Vyšenskij i pol'skaja literatura," pp. 24–30, 34–42.

23 See H. Goldblatt, "On the Language Beliefs of Ivan Vyšens'kyj and the Counter-Reformation," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 15 (1991): 7–34.

philology"[24] (i.e., concern with the reliability of the authoritative texts of Christendom) and church order (in particular, the thetical doctrine of a hierarchical church granting a special role to the clergy and viewing the episcopacy as the full exercise of the priesthood), themes which are essential components of the reformist ideology expressed by Protestants, Catholics, and Orthodox polemicists alike in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries and which are also of paramount importance for the present study.

* * *

In 1614 the Lviv Confraternity published a volume—traditionally referred to with the abbreviated title *Book on the Priesthood*[25]—which offered to Ruthenian readers a Slavic version of John Chrysostom's most celebrated work, *On the Priesthood*.[26] Yet, as indicated in the title to the Slavic text, the volume contained not only a translation of Chrysostom's treatise on the priesthood, in six books,[27] but also other writings "necessary for the general benefit of readers."[28] These included not only information on the saint's life, by such "authorities" as Socrates Scholasticus, Theodoret, bishop of

24 P. Kristeller, "Paganism and Christianity," in his *Renaissance Thought. The Classic, Scholastic, and Humanist Strains* (New York, 1961), p. 79. See D. Frick, *Sacred Philology in the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation*, University of California Publications in Modern Philology, 123 (Berkeley, 1989), esp. pp. 1–11.

25 "Iže v svjatyx otca našeho Ioanna Zlatoustaho, arxiepiskopa Konstantinupolja. Kniha o svjaščen''stvî. . . . V Lvovî. Z drukarni bratskoj Stavropihia v obiteli svjatoho Onufria trudom iže kinoviatov, ieromonaxa Pafnutia i pročix, roku 1614" (fol. 1ʳ). (Hereafter the *Kniha o svjaščen''stvî* is cited as *KS*.) For a description of the book's contents, see Ja. Zapasko and Ja. Isajevyč, *Pam'jatky knyžkovoho mystectva. Kataloh starodrukiv, vydanyx, na Ukrajini, Knyha perša (1574–1700)* (Lviv, 1981), pp. 97–98. A copy of *KS* is located in the Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library of the University of Toronto (Millennium Ukrainian Collection, no. 1). For a plate of the title page, essentials of the title, and the marginalia in the Toronto copy, see E. Kasinec and B. Struminskyj, *The Millennium Collection of Old Ukrainian Books at the University of Toronto Library. A Catalogue* (Toronto, 1984), pp. 1–2. I wish to acknowledge my gratitude to the Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library for allowing me access to the volume.

26 *De sacerdotio* (*PG* XLVIII, 623–92). This work was written around A.D. 382, that is, during the saint's deaconate and before his ordination as priest in A.D. 386. As Ladner notes, the six books of *On the Priesthood* "strike the key note of [Chrysostom's] life as a great priestly orator and preacher in Antioch and as a reforming Patriarch of Constantinople" (*The Idea of Reform*, p. 126).

27 "Iže v svjatyx otca našeho Ioanna arxiepiskopa Konstantina hrada Zlatoustaho, v uvahajuščim eže bîžati Svjaščen''stva otvîščatelno. O svjaščen''stvî" (*KS*, pp. 1–210).

28 "K nej že v'kratcî s''brannoe žitie svjatoho i pročaja nuždnaa v obščuju polzu pročitatelem, . . ." (*KS*, fol. 1ʳ). It appears that the *Book on the Priesthood* is not based on an existing Greek collection but represents independent selections from collections containing Chrysostom's works and "authorities" on his life. As regards possible sources for the volume, it goes without saying that one should examine not only the Greek and Slavic manuscript traditions, but also the printed editions produced in the West by humanists or humanistically trained theologians.

Cyrrhus, Hermias Sozomenus, Patriarch George of Alexandria, Photius, and Suidas,[29] as well as Isidorus of Pelusium,[30] but also a set of thirty "eclogues" dealing with the "attributes of the priesthood" which were drawn from Chrysostom's homilies on St. Paul's epistles.[31] In addition, strategically interspersed throughout the volume were *virši* composed by such important cultural figures of the time as Havrylo Dorofijovyč and Pamvo Berynda.[32]

Shortly thereafter, in 1615 or 1616, Ivan Vyšens'kyj wrote and sent from Mt. Athos to Rus' his *Spiritual Spectacle*.[33] Written with a particular audience in mind—that is, as he put it, "for the monastic order, lest it be fettered by the deception of this useless world"[34]—and in deliberate response to the *Book on the Priesthood* published by the Lviv Confraternity, the *Spiritual Spectacle*—which has come down to us by a single thread of tradition[35]—is Vyšens'kyj's last extant work.

As the Athonite monk himself pointed out, he did not find fault with the entire volume. To the contrary, he felt it necessary to praise the diligence of those who had brought forth the book, for through their translation of *On*

29 "Iže v svjatyx otca našeho Ioanna Zlatoustaho, arxiepiskopa Konstantinupolja, ot Sokrata Sxoljastika, Theodorita, episkopa Kurskaho hrada, Eremia Sozomena, Heorhia arxiepiskopa Aleksandrijskaho, Fotia, i Sunidy, v'kratcî s''brannoe žitie" (*KS*, fols. 5^r-25^v). One should note that there is no reference here to the apologetic dialogue of Palladius, bishop of Helenopolis and a trusted friend of Chrysostom, which is our principal authority for the later history of the saint (*Palladii Dialogus*, *PG* LXVII, 5–81).

30 "Iže v svjatyx otca našeho, Isidora Pelusiota, K Palladion Diakonov: o eže, kako dobra dîla xoščet, ašče kto episkopstva ili svjaščenstva želaet" (*KS*, fols. 26^r-28^v). "Tohožde k Evstafiju" (*KS*, fols. 28^r-29^r).

31 "Tohožde iže v svjatyx otca našeho Ioanna Zlatoustaho, arxiepiskopa Konstantinupolja, O tîx''žde, ix''že o Svjaščenstvî v''spominaet, ot besîd, pače že ot jaže na poslania Pavla apostola, jaže sout Svjaščenstvu prilična, v obščuju pl''zu Svjaščenstvujuščim izbrannyja Eklohi" (*KS*, pp. 211–404).

32 See V. P. Kolosova and V. I. Krekoten', *Ukrajins'ka poezija* (Kiev, 1978), pp. 388–90.

33 The opening words of the title read, as follows: "Spisanie, zovetsja pozorišče myslennoe, sostavlennoe ot inoka..." (211.2–3). Cf. the initial words to the text: "Priidite, stecîtesja na sie mysl'noe i slovesnoe pozorišče, a najbolšej predobrîjšej inočeskij čin,—vas bo radi na ostorohu pozorišče sie slovesnoe sostavixom, da ne uvjaznet kto v prelesti seho bezpolîznoho svîtu..." (211.13–16). See fn. 72 below.

34 See fn. 33 above.

35 The work is found only in the nineteenth-century Uvarov manuscript (GIM, Collection of A. S. Uvarov, no. 2009[632/486]), fols. 519^r-536^v. For a discussion of this codex, which is of Old Believer provenance and which contains three of Vyšens'kyj's writings found nowhere else, see Eremin, *Ivan Višenskij*, pp. 272–80. One is tempted to conjecture that the location of the text—placed immediately after an "incomplete" version of the so-called *Poslanie k utekšim ot pravoslavnoe vîry episkopom* (i.e., the initiators of the Brest Union), which has come down to us as chapter 5 of the *Knyžka* (fols. 439^r-518^v)—is not accidental but reflects a conscious desire to underscore the common ideological (i.e., antihierarchical and even anticlerical) thrust in the two works; see fn. 54 below.

the Priesthood they had sought to reveal to all who were ignorant of the dignity inherent in the priesthood Chrysostom's struggle on behalf of the salvation of human souls.[36] Instead, what Vyšens'kyj found false, slanderous, and even blasphemous were certain "additions" offered by the translator "in the appendices to the commentary on the Apostle," that is, in the "eclogues" drawn from Chrysostom's homilies devoted to the epistles of St. Paul.

The object of Vyšens'kyj's frontal assault was the translation of part of eclogue XIV, which is entitled: "By the same [St. John Chrysostom]. Praise to the teachers, and how it is proper for them to persevere in everything for the sake of God's Word."[37] The fourteenth eclogue contains excerpts from Chrysostom's homily VI on First Corinthians (devoted to 1 Cor. 2.1–5) as well as excerpts from his homily XII on First Corinthians (devoted to 1 Cor. 4.6–10). The special focus of his attention was a portion of the sixth homily in which Chrysostom aimed to denounce the unbelief and acquisitive character of contemporary society in contradistinction to the age of the apostles. In Vyšens'kyj's opinion, a textual portion located near the end of the excerpt from the sixth homily had not been written by Chrysostom himself but was, instead, a blasphemous addition of the translator which deserved the strongest possible condemnation. I quote in English translation the excerpt from Chrysostom's homily VI in its entirety—as found in the Slavic *Book on the Priesthood*—with the alleged "addition" of the translator in italics:

From the Sixth Homily on the First Book to the Corinthians.

"For," it is written, "let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works and give glory to your Father who is in heaven" [Mt. 5.16]. "And they were all of one heart and soul, and not a single one said that any of his belongings was his own, but they had everything in common, and they made distribution to each as any had need" [Acts 4.32, 35], and they lived an angelic life. And if this were done now, we would convert the whole world, even without signs. But in the meanwhile, let those who wish to be saved give heed to the Scriptures; for they will find there both these noble actions and those which are greater than these. For the teachers themselves surpassed the deeds which are of the others, in hunger, in thirst, and nakedness. But we are desirous of enjoying much luxurious living, rest, and ease;

36 I.e., ". . . podvih o spaseniju ljudskom. . ." (211.20–21); see fn. 120 below.

37 "Tohožde, Poxvala učitelem, i jako podobaet im vsja tr''pîti slova radi Božia" (*KS*, pp. 227–31). The use in the title of the marked term *tr''pîti* (cf. Greek, προσκαρτερέω, 'be devoted to, persevere in') underscores the apostolic underpinnings of eclogue XIV and the crucial connection between teaching and apostleship. See, in this regard, Acts 2.42: "And they devoted themselves to the apostle's teaching and fellowship [Ostroh Bible: 'I bjaxuže tr''pjašče v oučenii apostol, i v obščenii'], to the breaking of bread and the prayers" (cf. Eph. 6.18).

however, it is not so for them who cried aloud: "Even to the present hour, we hunger and thirst, we are naked and are buffeted, and we are unsettled" [1 Cor. 4.11]. For some ran from Jerusalem as far as Illyricum [Rom. 15.19]; and one ran to India, while another to Mauretania, and still another to other parts of the world. But we dare not depart even from our own country, but seek out luxury, a resplendent house, and all other abundance. For which of us has suffered from hunger for the sake of God's word? Who has ever wandered in the desert? Who has ever set out on distant journeys? Which of our teachers lived by the labor of his hands to take care of others? Who endured death daily? Consequently, therefore, those who are with us are most slothful. For if one were to see soldiers and generals struggling with hunger, thirst, death, and with all dreadful things, while enduring cold, misfortunes, and all things like lions, and thus accomplishing everything successfully; and then afterwards having made an end of that discipline and having become softened, and having a preference for money and turning one's mind to business affairs and dealings, and defeated by their enemies, it would be the utmost folly to seek out the cause of all these things. Now let us be concerned with this in regard both to ourselves and to our ancestors; *for we too have become weaker than all, and have become bound to the present life. And whoever is found having a trace of the ancient wisdom, then he, having left the cities and the market-places, and ceasing to live with people and to regulate the mores of others, reaches the mountains. And if one asks him about the reason for his separation from the world, he will invent a pretext without excuse. "For," he says, "lest I perish or lose the edge to the virtue in me, I shall jump aside." And how much better would it be for you to become less keen and to gain over others than to remain on high in the mountains and despise your perishing brethren?* When, however, some show no regard for virtue, while those who care about it are far from our forces, then how will we battle against our enemies and subdue them.[38]

It was Vyšens'kyj's contention that, by adding these lines near the end of the excerpt from homily VI, the translator deliberately had distorted the thought and intent of Chrysostom's "commentary" on St. Paul. In his opinion, it was blasphemous to suggest that John Chrysostom, who had cleansed himself and purified himself in wisdom, through tranquillity and in separation from men, would have reproached the monks for going into the wilderness or rebuked them for seeking to isolate themselves from the temptations of life in the world. Such a reading of homily VI contradicted the true significance of Chrysostom's overall legacy by suggesting that the monks were not to follow the model established by the saint himself. The Athonite monk thus rejected as categorically false the proposition that Chrysostom cared more for the inhabitants of the cities than for the practitioners of the

38 "Ot poslania k Korinthom 1, Nravoučenie 6" (*KS*, pp. 227–29). The Greek text is found in *PG* LXI, 52–54. For the facing Slavic and Greek versions, see Eremin, *Ivan Višenskij*, pp. 327–28.

contemplative life who had left the world in search of salvation.

In attempting to demonstrate the falsity of the version of eclogue XIV offered by the Lviv Brotherhood, Vyšens'kyj does not seem to have relied on the Greek text of the work. If we compare the Slavic text of the eclogue in question with that of extant Greek testimonies, one can only conclude that the Slavic translation does not contain an "addition" but rather appears to represent a faithful translation of the Greek text of homily VI.[39] Indeed, what is especially noteworthy is that the Athonite monk's commentary on the "true reading" of the Slavic version of the homily does not seem to depend on "philological" criteria of any kind.[40] Specifically, it does not appear to have involved any consideration for the mechanisms of textual transmission or a comparison of various textual witnesses in Greek or Slavic.[41]

Instead, in order to demonstrate the calumny of the translator's intentional distortion, Vyšens'kyj employed a somewhat different approach.[42] First, he aimed to reveal Chrysostom's "true and proper intention" by briefly presenting the main topics of the entire homily and offering Chrysostom's own ascetic life as a model for the monks. Second, he sought to expose the falsity of the translator's version by stressing the parallel between Chrysostom's "true doctrine" and the writings of other "saintly men" and apologists of the monastic life, such as Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite, Basil the Great, John Climacus, Isaac the Syrian, Symeon the New Theologian, and Gregory of Sinai.

39 On the basis of his comparison of the Slavic and Greek texts, Eremin noted that "not only the first lines of the 'eclogue' but also the final lines, in particular those that troubled Vyšens'kyj, find their parallel in the Greek text and are translated into the Slavic language completely accurately" (*Ivan Višenskij*, p. 328). Although the Slavic version betrays some minor deviations from the Greek text, I essentially agree with Eremin's observations. On the other hand, one cannot entirely exclude the possibility that Vyšens'kyj had access to a quite different version of the text of homily VI.

40 Ivan Franko observed "that Vyšens'kyj, in attempting to prove that the text of John Chrysostom had been falsified in the Rus'ian translation of 1614, does not do this as we would now, that is, he does not compare the Rus'ian text with the Greek" (*Ivan Vyšens'kyj*, p. 176). Franko goes on to conclude that "either this means that Vyšens'kyj did not know Greek and could not offer a comparison of the texts, or that he did not have available the Greek text of John Chrysostom, or that philological proof was altogether alien to his theological mode of thinking. . ." (ibid., pp. 176–77).

41 The idea that Vyšens'kyj offers a decidedly "non-philological" solution for eclogue XIV does not necessarily mean either that he did not understand the diverse attitudes toward the techniques of "sacred philology" held by his adversaries or that he was not familiar with the basic vocabulary for applying those techniques current in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

42 Cf. Franko, *Ivan Vyšens'kyj*, p. 176; Voznjak, *Istorija ukrajins'koji literatury*, 2: 165.

In seeking to counter the calumny and blasphemy directed against the "theology of Chrysostom," the Athonite monk makes the following three points:

(1) It was Chrysostom himself, in homily VI, who stated that there could be no rank of priest, leader, or pastor (i.e., those who are obliged to work for the salvation of others) until illumination, perfection, and spiritual wisdom had been achieved.[43] In other words, only after a person is "dispassioned"—that is, "purified" through separation from this world—and occupied in mind and heart with the continual presence of God, can he begin to deal with the ideal of the apostolate. One should note, in this regard, that, in the excerpt from homily VI found in eclogue XIV, Chrysostom stresses the fact that the apostles were able to convert the whole world, and achieve salvation for it, "by their angelic mode of life."[44] More specifically, as apostolic teachers they surpassed the deeds of others "by living in hunger, in thirst, and nakedness," that is, by relieving themselves of the material goods of this world and by virtue of their ascetic quest for perfection.[45] No less important was the way of life of Chrysostom himself. Vyšens'kyj reminds his readers that, instructed by God, "Chrysostom endured hunger, left the priesthood and went from the turbulence of the city into a cave, still being unwhole. And when he had achieved a victory over the passions, he returned to his people" (212.16–19).[46] We should not forget that at the time he was writing the treatise *On the Priesthood* Chrysostom "dreaded the possibility of becoming an unworthy priest."[47] In his view, "undefiled purity," "unworldliness," and "holiness" were all fundamental requisites for the sacerdotal office, as we read in book VI of the treatise, where, in response to a question from his friend Basil—*On the Priesthood* is composed in the form of a Platonic dialogue—Chrysostom

43 "Pervo izrek Zlatousty, iž' svjaščennikom, voždem i nastavnikom mnohix byti ne možet, kto prosvîščenenija i soveršenija s mudrostiju slovîsnoju (vîdati, jak koho spasati različno) ne dostihnît" (212.9).

44 ". . . i žitiem živjaxu anhel'skim" (*KS*, p. 227). For the "angelic life" of the monks, as well as the comparison between priest and angel, see Ladner, *The Idea of Reform*, p. 125, fns. 51–52; L. Meyer, *Saint Jean Chrysostome, maître de perfection chrétienne* (Paris, 1933), pp. 192–206.

45 It is noteworthy that in the lines from homily VI immediately prior to the excerpt presented in eclogue XIV, Chrysostom explains the reason for the disjunction between the age of the apostles and "this present life": "Why then do not all believe now? Because things have degenerated: and for this we are to blame. . . . For surely not even then did they trust to signs alone, but *by the mode of life as well* [ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ βίου] many of the converts were attracted" (italics mine) (*Epist. I ad Corinthios, homil.* VI, 8, *PG* LXI, 52).

46 Cf. *Palladii Dialogus* 5, *PG* XLVII, 17.

47 Ladner, *The Idea of Reform*, p. 127, fn. 54.

rejects the notion that one should set over the administration of the Church those who move in society and are careful of the concerns of this world.[48]

It is perhaps not surprising that Vyšens'kyj—whose "hesychast credentials" have been stressed by many critics[49]—almost immediately identifies Chrysostom's "true and proper intention" with the doctrine of Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite:[50]

According to Dionysius the Areopagite, and the spiritual indications of ascesis in the Church, the first step to illumination is purification. From purification one proceeds to illumination; from illumination one enters the perfect and most supernal glory. The basis of purification is monasticism, and that is withdrawal from the world, flight from the world and separation from people, the mountain, the cave, struggle with fasting to clothe the old man in the new man (after victory over the passions), which is Christ (212.9–15).

What counts for Vyšens'kyj in the Dionysian schema of hierarchical division and triadic structures[51]—especially insofar as the orders and functions of the ecclesiastical ranks are concerned—is the spiritualized interpretation of the three hierarchical activities of purification, illumination, and perfection as the final three steps in the mystical ascent toward union with God and ultimate salvation.[52] As shall become evident below, he might

48 *De sacerdotio*, VI, 8, *PG* XLVIII, 656.

49 See fn. 11 above.

50 The Pseudo-Dionysian corpus, which was first translated from Greek into the Slavic language by the monk Isaiah of Serres in 1371 on Mt. Athos, was extremely popular among the hesychasts, from the Balkan territory to the East Slavic lands. See H. Goltz, "Studien und Texte zur slavischen Kirchenvätertradition. Zur Tradition des Corpus areopagiticum slavicum," Diss. Halle (Saale, 1979); G. M. Proxorov, "Korpus sočinenij s imenem Dionisija Areopagita v drevnerusskoj literature (Problemy i zadači izučenija)," *Trudy Otdela drevnerusskoj literatury* 31 (1976): 351–61; idem, "Korpus sočinenij Dionisija Areopagita," in *Slovar' knižnikov i knižnosti drevnej Rusi*, vol. 2, *Vtoraja polovina XIV–XVI v.*, ed. D. S. Lixačev (Leningrad, 1988), pt. 1, pp. 491–93.

51 In the Dionysian system, the function of perfection (or union) relates to the first term, that of illumination to the second, and the function of purification pertains to the third. Thus, in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, among the three orders of hierarchs, priests, and deacons, only the leader (or "hierarch") participates preeminently in all three hierarchical activities of purification, illumination, and perfection. As regards the three orders of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, Paul Rorem has pointed out that "in accordance with this principle of hierarchical mediation, a superior order possesses all the power of a subordinate one, whether in the human or celestial sphere. The two lower clerical offices and all the lay orders, as well as all of their liturgical activities, depend fully upon the hierarch, who participates preeminently in the three hierarchical activities of purification, illumination, and perfection" (*Biblical and Liturgical Symbols within the Pseudo-Dionysian Synthesis* [Toronto, 1984], p. 31). On the twofold universe (i.e., angelic and human) of Pseudo-Dionysius, see R. Roques, *L'univers dionysien: Structure hiérarchique du monde selon le Pseudo-Denys* (Paris, 1954).

52 In his illuminating discussion of the extent to which the mystical speculation of Pseudo-Dionysius shaped the evolution of both Orthodox doctrine—through such movements as the hesychasm of the fourteenth century—and Western theology, Jaroslav Pelikan has written:

have cared little for the Dionysian parallelism between the celestial and ecclesiastical hierarchies, or Pseudo-Dionysius's glorification of those who sanctify (i.e., the clergy) at the expense of those who are to be sanctified (i.e., the monastic rank).[53] Indeed, what may have interested him far more was the legitimacy of ecclesiastical functions performed by a priest not consecrated by the Holy Spirit and therefore not in a state of grace.[54] In *Epistle 8*—entitled *To the monk Demophilus. Concerning one's proper work, and kindness*—which provides a justification for the tripartite nature of the hierarchic order and deals with the problem of justice,[55] Pseudo-Dionysius addresses the question of "impious priests or those convicted of some other unseemliness."[56] His response is clear and direct:

If then the rank of priests is that most able to pass on illumination, he who does not bestow illumination is thereby excluded from the priestly order and from the power reserved to the priesthood. . . . He dares to be like Christ and to utter over the divine symbols not anything that I would call prayers but, rather, unholy blasphemies. This

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"The point at which the dogmas of orthodoxy and the tenets of mysticism intersected most significantly was the definition of salvation as deification. . . . This Greek Christian definition provided Dionysius with a point of contact to which he could attach his doctrine of mystical union with God. It was the purpose of a hierarchy, whether celestial or ecclesiastical, to achieve, 'as much as attainable, assimilation to God and union with him' [*CH* 3.2 (*PG* III, 165)]. This definition was amplified elsewhere: 'Reasonable salvation. . . cannot occur otherwise than by the deification of those who are saved' [*EH* 1.3 (*PG* III, 373)]. . . . Such statements as these suggest, perhaps more in their connotations than in their denotations, that the definition of salvation as deification had undergone a change by being identified with the goal awaiting the true mystic at the end of the three steps of purification, illumination, and union" (*The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition [100–600]* [Chicago, 1971], pp. 344–45).

53 See Ladner, *The Idea of Reform*, pp. 348–50; Rorem, *Biblical and Liturgical Symbols*, pp. 31–39.

54 This is, of course, one of the central concerns in the opening section of chapter 5 of the *Knyžka*, that is, the celebrated epistle addressed to the "bishops who have forsaken the faith" by embracing the Union of Brest. Here, too, Vyšens'kyj relies on Pseudo-Dionysius to underscore the point that priests who have not been consecrated in a legitimate manner cannot fathom the mysteries of the faith: ". . . o čom Deonisij Areopahit dostatočne piše, znati dajuči, jak ne dosyt na tom, esli by i tye pjat' stepenij, voslîd Boha izšedšie, kotoryx vyšše pomenil esm, ispolnil, a svyše ot duxa svjatoho sja ne posvjatil, istinnym zakonnym svjaščennikom i znatelem dostatočnym tajnstva vîry byti ne možet. . . . Taže i porjadok Deonisij Areopahit opisal. Po tom pjatom stopnju to est konečnoj niščetî, xotjaščomu svjaščenstvo postihnuti i tajnstvo vîri razumîti inačej,—reče,—ne moščno, tolko prežde podobaet emu sja očistiti; očistivšižsja, prosvîtitisja: prosvîtivšižsja soveršitisja,—o čom čitaj Deonisia Areopahita. 'O svjaščennonačalii' i uzriši, iž pravdu movlju" (52.16–28). On the links between chapter 5 and the *Pozorišče myslennoe*, see fn. 35 above.

55 See R. Hathaway, *Hierarachy and the Definition of Order in the Letters of Pseudo-Dionysius* (The Hague, 1969).

56 *PG* III, 1084–1100.

is no priest. He is an enemy, deceitful, self-deluded, a wolf in sheep's clothing [Mt. 7.15] ready to attack the people of God.[57]

As Father John Meyendorff has noted, "In the neo-platonic tradition going back to Origen and reinterpreted in the peculiar system of Pseudo-Dionysius, the hierarchy is described in terms of a personal *state*, not ecclesiastical function, and the bishop is seen as a 'deified and divine man', with the implication that the loss of personal holiness involves also the loss of his hierarchical position."[58]

(2) The path toward purification and the return to God can only take place "in the mountains" away from the world, for did not Chrysostom himself—as did Lot—feel the need "to flee from the worldly fire of Zoar in order not to be burned by the fire of the sins of the flesh" (213.21–23)?[59] And did not the apostles become the light shining before men "by abiding in the wilderness"?[60] In this regard, it is important to bear in mind the close

[57] *PG* III, 1092. The English translation is found in: *Pseudo-Dionysius. The Complete Works*, trans. C. Luibheid (New York, 1987), pp. 274–75.

[58] J. Meyendorff, *Byzantium and the Rise of Russia. A Study of Byzantino-Russian Relations in the Fourteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1981), p. 108; cf. Roques, *L'univers dionysien*, pp. 98ff. Meyendorff's reference to Pseudo-Dionysius is placed within the context of Eastern Christian monasticism and the numerous examples of its opposition to episcopal and patriarchal institutions. In this regard, he cites Symeon the New Theologian—whose popularity among Byzantine hesychasts was very great—who speaks of " 'true' priests and bishops, meaning charismatic leaders, and condemn[s] those who desire priesthood for material reasons, and episcopacy as a source of wealth" (p. 108), and also refers to the *Hagioretic Tome* written by Gregory Palamas as a "theological manifesto, quite independent of any statement of the hierarchy" (p. 109). (Cf. L. Clucas, "Eschatological Theory in Byzantine Hesychasm: A Parallel to Joachim da Fiore," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 70 [1977]: 324–46.) At the same time, we should not forget that in the above-cited *Epistle 8*, Pseudo-Dionysius *also* stresses that the exalted state of the monks is in no way inconsistent with the obligation to honor the clerical orders as their superiors. Responding to a perceived threat to the hierarchy and order on the part of the monk Demophilus, he asserts that the order of hierarchy parallels the angelic "class-ranks." Each illuminates the next in order: "Now hear what I have to say to you. It is not permitted that a priest should be corrected by the deacons, who are your superiors, nor by the monks. . . . Even if disorder and confusion should undermine the most divine ordinances and regulations, that still gives no right, even on God's behalf, to overturn the order which God himself has established. God is not divided against himself. Otherwise, how could his kingdom stand [Mt. 12.25]?" (*PG* III, 1088C; *Pseudo-Dionysius*, p. 272). This type of apology for hierarchy and order could hardly have been supported by Vyšens'kyj.

[59] Cf. Vyšens'kyj's plea for purification in his introduction to the *Knyžka*: "Proto, molju vas, spasajtesja obrazom Lota, izbîhša iz Sodomy vo Sihorî—Sihor ž est pokajanie i očiščenie ot hrîxa [Gen. 19.1–38]—sicevym obrazom, jako tu poslîdi o očiščenii cerkvi reklosja, najdete (7.22–24). Lot's flight from the appalling wickedness of Sodom was a commonplace in an ascetic theology that sought to stress the necessity of detachment from the world in the ascent toward God.

[60] The excerpt from homily VI in eclogue XIV, which Vyšens'kyj cites in his text (214.14–16), exposes the disjunction between the age of the apostles and "this present life"

semantic link, often found in patristic usage, between the "mountains"[61] and the "desert,"[62] both identified as wilderness regions favorable to union with God, and as scenes of outstanding events and solitude, but often as places in which the monks were liable to demonic temptations and the unending assault of evil spirits. Vyšens'kyj's insistence on "withdrawal from the world," "renunciation," and "detachment" thus must be seen against the backdrop of Christian ascetic thought and the understanding of the monk's vocation in terms of his struggle "in the desert" with the "prince of this world."[63]

In stressing that the obligation of the true monk is to overtake the devil "in his last refuge," that is, to flee "into the mountains" lest he become "less keen" and unable "to gain over others," Vyšens'kyj makes reference to Ephesians 6.12, where St. Paul asserts that we are to put on the whole armor of God, for we are contending not merely "human forces but against the world rulers of this present darkness, against the spiritual hosts of wickedness in the heavenly places":[64]

And how can the person who has engaged in a military battle or struggle, or who has not seen soldiers entering into battle, instruct others in the military skills and techniques of that craft? But *the conflict*, which is more severe and cunning than all disciplines, *is not against flesh and blood, but against the principalities, against the world rulers of this present age, against the spiritual hosts evil in the heavenly places*. How can one who has become less keen and is totally ignorant of these things instruct and gain over others who are equally lacking in understanding? What gain will be seen on the part of one who has become less keen and is ignorant of the longlasting struggle of the monk in the desert (216.16–23)?

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with a number of rhetorical questions, including a reference to life "in the wilderness": "Kto bo hladom istaan est' ot nas slova radi Božija? Kto v pustyni byst' skitajasja? Kto otšestvija tvorjaše dalečajšaja. . ." (*KS*, p. 228).

61 See, for example, John Chrysostom, *In Matthaeum, homil.* VII, 7 (*PG* LVII, 166), where it is asserted that one need not "master the wilderness" (τα ὄρη καταλαμβάνειν) in order to be a perfect Christian. See fn. 118 below.

62 In patristic usage, moreover, the term ἐρημία often combines the notion of "solitude" with that of "tranquility" (ἡσυχία) to describe at once a state of separation from the world and a state of the soul necessary for contemplation; see, for example, John Chrysostom, *In Matthaem, homil.* L, 1 (*PG* LVIII, 503): ". . . ἡσυχίας γὰρ μήτηρ ἔρημος, . . ."; idem, *Timotheus I, homil.* XIV, 4 (*PG* LXII, 576): ". . . ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ βαθείᾳ, καὶ ἐν ἐρημίᾳ τῶν ἁγίων ᾀδόνιων." It is important to note that the church fathers employ the "double connotation of solitude and silence" in reference to preparation for the apostolate; see G. Lampe, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon* (Oxford, 1961), p. 609. Cf. Gerhard Kittel, ed., *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament* (Grand Rapids, 1964), vol. 2, pp. 657–59.

63 See Maloney, *Russian Hesychasm*, pp. 75–76; Russell, *Satan. The Early Christian Tradition*, pp. 149–85.

64 Cf. 2 Cor. 10.3–4: "For though we live in the world we are not carrying on a worldly war, for the weapons of our warfare are not worldly but have divine power to destroy strongholds."

One should not forget that this citation from St. Paul's *Letter to the Ephesians*, in its biblical context, played an important role for many authorities on the spiritual life—from Athanasius's *Life of St. Antony*[65] and the early fathers of the desert in the fourth century to Gregory Palamas and Nil Sorskij—all of whom defined the spiritual life of the Christian not only in the context of the battle between supernatural forces[66] but as a war waged with the "hidden stratagems" of the devil both in the body and in the soul.[67] In addition, as I have shown elsewhere,[68] Vyšens'kyj's reference to this biblical citation, which is found not only at the very beginning of the *Knyžka Ioanna mnixa Višenskoho* (Book of the monk Ivan Vyšens'kyj)[69] but elsewhere in his writings,[70] is marked by and connected with a belief in the absolute necessity of the monk's struggle in solitude, a spiritual activity performed in imitation of the Lord who was sent into the desert for forty days to be tempted by the devil.[71] Finally, one should note that this biblical citation plays a central part in eclogue XIV, specifically in the excerpt from Chrysostom's homily XII. More important, it appears that the reference to Ephesians at the end of the excerpt from homily XII found in eclogue XIV, used to underscore the lofty nature of the apostolic struggle, served as the

65 Athanasius, *Vita Antonii* 78 (*PG* XXVI, 951).

66 Cf. 1 Cor. 2.6; 2 Cor. 4.4. One should remember that the possible impact of dualistic doctrines, such as Gnosticism, have been detected in St. Paul's references to the "god of this world"; see R. Grant, *Gnosticism and Early Christianity* (New York, 1959), pp. 27–57. Indeed, throughout the history of the Church the apocalyptic vision reflected in the idea of a supranatural order was frequently united with various dualist doctrines, "in which the devil and his kingdom became a rival not only to the Christian soul, but to the divine sovereignty" (Pelikan, *The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition*, p. 136). In this regard, many scholars have sought—mistakenly, I submit—to see in Vyšens'kyj's writings, especially in chapter 1 of the *Knyžka* (see fn. 71 below), a dualistic world view; see B. Gröschel, *Die Sprache Ivan Vyšenśkyjs. Untersuchungen und Materialien zur historischen Grammatik des Ukrainischen*, Slavistiche Forschungen, no. 13 (Cologne and Vienna, 1972), p. 17, and, most recently, Grabowicz, "The Question of Authority in Ivan Vyšens'kyj, pp. 783–85.

67 Špidlík, *La Spiritualità dell'oriente cristiano*, pp. 201–29; Maloney, *Russian Hesychasm*, pp. 73–78. Here, as in regard to other topics, such as the "Manichean-sounding" definitions of evil, the theme of the Antichrist, the question of "wicked" and "carnal" priests, and the motive of apostolic poverty, one can observe striking parallels between certain aspects of Vyšens'kyj's thought and Reformation (and Counter-Reformation) ideology; see fns. 21–23 above.

68 Goldblatt, "Godlike 'Simplicity' *versus* Diabolic 'Craftiness.'"

69 See fn. 6 above.

70 See, for example, 20.35–21.1; 46.33–34; 163.13–14; 175.17–19; 180.8–13; 191.18–19.

71 This is the principal theme of chapter 1 of the *Knyžka*—entitled *Obličenie diavolamiroderžca i prelestnyj lov eho vîka seho skoro pohibajuščeho, ot sovlekšahosja s xitroupletenyx sîtej eho holjaka-strannika, ko druhomu, buduščemu vîku hrjaduščaho, učinenoe*—which offers a dialogue between the devil and a "naked pilgrim." It is hardly accidental, therefore, that the epigraph for chapter 1 is drawn from Mt. 4.8–10, that is, the textual excerpt dealing with Jesus' temptation in the desert.

source for the title of Vyšens'kyj's "writing called the *Spiritual Spectacle* [*Pozorišče myslennoe*]":[72]

Because we have become a spectacle [*pozor*] to the world, both to angels and to men [1 Cor. 4.9]. . . . But what does "to angels" mean? It means that one can "become a spectacle to men" but not so to angels when certain things done are insignificant. But our battles are such as to be worthy even of angelic contemplation. For not with men only are we contending, but also with the incorporeal powers [cf. Eph. 6.12]. For this reason, a mighty spectacle [*pozorišče*] has been set."[73]

(3) The need to detach oneself from the society of other men in search of "inner quiet" (*bezmolvie*) and to cleanse the heart of all "passions" (*besstrastie*) as a precondition for return to active life in the world—in order to work on behalf of the salvation of one's neighbors—is confirmed not only by the writings and mode of life of John Chrysostom but also by those of other spiritual authorities. It is noteworthy that, among the spiritual guides offered by Vyšens'kyj as a model for contemplation, Basil the Great plays an especially decisive role. Specifically, Vyšens'kyj quotes extensively from St. Basil's celebrated letter to Gregory of Nazianzus, written about A.D. 358 shortly after St. Basil had retired to a family estate at Annesi in Pontus determined to abandon the world.[74] In this letter, in attempting to induce St. Gregory to join him, St. Basil explains the practices of the monastic life and the dire necessity of leaving the distractions of the city.

Immediately after describing Chrysostom's withdrawal from the turbulence of the city in order to be spiritually prepared for a return to his people, Vyšens'kyj begins to cite excerpts from the letter of St. Basil and

[72] In the initial lines the work is called *Pozorišče myslennoe* (211.2), *Mysl'noe i slovesnoe pozorišče* (211.13), and *Pozorišče slovesnoe* (211.16). Here the two qualifiers *myslennyj*/ *mysl'nyj* 'mental, intellectual, spiritual' (cf. Greek, νοερός) and *slovesnyj* 'rational, intellectual, spiritual' (cf. Greek, λογικός) both designate a *spiritual* or *intellectual* reality (or *metaphorical* sense) in opposition to the corporeal or material world (or literal sense). On the semantic relations between *myslennyj* and *slovesnyj*, see the Slavic version of *Liturgia s. Basilii Magni*: ". . . istočnik. . . imže vsja tvar' slovesnaja že i mysl'naja [cf. Greek, λογική τε καὶ νοερά] ukrěpljaema" (M. Orlov, *Liturgija svjatogo Vasilija Velikogo* [St. Petersburg, 1909], p. 191). Note also, in this regard, that—as pointed out by Geoffrey Lampe in *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*—in patristic usage the qualifier νοερός is "often scarsely distinguished from the spiritual; hence it is often joined with λογικός, meaning strictly 'rational, intellectual' [or] more widely, 'belonging to the unseen, intelligible, or spiritual order' " (pp. 915–16).

[73] "Jako pozor byxom miru [ὅτι θέατρον ἐγένήθημεν τῷ κόσμῳ], i Anhelom i čelovîkom. . . . Čto že est i Anhelom; Est ubo čelovîkom byti pozoru, ne ktomu že Anhelom, ehda xuda nîkaa byvaemaa sut: naša xraborstva takova, jako i Anhel'skomu zrîniju dostoinom byti. Ne bo k čelovîkom nam bran' tokmo, no i protivu besplotnym Silam: Seho radi velie pozorišče sîdit [μέγα θέατρον κάθηται] (*KS*, pp. 230–31). For the Greek text, see *In Epist. I ad Corinthios, homil.* XII, 3, *PG* LXI, 99.

[74] Basil, *Epistolarum classis* I., *Epist.* II, *PG* XXXII, 224–33.

explicitly establishes a parallel between the life and thought of the two great church fathers:

Similarly, Gregory the Theologian went off to Pontus,[75] and Basil the Great escaped into the desert to cleanse himself of the passions, for he was not satisfied with only eloquent learning if his nature was not healed. . . . And Basil the Great says to Gregory the Theologian in his epistle, *I recognized your letter*. For I have abandoned my residence in the city, which is the cause of innumerable evils, but I have not yet been able to forsake myself. For I am similar to seafarers sailing a ship who do not know how to guide the ship well. They are at a loss and are distressed by the size of the boat because much tossing and billowing has affected it (212.19–28).

For just as—he says—it is not possible to write or describe something in wax that has been imprinted earlier without smoothing down the images already engraved upon it, so it is impossible to place or establish the divine commandments in the soul unless someone first expels the passions already existing in it. . . . Now the desert provides this great help towards this achievement, quieting our passions and giving leisure to our reason to uproot them completely. For just as beasts are more easily caught in cold weather, so desires and wraths, and passions, and other venomous evils of the soul, when they have been calmed by silence and not enraged by frequent irritation, they are more easily overcome by reason, and so forth. This is sufficient regarding the shameful statement [of the translator] about losing the edge to virtue by escaping to the mountains. For Basil the Great and Chrysostom offer a defense and trample upon this blasphemy (215.13–35).[76]

It is possible to observe in these three points a general ideological orientation which, in substantial measure, represents the evolution of a message presented in Vyšens'kyj's earlier writings.[77] Especially worthy of mention, in this regard, are chapter 3 of the *Knyžka*, where the monastic ideal is exalted as the only mode of salvation for the Rus' nation;[78] chapter 5 of the *Knyžka*, which affirms that the legitimacy of the rank of the priesthood is dependent on purification as well as consecration "from above by the Holy

75 While students at Athens, St. Basil and St. Gregory had resolved to retire from the world and engage in a plan of common life. Finally, after several letters from St. Basil—one describing the beauties of the place and another discussing the nature of his life and work—St. Gregory set out to join his friend in Pontus.

76 Cf. Basil, *Epist.* II, 1–2, *PG* XXXII, 224–28.

77 It goes without saying that Vyšens'kyj's ideology must be examined not only in the context of the traditional patristic statements on priests and monks and on the distinction between the contemplative (theoretical) and the active (practical) way of life, but also against the background of the discussions, beginning in the age of Humanism and Renaissance, on the problem of the relationship between action and contemplation. As is well known, these more recent debates inevitably touched upon the themes of ideal community, the correct formation of Christian man, and the role of monastic life.

78 See Goldblatt, "Isixasts'ka ideolohija u tvorčosti Ivana Vyšens'koho" (see fn. 11).

Spirit;"[79] and—above all—the *Epistle to Sister Domnikija*, where the Athonite monk insists that the wilderness takes precedence over preaching, inasmuch as one who is unpurified and not "dispassioned" cannot help others.[80] Evident in these earlier writings is a specific and deliberately polemical reaction to particular aspects of the humanistic *renovatio studiorum* which the Ruthenian lands were undergoing at the end of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth century.[81] And, in similar fashion, Vyšens'kyj's efforts in the *Spiritual Spectacle* to prove the fallacious character of the Slavic version of Chrysostom's "eclogue" can be said to represent an essential component in a programmatic response to what was regarded as a direct threat to the very essence of the Orthodox spiritual heritage.

One should not forget that in the educational and printing revival which took place in Ruthenia during Vyšens'kyj's lifetime the writings of John Chrysostom played a central part. From the appearance of a collection of homilies called the *Margarit* in Ostroh in 1595 to the printing of his homilies on the Acts of the Apostles by the Kievan Caves Monastery in 1624, the writings of John Chrysostom, in their Slavic version, were presented to Ruthenian readers as a part of an educational and cultural program aimed at

[79] See fn. 54 above.

[80] Here, too, Vyšens'kyj relies on Pseudo-Dionysius's scheme of purification, illumination, and perfection: "I pervoe ubo čudujusja semu, jako pan Jurko [i.e., Jurij Rohatynec'] vedjašče estestvo čelovîčeskoe nemoščno sušče, strastno, hrîšno i vsîmi uzami aernyx duxov zloby zvjazano,—bez ispytanija, iskusa, nakazanija, očiščenija, prosvîščenija i sveršenija, po Dionisiju Areopahitu, ne v činu nedužnyx, ale zaraz v' zdravyx, očiščennyx, prosvîščenyx i sveršennyx—čelovîka tvorit i razumîit" (160.21–26). In defense of life "in the wilderness," Vyšens'kyj also makes reference to the above-cited epistle of Basil the Great addressed to Gregory of Nazianzus: "Nexaj že ne vykladaet pan Jurko xristovyx sloves po strasti i svoemu uhoždeniju, ale po pravdî. I moju pustynju da ne uničižaet, bez kotoroe i on sam (esli sxočet mira svleščisja i pamjati i žitija strastnoho svoboditisja, po Vasilija Velikaho pisaniju k Hrihoriju Bohoslovu) byti ne možet" (165.14–19).

[81] On the cultural and intellectual revival of the period, see, *inter alia*, S. T. Golubev, *Istorija Kievskoj duxovnoj akademii*, vol. 1, *Period domogilijanskij* (Kiev, 1886); K. V. Xarlampovič, *Zapadno-russkie pravoslavnye školy XVI i načala XVII veka, otnošenie ix k inoslavnym, religioznoe obučenie v nix i zaslugi ix v dele zaščity pravoslavnoj very i cerkvi* (Kazan', 1898); M. Hruševs'kyj, *Kulturno-nacional'nyj rux na Ukrajini XVI–XVII st.*, 2nd ed. (n.p. 1919); A. Savyč, *Narysy z istoriji kul'turnyx ruxiv na Ukrajini ta Bilorusi v XVI–XVII v.*, Zbirnyk Istoryčno-filolohičnoho viddilu Vse-Ukrajins'koji Akademiji Nauk, no. 90 (Kiev, 1929); E. N. Medynskij, *Bratskie školy Ukrainy i Belorussii XVI–XVII vv.* (Kiev, 1954); Ja. D. Isajevyč, *Bratstva ta ix rol' v rozvytku ukrajins'koji kul'tury XVI–XVIII st.* (Kiev, 1966); idem, *Džerela z istoriji ukrajins'koji kul'tury doby feodalizmu XVI–XVIII st.* (Kiev, 1972); A. S. Lappo-Danilevskij, *Istorija russkoj obščestvennoj mysli i kul'tury XVII–XVIII v.* (Moscow, 1990), pp. 43–121.

the ideal formation of their Orthodox Christian audience.[82] It was the obligation of the printing and educational centers to present to the Ruthenian Orthodox faithful what was viewed as "learning" (*nauka*), "from which as from a source all good emanates and through which man becomes man"[83]—that is, to present vital aspects of a Christian *paideia*[84]—that explains the special significance attached to Chrysostom and the appearance of collections such as the *Book on the Priesthood.*

Yet one should recall that, as we read in the title to the work, the volume *Book on the Priesthood* was not merely "for the general benefit of its readers" but above all for the "setting right" or "reform" of the blessed priests.[85] Indeed, one cannot overemphasize the importance of the fact that the excerpt from the text of the homily on First Corinthians allegedly distorted by the translator was included in a volume which contained *On the Priesthood*, a treatise not only extremely significant for Chrysostom's own evolution but of paramount importance for the history of patristic thought. Whereas in some of his other treatises, such as *Comparison of a King with a Monk*,[86] *Against the Opponents of the Monks*,[87] and *On Virginity*,[88] Chrysostom had made the point that monks were the true spiritual rulers of society, for only they lived an authentically Christian life, it is in his *On the Priesthood* where he felt required to stress that, because the active life of the priest required even more perfection than that of the monk, he was placed above all other members of the Church. The priest's was a loftier state, for he consummated the holy sacrifice and had to wield authority. As Gerhart Ladner has noted in his brilliant study devoted to the impact of the idea of reform on Christian thought in the age of the church fathers:

A change of attitude however is evident already in his six books *On the Priesthood*, which strike the key note of his life work as a great priestly orator and preacher in

[82] See Zapasko and Isajevyč, *Pam'jatky*, no. 32 [p. 31] (*Ioann Zlatoust. Margarit* [Ostroh, 1595]); no. 76 [p. 35] (*Ioann Zlatoust. Besîda izbrannaja o v''spitanii čad* [Lviv, 1609]); no. 95 [pp. 36–37] (*Ioann Zlatoust. Knyha o svjaščenstvî* [Lviv, 1614]); no. 138 [pp. 41–42] (*Ioann Zlatoust. Besîdy na dîjanija i poslanija svjatoho apostola Pavla* [Kiev, 1623]); no. 139 [p. 42] (*Ioann Zlatoust. Besîdy Ioanna Zlatousta na dîjanija svjatyx apostolov* [Kiev, 1624]).

[83] Kolosova and Krekoten', *Ukrajins'ka poezija*, p. 161: "Zvlašča nad vse toje xotjači uvažati, / Žeby vas zaraz v nauku zapravovati, / S kotroi, jak z žrodla, sve dobroje poxodit, / I prez nju čelovîk čelovîkom sja naxodit" ("*O Naucî*," in *Ioann Zlatoust. Besîda izbrannaja o v''spitanii čad* [Lviv, 1609]). See V. I. Krekoten', "Tema nauki v baročnoj ukrainskoj poèzii 30-x godov XVII veka," in *Barokko v slavjanskix kul'turax* (Moscow, 1982), pp. 255–75.

[84] See W. Jaeger, *Early Christianity and Greek Paideia* (Oxford, 1961), esp. pp. 117–18.

[85] "...i pročaja nuždnaa v obščuju polzu pročitatelem, pače že blahoslovînnym iereom v ispravlenie, priložena sut" (*KS*, fol. 1r).

[86] *De comparatione regis et monachi*, *PG* XLVII, 387–97.

[87] *Adversus oppugnatores vitae monasticae*, *PG*, XLVII, 319–86.

[88] *De virginitate*, *PG*, XLVIII, 533–96.

Antioch and as a reforming Patriarch of Constantinople. The priest's soul, just because he lives and works in the midst of the world's storm and dangers, must be stronger and purer even than the monk's, who stays as it were in a safe port. The dignity of the priesthood is now extolled over all merely terrestrial things and compared to the pure ministry of the angels; for, the priest's throne is set up in heaven and stands on a higher plane than all human rulership.[89]

What is especially relevant here, it seems to me, is that Vyšens'kyj's pretext for writing the *Spiritual Spectacle*—namely, the perceived distortion of Chrysostom's homily VI on First Corinthians—must be evaluated within the context of the entire book entitled *Book on the Priesthood* or, more precisely, against the broader background of the volume's ideological attitude and how this attitude reflects the situation in the Ruthenian lands.

The ideological position offered by the *Book on the Priesthood* is perhaps most clearly evidenced by the *virši* strategically located throughout the volume. While a detailed analysis of the *virši* in question is beyond the scope of this paper, permit me to make some general observations about them.

(1) The first *virš* is devoted to Lviv and its confraternity and is accompanied by their coats of arms.[90] Havrylo Dorofijovyč, the author of the *virš*, stresses here that the Lviv Confraternity has been granted its status directly "by the patriarchs" and has been given its privileges in perpetuity "by the kings."[91]

(2) In the second *virš*[92]—also accompanied by a coat of arms—Dorofijovyč praises the "noble" and "virtuous" members of the Balaban family, the "defenders of the fatherland," whom God calls into his service and from whom the Church receives comfort.[93]

(3) In the third *virš*[94]—dedicated to Alexander Balaban, starosta of Vynnycja, at whose expense the volume was printed—emphasis is placed on the

89 Ladner, *The Idea of Reform*, p. 127. In his book Ladner further noted that the intimations of hierarchy would later be most fully developed in the thought of Pseudo-Dionysius, whose ecclesiastical and celestial hierarchies imparted special dignity to the clergy, above all to the bishops (pp. 348–50).

90 *KS*, fol. 1^v (Kolosova and Krekoten', *Ukrajins'ka poezija*, p. 189).

91 ". . . v kotrom bratstvo ot patriarxov jest nadano, / i ot krolev vîčne uprivilijevano" (*KS*, fol. 1^v). In the 1580s the Confraternity of the Assumption was established in Lviv and granted "stauropegial" status—that is, it was placed directly under the jurisdiction of the patriarch of Constantinople.

92 *KS*, fol. 2^r (Kolosova and Krekoten', *Ukrajins'ka poezija*, p. 189).

93 "I obron'cami sja otčizni naxodili. / . . . / Boh sam na službu sobî ix pobolyvajet, / I z Balabanov potîxu cerkov mîvaet" (*KS*, fol. 2^r).

94 The *virš* is entitled: *Do Vel'možnogo pana, jeho milosti pana Aleksandra Balabana, starosty Vînnickoho i pročaja* (*KS*, fols. 2^v–3^r [Kolosova and Krekoten', *Ukrajins'ka poezija*, p. 190]).

harmony and commonality of interests between the members of the confraternity and the clerics (or, more precisely, the bishops) in defense of Orthodoxy. Thus, the printing of the volume by the Lviv Confraternity is presented as the realization of the zealous efforts made by Bishop Gedeon Balaban, whose celebrated feuds with the confraternity had been overcome before his death in 1607.[95] Implicit here is the notion that the brotherhood's conflict with episcopal authority had proved detrimental in the struggle to preserve the spiritual and cultural identity of the "Rus' nation."

(4) In accordance with the general orientation of the volume, the following *virš*[96]—addressed to John Chrysostom—exalts Chrysostom the great priestly orator and, above all, the great bishop appointed by God on high, who has led all of us from darkness to light by revealing the supreme dignity and purity of the priesthood.[97]

(5) The next *virš*, entitled *To the Honorable Presbyters*,[98] takes up the lofty mission given to the priesthood by Isidorus of Pelusium (in his epistles to Palladius and Eustathius). Here Dorofijovyč asks all clerics to love and respect the virtuous book *On the Priesthood* and use its learning on behalf of the spiritual good of Rus' and the salvation of human souls.

(6) The sixth *virš* is addressed not to John Chrysostom but to St. Basil the Great,[99] who also is presented as a fiery priestly orator and bishop annointed by God. The point is made that St. Basil's glory is not only connected with Pontus, where—as was mentioned earlier[100]—he had retired with the aim of abandoning the world and elaborated his idea of coenobitic monasticism, but with his concern for the whole Church—first as priest and then as bishop—in conducting ecclesiastical business and suppressing

95 "Knihu, s knih Zlatoustoho najprednîjšuju / . . . / O kotruj, vedluh potreby, upodobanja, / pilnoje ot jepiskopa bylo stranja / Zešloho otca Hedeona Balabana, / nîhdy vsîm nam ljuboho pastyrja i pana, / Aby preložena byla na jazyk slavnyj / naš slovenskij, meži mnohimi starodavnyj" (*KS*, fol. 2^{v}). As a matter of fact, it was precisely because of his constant conflicts with the Lviv Confraternity that Bishop Balaban had founded his own printing press (on his native estate of Strjatyn), which soon began to compete with the printing shop of the confraternity; see I. Ohijenko, *Istorija ukrajins'koho drukarstva*, 2nd ed. (Winnipeg, 1983), pp. 78–83, 124–26, 136–42.

96 The *virš* is entitled: *Na Zlatoustaho* (*KS*, fol. 4^{v} [Kolosova and Krekoten', *Ukrajins'ka poezija*, pp. 190–91]).

97 "S temnosti i nevîdomosti vsîx nas vyvodit', / a do svîtlosti i počuvanja sja privodit'/ Vysokij stan svjaščen''stva opovîdajuči / i nad všeljakuju hodnost' vyvyššajuči" (*KS*, fol. 4^{v}).

98 *K Čestnym Prezviterom* (*KS*, fol. 29^{r-v} [Kolosova and Krekoten', *Ukrajins'ka poezija*, pp. 191–92]).

99 *Na Velikoho Vasilia* (*KS*, p. 405 [Kolosova and Krekoten', *Ukrajins'ka poezija*, p. 193]). Kolosova and Krekoten' attribute this *virš* to Pamvo Berynda (pp. 389–90).

100 See fns. 74–76 above.

heresy.[101] Here the attempt to parallel the thought and work of St. John with his Cappadocian rival cannot be missed.

(7) In the final *virš*[102] Dorofijovyč first praises God for assisting in the completion of the book and then speaks out against "disgraceful and extremely evil jealousy."[103] V. P. Kolosova has remarked that the "epigram, written in an ironic tone, is clearly directed against the ideological and political enemies of the members of the Lviv Confraternity, who initiated the printing of the *Book on the Priesthood*."[104]

It is evident, therefore, that the *Book on the Priesthood*, which appeared in the complex situation before 1620 (i.e., in the years before the restoration of an "illegal" Orthodox hierarchy),[105] was printed with a clear aim in mind: namely, to stress the dignity of the priestly and episcopal rank,[106] raising it above all other offices and thereby affirming the need for the restoration of an Orthodox ecclesiastical hierarchy on behalf of the spiritual good of Rus' and the preservation of its cultural heritage. More specifically, the ideological attitude regarding the contributions of John Chrysostom and Basil the Great to the Christian tradition appeared to play a deliberate and central role in the *Book on the Priesthood*. From the standpoint of "a monk sitting in a cave on the mountain and listening attentively to himself,"[107] the two church fathers emerged in the volume not as monks in an ascetic quest for spiritual perfection, but as priestly orators and bishops.

101 "Slava ne tyl'ko v Pontî, samym kappadokom, / Ale vsej prosto cerkve bystrym jest okom. / Kotrym, jak neospalym, pilne dozirajet / I vsjakix nerjaduv v cr''kvi peresterîhajet" (*KS*, p. 405).

102 The *virš* is entitled: *Bohu na čest' i na zazdrost', sobî samuj škodlivuju* (*KS*, p. 447 [Kolosova and Krekoten', *Ukrajins'ka poezija*, p. 192]).

103 "I dlja toho ž ty u vsîx jestest' v nenavisti, / O bezecnaja i nadder zlaja zazdrosti" (*KS*, p. 447).

104 V. P. Kolosova, "Funkciji viršiv v ukrajins'kix starodrukax kincja XVI–peršoji polovini XVII st.," in *Ukrajins'ke literaturne barokko*, ed. O. V. Myšanyč (Kiev, 1987), p. 151.

105 The Polish-Lithuanian goverment did not grant official recognition to an Orthodox hierarchy until 1632; see J. Macha, *Ecclesiastical Unification. A Theoretical Framework Together With Case Studies From the History of Latin-Byzantine Relations*, Orientalia Christian Analecta, no. 198 (Rome, 1974), pp. 216–23.

106 It is important to note that in his treatise *On the Priesthood*, Chrysostom often discusses the duties of the ministry without distinguishing clearly between the priestly and episcopal offices; see P. Schaff, ed., *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church* (Grand Rapids, 1956), vol. 9, pp. xxi–xxii.

107 This is Vyšens'kyj's self-definition, as presented in the opening words of the title to the *Pozorišče myslennoe*: "Spisanie, zovetsja pozorišče myslennoe, sostavlennoe ot inoka, v peščerî gorî sîdjaščeho i sebî vnimajuščaho. . ." (211.2–4).

If we turn once again to the *Spiritual Spectacle*, it becomes clear that it is within the context of the particular relation between priest and monk that one has to evaluate Vyšens'kyj's negative reaction to the Slavic translation of the Chrysostom eclogue. In the structures of Vyšens'kyj's thought, acknowledging the validity of the version of the eclogue offered in the *Book on the Priesthood* would be tantamount to altering significantly the vision of the monastic order as the exemplary Christian way and only true agent of restoration and salvation, as well as its fundamental role in shaping Orthodox doctrine.[108] It thus appears that the Athonite monk's aim in writing the *Spiritual Spectacle* went far beyond the need to expose as false a particular textual "addition" which suggested that Chrysostom had forbidden the monks to leave the city for the mountains. Vyšens'kyj may have felt obliged to unmask and condemn forthrightly what he viewed as an even more insidious distortion of the Christian heritage—namely, the attempt on the part of some to separate the legacy of John Chrysostom (and St. Basil[109]) from the ascetic and mystical foundations of Orthodox monastic piety and spirituality. Vyšens'kyj's ultimate goal was to claim the patrimony of Chrysostom (as well as that of St. Basil) for the monks, and this can be observed at two levels: not only against the general backdrop of centuries-old discussions on the relationship between priest and monk but also against the specific background of the situation in the Ruthenian lands.

One should recall the crucial significance of elucidating the relationship between priest and monk in Chrysostom's writings.[110] Vyšens'kyj's response to this problem was clear and unambiguous. In his denunciation of the evil found in the Ruthenian lands and the Polish Kingdom—with its unholy alliance of corrupt church dignitaries and the secular power—there was no possibility of affirming the dignity of the cleric over that of the monk. Chrysostom himself had pointed out in *On the Priesthood* that those who had entered upon the priestly office for ambitious motives would be

108 See fn. 58 above.

109 As Francis Thomson has noted, "Basil is also the father of coenobitic monasticism and in his principal ascetic works, *Moralia* [*PG* XXXI, 692–869] and *Regulae fusius et brevius tractatae* [*PG* XXXI, 889–1305], he expounds the true aim of monasticism, not so much a flight from the world as a rejection of worldly values—asceticism frees the soul from the passions of the body and leads to the state of ἀπάθεια" ("Continuity in the Development of Bulgarian Culture during the Period of Byzantine Hegemony and the Slavonic Translations of Works by the Three Cappadocian Fathers," in *Meždunaroden simpozium. 1100 godina ot blaženata končina na sv. Metodij* [Sofia, 1989], vol. 2, p. 142). Here, too, Vyšens'kyj's vision obscured certain fundamental differences between Chrysostom and St. Basil; see fn. 116 below.

110 See L. Meyer, *Saint Jean Chrysostome*, pp. 229–88; Ladner, *The Idea of Reform*, pp. 125–30.

severely punished for their sins.[111] In this regard, we should not forget that in chapter 3 of his *Knyžka* Vyšens'kyj had already concluded that in Rus' it was better to be without clerics installed by the devil—that is by secular power because of earthly ambitions—than to be with them, for those not purified and consecrated by the faith were incapable of being true pastors and would trample the faith:

And as to those who rise to the rank of the priesthood in accordance with the rules of the holy fathers and not according to what is desired,... let them acquire this dignified office.... And do not accept anyone who jumps into [this position], and chase out and curse the one offered by the king without your assembly. For you were not baptized in the name of the pope nor in the power of the king.... For it is better for you to go to church and preserve Orthodoxy without bishops and priests appointed by the devil than to be in church with bishops and priests not called by God and thereby deride it and trample Orthodoxy. For it is not priests who will save us, or the bishops or metropolitans, but the Orthodox mystery of our faith and the observance of God's commandments—this is what can save us (24.6–17).

Of course, in chapter 3 of the *Knyžka*, which was written after 1596, historical reality is important: in the aftermath of the Union of Brest, according to the Athonite monk, the Ruthenian clergy who had accepted union with Rome were to be rejected as false pastors who had disgraced the Church and spread evil among Christians.[112] Yet it is fair to say that Vyšens'kyj's condemnation extends beyond one specific category of Ruthenian clerics and seems distinctly hostile to the idea that the rank of the priesthood could offer salvation to the Orthodox faithful.[113] It is not by chance that in the title to the *Knyžka*, where the Athonite monk addresses all ranks of Orthodox Christians in Little Rus' to whom he is sending his writing, he excludes both the priesthood and the episcopate.[114] Within the basic parameters of Vyšens'kyj's thought, the clergy was corrupt and could not act as the spiritual conscience of Orthodoxy. Only the monks, for whom the *Spiritual*

111 *De sacerdotio*, IV, 1, *PG* XLVIII, 659–63.

112 See the table of contents for chapter 3: "Porada, kako da sja očistit cerkov xristova, zapljuhavljennaja lživymi pastyri i nečistym žitiem onyx,...i kotoryj smrad pohanskij v''zlonravstvisja v xristijanex" (8.21–24). On the dating of chapter 3, see Eremin, *Ivan Višenskij*, pp. 297–301; I. Z. Myc'ko, "Ostrožskij kul'turno-prosvetitel'nyj centr i ego bor'ba protiv ideologičeskoj èkspansii katolocizma i unii na Ukraine (1576–1636)," Avtoreferat dissertacii na soiskanie učenoj stepeni kandidata istoričeskix nauk (Lviv, 1983), p. 19.

113 Grabowicz, "The Question of Authority," p. 787.

114 In his enumeration of "all Orthodox Christians" and "all pious people living in Little Rus', in the Polish Kingdom," Vyšens'kyj does include the confraternities, monastic communities, archimandrites, hieromonks, virtuous monks, all nuns, and "others who exert themselves on behalf of the Church" (7.2–9).

Spectacle had primarily been written,[115] could overcome the human weakness of the priests in defense of the faith.

When considering the underlying motives for the writing of the *Spiritual Spectacle*, it is important to examine the ideological thrust of the particular excerpt from homily VI on First Corinthians found in eclogue XIV. The textual excerpt in question, which opens with a marked series of citations from St. Matthew and the Acts of the Apostles,[116] is precisely that section of the homily where Chrysostom offers as a model for the entire Church the age of the apostles, who "lived an angelic life," in contradistinction to his own age of disbelief, in which "we are desirous of enjoying great luxury, and rest, and ease."[117] What is interesting here is the fact that by eliminating as false and blasphemous the textual passage located near the end of the eclogue—that is, the lines which seem to imply that it is not necessary to go into the mountains in order to be a perfect Christian and work for one's neighbor's salvation[118]—it was possible for Vyšens'kyj to assert, on the basis of Chrysostom's thought, that the apostolic mode of life could apply to the whole world without minimizing what he viewed as the unique and indissoluble bond between the apostles and the monks.[119] In this way, monasticism could represent not merely a perfect model but an ideal

115 See fn. 33 above.

116 Cf. St. Basil's *Regulae fusius tractatae*, VII, 4 (*PG* XXXI, 933), where—in linking his coenobitic idea for the monks with the apostolic way of life—he combines Mt. 5.16 with Acts 2.44 and Acts. 4.32. As to important differences between Chrysostom and St. Basil regarding the ascetic sphere of influence, Ladner has noted the following: "While for St. Basil the thought that man cannot be saved if he does not work for his neighbour's salvation had become the great justification of the coenobitical as against the hermitical idea of monasticism, St. John Chrysostom explicitly re-applied this scriptural principle to the entire Church, transcending the sphere of the ascetic quest for perfection.... But with Basil the ascetic ideal remained foremost and gradually assumed those more institutionalized monastic forms with which we are familiar from the printed text of his ascetical writings" (*The Idea of Reform*, pp. 126–27, 343).

117 "I učitelie bo sami prevzyjdoša jaže sut onîx, v hladî, v žaždî, v nahotî, prebyvajušče. My že xoščem mnohia nasladitisja pišča, i pokoja, i svobody. . ." (*KS*, p. 228).

118 In fact, in *In Epist. I ad Corinthios, homil.* VI, 8 (*PG* LVI, 54), Chrysostom does say this. Cf. *In Matthaeum, homil.* VII, 7 (*PG* LVII, 88ff.), where—as Ladner has noted—"the whole chapter is important for John Chrysostom's conviction and emphatic assertion that it is neither necessary to go into the wilderness (τα ὄρη καταλαμβάνειν) in order to become a perfect Christian nor excusable not to be one under the pretext of not being a monk" (*The Idea of Reform*, p. 127, fn. 55). What is crucial here for Chrysostom is not the necessity of departing from an ascetic way of life but, rather, the obligation of all Christians living in the world to live as the monks; see Meyer, *Saint Jean Chrysostome*, pp. 253ff.

119 I.e., Vyšens'kyj thus can both affirm the life of the monks as closest to the apostolic way of life—cf. Chrysostom's early work *Adversus oppugnatores vitae monasticae*—and, like Chrysostom, opt for a monastic type of Christian society, that is, expand the ascetic quest for perfection to embrace the entire ecumene; see Meyer, *Saint Jean Chrysostome*, pp. 153ff.; Ladner, *The Idea of Reform*, p. 128, fn. 59.

evangelical pattern for all Christians, for only the monks "persevered" in accordance with the apostolic way of life, that is, a mode of life which combined the ascetic quest for perfection with a concern for the salvation of all believers.[120] The link between monasticism and the apostolate could thereby counter the claim, implicit in the textual "addition" in question, that the monastic way of life was not exemplary because it ignored the salvation of others. Hence, according to Vyšens'kyj, it was the monks and not the clerics who were responsible for the salvation of the Orthodox faithful in Rus' and the Polish Kingdom.[121]

What appears to have been of central importance in Vyšens'kyj's criticism is not only the notion that the *Book on the Priesthood*, with its "blasphemous" reading of Chrysostom's homily, exalted clerical functions over monastic detachment but also the idea that the monk was subject to an ecclesiastical hierarchy in which the episcopate occupied the highest rank. As suggested above, given the political and religious situation within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, there is no question that John Chrysostom's *On the Priesthood* was published not merely to exalt the clerics but to play an integral part in the struggle by the Ruthenians to restore the position of the Orthodox Church by consecrating an Orthodox hierarchy. It was the conviction of the Lviv Confraternity that this most celebrated of Chrysostom's writings would serve to remind both clergy and laymen of the dire need to restore an ecclesiastical hierarchy.[122] Vyšens'kyj could hardly embrace this type of restoration, for the episcopal state, if not wholly based on monastic principles, belonged to the world of status, wealth, and rank and could not bring about the reform of Christian society and consequent salvation for all men that represented the Athonite monk's ultimate aim. Indeed, the affirmation of any ecclesiastical hierarchy was totally incompatible with his depiction of a world determined by oppression and marginality[123] and his concomitant desire not only to address an

[120] On the importance of the theme of salvation for Vyšens'kyj, see the concluding words to the introduction of the *Knyžka*: "Siju že terminu. . . i inšim vsîm znati o tom dajte, ponež ne o lyčko ili o remenec idet, ale o cîluju kožu, se est o spasenie duš našix i da ne pohibnem i dočasne i vîčne ot Boha živa" (8.1–3).

[121] As Vyšens'kyj stresses repeatedly in chapter 3 of the *Knyžka*: "Ili ne vîdaete, bîdnici, esli by nebylo istinnyx inokov i bohouhodnikov meži vami, už by davno, jakož Sodoma i Homora župelom i ohnem v Ljadskoj zemli este opopilîli" (25.7–9).

[122] From this standpoint, the *Pozorišče myslennoe* can be viewed as the last in a series of "epistles" in which Vyšens'kyj—especially after his visit to Lviv in late 1604 or 1605—deliberately opposed the cultural and educational policies of the Lviv Confraternity; see Eremin, *Ivan Vyšens'kij*, pp. 259–65; cf. Grabowicz, "The Question of Authority," p. 789.

[123] As George Grabowicz has asserted, "the general thrust of Vyšens'kyj's thinking, plainly expressed in his texts, is distinctly anti-hierarchical" ("The Question of Authority," p. 787). In establishing a link between Vyšens'kyj's world view and Taras Ševčenko's vision of a "holy

audience which encompassed all levels of society but to break down the notion of a divided humanity. In this regard, Vyšens'kyj's fierce condemnation of the luxurious life-style of the Rus' bishops could easily have relied on a peculiar vision of John Chrysostom which incorporated the church fathers' denunciation of wealth, status, neglect of the poor, and generally acquisitive character of contemporary society.[124]

I have alluded to the importance of Vyšens'kyj's vision of true believers as oppressed and persecuted in a world of "structure"[125] and the *apostolic* role of the monks in that world. Yet equally important for him was the *prophetic* role of the monks. As in the case of Chrysostom, the Athonite monk seems to have endeavored to go beyond the monks and organized monasticism and advance a movement of broader and more radical reform for all Christians. Yet his focus on the "ordeal" of Rus' inevitably involved a projection into a future embodying an ideal state of being. In opposition to the hierarchical and sacerdotal institutions existing in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Vyšens'kyj presented an *eschatological* vision of the Church. In addressing his Ruthenian countrymen, the Athonite monk felt obliged to insist that the Church could no longer be linked with the terrestrial kingdom and natural order; rather, it had to offer itself as an anticipation of the immanent Kingdom of God which would come at the end of the world. As in the past, only the monks, having separated themselves from a secularized Church and having purified themselves in the mountains, could engage in a struggle with the Antichrist for the purification of the Church in the face of the imminently approaching end of time. And this was because the monks not only were anticipating the life to be shared by all in the Kingdom of God but also were seeking to approximate the pure form of life which had been intended before man's fall.

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communitas," both defined as elements of a "deep recurring structure in Ukrainian culture and literature" (ibid., pp. 793–94), Grabowicz's recent study has alluded to the usefulness of structural anthropological models, such as those provided by Victor Turner in *The Ritual Process. Structure and Anti-Structure* (Ithaca, 1977), in the study of pre-modern authors such as Vyšens'kyj who operated in periods of profound societal crisis and transformation. Some of these models have already been successfully employed by Grabowicz in the study of modern Ukrainan literature; see his pathbreaking book, *The Poet as Mythmaker: A Study of Symbolic Meaning in Taras Ševčenko* (Cambridge, Mass., 1982). See fn. 125 below.

124 G. Florovsky, "St. John Chrysostom: The Apostle of Charity," in *Aspects of Church History*, Collected Works of Georges Florovsky, 4 (Belmont, 1975), pp. 79–87.

125 Here I have in mind the concepts of "structure" and "communitas" first formulated by Turner, that is, the contrast which "is posited between the notion of society as a differentiated, segmented system of structural positions (which may or may not be arranged in a hierarchy), and society as a homogeneous, undifferentiated *whole*" (*Dreams, Fields, and Metaphors*, [Ithaca and London, 1974], p. 237). See fn. 123 above.

Thus, in the structures of Ivan Vyšens'kyj's thought, monastic piety, with its eschatological foundation and prophetic quality, had a special responsibility toward the whole Church and for the individual salvation not only of the monks but of all believers. The monks alone could both expose the evil which reigns over all ends and parts of Christendom—that is, serve as "prophets of disaster"—and proclaim the eschatological fulfillment of human history—that is, serve as "prophets of salvation."[126] And yet, only those monks who had gone into the wilderness in search of self-perfection could, with their kerygmatic message, lead the faithful into cleansing from sin, the Kingdom of God, and everlasting salvation. According to Ivan Vyšens'kyj, St. John Chrysostom, the apostle of Christian life, could never have said otherwise.[127]

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[126] These two terms are drawn from Klaus Koch's form-critical study of prophetic narratives—specifically, "Ahaziah's Fall" (2 Kings 1) and "The Yoke of the King of Babylon" (Jeremiah 28); see K. Koch, *The Growth of the Biblical Tradition. The Form-Critical Method*, trans. S. Cupitt (New York, 1969), pp. 183–200. The application of the form-critical definition of Old Testament prophetic writings can prove especially useful in the exegesis of Vyšens'kyj's oeuvre; see, for example, the introduction to the *Book*, where Vyšens'kyj's prophetic stance betrays not only a threat already founded in the present but an eschatological proclamation with its prediction of salvation; see Goldblatt, "Godlike 'Simplicity' *versus* Diabolic 'Craftiness'."

[127] In a recent study, Sister Sophia Senyk examined Vyšens'kyj's denunciation of *KS* within the context of "a certain tension" that existed between two tendencies in Ruthenian monasticism at the end of the sixteenth century and beginning of the seventeenth century. In her opinion, one trend encouraged monks and monasteries to participate in the "life of the church" and "religious culture," while another current proclaimed the necessity of "retreating into the desert"; see Senyk, "L'Hésychasme dan le monachisme ukrainien," pp. 209–210.

Ut Poesia Pictura. . .: Emblems and Literary Pictorialism in Simiaon Połacki's Early Verse

PETER A. ROLLAND

To the Memory of Kalman and Clara

The ties between visual and verbal art are not as evident today as in previous centuries when the two were often considered manifestations of the same phenomenon. This is particularly true of the art and literature in Europe from the late Middle Ages to the end of the eighteenth century. During these centuries the visual and verbal arts existed in a creative symbiosis, by which the written word could inspire the painter or sculptor. Conversely, painting and sculpture could inspire the poet, if only to provide versified explanations of what the plastic arts depicted. The popularity of emblem books and iconographic manuals well attest to this phenomenon, as evidenced by their use from Britain to Muscovy.[1]

The monastic poet Simiaon Połacki (Symeon Poloc'kyj, Simeon Polockij/Polotsky) and his development exemplify the manner in which Western European Neo-Latin literature and culture of the Baroque gained entrance to the early modern Russian literary milieu. An Orthodox Belorussian born in or near Polish-ruled Połack (Polock) and named Samuił Sitnjanovič-Pjatroŭski before his entry into religous life, Simiaon gained

[1] The classic expression of the relationship of the visual arts to poetry is the Horatian phrase, "ut pictura poesis." Horace, *De arte poetica*, 361. Bartolomeo Fazio (1400–1467) elaborated upon this statement, saying: "Est enim inter Pictores ac Poetas magna quaedam affinitas. Neque enim aliud est pictura quam poema tacitum" [There is a close relationship between painters and poets, for painting is simply silent verse]; in Władysław Tatarkiewicz, *History of Aesthetics*, vol. 3, *Modern Aesthetics*, trans. Adam and Ann Czerniawski (The Hague, 1979), p. 76. For the purposes of this study, a quote by Plutarch, published in Tatarkiewicz, *History of Aesthetics*, vol. 1, *Ancient Aesthetics*, p. 40, is more appropriate: "Simonides calls painting silent poetry and poetry articulate painting." For an erudite and lucid discussion of the emblem and its history in European literature, see Mario Praz, *Studies in Seventeenth-Century Imagery*, 2nd ed., considerably enlarged, Sussidi eruditi, 16 (Rome, 1964); Janusz Pelc, *Słowo-Obraz-Znak. Studium o emblematach w literaturze staropolskiej*, Studia staropolskie, 37 (Wrocław, 1973), pp. 1–37; A. A. Morozov and L. A. Sofronova, "Èmblematika i ee mesto v iskusstve Barokko," in A. I. Rogov, A. V. Lipatov, L. A. Sofronova, eds., *Slavjanskoe Barokko: Istoriko-kul'turnye problemy èpoxi* (Moscow, 1979), assess the role of emblem literature in Slavic literatures, including Połacki's writings.

knowledge of contemporary Neo-Latin and Polish literature and culture first during his studies at the Kievan Mohyla Collegium during the latter part of the 1640s and then at a Jesuit-run institution in Vilnius or Połack. The education he obtained enabled Połacki to become one of the most influential propagators of Western literature and culture in Moscow during the period 1663–1680.[2]

Among the genres of Western verse that Połacki introduced into early modern Russian literature were the inscription and the emblem—genres with which he had become familiar during his course of study.[3] Verse

[2] The two works, Ierofej Tatarskij, *Simeon Polockij (ego žizn' dejatel'nost'): Opyt issledovanija iz istorii prosveščenija i vnutrennoj cerkovnoj žizni vo vtoruju polovinu XVII veka* (Moscow, 1886), and L. N. Majkov, "Simeon Polockij," in *Očerki iz istorii russkoj literatury XVII–XVIII vekov* (St. Petersburg, 1889), pp. 1–162, remain the only comprehensive accounts of Połacki's life and activities. Peter A. Rolland "Three Early Satires by Simeon Polotsky," *Slavonic And East European Review* 63, no. 1 (January 1985): 1–20, fn. 1, and idem, "'Dulce est et fumos videre Patriae'—Four Letters by Simiaon Połacki," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 9, no. 1/2 (June 1985): 166–81, fn. 1, list the most important studies of Połacki's life and creative activity published before 1980. Subsequent literature relevant to the subject of this article will be given in the footnotes below. Since Połacki was Belorussian by birth, it seems only fitting to use this as the basic rendering of his name. Variants reflecting the usage in the scholarly literature are given in the standard transliteration of the language of the source.

There is no agreement in the scholarly literature as to Połacki's educational career. Tatarskij, *Simeon Polockij*, pp. 30–33, and Majkov, "Simeon Polockij," p. 2, agree that the young Belorussian studied in the late 1640s at the Mohyla Collegium and then went on to higher studies at a Jesuit institution. S. T. Golubev, "Otzyv o sočinenii V. O. Èingorna, *Očerki iz istorii Malorossii v XVII v. I. Snošenija malorossijskogo duxovenstva z moskovskim pravitel'stvom v carstvovanie Alekseja Mixajloviča*," *Zapiski Imp. akademii nauk po Istoriko-filologičeskomu otdeleniju* 6, no. 2 (1902): 113, and K. V. Xarlampovič, *Malorossijskoe vlijanie na velikorusskuju cerkovnuju žizn'* (Kazan, 1914; reprinted, 1968), p. 380, point to the "Academia" in Vilnius. The matter remains to be resolved.

[3] The program of studies at the Mohyla Collegium has been discussed by such historians as V. Askočenskij, *Kiev, s drevnejšim ego učiliščem Akademieju*, 2 vols. (Kiev, 1856; reprinted, 1976); Aleksander Jabłonowski, *Akademia Kijowsko-Mohylańska: Zarys historyczny na tle rozwoju ogólnego cywilizacji zachodniej na Rusi* (Cracow, 1899–1900); and Alexander Sydorenko, *The Kievan Academy in the Seventeenth Century*, University of Ottawa Ukrainian Studies, 1 (Ottawa, 1977).

N. I. Petrov, "O slovesnyx naukax i literaturnyx zanjatijax v Kievskoj Akademii ot načala ee do preobrazovanija v 1819," *Trudy Kievskoj duxovnoj akademii* 3, no. 7 (July 1866): 305–30; 3, no. 11 (November 1866): 343–88; 3, no. 12 (December 1866): 552–69; and 4, no. 1 (January 1867): 82–118; H. M. Syvokin', *Davni ukrajins'ki poetyky* (Xarkiv, 1960); Ryszard Łużny, *Pisarze kręgu Akademii Kijowsko-Mohylańskiej a literatura polska: Z dziejów związków kulturalnych polsko-wschodniosłowiańskich XVII–XVIII wieku*, Kraków Uniwersytet Jagielloński, Prace historyczno-literackie, 11 (Cracow, 1966); and V. P. Masljuk, *Latynomovni poetyky XVII–peršoji polovyny XVIII st. ta jix rol' y rozvytku teorii literatury na Ukrajini* (Kiev, 1983), devote special attention to poetical and rhetorical theory taught in the Kiev Collegium and similar institutions in Ukraine.

Masljuk, *Latynomovni poetyky*, pp. 177–80, briefly notes that the composition of emblems and related genres was discussed as part of the course on poetics. Askočenski, *Kiev*, vol. 1, p. 332, fn. 191, gives the headings of the earliest known course in poetics at the collegium from a

inscriptions composed for various icons are found in *Vertograd mnogocvetnyj*, the enormous collection of didactic and moralistic verse compiled by Połacki during the last decade of his life. Furthermore, the British scholar Anthony Hippisley has demonstrated the formative role of the emblem in individual poems from this collection and as a significant element in the allegorical poetic style of Połacki's mature verse. Refining some of Hippisley's observations, Jan Baptist Bedaux has commented on the nature of Połacki's emblem verse, using selected texts composed during the poet's career in Moscow. Bernd Uhlenbruch has discussed Połacki's emblematics as illustrative of the antipodal understanding of the significance of immutable text which the German scholar posits as the root of the controversy between advocates of the Nikonian reforms (Połacki) and adherents of the Old Belief (Avvakum).

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manuscript dated 1637, revealing that the composition of emblems and related genres was an integral part of Kievan poetics. Chapter nine contains the following: "IX. De epigrammate eiusque specibus nempe: a) emblemate, b) symbolis, c) aenigmate, d) logogriphus, e) echone, f) anagramatisimo, g) epitaphio, epicaedo, naenia, h) collosso, pyrimidae, inscriptione vexillorum, obelisco." V. I. Krekoten', "Kyjivsk'a poetyka 1637 roku," in O. V. Myšanyč, ed., *Literaturna spadščyna Kyjevskoji Rusi i ukrajins'ka literatura XVI–XVIII st.* (Kiev, 1981), pp. 118–54, published a Ukrainian translation of the full text of this course of poetics on the basis of a copy of the original (now, again lost) made in 1910 by O. S. Hruzyns'kyj. In Połacki's own surviving notes on poetics, the *Commendatio brevis Poeticae. Anno 1646* (CGADA, fond 381, MS. 1791, fol. 14^r), we read the following:

Quae divisio epigramatis?... 3tius modus est emblema, quasi interiectio, vel interpositio alicuis ornamenti in epigrammate, et ita pulchre relucet sicut V:G: "Splendent gemmae, aurei claviculi in aliquo vase reste parute pocula clipio, etc." Constant communiter tribus partibus: Inscriptione, quae est velute anima; Pictura, quae est velute corpus, et Poesis V:G: Si qua[?] in sylvam igna portans pingatur, at illie addi epigramma sive lemma, tamquam anima: "Labor inutilis."

[What are the types of the epigram?... The third way is the emblem, as if in an inscription intermingled with or with some inscription inserted, into the epigram and thus it reflects beautifully v.g.: "Gold and gems glisten, as with the leaf pattern on some vase and with a rope pattern, as if around a bust or shield-shaped surface." They generally consist of three parts: an inscription, which is to say, the soul or spirit (of the work); a picture, which is so to speak the body, and an epigram, v.g.; If anyone should be portrayed carrying faggots into a forest, to this picture should be added the following epigram or motto, its soul, so to speak: "Useless labor."] (My thanks to Dr. Robert Buck of the Department of Classics, University of Alberta, for his aid in translating these passages.)

Anthony Hippisley, *The Poetic Style of Simeon Polotsky*, Birmingham Slavonic Monographs, 16 (Birmingham, 1985), pp. 37–39, quotes from this text and from another fragment from the same manuscript, demonstrating Połacki's familiarity with contemporary tripartite emblem structure, although in his later poetry this structure is not evident; cf. Bernd Uhlenbruch, "Emblematik und Ideologie: Zu einem emblematischen Text Simeon Polockijs," in Renate Lachmann, ed., *Slavischer Barockliteratur II: Gedenkschrift für Dmitrij Tschiżewskij (1894–1977)*, Forum Slavicum, 54 (Munich, 1983), p. 118.

Among Soviet scholars, A. A. Morozov and L. A. Sofronova have remarked on the significance of the emblem for Połacki's verse generally, while A. S. Eleonskaja and V. P. Grebenjuk have noted the influence of emblem literature on Połacki's thought and in his panegyrical anthology *Rifmologion*.[4] No one has traced the influence of emblem books and iconography on Połacki during his formative student years and before his removal from Połack to Moscow. This little-investigated period of Połacki's creative life is important; what the young student learned in Kiev and Vilnius or Połack, he used to great effect in Moscow.[5]

This study will examine several Polish verse texts found in the miscellany *Pandecta, seu Collecteana albo Zebranie rozmaitych scriptów y notatie*, a *silva rerum* that contains Simiaon's earliest known verse and his notes on various subjects. The poems are entitled "Pieszczota dziatek" (Mollycoddling children; fol. 43/60^{v}), "Roskosz" (Luxury; fol. 133^{v}), "Wściekłemi biegasz końmi, Kupidynie..." (Like wild horses you run, O Cupid...; fol. 119^{r}), and "Czasu odmiana y różność" (The Passage of time and the difference; fol. 118^{v}). Scholars who have studied Połacki's early verse—and, indeed, these very poems—have remarked on their heavily allegorical nature, on their vivid and, at times, puzzling imagery, and on their often strange intermingling of pagan and Christian themes.[6] As I shall

4 Anthony R. Hippisley, "Simeon Polotsky as a Representative of the Baroque in Russian Literature" (Ph.D. diss., Oxford University, 1966); idem, "The Emblem in Simeon Polotsky," *The Slavic and East European Journal* 15, no. 2 (Summer 1971): 167–83; Jan Baptist Bedaux, "Emblem and Emblematic Poem in the work of Simeon Polockij," in B. J. Amsenga et al, eds., *Miscellanea Selecta: To Honour the Memory of Jan M. Meijer* (Amsterdam, 1983), pp. 53–73; and Peter A. Rolland, "Aspects of Simeon Polockij's Early Verse (1648–1663)" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1978), pp. 55–68, discuss the influence of the emblem and inscriptions in Połacki's early verse. See also Morozov and Sofronova, "Èmblematika," p. 32; A. S. Eleonskaja, "Rabota Simeona Polockogo nad podgotovkoj k pečati knig *Obed duševnyj i Večerja duševnaja*," in A. N. Robinson, ed., *Simeon Polockij i ego knigoizdatel'skaja dejatel'nost' (Russkaja staropečatnaja literatura XVI–XVIII v.)*, vol. 3 (Moscow, 1982), pp. 152–202; and V. P. Grebenjuk, "*Rifmologion* Simeona Polockogo (Istorija sozdanija, struktura, idei)," in ibid., vol. 3, pp. 259–308.

5 The late M. I. Praškovič ("Paezija Simiaona Połackaha: Ranni peryiad 1648–1664" [Diss., Minsk University, 1964], and "Simiaon Połacki," in V. V. Barysenka et al., eds., *Historyia belaruskaj dokastryčnickaj litaratury u dvux tamax*, vol. 1, *Z staražitnyx časoŭ da kanca XVIII st.* [Minsk, 1968], pp. 354–82) and Łużny (*Pisarze kręgu*, pp. 109–28) do not take up this question at all. Rolland, "Aspects of Simeon Polockij's Early Verse," chap. 2, provides a preliminary discussion of the problem; the present study is an enlarged and reworked version of a portion of that chapter.

6 Łużny, *Pisarze kręgu*, pp. 117–22. In preparing the texts, which I copied *in situ* from CGADA, fond 381, MS. 1800, and compared with witnesses in GIM, *Sinod. Sobr.*, MS. 731, I followed Konrad Górski, "Zasady transliteracji tekstów XVI i XVII wieku," in *Z badań nad literaturą staropolską: Program i postulaty* (Wrocław, 1952), pp. 79–87. I have separated the texts into strophes as indicated by lines drawn in the manuscript, presumably by their author. V. K. Bylinin and L. U. Zvonareva give the texts of "Pieszczota dziatek," "Roskosz," "Czasu

demonstrate, these features are due to the fact that the verses in question are Połackij's first attempts to compose emblem verse and inscriptions inspired by plates or drawings. In demonstrating this hypothesis, I shall present each of the texts, indicate a possible source, and discuss those correspondences between the verse and the suggested source which allow us to posit such a relationship.[7]

The connection between these texts and emblem verse is most clearly seen in "Pieszczota dziatek." The poem is a quatrain in which the author warns of the dire consequences of excessive parental affection:

Małpa, ucieszne i smyślne zwierzątko
  Zbytnie kochając, zadławia małpiątko.
Tak zbytnie pieszcząc miłe swoje dziatki,
  O śmierć przywodzą nieuważne matki.[8]

Both the theme and illustrative motif of this text appear in several emblem books of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. One, entitled "Caecus Amor Sobolis," is listed as "No. 77" by Joachim Camerarius in his *Sym-*

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odmiana y różność," and, as part of this text, "Wściekłemi biegasz końmi, Kupidynie. . ." in an annotated scholarly edition: *Simeon Polockij: Virši* (Minsk, 1990), pp. 195, 172, 174. While following contemporary punctuation and spelling, they do not separate the texts into strophes, contrary to indications in the manuscript. In treating "Czasu odmiana y różność" and Wściekłemi biegasz końmi, Kupidynie. . ." as a single text, they repeat Łużny's error (cf. fn. 20 below).

No archaeographic description of CGADA, fond 381, MS. 1800, is known to me. Łużny, *Pisarze kręgu*, pp. 109–24, contains a general description and partial listing of contents. Bylinin and Zvonareva remark on the paleography of the manuscript. The earliest dated work is Połacki's translated *Akafist Najświętszej Pannie*. . ., dated by him in the text to 1648. Among the latest texts is *Lamiencik sławieński*, dated by the author 27 May 1663. The watermarks I obtained *in situ* (fols. 7, 10, 14, 22/24, 24/26, 28/30) seem to reflect most closely E. Laucevičius, *Popierius Lietuvoje: Atlasas*, 2 vols. (Vilnius, 1967), vol. 1, p. 171, nos. 1090 and 1089, a mounted figure in a double circle containing the name *Marcjan Giedroycz*; vol. 2, p. 189, dates no. 1089 to Vilnius, 1646/Rasenai, 1648; no. 1090 to Vilnius, 1647/Rasenai, 1648; and no. 1094 to Vilnius, 1654. If the *terminus post quem* of 1646/47 is accepted and the last watermark has been correctly identified, some of the texts in question definitely stem from Połacki's studies in Kiev and Vilnius or Połack.

7 Praz, *Studies in Seventeenth-Century Imagery*; Samuel C. Chew, *The Pilgrimage of Life* (New Haven and London, 1962); E. H. Gombrich, *Symbolic Images: Studies in the Art of the Renaissance* (London, 1972); Arthur Henckel and Albrecht Schöne, *Emblemata: Handbuch zur Sinnbildkünst des XVI und XVII Jahrhunderts* (Stuttgart, 1972); Janusz Pelc, *Słowo-Obrak-Znak*; and idem, "Old Polish Emblems: An introduction to the Problem," *Zagadnienia rodzajów literackich* 12, no. 2 (1968): 31–54, served as my introduction to the problems of the emblem and related genres.

8 The monkey, an amusing and intelligent beast/loving excessively suffocates the young monkey./Caring for their dear children in a similarly excessive way,/careless mothers cause their death.

bolorum et Emblematum. . . Centuria Altera.[9] Under the motto "Caecus Amor Sobolis" there is a plate depicting the following scene: a female simian sitting beneath a tree fondles an offspring who revels in the display of affection; at the rear rests another young monkey who has turned his back on this touching scene. The poem accompanying this device reads:

> Saepe et amare nocet. Suffocat simia, amando
> Simiolum. Exemplum hoc o fugitote patres.[10]

When Simiaon's text is compared to that of Camerarius, it is evident there is a coincident central theme—the deadly effects of overzealous parental affection—and central image—the female monkey (Latin, *simia*; Polish, *małpa*) and her offspring (Latin, *simiolum*; Polish, *małpiątko*); from this we may conclude that the fledgling poet drew upon some similar emblem as inspiration. One detail of vocabulary suggests that Camerarius probably did serve as Połacki's source. Both authors use the same verb 'suffocate, choke' (Camerarius: Latin, *suffocat*; Połacki: Polish, *zadławia*) to convey the manner in which excessive affection causes the death of the offspring. Furthermore, of the several emblematic texts treating this theme, only Camerarius's text is as succinct in its style and philosophy as Połacki's. We know that a copy of Camerarius's *Symbolorum et Emblematum* was apparently in Połacki's library in Moscow, and individual poems of the *Vertograd mnogocvetnyj* have been traced to this source. It is, therefore, most probable that "Caecus Amor Sobolis" from this collection inspired Połacki's early quatrain.[11]

The influences of both Camerarius and Andreas Alciati are discernable in the poem "Roskosz" (Luxury), in which Połacki warns of the fatal allure of Luxury and Venery. He writes:

9 Henckel and Schöne, *Emblemata*, cols. 428–31, list six emblems that contain some variant of this theme. I have also consulted Joachim Camerarius, *Symbolorum et Emblematum ex Animalibus Quadrupedibus Desumptorum Centuria Altera* (Frankfurt, 1661), fol. 78^r.

10 To love often kills. A mother ape suffocates the young ape [while] loving [him]/ Avoid this example, Parents. (Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are mine—P.A.R.)

11 Anthony R. Hippisley, "Simeon Polotsky's Library," *Oxford Slavonic Papers*, n.s., 16 (1983): 52–61, discusses the problems connected with assembling a tentative catalogue of Połacki's library. On pages 60–61 he provides a "Short-title List," giving (p. 61) "Camerarius, J., *Symbola et emblemata* (1593–7)" among those volumes which Połacki had with him in Moscow. On page 58 Hippisley gives the text of a Slavonic version of "Pieszczota dziatek," entitled "Laskanie," from *Vertograd mnogocvetnyj.* He notes that "Almost certainly Polotsky took this image [of deadly simian maternal affection] from the *Symbola et emblemata* of Camerarius. . ." and identifies the source as "Caecus Amor Sobolis." We can only agree. Further study will doubtless reveal other texts from Połacki's early period in the later compendia of his works.

Morskie zwierzęta, Syreny rzeczone,
Twarzą człowieczą od Boga uczczone,
Zwykły żeglarzom podczas niewolności,
Słodkiem śpiewaniem topić w głębokości,
Psom na pożarcie, Scille nieprzebytej
Śmierci okrętów morskich jadowitej.
Rozkosz, Wszeteczność—to Syreny wtóre,
Żeglarzom świata pieśń śpiewają które,
Zda się ucieszna, lecz jadem piekielnym
Pełna, ku Scillom wabiącą śmiertelnym,
Aby żywota wywróciwszy nawę
Dali człowieka Cerberowi strawę.
Herkules baczny kazał się skrępować
U maszta, gdy miał przez Scille żeglować,
Aby od Syren nie był oszukany,
Bestiom srogim na pokarm oddany.
Nam krzyż Chrystusów maszt jest, do którego
Uwiąże niech kożdy siebie samego,
By od złych Syren nie był omawiony,
W Scille piekielnej wiecznie pogrążony.[12]

A comparison of this text with those found in emblem books strongly suggests that Połacki relied on Camerarius's emblem, "Mortem Dabit Ipsa Voluptas," and on Alciati's "Sirenes."[13]

Camerarius's emblem is composed of a motto with a moralistic theme ("Luxury itself causes death") and is illustrated with a plate in which Sirens sit upon a rocky outcrop and sing while ships founder on the distant sea.

[12] Marine animals called Sirens,/endowed by God with human faces,/were accustomed to drown in the deep/sailors captivated by sweet singing/as food for dogs, in impassable Scylla/venomous death of marine vessels./Luxury and Venery—they are [a] second [type of] Sirens,/who sing sailors of this world a song,/which seems pleasant, but with infernal poison/[is] filled, [which] lures [men] to the death-dealing Scyllas/in order that, having capsized the Ship of Life/they give Man as food to Cerberus./Prudent Hercules commanded himself to be bound/to the mast, when he had to sail through Scylla,/lest he be tempted/by the Sirens and given to fierce beasts as food./For us the Cross of Christ is the mast,/to which let everyone bind himself,/lest by the evil Sirens he be not persuaded/[and] into the infernal Scylla eternally plunged.

[13] Henckel and Schöne, *Emblemata*, col. 1697; Joachim Camerarius, *Symbolorum et Emblematum ex Aquatilibus et Reptilibus Desumptorum Centuria Quarta* (Frankfurt, 1661), fol. 64^{r}; Andreas Alciati, *Emblemata cum Commentariis Amplissimis* (Padua, 1621; reprinted, 1976), pp. 487–89; Hippisley, "Emblem," p. 170, notes that Alciati's *Emblemata* was among the emblem books found in Połacki's later library; in "Simeon Polotsky's Library," p. 61, Hippisley lists it as "Alciatus, A. *Emblemata* (1648)."

Underneath this is a short epigram which explains the whole. It reads: "Dulcisono mulcent Sirenes aethera cantu/ Tu, fuge, ne pereas collida monstra maris."[14]

Alciati's emblem compares meretricious women to the mythical creatures who lured to destruction those captivated by their irresistible song. The emblem consists of the simple title "Sirenes" above a plate depicting Odysseus's escape from these deadly monsters. In the left foreground of the plate sit two or three Sirens looking out to sea while playing instruments and singing. On the right Odysseus's ship sails, with the hero firmly bound to the mast. In the background ships founder. Below the plate appears the following:

> Absque alis volucres et cruribus absque puellas
> Rostro absque et pisces, qui tamen cre canant.
> Quis putat esse illos? Iungi haec Natura negavit
> Sirenes fieri sed potuisse docent.
> Illicium est mulier, quae is piscem desinit atrum,
> Plurima quod secum monstra libido vehit.
> Aspectu, verbis, animi candore trahuntur,
> Parthenope, Ligia, Leucosiaque viri,
> Has Musae expumant, has atque illudit Ulysses.
> Scilicet est doctis: cum meretrice nihil.[15]

An examination of Połacki's text reveals that the fledgling monk-poet melded elements from both Camerarius and Alciati into a work both derivative and uniquely his own. Whereas Alciati's emblem furnished the theme of Odysseus's success in withstanding the Sirens' song by being bound to the mast of his ship and both sources provided the central image of the Sirens and the seductive force of their song, each source identified the Sirens with a different vice. From Camerarius Połacki incorporated the idea of Luxury (Latin, *voluptas*; Polish, *roskosz*) as a destructive but alluring force; from Alciati he derived the theme of Venery or Meretriciousness (Latin, *meretricium*; Polish, *wszeteczność*) as the sweet source of doom for those who fall under its sway. These thematic parallels and the presence of both collections in Połacki's library in Moscow confirm the conclusion that

[14] The sweetly singing Sirens harm the world by their singing/ flee, you will not elude these sly monsters of the sea.

[15] Bird without wings and women without legs/ and a fish without a fish's head, who for all that on the seashore sing./ Whom do you think they are? Nature denies joining [these things]/ to make the Sirens, but teaches that they are possible./ Forbidden is woman, whose extremity is shaped like a fish,/ for monstrous desire takes many with her./ By appearance, word, lively spirit/ were attracted Parthiope, Ligia, and the men of Leucosire,/ these the Muses plucked, these Ulysses eluded./ So a wise man should know: [have] nothing to do with a meretrix.

these emblems served as the source for "Roskosz."

An analysis of Połacki's text also reveals that, while making use of elements from the two emblems discussed above, the young seminarian rejected others that were at variance with his world view and infused the work both with an explicitly Christian content and with Baroque stylistic embellishments completely lacking in his sources. In dealing with "Sirenes," Simiaon excluded the rather explicit references to the female physiology and the power of the Sirens' sexual allure, as well as the secular humanistic nature of Alciati's advice ("Scilicet est doctis: cum meretrice nihil"). While considering Camerarius's observations germaine, the committed Christian in Połacki rejected the pessimism inherent in them ("Tu, fuge, ne pereas collida monstra maris"). Instead, the poet endowed his work with a Christian religious meaning tinged with an element of hope. Drawing upon the longstanding practice of reinterpreting pagan myth in light of Christian revelation, Połacki transformed the messages of both emblematic sources.[16] Acknowledging that Luxury and Venery were powerful in their attempts to upset the vessel of those who sail on the "sea of life," Połacki affirmed that the Christians might escape destruction by binding themselves to the mast of the ship, the Cross of Christ. Through his reinterpretation Połacki raised Luxury and Venery from the realm of problems of everyday life, whose consequences are grounded in the here and now of human existence, to the transcendental plane of eternal salvation and damnation.[17]

While transforming the sense of his sources, Połacki also reworked the style. The works by both Camerarius and Alciati are spare in style and restrained in tone. They seek to instruct the reader by appealing to his good sense and sound reason. Połacki, on the other hand, sought to play on the reader's emotions in addition to appealing to his intellect. Displaying that fascination with terror and the terrible so characteristic of the Baroque, the poet heightened the dangers facing the voyager on the sea of life through the use of such phrases as "jadem piekielnym pełna" (filled with infernal poison), "ku Scillom. . . śmiertelnym" (toward the deadly Scyllas), "Psom na pożarcie" (as food for dogs), "W Scille piekielnej wiecznie pogrążony" (into the infernal Scylla eternally plunged), "Scille nieprzebytej/Śmierci okrętów morskich jadowitej" (impassable Scylla/venomous death of marine vessels), and "złe Syreny" (evil Sirens). The cumulative effect of such a

[16] Hugo Rahner, S.J., *Greek Myths and Christian Mystery* (London, 1963), pp. 328–86, discusses the Christian interpretations of "Odysseus at the Mast."

[17] Morozov and Sofronova, "Èmblematika," p. 15, and Uhlenbruch, "Emblematik und Ideologie," p. 119, comment on constant reinterpretation of emblems as inherent to the artistic and semantic systems that fostered them.

suggestive vocabulary, with its stress on the poisonous and infernal, is to terrify the reader into swift and unhesitating acceptance of the proffered means of escaping eternal damnation—binding onself to "the Life-giving Cross."

Analysis of the ideological transformation of Połacki's sources reveals that the poet has transformed the motifs contained in them to suit his new religious purposes as well. The myths of Scylla and Charybdys are distinct from that of the Sirens. Their use here, as well as the reference to Cerberus, monstrous watchdog of Hades, is motivated solely by the author's desire to evoke terror in the reader. Połacki's own ideological position motivated still another recasting of a classical motif. As we know, classical myth (and Alciati's emblem) made reference to Odysseus's escape from the Sirens, as given in Book XII of the *Odyssey*. Known for his sly, amoral nature, the "wily Odysseus" did not suit Połacki's purpose. Hercules, on the other hand, was a hero known for overcoming a series of monstrous beings and for the performance of impossible feats. In one interpretation contemporary to Połacki, Hercules and his adventures illustrated the neccesity for avoiding Luxury and female entrapment.[18]

Połacki's creative reinterpretation of classical myth and emblematic literature is not unique; rather, it reflects the author's understanding of the principle of *imitatio*, the principle that artistic perfection could be attained by modeling one's own work on that of acknowledged masters. While other

[18] M. K. Sarbiewski, *Dii gentium. Bogowie pogan*, introduced, edited, and translated by Krystyna Stawecka, compiled initially by St. Skimina in collaboration with Maria Skimina, Biblioteka pisarzów polskich, series b, no. 20, (Wrocław, 1972), *Caput XLI Hercules*, pp. 492–527, discusses Hercules' attributes as a *vir fortis* (*mąż dzielny*). "Roskosz" echoes some of Sarbiewski's observations: "I. Nihil esse magis vitandum femineis illecebris" [Nothing should be avoided more than feminine allure] (p. 506); "XIV. Magna ingenia ad malum aeque et ad bonum strenua sunt. Lege Xenophontem libv. II p. 131, prolixe describentem, quomodo Herculi deliberanti de statu vitae, virtutisne via an voluptatis ad gloriam grassaretur occurerit Virtus et Voluptas" [Outstanding souls are inclined equally to good and evil. Read Xenophon bk. II, p. 131, who describes profusely how Hercules deliberated on the course of his life, whether to achieve glory by the path of virtue or by that of luxury after he had been confronted by Virtue and Luxury (themselves)] (p. 513); "XXIX. Forti maxime voluptas fugienda" [The brave should avoid Luxury most of all] (p. 518).

According to Stawecka's introductory comments (pp. 8–9), Sarbiewski's mythological treatise was formulated while he was a lecturer at the Jesuit collegium in Połack in 1626 and was widely circulated in manuscript for at least the next ninety years. The close resonance between the cited passages and "Roskosz" and Simiaon's own physical presence in at least one of two places connected with the manuscript tradition (Vilnius or Połack) make it very probable that he was acquainted with Sarbiewski's tract. Łużny's documented assertion (*Pisarze kręgu*, pp. 29–30) that Połacki's *Commendatio brevis Poeticae. Anno 1646* is related in part to Sarbiewski's "De acuto et arguto," in M. K. Sarbiewski, *Wykłady poetyky (Praecepta poetica)*, translated and edited by St. Skimina (Wrocław, 1958), pp. 1–20, makes it even more certain that Połacki was familiar with *Dii gentium*, and that its ideology is reflected in "Roskosz."

scholars have drawn attention to Połacki's creative reshaping of material taken from other sources, in discussing these poems in *Vertograd mnogocvetnyj*, the analysis here of both "Pieszczota dziatek" and, particularly, "Rozkosz" demonstrates the manner in which he employed the principle of *imitatio* while still in the formative stages of his versifying.[19]

This investigation has dealt thus far with texts whose sources we have been able to posit with certainty. We shall now turn our attention to others whose ties to contemporary iconography are evident but not concretely demonstrable. Let us consider the case of "Wściekłemi biegasz końmi, Kupidynie...," whose nature has eluded those few scholars who have referred to it thus far.[20] The text as given in the manuscript reads as follows:

Wściekłemi biegasz końmi, Kupidynie,
  Sprośnej Wenery niewstydliwy synie.
Kogoś nie ranił złej strały lubości?
  Hektor, Salomon, złej upali złości
Zacnym poetom, ni oratorowi
  Umiesz przebaczyć, ba, ni Jowiszowi.

Owo, Wstyd Święty, połamawszy strzały
  Kupidynowe, ma triumf niemały.
Scipio, Joseph, wprzód niepokalanie
  Idą, Suzanna, Judita, zacne panie.
Wstrzemięźność, Miemość u kół woza stoją,
  Palmy w ofiarę panny pozad stroją.

"Ja, Śmierć, cokolwiek oczom się nawinię,
  Ostrą i bystrą koniec kosą czynię.
Ja to papieskie, królewskie, biskupie

[19] On the history of the concept of *imitatio* in the literary theory of the Renaissance and later period, see Bernard Weinberg, *A History of Literary Criticism in the Italian Renaissance*, vol. 1 (Chicago, 1961), pp. 146–47, 178–80, 280–81, et passim; idem, "L'Imitation au XVI^e^ et au XVII^e^ siècles," in F. Jost, ed., *Actes du IV^e^ congrès de l'Association internationale de litterature comparée (Fribourg, 1964)*, vol. 2 (The Hague, 1966), pp. 697–703; Barbara Otwinowska, "Imitacja eklektyczna i spontaniczna," in *Studia estetyczna*, vol. 4 (Warsaw, 1976), pp. 25–38; idem, "Imitacja," in Janusz Pelc, ed., *Problemy literatury staropolskiej. Seria druga* (Wrocław et al., 1973), pp. 381–459; Elżbieta Sarnowska-Temeriusz, "Renesanowe pojęcie poezji w Polsce," in *ibid.*, pp. 459–92; Władysław Tatarkiewicz, *A History of Six Ideas: An Essay in Aesthetics*, trans. Christopher Kasparek (Warsaw and The Hague, 1980), pp. 266–75; Masljuk, *Latynomovni poetyky*, p. 33.

[20] Łużny, *Pisarze kręgu*, p. 121, considers "Wściekłemi biegasz końmi, Kupidynie..." a part of "Odmiana wszech rzczeczy ludzkich." Łużny considers the text an exercise in "antiquization" (*antykizacja*). Comparison of this text and the variant found in GIM, *Sinod. Sobr.*, MS. 731, reveals that the two poems in question are independent works. While noting (p. 122) that other poems in Połacki's early works possessed highly visual imagery, Łużny does not speculate as to the sources of these verses.

Korony, berła, z głów infuły łupię.
Bawoły wściekłe karocę mą toczą.
Lud wszelkich stanów koptyty ostre tłoczą."

Sława skrzydłami pod niebo wzlecona,
Brzmiących trąb dźwiękiem wszędy ogłoszona.
Chciwe ma Sława zwierzęta za konie
Silne, ogromne, narzeczone słonie.
Tą Alexander, Juliusz i Plato
Slyną na świecie, i wymowny Cato.

Czas bystrolotny przez bystre jelenie
Dniem, nocą bieży, a stać się nie lenie.
"Jadę godzinami, Jesień, Zima, Lato,
Ze mną biegają, jako widzisz, a to
Lata mnie psują, jak też one trawie.
Wszytko ja depcę, śladu nie zostawię."

Wsystko na świecie koniec terminuje,
Sam jeden Chrystus wiecznie triumfuje.
Nigdy nie cierpiąc zgrzybiałej starości,
Z poczetami świętych, w świetej trwa jasności.[21]

This work is indeed quite puzzling because of the multiplicity of themes, the change of narrative voices, and the myriad of visual images it contains. All of these baffling details are made clear at once, however, when we accept the fact that this text actually is composed of a series of inscriptions inspired by some plate or plates illustrating Petrarch's *Trionfi.* To demonstrate the probability of this hypothesis, it is necessary to consider an instance of such influence in the writings of the Polish author Mikołaj Rej.

[21] Like maddened horses you run, O Cupid,/shameless son of licentious Venus./Whom have you not wounded with the arrow of concupiscence?/Hector, Solomon fell by your malice./Virtuous poets nor orators you cannot overlook/Ha, not even Jove./Behold, Holy Shame, having broken the arrows/of Cupid, has no small triumph./Scipio, Joseph unconquered in the vanguard/go, Suzanna, Judith, virtuous ladies./Restraint, Moderation stand by the carriage wheels,/the ladies in the rear prepare an offering of palms./"I, Death, to whatever comes to my eyes,/I put an end with my sharp, swift scythe./It is I who papal, royal, episcopal/tiaras, sceptres, and mitres from the head do bash./Wild bulls pull my carriage./They trample all estates with their sharp hooves."/Fame borne up to the heavens on wings/is announced everywhere by the sound of blaring trumpets./Fame has rapacious beasts for horses/strong, huge, called elephants./By this [Fame] Alexander, Julius, and Plato/are renowned in the world, and [also] eloquent Cato./Swiftly flying Time, by swift hinds drawn/day [and] night courses, and hastens not to stop./"I drive for hours, Spring, Winter, and Summer/run with me as you see/and the years spoil me as I consume them./I touch everything and leave not a trace."/Everything in [this] world has an end,/only Christ Himself eternally triumphs./Never having suffered bent old age,/with the community of saints/He remains in holy splendor.

In *Słowo-Obraz-Znak*, his seminal study on the influence of the emblem and related genres in Polish literature, Janusz Pelc made a most interesting discovery. In the fourth chapter of the 1574 posthumous edition of Rej's *Zwierzyniec*, there appeared six emblems, entitled "Bostwo jedyne," "Zacność czystości," "Miłość nieprzystojna," "Sława dobra długo trwa," "Czas prętko bieży," and "Żaden stan śmierci nie umknie." Each of these was illustrated by a plate identical to those executed by George Benz, the Nuremberg engraver, for the 1547 Venice edition of *Il Trionfi*. Pelc concluded that either Rej or his editor had adapted Benz's engravings to a new purpose, providing them with new moralistic interpretations and reordering them in keeping with the Polish author's intentions.[22]

A comparison of Połacki's text with the plates used to illustrate Rej's verse octets offers convincing evidence that the Belorussian poet was inspired by a similar set of plates. Lines 1–6 of Połacki's verse, for example, clearly reflect some illustration of Petrarch's "Trionfo d'Amore." The theme of these lines—the power of "Indecent Venera"—and such details as Cupid running with his bow and arrow next to "maddened horses" and the figures identified by Połacki as Hector, Solomon, and Jupiter reflect a plate similar to that used for Rej's "Miłość nieprzystojna." Lines 7–12, in which "Holy Shame, having broken the arrows/ of Cupid, has no small triumph," contain thematic and visual details similar to the plate illustrating Rej's "Zacność czystości." Both Rej's verse and Połacki's stanza treat some aspect of Purity, using the same central element of a female figure seated high on a carriage preceded by two female figures (Suzanna and Judith) and two male figures (Joseph and Scipio). The two female figures standing next to the chariot—Moderation (*Mierność*) and Restraint (*Wstrzemięźność*)—and those bearing palms are features common to both Benz's plate and Połacki's stanza. They argue convincingly for Połacki having used an illustration based on Petrarch's "Trionfo d'Castitá" as his inspiration.

Similarly, lines 13–18, in which Death speaks out in his own name, reflect—like Benz's plate used to illustrate Rej's "Żaden stan śmierci nie umknie"—Petrarch's "Trionfo della Morte." Common to both Połacki's verses and Benz's plate are the figure of the skeletal "Grim Reaper," with his scythe, who rides in a carriage drawn by "raging bulls" and, in the background, the cowering figures of a king, a bishop, and a pope—identifiable

22 Pelc, *Słowo-Obraz-Znak*, pp. 76–80. For this study I consulted D. D. Carcinelli, ed., *Lord Morley's Tryumphes of Fraunces Petrarcke* (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), and Ernest Hatch Wilkins, *The Triumphs of Petrarch* (Chicago, 1962). Carcinelli supplied sixteenth-century plates demonstrating the influence Petrarch's work had on painters, engravers, and manuscript illuminators. Gombrich, *Symbolic Images*, provides as an illustration (fig. 143) a fifteenth-century engraving in which all the "Triumphs" are represented on one large plate.

by their crown, mitre, and tiara. In the foreground fallen warriors lie trampled under the chariot's wheels and the bulls' hooves. Such coincidences of theme and content are too great to be mere chance.

Likewise, a plate illustrating Petrarch's work must have served as Połacki's source of inspiration for lines 19–24 of his text. This sextet describes the triumphal passage of Fame, who rides in a splendid vehicle drawn by elephants and is accompanied by an entourage that, according to Połacki's text, includes Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, and the "eloquent Cato." Both this text and Benz's plate illustrating Rej's "Sława dobra długo trwa" have Petrarch's "Trionfo della Fama" as their ultimate model. In lines 25–30 of Połacki's text and in Benz's plate that appears as part of Rej's thematically related emblem, "Czas prętko leci," we can discern several similarities: the figure of Winged Time, the swift hinds which draw Time's chariot, and the allegorical figures of the seasons which strive to keep pace. All these argue convincingly that Połacki's verses were inspired by some visual representation of Petrarch's "Trionfo del Tempo."

We have argued that all the above segments of the Połacki text contain details of both theme and content which support the argument that the text reflects an engraving or engravings illustrating Petrarch's *Trionfi*. This type of evidence is not found in lines 31–34 of the poem. Nevertheless, the very theme of this fragment—"Sam jeden Chrystus wiecznie triumfuje"—together with the evidence adduced above, suggests very strongly that this quatrain, like the other stanzas, is the author's rendering of a plate inspired by Petrarch's "Trionfo della Divinitá," which appears in the 1574 edition of Rej's *Zwierzyniec* as "Bostwo jedyne."

This comparison of Połacki's text and Benz's plates has demonstrated a very close correspondence in theme and detail; it is, therefore, safe to assume that some engraving or engravings based on *Il Trionfi* served as the source for the Polish verses.[23] A reading of Petrarch's texts discloses an

[23] A comparison of Rej's ordering of themes with Połacki's exludes the *Zwierzyniec* as a source for the latter poem. Połacki's themes are ordered exactly as they are in Petrarch's work and in any of the illustrations based on it that were available to me at the time of writing.

The theme of "The Triumph" seems to have been one of interest to the young Belorussian student. Virtue triumphant is the theme of a text whose name and detailed imagery call to mind both "Wściekłemi biegasz, końmi, Kupidynie..." and "Czasu odmiana i różność." Found among Simiaon's earliest verse (CGADA, fond 381, MS. 1800, fol. 115^v; GIM, *Sinod. Sobr.*, MS. 731, fol. $122/144^{r-v}$), the text is entitled "Triumf cierpliwości pięknemi obrazy wyrażony." The full text reads:

Nadzieja z Żądzą ciągną wóz jak konie
  Pod Cierpliwością na wspaniałym tronie
W ogniu, przed ktorym serce nie szwankuje
  Więc jej Niewolą Fortuna hołduje.

even closer relationship between them and the lines we have analyzed, namely, that, with one significant exception, the author's use of the names drawn from the Bible or from classical mythology or history corresponds to the manner in which the Italian humanist made use of them. The one deviation from this norm is found in lines 4 and 10, where Połacki introduces the figures of Hector and Suzanna into his text to dramatize the power of the "shameless son of licentious Venus." In the first instance Hector, a virtuous man destroyed by the adulterous love of his brother, Paris, for Helen, is counted among those wounded by Cupid's arrows. In the second instance, Suzanna, subjected to calumny on the part of the lascivious elders after having spurned their advances (Dan. 13), is mentioned among the paragons of feminine virtue of past ages. Our discussion of "Roskosz" has demonstrated

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Cnota w wielbłądzie, że przed Swego Pana
  Gdy wkłada cięzar nachyla kolana,
Niesie co włożą. Tak Izaak święty
  Słuchał Abrama, żeby też miał być scięty.

Zazdrość do studnia Jozefa strąciła,
  Wiara go stamtąd wnet oswobodziła,
Niecną Zefirą z płaszcza obnażony.
  Lubością nie jest w cnocie zwyciężony.
Cnoty w ofiarę nad wielu pięknego
  Bóg lubi. Chował w czas przyszły samego,
By w głodzie Ojca i Ægyptską Ziemię
  Żywił obficie i Jakóba plemię.

Mężną prawicą lwa Dawid silnego,
  Niedźwiedzia zraził i obrzyma złego.
Saula zaś króla i Semeja swoją
  Zniósł cierpliwością, acz mu biedy stroją.

Żółwia skorupy nie trze ciężar koła
  Tak Cierpliwości Jopa [sic] nie zmógł zgoła
Diaboł [sic], ni żona, ni też przyjaciele,
  Lub wszystko stracił i cierpiał wiele.

W szędziwym [sic] wieku, ubóstwem strapiony
  Tobiasz nad to oczu pozbawiony
Stale był cierpliw, przeto z wiarą tego
  Poznał, mędrkowie nie znali którego.

116/138[r] (731, 122/144[v])
Słoń porażony, łzy wylewa takie
  Co są lekarstwem na rany wszelakie,
A Stefan święty za ciękie kamienie
  Łzami ubicom modli o zbawienie.

W pracy, w boleści do śmierci krzyżowej
  Przeżywszy Chrystus nabył czci takowej
Świat, grzech, śmierć, piekło przezeń zwyciężone.
  Imię jego nad wszystko wyniesione.

both Połacki's willingness to adapt mythological motifs to suit his purpose and his concern with the issue of chastity.[24] Knowing this, we can fully understand both the attraction Hector and Suzanna hold for the fledgling poet and their function in the text, which is to illustrate the destructive force

[24] Połacki's concerns about the preservation of chastity found their expression in the poem "Czystości stróżow sześć," also found among these early works (CGADA, fond 381, MS.1800, fol. 135^{v}):

Lilia śliczna symbolem czystości
  Przez wzdienczność [sic] oczom przedziwnej białości
Sześcią się zwykła rozszerzać listkami,
  Tyląż [sic] złotemi zdobić ziarnkami.
Coś nie trefunkiem jej natura dała,
  Lecz aby czystość sześciu stróżów miała.
Pierwszy jest mierność w piciu, w jedzeniu.
  W żartach uczciwość, a wstyd w posiedzeniu.
Wtory stróż-strzec się pilno próżnowania,
  Bo to jest matka złości nawykania.
Trzeci-mieć proste ciała ubieranie,
  A nie wymyślne kędziorów zmyślanie,
Bo tym jest sposobem lud Pański skradziony,
  K miłości córek moabskich zwiedziony.
Czwarty-strec smysłów, by się nie błąkały,
  Najbardziej oczu, jak Job doskonały,
Który przymierze wziął z swemi oczyma,
  By nie patrzały, gdzie gładka liczyna.
A Jeremiasz "Przez okna," powiada,
  "Nasza śmiertelna weszła na świat zdrada."
Jakoż Dawid oczu niestrażnością
  Upadł był ciężko, ciała nieczystością.
Dyna też zbyła dziewictwa swojego
  Przez niewstrzymanie oka ciekawego.
A Samson oczu przecz jest pozbawiony,
  Iż na Dalilę patrząc, ułowiony.
Piąty stróż wieczny panieńskiej czystości:
  Pilno obiegać wielmowności,
Bo złe rozmowy najlepsze nałogi
  Psują, obyczaj w złe mienią błogi.
Dlatego ustom prosił ogrodzenia
  U drzwi warg Dawid prosił dla mowy zamknienia.
Szósty—okazji wstrzegać się wszelkich
  Bodayże[?] najmniejszych, a nie ino wielkich,
Bo z małych wielkie wały powstają.
  Które okręty na szczęty rozbijają.
Rzecz mała wielkie czynią zepsowanie,
  Jeśli poniechasz czynić zabieganie.
Z małej iskierki pożary bywają.
  Stzreż się okazji, bo cię uwikłają,
Że nie potrapisz wyplątać się jako,
  Nie waż okazji małych ladajako.

of untrammeled carnality even upon those who are completely innocent of any wrongdoing. Their use here—like that of Hercules in "Roskosz"—indicates that, for Połacki, mythological figures, whether biblical or classical in origin, were important for their connotative or symbolic value rather than for their literal or denotative meaning.[25]

These minor deviations do not alter the fact that these experimental stanzas stem from a visual representation of the *Trionfi*, a work that appealed to generations of artists and engravers. The impossibility of determining the exact source for Połacki's verses is less important than the fact of that inspiration.

The multiplicity of motifs, the detailed and vivid "plastic" imagery, and the distinct stanzaic structure are all features which suggest that "Czasu odmiana i różność" reflects an engraving or set of engravings that attracted Połacki's attention. In similar fashion to "Wściekłemi biegasz końmi, Kupidynie...," the text of "Czasu odmiana i różność" consists of a series of stanzas (quatrains and sextets), each of which develops a single theme or motif. In the first quatrain the author paints an introductory image of great plasticity: on the broad expanse of heaven, allegorical figures representing Day and Night follow each other, with a figure of Winged Time in hot pursuit; underneath this ensemble, representations of the Four Elements are seated on a carriage, above which the Four Winds blow, turning all creation topsy-turvy. The quatrain reads:

> Okrągłe niebo dookoła się toczy,
> Czas dniem i nocą skrzydłastemi kroczy.
> Wiatr, Ogień, Ziemia też na wozie z Wodą.
> Wzwysz cztery wiatry świat w odmianę wiodą.[26]

Following these lines is a series of images that one is tempted to call the "Triumph of the Vices"; a personification of each of the Vices (Wealth, Pride, Falsehood, Envy, War, Vengence) sits in a carriage surrounded by an entourage. Wealth, for example, rides attended by Pride, Pillage, Treachery, and Greed. Usury, Venality, Luxury, and Riot keep pace with the carriage. The entire passage as it appears in the manuscript reads:

[25] L. I. Sazonova, "*Vertograd mnogocvetnyj* Simeona Polockogo (Èvoljucija xudožestvennogo zamysla)," in A. N. Robinson, ed., *Simeon Polockij i ego knigoizdatel'skaja dejatel'nost' (Russkaja staropečatnaja literatura XVI–XVIII v.)*, vol. 3 (Moscow, 1982), pp. 203–58 passim, has referred to "associativeness" (*associativnost'*) as a component of Połacki's aesthetics and especially as the organizing principle of thematic verse cycles in *Vertograd mnogocvetnyj*. It would seem that the same principle manifests itself in his treatment of figures drawn from the Holy Writ or from classical mythology.

[26] The vault of heaven circles around,/Winged Time advances Day and Night./Air and Fire, Earth also [sits] in the carriage of Water./Above, the four winds lead the world into transition.

Bogactwo z corą Pychą triumfuje,
Łupiestwo, Zdrada, Chytrość forytuje.
By konie jakie, Lichwa po prawicy,
Weny z Wydaniem biegą po lewicy.
Próżna zas Roskosz z Weselem pozadazie
Za pysznym wozem stopy swoje kładzie.

Pycha na wozie z Zazdrością, złą corą.
Konmie-Ciekawość, Upór ciągą którą.
Wzgarda po wozie, Chętliwość przy boku
Śmiech, Nieposłuszność z lewej idą w kroku.

Z Zazdrością Wojna, z której urodzona,
Na wóz Nieprawdy wspaniały wsadzona.
Szczypanie Sławy potwarzą się zwozi,
Którym Nienawiści biczem woźnic grozi.
Zła Turbutio, Niepokój fagoszy
Plenują. Niechęć rózgą konie płoszy.

Wojna na wózce niechaj Pomsty siedzi,
U której się nóg Niepokój biedzi.
Zguba, Pustota, wóz ten pociągają,
Gniew na woźnicę, z ognia bicze mają.
Bluźnierstwo, Swary, Głód opłakany
Obok, a pozad mnogi płon zabrany.[27]

This turbulent scene contrasts sharply with the next fifteen lines, which might be called "The Triumph of the Virtues," in which the beneficent effects of Poverty, Patience, Humility, Peace, Faith, Hope, and Charity are extolled. The author writes:

Ubóstwo wozem Niedostatku z corą,
Chorym i słabym wlecze się Pokorą.
Gnuśność pogania, Słabość tu przodkuje.
Cierpliwość osi z Niewolą pilnuje.

[27] Wealth with her daughter Pride triumphs,/Plunder, Treachery, Cunning are outriders./What horses [she has], Usury on the right/Chance with [its] winnings runs on the left./Idle Luxury with Riot/paces in the lee of the magnificent carriage./Pride in the carriage of Envy, [her] evil daughter/Whom Curiosity, Obstinacy draw/Disdain [follows] after the carriage, Vainglory at its side/Mockery and Disobedience keep pace at the left./With Envy is War, of whom she is born,/seated upon the grand carriage of Falsehood./She is conveyed with the Sting of Words with Calumny,/whom the coachman threatens with the whip of Hate./Evil Tumult, Discord servants/take captive./Antipathy frightens with horses with the lash./Let War sit on the carriage of Vicious Vengence,/at whose feet Peace fares badly./Destruction, Desolation pull this carriage,/they have Anger for the coachman with a whip of fire./Blasphemy, Quarrels, and Lamented Hunger/stand by, and in the rear follows a multitude of those taken captive.

Pokora na wóz Cierpień wysadzona,
I pod niej Pokój, cora z niej spłodzona.
Cichość, Stateczność ciągną wmiasto koni.
Bojaźń kieruje i postrachem goni.
Wiara, Nadzieja, i Miłość przy boku
Nie odstępują od jej wozu kroku.

Pokój z Dostatkiem jednomyślności
Użyty za wóz, Woźnicą Miłości,
Za assystenty Prawdę, Pilność mają
I Sprawiedliwość, które przy nich stoją.
Para tu cudnych koni tu usługuje:
Zgoda, Pożytek, któż ich nie lubuje?[28]

The text closes with a description of the fates of the vicious and the virtuous; the former descend to perdition while the latter pass over to eternal delight. The poet writes:

A gdy już przyjdzie ostatni dzień świata,
Tam i złym i dobrym odda się zapłata.
Pyszni bogacze, zazdrośny wojenny
Pójdą do wiecznej na zgubę Gehenny.
Ubóstwo, zasię, Pokój i Pokora
Na wieczną roskosz do rajskiego dwora.[29]

The text of "Czasu odmiana i różność" as presented here is a confusing jumble of themes and motifs whose exact interpretation is problematic. Details in the manuscript, the testimony of contemporary iconography, as well as evidence in the text itself unite to help us understand the meaning of this verse. In the manuscript itself the text is divided into stanzas of unequal length (quatrains and sextets), providing the basis for a thematic breakdown that could also be connected with an individual plate or engraving. The themes of the virtues and the vices and the fates of those who follow either

[28] Poverty in the carriage of Want with her daughter,/Humility, sick and weak drags along./Infirmity catches up, Weakness here proceeds./Patience and Submission tend the axles./Humility in the carriage of Sufferings sits,/and near her Peace, daughter born from her./Tranquility, Stability pull instead of horses./Timidity drives with deadly fear./Faith, Hope, and Charity at the side/not even one pace fall behind./Peace with the Abundance of unanimity/[is] used [as] the carriage, the coachman of Love/has Truth [and] Industry for assistants/And Justice, which stand near them./A pair of wonderful horses attend:/Concord, Benefit, who does not delight in them?

[29] And when finally the last day of the world comes,/there the good and evil will receive their reward./The proud rich and envious warrior/will go to Gehenna to eternal destruction./But Poverty, Peace, and Humility/[will go] to the heavenly court for eternal delight.

one path or the other are known iconographic themes.[30] Finally, each of the stanzas contain tableaux scenes for which Połacki has created images full of very exact detail, in much the same style as in "Wściekłemi biegasz, końmi, Kupidynie. . . ." The cumulative weight of this evidence suggests very strongly that "Czasu odmiana i różność" owes its inspiration to some plate or plates treating the triumph of the virtues over the vices, a theme of indisputable attraction for a fledgling poet who in his mind's eye saw himself in "the angelic image."[31]

Emblematic and iconographic influences on Simiaon Połacki's early versifying is by no means limited to the four texts examined above, but the documentation of each and every instance lies outside the scope of this limited investigation. (I hope to undertake this study elsewhere.) Nevertheless, certain important facts emerge even from the brief analysis of these poems. Perhaps the most important point to make is that the clue to an accurate textological presentation and literary analysis of some of Simiaon Połacki's early poetic experiments lies in the study of emblem books and contemporary iconography. From even this short discussion it is clear that the student Samuił Sitnjanovič-Pjatroŭski was familiar not only with such famous and easily identifiable sources as the emblem books of Andreas Alciati and Joachim Camerarius, but that he drew upon other less well-known iconographic sources as well. Not content with simple *reproductio*, the young adept early incorporated the principle of *imitatio* into his poetic practice. Imitating his sources, he adapted and reshaped the ready materials they provided to reflect his own views, needs, and even the associations they called forth in his creative consciousness. It was this combination of factors that transformed the Renaissance emblems of Alciati and Camerarius into the Baroque "Roskosz," prompted the introduction of Hector and Suzanna into the text of "Wsciekłemi, biegasz końmi, Kupidynie. . .," and led to the creation of the pictorial verse ensemble "Czasu odmiana i różność." All of these efforts to write *ut poesia pictura* demonstrate the skills acquired by Samuił Sitnjanovič-Pjatroŭski/ Simiaon Połacki which he employed so effectively in Moscow as Simeon Polockij.

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30 Chew, *Pilgrimage*, figs. 88, 132. Figure 88, "The Chariot of Sin," stemming from Jan David, *Veredicus Christianus* (Antwerp, 1601), is especially interesting for our investigation. It depicts a sinner seated in a carriage drawn by various animals and driven by a devil down a road that ends in an allegorical depiction of Hell. Hippisley, "Simeon Polotsky's Library," p. 61, lists David's work among those in Polockij's library. It could, therefore, have served as the source of inspiraton for this poem.

31 Hippisley, *Poetic Style*, p. 10, notes that Połacki entered the Połack Epiphany Confraternity Monastery on the second Sunday after Pentecost, 1656.

Ottoman Podillja: The *Eyalet* of Kam''janec', 1672–1699

DARIUSZ KOŁODZIEJCZYK

In October 1672 the Ottoman *dragoman* Panaioti congratulated the French ambassador in Istanbul on the fortunate conjuction that provided two great monarchs—Mehmed IV and Louis XIV—with their respective successes in Poland and the Netherlands.[1] Thanks to Henryk Sienkiewicz's novel, *Pan Wołodyjowski*, the history of the loss of Kam''janec'-Podil's'kyi (Turkish, Kamaniçe; Polish, Kamieniec Podolski) to the Ottomans has become part of Poland's popular history. Unfortunately, the later period has been completely neglected and the stereotypes about the "barbarian night" survive even today. And, in spite of Halil Inalcïk's assertions that the Black Sea and Cossack question is basic to the understanding of seventeenth-century Ottoman history,[2] very little has been done from the Turkish side to clear up this chapter of Ahmed Köprülü's[3] foreign policy.

To begin with, we should consider the economic, demographic, and political factors that might have had some bearing on the Ottoman decision to attack the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth:

Economy: Contrary to common views, Podillja was not a rich province, at least not during the second half of the seventeenth century. All the rivers in Podillja flowed in the "wrong" direction—toward the Black Sea. Since the fifteenth century the economy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had been tied to the export of cereals and forest products to Western Europe. Michael Postan has estimated that the land transport costs between the Midlands and London may have been higher than the water transport costs between Warsaw and London.[4] This cheap transport was possible only because of the great Polish rivers that flowed north. The Italian projects for exporting Ukrainian products through the Black Sea had already failed in

[1] A. Galland, *Journal. . .pendant son séjour à Constantinople (1672–1673)*, ed. Ch. Schefer, vol. 1 (Paris, 1881), p. 225.

[2] See H. Inalcïk, "The Heyday and Decline of the Ottoman Empire," in *The Cambridge History of Islam*, vol. 1A (Cambridge, 1970), p. 350.

[3] The household of Köprülü had remained in power since 1656. Its founder, Mehmed Köprülü, was succeeded in the post of grand vizier by his son, Fazïl Ahmed (1661–1676), and then by his protégé and son-in-law, Kara Mustafa (1676–1683).

[4] M. Postan, "The Trade of Medieval Europe: The North," in *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe*, vol. 2, *Trade and Industry in the Middle Ages*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1987), p. 196.

the sixteenth century. Traditionally, only the Ottomans were accused of blocking these attempts. Sixty years ago, however, Janusz Pajewski discovered a report from a Polish Senate meeting at which it had been decided not to open the Dniester trade because of the fear that this would show the Turkish galleys the way to Poland; it was more prudent to leave the Ukrainian borderland undeveloped than to tempt the Ottomans.[5] These fears are better understood if we remember that the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, with a population three times smaller, had a state budget about thirty times smaller than that of the Ottoman Empire.[6]

Demography: The same reasons that led to the underdevelopment of Ukraine under Poland-Lithuania could have enabled its development as a base within the Ottoman Black Sea system for provisioning Constantinople. For the Ottomans to achieve this level of development in the area, however, intensive colonization and settlement were necessary. From the end of the sixteenth century, the demographic pressures within the Ottoman Empire itself declined sharply. It was unlikely that the Ottomans, having failed to colonize the Hungarian plain and the shores of the Black Sea in Bucak and Yedisan, would succeed in colonizing even more remote Podillja.

Politics: The third, political, factor should have prevented the Ottomans from attacking the Commonwealth in 1672. The attack seemingly contradicted the Ottomans' traditional northern policy of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. The main concern of this policy was to preserve equilibrium between the main rivals, Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy. In the sixteenth century a balance was maintained indirectly by the Crimean Tatars. The Tatars had sufficient reason (slaves and cattle) to raid both neighboring territories, but it was safer to do so under the Ottoman umbrella. In the first half of the sixteenth century, most of the Tatar raids were directed against an actually stronger Poland-Lithuania. During the second half of that century, it was Ivan the Terrible who was considered the primary enemy, and Ottoman relations with Poland were very good in that period. In 1571, the year of the Battle of Lepanto, Poland sold large amounts of tin—a strategic material—to the Ottomans. In 1579, when

[5] "Około portu na Dniestrze pamiętamy, gdyśmy to byli podali między pany Rady Nasze, że ich wiele było ktorzy nań zezwalali, ale jak też nie mniej było, ktorym się zgoła nie podobał. Przeto, że się tym sposobem Turkom droga do ziem naszych ukazuje"; from King Zygmunt August's letter to Piotr Zborowski, 7 December 1567, in J. Pajewski, "Legacja Piotra Zborowskiego do Turcji w 1568 roku. Materiały do historii stosunkow polsko-tureckich za panowania Zygmunta Augusta," *Rocznik Orientalistyczny* 12 (1936): 21.

[6] I give some rough estimations in D. Kołodziejczyk, "Imperium Osmańskie w XVI wieku—kilka uwag o potencjale demograficznym i gospodarczym," *Przegląd Historyczny* 78, no. 3 (1987): 375–94.

William Harborne succeeded in acquiring the first English capitulations with the Ottomans, it was stated that the English merchants would then enjoy the same privileges as the French, Venetian, and Polish subjects.[7]

This policy of equilibrium lasted into the seventeenth century. Successive Polish-Lithuanian triumphs over Muscovy in 1619 and 1632 were followed immediately by two Ottoman attacks against the Commonwealth—in 1621 (Sultan Osman's Xotyn campaign) and in 1633 (led by Abaza Paşa). In 1657 the Tatars were sent, this time to help weaken Poland-Lithuania against the coalition of Sweden, Brandenburg, the Cossack Hetmanate, and Transylvania.

In 1667, after the cataclysms of Xmel'nyc'kyj's uprising and the wars against Sweden, Russia, and Transylvania, the Commonwealth was forced to cede Smolensk and a great part of Eastern Ukraine, including Kiev, to Russia. Polish historians consider this date a turning point in the relations between the two states. Between 1667 and 1795, when the Polish noble state was liquidated, the border moved only westward. Given these circumstances, an Ottoman attack against the Commonwealth could only strengthen Russia.

* * *

As we have seen, neither economic, nor demographic, nor political reasons can account for the war of 1672. This war was, in addition, very unpopular among the Ottoman soldiers. Poland was considered a remote and cold country; it did not offer great spoils and could not even feed the invading army. The road through the Balkans and Moldavia was long and exhausting. Poor systems of communication excluded any greater Ottoman territorial gain in Eastern Europe. Paul Kennedy's term of "strategical overextension"[8] is applicable not only to the Hungarian and Persian limitations on Ottoman growth, but also to the Polish-Ukrainian limitations.

It was not accidental that almost all the Turkish-Polish truces were signed at the end of October. The Turks preferred to be home by *ruz-i Kasïm* (5 November), the day when peasants paid the second installment of the *timar* and other taxes. This was also the end of the season for trade traffic on the Black Sea. If we consider that one month was necessary for assembling troops, at least one month was needed to reach the Polish border, and at least one month more to return home, the time available for

[7] S. A. Skilliter, *William Harborne and the Trade with Turkey 1578–1582: A Documentary Study of the First Anglo-Ottoman Relations* (London, 1977), p. 50.
[8] P. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York, 1987), p.11.

effective campaigning was very limited.

In spite of these conditions, Ahmed Köprülü, one of the greatest Ottoman statesmen, decided to move against Poland. According to his letter to the Crown deputy chancellor Jędrzej Olszowski, the primary factor leading to the war was the relationship with the Zaporozhian Cossacks and their hetman Petro Dorošenko, to whom the Ottomans had granted protection against the Polish king a few years earlier.[9] If we accept this explanation not as a pretext but as a real cause for the war, a further question arises: Why did the Ottomans involve themselves in supporting such an unstable element as the Cossacks, whom they themselves had many reasons to hate and destroy?

From the "classical" point of view, the Cossack raids were considered a just revenge made by a desperate Ukrainian population in reaction to the Tatar raids. The Cossack "revenges," however, were usually directed not against the Tatars but against the rich Turkish towns and villages on the Black Sea. Whereas the Tatars primarily sacked Ukrainian towns and villages that were of lesser economic importance for the Commonwealth, the Cossacks struck at the core of the Ottoman Empire. Narrative sources and Victor Ostapchuk's recent research on *kadi* court registers (*sicil*s) from Trebizond and Üsküdar give evidence of the disastrous effects of Cossack raids on the Black Sea towns.[10] The importance of these raids was also strategic. The Venetian Bailo Giacomo Quirini wrote in 1676 that "da questo mar Nero dipende la difensa e la conservatione del mar Bianco," citing instances when the Ottomans were forced to send galleys against the Cossacks on the Black Sea that could then not be used against the Venetians in the Mediterranean.[11]

By the end of the sixteenth century, Cossack raiding had become more a professional than a temporary activity. Polish control in Ukraine was very weak. After Xmel'nyc'kyj's uprising, it seemed obvious that Poland was no longer able to suppress the Cossacks. It was then that the Ottomans seem to have made their desperate decision to stop the Cossack attacks, even at the expense of breaking their traditional policy and further weakening the Commonwealth vis-à-vis Russia. While the direct destruction of the Cossacks

[9] Quoted in the chronicle of Silahdar (*Silahdar tarihi* [Istanbul, 1928], vol. 1, pp. 569–72); a copy of the contemporary Polish translation is in the Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych (hereafter AGAD), Warsaw, AR, dz. II, ks. 22, pp. 819–21.

[10] V. Ostapchuk, "The Effect of the Cossack Naval Raids on the Muslim and Non-Muslim Populations of the Ottoman Black Sea," paper read at the Seminar in Ukrainian Studies, Harvard University, 12 March 1992.

[11] *Le Relazioni degli stati Europei lette al senato dagli ambasciatori Veneziani nel secolo decimosettimo*, ed. N. Barozzi and G. Berchet, series 5, *Turchia*, pt. 2 (Venice, 1871), p. 168.

appeared unlikely, offering them Ottoman protection and thus directing their attacks northward did seem a possible solution.

Many of the Cossacks and Ukrainian peasants greeted the Ottomans with hope following the twenty years of wars and the recent partition of Ukraine between Poland and Russia. This response is mentioned in the Ottoman chronicles of Haci Ali and Silahdar, as well as in Polish sources.[12] The typical Ottoman policy of supporting the Orthodox Ukrainian peasants against the Catholic Polish nobility and the extension of the *millet* policy toward Armenian and Jewish merchants meant that only the Polish Catholic community could be considered totally opposed to the new rulers. And even from among that group there were some *poturczeńcy*.[13]

To control the Cossacks, however, an active Ottoman presence—a stronghold ruled directly from Istanbul—was necessary. As early as 1670, the Polish envoy warned the king that the Turks wanted to capture Kam''janec'. That Kam''janec' was a main strategic target of the war can be deduced from the activity—or, rather, inactivity—of the Ottoman army after it seized the fortress in August 1672: the Ottomans seemed well satisfied with this conquest.

The immense strategic importance of Kam''janec' in securing Ottoman rule over Cossack Ukraine and Moldavia is evident from its geographic location. According to Metin Kunt, a parallel role was played by the new *eyalet*s (provinces) of Yanova (Romanian, Ineu) and Varad (Romanian, Oradea) in relation to Transylvania.[14] In times of crisis, and given the unstable allegiance of the three Danubian principalities, such bulwarks were indispensable. In this context the strategic importance of seizing Košice (Kassau), which in fact ensued a few years later, is also evident. Seizing Podillja enabled the strengthening of control over the Crimean Khanate. Two major Tatar routes to the Commonwealth, the *Wołoski* (Turkish, *Eflak*) and the *Kuczmański* (Turkish, *Göçmen yolu*), ran across this province.

In addition to these strategic reasons, two other classical explanations for the Ottoman attack against the Commonwealth should be noted: the use of continual campaigns in maintaining necessary discipline in the army and the eagerness of Sultan Mehmed IV (who had never taken part personally in a

12 Haci Ali, *Fethname-i Kamaniçe*, Süleymaniye Kütüpkanesi, Lala Ismail 304, fol. 101a; *Silahdar tarihi*, vol. 1, p. 610; compare "Copia di relatione venuta dalla Corte di Polonia"—[the Turks] "dichiaratosi di trattare male la solta nobilta e bene la gente rostica"—in J. Woliński, "Materiały do dziejów wojny polsko-tureckiej 1672–1676," *Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości* 10, pt. 1 (1964): 260.

13 Polish, *poturczeniec*: a person who has "become a Turk" (i.e., accepted Islam).

14 M. Kunt, "17. yüzyılda Osmanlı kuzey politikası üzerine bir yorum," in *Bogaziçi Universitesi Dergisi, Beşeri Bilimler-Humanities* 4–5 (1976–1977): 111–16.

campaign) to become a Muslim *ghazi* at the expense of a weak neighbor.

The Commonwealth was completely unprepared for the war. Great Hetman Jan Sobieski, head of the "French faction," was in sharp conflict with the pro-Habsburg King Michał. The hetman warned of war and asked for money to raise an army, but his opponents claimed that such an army could overthrow the king and that the Turkish threat was being used as a pretext. It was believed that the few Tatar captives the hetman sent to Warsaw were in fact disguised Armenian merchants from Lviv. The commonly held opinion was that "the Turks will arrive to sell soap, raisins, and carpets as they do every year"; the danger of war was merely the "hetman's imagination."[15]

A remarkably situated fortress, Kam''janec'-Podil's'kyj was considered in the sixteenth century to be a main bulwark against "barbarism" and was compared to La Valetta in Malta. The city was surrounded by the deep gorge of the river Smotryč and had vertical granite walls. Between the city and the castle a moat was built with a bridge over it. A hydrotechnical system raised the level of water in the gorge. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Dutch *Hornwerk* was added (the Poles called it *Nowy Zamek*,[16] and the Turks, *tabye-i kebir*[17]). However, the fortress that had been impenetrable in the sixteenth century was no longer unconquerable in the epoch of Vauban; the Ottoman army, with its modern artillery and assisted by French renegade specialists, was able to seize the castle, which was situated higher than the city.

The Ottoman army departed from Edirne on 4 June and reached Kam''janec' on 18 August.[18] After suffering nine days of heavy bombardment and the loss of the *Hornwerk*, the Poles surrendered. On the following Friday, 2 September, Mehmed IV celebrated the *cuma namazï*[19] in the former cathedral. He appointed a governor (*beylerbeyi*) of the new province and a judge (*kadi*) and ordered the establishment of three pious foundations (*vakïfs*). The viziers Ahmed Köprülü and Musahib Mustafa, the future grand vizier Kara Mustafa, and the chief preacher Vani Efendi followed the sultan's example. Seven churches were converted to mosques and two

[15] See "Relacya Kamieńca wziętego przez Turków w roku 1672 opisana wierszem polskim przez Stanisława Makowieckiego z Wielkiego Łukoszyna, stolnika latyczewskiego," in AGAD, Sucha (Branicki Family Collection), sygn. 168/199.

[16] Literally, New Castle.

[17] Great bastion.

[18] For more detailed chronology and further bibliography, see my forthcoming book, *Ejalet kamieniecki 1672–1699. Turcy na Podolu* (to be published by Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe).

[19] Friday prayers.

schools and a high school[20] were founded. According to Polish reports, the Turks registered all property in Kam''janec'. In this register, which survives in the Istanbul archives, several names of citizens of Kam''janec' can be found: for instance, the bishop Wawrzyniec Lanckoroński appears in the register as "Lançkoronçki papas-i kebir." The Christians who remained in the city retained their property. The workshops, shops, and houses of Christians who left the city with the Polish soldiers were sold to the new Muslim military settlers.[21]

According to reports of Polish spies, only Poles and a number of Armenians remained loyal to the former sovereign. Jews, who by then had been excluded from sharing in city rights, were now allowed to settle in Kam''janec'. De la Magdeleine, a French captive and interpreter in the Turkish camp, recorded a story that characterized the internal clashes in the city. Since all the Catholic churches were converted into mosques, the Poles remaining in Kam''janec' were given an Orthodox church. The following day, a delegation of the Ukrainian Orthodox population asked the Turks to keep dogs in the church rather than give it to the Poles.[22]

Under the terms of the Treaty of Bučač (Polish, Buczacz), signed 18 October 1672, the province of Podillja was ceded to the Ottoman Empire. The Commonwealth agreed to pay a yearly tribute. The Cossack Hetmanate of Dorošenko retained its autonomy under Ottoman protection. The Ottomans tried to maintain good relations with the Ukrainian hetman and even ceded to him the important Podilljan city of Mohyliv as a life tenure. This did not prevent relations from souring in the following years.

The defeat of 1672 prompted a temporary general reconciliation of factions within Poland. The diet rejected the Bučač treaty and voted new taxes. The army was increased to over fifty thousand, and Sobieski was able to defeat the *serasker* Hüseyin Paşa at Xotyn (Polish, Chocim; Turkish, Hotin) in November 1673—a victory that brought him the Polish crown after King Michał's death.

Sobieski was one of the few Polish statesmen to realize both the importance of a Baltic policy and the threat from Hohenzollern Prussia, a former Polish tributary that had gained independence in 1657. It is, therefore, ironic that this man spent almost his entire reign in war against the Ottomans.

20 In an Ottoman register we find *Şeyh 'ül-kurra*, a title applicable to a lower *medrese* professor; see Istanbul, Başbakanlïk Arşivi (hereafter BA), Maliyeden Müdevver (hereafter MM) 4559, p. 4

21 BA, MM 709 passim.

22 C. de la Magdeleine, *Le Miroir ottoman avec un succinct récit de tout ce qui c'est passé de considerable pendant la guerre des Turcs en Pologne, jusqu'en 1676* (Basle, 1677), p. 10.

After three years of successive campaigns with no results, the armistice at Žuravno was signed in October 1676. It is not surprising that among the intermediaries were the Moldavian *hospodar* Duca and the Crimean khan. Duca wanted to throw off the burden of provisioning Kam''janec', and the khan was furious that the Ottomans had succeeded in protecting their new subjects against the Tatars more efficiently than the Poles had done. Both Duca and the khan, as well as the *serasker* Şeytan Ibrahim Paşa, led the Poles to believe that their ambassador in Istanbul would obtain much better peace conditions for them than had been provided in the Bučač treaty.

Sobieski hoped that, after signing the new treaty, the Commonwealth would attack Prussia-Brandenburg, as part of a secret alliance with Louis XIV. Contrary to expectations, however, the mission of the palatine Jan Gniński in Istanbul proved to be very difficult. The new treaty was in fact a confirmation of Bučač, with the exemption of the tribute known as *pişkeş*. Only two small fortresses in Right-Bank Ukraine—Bila Cerkva (Polish, Biała Cerkiew) and Pavoloč—were left in Polish hands. When Gniński returned to Poland in 1678, it was too late to attack Prussia. In the same year the treaty at Nijmegen was signed, and Louis XIV was no longer interested in an alliance with Poland.

The crude manners of the new grand vizier Kara Mustafa toward European envoys are well known and his treatment of Gniński was long remembered in Poland.[23] The peace treaty was accepted by the Diet, but the sense of threat and feeling of humiliation were not erased. The possibility of Ottoman occupation may appear to us today to have been unlikely, but the seventeenth-century Poles felt surrounded. The new Ottoman border was only one hundred kilometers from Lviv, and less than two hundred kilometers from Cracow. There was another factor in Polish internal policy which, combined with Catholic propaganda, forced the king to join the Habsburgs in 1683: nobles from the lost territories preserved their provincial diets and their seats in the Diet; with their famous right of veto, these men could paralyze every legislative or fiscal decision. Every diet held in the second half of the seventeenth century began with a reassurance that the so-called *exulantes* would regain their provinces.

In the nineteenth century, after the partitions, some Polish historians began to treat the victory of Vienna as a great mistake. Some of them asserted that it would have been better to help the Turks seize Vienna rather than defend it. The recent works of Zbigniew Wójcik, the foremost expert

[23] Gniński's report from the mission was read to the Diet in 1679. It has been published, together with a diary and collection of letters, in F. Pułaski, *Źródła do poselstwa Jana Gnińskiego wojewody chełmińskiego do Turcyi w latach 1677–1678* (Warsaw, 1907).

on Sobieski's times, prove that all external and internal factors led the Polish king to Vienna in 1683. He simply had no other choice.[24]

Following the impressive victory of the German Empire and the Commonwealth in 1683, the Poles were still unable to regain Kam''janec' until the Karlowitz treaty seventeen years later. The reasons usually given to explain this delay are the shortage of Polish infantry and artillery and the friction between the king and the new hetman, Stanisław Jabłonowski. At least two other factors must be added. The first was the very effective Ottoman system of provisioning and the second the heroism of the besieged. Every year, in spite of a Polish blockade, convoys of hundreds of carts and oxen, protected by Turkish soldiers, were sent from Silistra, Nikopil', and Bender[25] to Kam''janec'. In the later period, this task fell mainly to the Tatars and Moldavians. In a 1686 letter to the grand vizier, the governor of Kam''janec', Hüseyin Boşnak, reported that even during Ramadan, every night after *iftar*, the soldiers continued fortification work by torchlight.[26] Another source reports that people often starved, the corpses of horses lay on the streets, and in the winter Turkish soldiers burned wooden roofs to warm themselves.[27]

There is, however, another problem to raise. After the Swedish wars, the Polish infantry and artillery were not as ineffective as has often been assumed. In spite of this, Sobieski never attempted an assault on Kam''janec'. According to his plans, the Polish army should first seize Moldavia and then force the starving garrison of Kam''janec' to surrender. From a strategic point of view, it seems obvious that attempting to secure Polish rule in Moldavia, with the Ottomans still in control of the fortress at the rear, was hazardous at best. But it was not the strategy which prevailed. Sobieski's idée fixe was to secure the throne for his son Jakub. In the Commonwealth, where the nobility considered a hereditary monarchy the beginning of *absolutum dominium*, the fulfillment of such a plan would prove difficult. According to the king's plans, Moldavia would become a small hereditary principality of the Sobieski family. No noble would commit funds for such a plan; but, as long as Kam''janec' was not reconquered, the king could be sure that the Diet would vote taxes for the Turkish war. This

[24] For the Polish internal and external policies of that time, see especially Z. Wójcik, *Rzeczpospolita wobec Turcji i Rosji 1674–1679* (Wrocław, 1976), and idem, *Jan Sobieski 1629–1696* (Warsaw, 1983).

[25] Present-day Bendery.

[26] *Defter-i masarifat-i ta' mirat*, in the Wojewodzkie Archiwum Państwowe (Cracow), Oddział na Wawelu, Archiwum Podhoreckie, teki A. Potockiego, pudło 14, teka 4.

[27] Letter from Lviv, 27 January 1695, in K. Sarnecki, *Pamiętniki z czasów Jana Sobieskiego. Diariusz i relacje z lat 1691–1696*, ed. J. Woliński (Wrocław, 1958), p. 367.

is not to say that Sobieski did not want to recapture Kam''janec'; he was, however, certainly much more concerned with capturing Moldavia.

In sum, for nineteen of the twenty-seven years of their rule in Podillja, the Ottomans were confined to the blockaded fortress, and the *beylerbeyi* of Podillja was in fact no more than the commander of the garrison in Kam''janec'. Only between the Treaty of Bučač in 1672 and the defeat of Hüsayin Paşa at Xotyn in 1673 and between the Treaty of Žuravno in 1676 and the establishment of the alliance in Vienna in 1683 can we speak of a normally functioning *eyalet*.

* * *

What first strikes one upon looking at the list of Kam''janec' *beylerbeyi*s (see the chart on pp. 100–101) is that the profession of Ottoman *amir* was not very safe—at least not during the great war. Most of the amirs died at the hands of others. Usually transferred *from* and *to* the neighboring European provinces, sooner or later they were also moved to the other parts of this three-continental empire. Because the average appointment of a *beylerbeyi* at Kam''janec' was less then two years, it was probably considered neither an advance nor a demotion. However, during the last ten years we can see the depreciation of this post. For Ahmed, the ninth *beylerbeyi*, Kam''janec' was probably his first important post. He must also have been inexperienced, provoking the riot in which he was killed by the soldiers (on the other hand, it probably did not take much to provoke a riot in a starving garrison). Kahraman Paşa, the man appointed to succeed Ahmed, does not fit the scheme at all. He remained ten years in the post, and then, after Kam''janec' was returned to Poland, he was appointed as only a *sancakbeyi* of Anatolian Nigde. The chronicles of Defterdar and Raşid call him a member of the Kam''janec' garrison; a Polish report even states that he was elected from among the rioters and later confirmed by the Porte. Silahdar defines him as a relative of the khan, which is also probable, given the good relations between Istanbul and Bahçesarayï in the 1690s and the Crimean participation in provisioning Kam''janec'.[28]

The average number of soldiers in Kam''janec' exceeded six thousand; of these, three thousand were *Yeniçeriyan-i Dergah-i Ali*[29] (the full name of

[28] Compare: Mehmed Efendi, *Zübdet'ül-Vekayi'at*, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hamidiye 949, fol. 180a–180b; *Tarih-i Raşid Efendi*, vol. 1, fol. 151b; *Silahdar tarihi*, vol. 2, pp. 410–12; Sobieski's letter to J. Dowmont, dated 11 March 1689, in "Kopiariusz korespondencji królewskiej," AGAD, AKW, Dz. tur., k. 78, t. 483, no. 808, p. 32.

[29] Janissaries of the sultan's court. For instance, in 1678 the garrison consisted of 2,782 central janissaries, 283 artillerymen (*topçu*), 261 armorers (*cebeci*), and 2,055 local soldiers (BA, D.BŞM 343; BA, MM 3113). To this should be added over 500 *timar*-holders (compare

the central janissaries, to distinguish them from the local troops). With more than two hundred guns, Kam''janec' was among the largest and most important of the Ottoman fortresses—Baghdad, Buda, Belgrade, and Candia in Crete. The other garrisons in Podillja—in Bar, Medžybiž, Jazlovec', and Čortkiv—barely exceeded one hundred soldiers each.

The *eyalet* of Kam''janec', like other seventeenth-century Ottoman provinces (Crete, Varad, Yanova, and Uyvar) was much smaller than the classical sixteenth-century Ottoman province. In all the new, late seventeenth-century *eyalet*s mentioned above, the Ottomans tried to introduce the classical landholding (*timar*) system—a system that had already been abandoned in the central provinces. These efforts should perhaps be considered within the context of Köprülü's policy of strengthening the state under the motto of returning it to the golden age of Sultan Suleyman.

The main task facing the Ottoman bureaucracy in the newly conquered territory was to register all taxpayers and sources of income. The first such register (*defter-i mufassal*) for Podillja was prepared probably in 1672 but is not extant. It is mentioned in Polish reports and in the later Turkish register. The war interrupted this first survey.

In 1680, only after the new treaty (at Žuravno) was confirmed, the former *defterdar* (treasurer), Ahmed Paşa, was appointed as the new Kam''janec' *beylerbeyi* and given the task of setting the new boundaries with the Polish commissioners. Both detailed Polish and Turkish reports on this action exist.[30]

After setting the borders, the new *mufassal* register was prepared (between the autumn of 1680 and the spring of 1681). The *eyalet* was divided into four *sancak*s (sub-provinces) and nineteen *nahiye*s (districts). The central *sancak* of Kam''janec' comprised the valleys of the most important rivers—the Dniester, Smotryč, and Zbruč. The three other *sancak*s of Bar, Jazlovec', and Medžybiž were much smaller. The sole *kadi* resided in Kam''janec'.

Defter-i ruznamçe, 1682, Poznań, Wojewódzkie Archiwum Państwowe, sygn. 2).

30 The Turkish copy is in the Biblioteka Czartoryskich (Cracow), MS 609, no. 21, fols. 81–85 (pp. 159–68), and is also registered in *Defter-i mufassal* (see below) on pp. 378–83; Polish reports can be found in AGAD, AKW, Dz. tur., k. 77, t. 479, no. 803 (detailed relation), and Biblioteka Czartoryskich, Teka Naruszewicza 178, pp. 187–96 (copy of the official protocol of delimitation). See also [J. Lelewel], *Materiały do dziejów polskich* (Poznań, 1847), pp. 165–67 (the text of another copy, burned in 1944); and the memoirs of Florian Drobysz Tuszyński, a nobleman-soldier assigned to escort Polish commissioners, in *Dwa pamiętniki z XVII wieku...*, ed. A. Przyboś (Wrocław, 1954), p. 66.

Considering Heath Lowry's skepticism about the usefulness of *defter*s as demographic sources,[31] close examination of the Podilljan *mufassal* is far from discouraging. Whereas the Polish inventories and poll-tax registers from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries mentioned fewer than seven hundred settlements in Podillja, the *defter-i mufassal* lists over eight hundred—even more than on the best maps from the nineteenth century. Another point to note is that almost 70 percent of these settlements were deserted (*hali ez reayet*). The population of Podillja was estimated at 96,000 by the end of the sixteenth century;[32] in 1662, after Xmel'nyc'kyj's uprising, it was only 55,000;[33] and, according to the *mufassal*, in 1680 the population, excluding the soldiers of the garrison, did not exceed 40,000.[34] The catastrophic depopulation in the seventeenth-century Commonwealth was particularly extreme in Podillja. In addition to the Cossack uprisings, Tatar raids, Polish pacifications, and the robberies, plagues, and climatic changes usually linked with the seventeenth-century global crisis, the Ottomans played their part in depopulating that particular province. They cannot, however, be held solely responsible, as has been done before. On the contrary, the Ottomans made some effort to resettle the province, especially the Dniester region (*Podnistrov''ja*; Polish, *Podniestrze*).

Their efforts, however, did not bring sufficient results. In the spring of 1683, just before the new war, the *beylerbeyi* of Kam''janec', who already enjoyed extra income (*arpalïk*) from the Bulgarian *sancak* of Nikopol', was given, in addition, a yearly salary (*salariye*) from the Anatolian *sancak* of Bolu, because the peasants in his *has* domain in Podillja had not yet returned (*reaya henüz yerlerine gelmedi*).[35]

According to the Ottoman provincial budget drawn up in 1681, thirteen million *akçe* were spent yearly in Kam''janec', primarily for soldiers' pay (*mevacib*). Of this amount, less than 3 percent was collected in Podillja

[31] See H. Lowry, "The Ottoman Tahrir Defterleri as a Source for Social and Economic History: Pitfalls and Limitations," unpublished paper prepared for the Fourth International Congress on Turkish Social and Economic History, Munich, 4–8 August 1986.

[32] A. Jabłonowski, *Polska XVI wieku pod względem geograficzno-statystycznym*, vol. 8, *Ziemie Ruskie, Wołyń i Podole*, Źrodła dziejowe, 19 (Warsaw, 1889), pp. 12, 62, 73.

[33] AGAD, ASK, oddz. I, sygn. 71, *Pogłowne generalne* (Poll-tax register from 1662); author's estimations. On the general depopulation of Podillja in that period, see M. Krykun, "Važlive dželo dlja vyvčennja istorii mist i sil Ukrajiny (Lustracija Podil's'koho vojevodstva 1665 r.)," *Naukovo-informacijnyi biuleten' Arxivnoho upravlinnja URSR*, 1963, no. 2/3, pp. 23–24.

[34] BA, Tapu Tahrir, no. 805.

[35] BA, Ali Emiri, IV. Mehmed, no. 1659 (*berat* issued for Abdurrahman Paşa). The same order is confirmed in *Ahkam defteri* (BA, MM 2931, p. 29).

itself; the rest was sent from the central treasury.[36]

In September 1683, war again broke out in Podillja. In 1684 Polish soldiers removed thousands of peasants from Southern Podillja to the neighboring provinces with the aim of starving the Kam''janec' garrison. According to a letter from Sobieski to the pope, some of these peasants had become Muslims under Ottoman rule and had been circumcized, though their wives had remained more faithful to the old religion.[37]

In conclusion, let us return to "the great politics." Polish historians agree that the statesman Ahmed Köprülü made a great mistake in taking Kam''janec': the conquest pushed the Commonwealth toward the alliance with the Habsburgs and into the long exhausting war that caused Ottoman defeat on one hand and the further weakening of the Commonwealth on the other. The real winners were the Habsburgs and Russia. This analysis is generally acceptable, though the issues were somewhat more complicated. In 1672, when the decision for the conquest of Kam''janec' was made, the Commonwealth did not appear capable of making such great efforts as the rescue of Vienna or even the Xotyn victory. Furthermore, the Muscovy of Aleksei Mikhailovich did not yet resemble the Russian Empire of Peter the Great and Catherine II.

During the twenty-seven years of its existence, the *eyalet* of Kam''janec' ensured Moldavian and Crimean loyalty. The Cossacks—the main reason for its foundation—seem to have disappeared from the Black Sea, although this matter still needs further research. The usefulness of Kam''janec' as a northern bulwark of the Ottoman Empire was proved after 1699 when the Ottomans took Xotyn—first as a *nahiye* and then as an independent *sancak*—from the Moldavian *hospodar* to replace Kam''janec'.

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36 BA, MM 4559 (this budget covers two years).

37 "Videre nuper fuit non sine horrore septuagenarios rusticos, Mahometanam ultra et benevole amplexos sectam, circumcisos, majorisque constantiae foeminas repertas, que maritis suis contactum Mahometismi aut dissuasere, aut rursus ab eo retraxere"; "Copia literarum a serenissimo Poloniae Rege ad Sanctissumum," in A. Załuski, *Epistolarum historico-familiarum tomus primus*, pt. 2 (Brunsbergae, 1710), p. 899.

BEYLERBEYIS OF KAM''JANEC'*

	Nicknames	Period of Service	Transfered from	to	Other Important Functions during Lifetime	Date of Death (Cause of Death)
1. Halil	Koca, Küstendilli	2/9/1672–winter 1675/6	Özü (Očakiv)	Bosna	1668, *beyl.* of Rumeli; 1685, *serdar* in Mora (Peloponnesus)	1685 (in siege of Coron)
2. Ibrahim†	Uzun, Arnavut	winter 1675/6 –9/1677	Budin	Budin	1677–83, *serdar* in Hungary	1683 (strangled)
3. Halil (second term of service)	see 1.	9/1677–beginning of 1680	Bosna	Bosna (?)	see 1.	see 1.
4. Ahmed	Defterdar	beginning of 1680–fall 1682	Bosna	Temeşvar (or Yanova?)	*defterdar*; 1675–76, *beyl.* of Egypt	1683 (natural death during the siege of Vienna)
5. Abdurrahman	Arnavut	fall 1682–12/1684 (in duty until 1/1685)	Bosna	Budin	1676–81, *beyl.* of Egypt; 1686, *serdar* in Hungary	1686 (during siege of Budin)

6. Mahmud	Tokatlï	12/1684	Özü	died in Kam''janec'	1682, *kaymakam*	1684 (*soguktan*, "from cold")
7. Mustafa†	Silahdar, Bïyïklï, Bozoklu	2/1685–5/1686	Özü	Özü	1680, kapudan paşa; 1693, grand vizier	1699 (gout)
8. Hüseyin	Sarï, Boşnak	5/1686–fall 1688	vizier (*kubbe neşin*)	Özü	1689, *serdar* of Danube	after 1690
9. Ahmed	Yegen	fall 1688–1/1689	— (?)	died in Kam''janec'	—	1689 (killed in riot)
10. Kahraman Mustafa	—	1/1689–22/9/1699	"yalï agasï and the relative of the Crimean khan" (Silahdar chronicle); "member of the garrison" (Defterdar and Raşid chronicles; Sobieski [see fn. 28])	Nigde (as *sancakbeyi*)	— (?)	— (?)

* Based on the Ottoman chronicles by Silahdar (*Silahdar tarihi* [Istanbul, 1928]), Defterdar (Mehmed Efendi, *Zübdet'ül-Vekayi'at*, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hamidiye 949), and Raşid (*Tarih-i Raşid Efendi*, vol. 1 [Constantinople 1153 (1740)]); M. Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani*, vols. 1–4 (Istanbul, 1308–1311 [1890–1893]); Polish reports and letters; the Ottoman documents in the archives of Istanbul and Cracow; and especially the register of *timar* bestowals (*Defter-i ruznamçe*), held in the Poznań archives. For more details, with references, see my book, *Ejalet kamieniecki 1672–1699. Turcy na Podolu* (forthcoming, December 1992). Fragmentary lists of Kam''janec' *beylerbeyis* are given in Z. Abrahamowicz, "Die Türkische Herrschaft in Podolien (1672–1699)," in *Actes du Premier congrès international des études balkaniques et sud-est européennes (Sofia, 1966)*, vol. 3 (Sofia, 1969), pp. 777–80; and in R. Abou-el-Haj, *The 1703 Rebellion and the Structure of Ottoman Politics* (Istanbul, 1984), appendix 1.

† Ibrahim and Mustafa were successive husbands of Mehmed IV's sister, Beyhan.

G. L. Piatakov (1890–1937): A Mirror of Soviet History*

ANDREA GRAZIOSI

I. INTRODUCTION

If I had to define what I am trying to do, I would say that I am attempting to write a piece of the "normal"[1] history of a phenomenon which is so atypical, "abnormal," and thus so scientifically interesting, as the history of the USSR in the twentieth century.

I would add that I hope in this way to contribute to the reconstruction of that crucial period in European history that has been defined as the Thirty Years' War of our time. Indeed, I believe that Soviet history is an integral part of a series of phenomena linked to the First World War. This is not to deny the importance of the imperial Russian past. To the contrary, the impact of the war in each country was filtered through the peculiarities of that country's history, and the historical material sedimented in each country triggered the subsequent historical developments. This material was in part the fruit of such common processes—experienced everywhere albeit in different ways—as urbanization, industrialization, and some cultural phenomena and was in part absolutely specific. And yet, it would be a serious mistake not to take into account, even when studying small portions of Soviet history, that this history itself is part of that process of "going backward" (the quotation marks are necessary because, of course, history never moves backward) and of the barbarization of the continent which followed World War I and which was immediately felt, though in different ways, by Croce and Meinecke, Cassirer and Rostovtsev.

* This paper, written before the crisis of the Soviet state and slightly modified after working in Russian archives in 1992, puts forth some of the hypotheses which have emerged from my research in the hope that they will receive further criticism. During 1990–1991, I discussed the paper with friends and colleagues at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (Paris), at the Kennan Institute, and at the Universities of Harvard, Yale, and Michigan (Ann Arbor). The title is, I think, Paul Bushkovitch's idea. The EHESS, the Kennan Institute, the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, the TsSGO MGU, the Italian Ministry of Research, and the Italian National Research Council made its writing possible.

[1] I say "normal" because, as a consequence of its political, ideological, and moral charge, Soviet history has, at times, been dealt with in rather strange ways.

I have decided to write my piece of this "normal" history of the USSR through the biography of Georgii Leonidovich Piatakov (1890–1937), a Russian born in Kiev into a family of industrialists, who was, during the course of his life, a leader of the Left Communists; a founder and first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party (KP[b]U); the premier of a government during the Civil War; the president of the State Bank (Gosbank) and of the First Labor Army; and, above all, the organizer of Soviet industrialization as vice-president of the Supreme Council of National Economy (VSNKh) in the 1920s and as first deputy of the Commissariat of Heavy Industry (NKTP) in the 1930s. Lenin, in his "Testament," included Piatakov among the six most important Bolshevik leaders, noting that he was a man of exceptional abilities, though one who tended to see only the administrative side of a problem. And, Piatakov was a friend of Bukharin and of Trotsky, whom he betrayed, and a close collaborator of Feliks Dzerzhinskii and Sergo Ordzhonikidze, to whose deaths he was in some way connected.

This brief outline alone would be sufficient explanation for the reasons behind my choice, given that little has been written about Piatakov.[2] It was not, however, the fact that his life is one of the many unexplored territories of Soviet history that attracted me. Rather, I chose Piatakov's life to study because of the role he played in two key fields—that of nationality and that of state intervention in the economy—whose interplay determined the outcome of Soviet history, and because it promised interesting insights into the workings of ideology and the "personal" question.

Furthermore, unlike other biographies that have been published—Trotsky's and Bukharin's, for example—whose relevance to Soviet history ceases around 1929, Piatakov's biography seemed to me to constitute a good observation point, not only for the Civil War and the 1920s, but *equally* for the 1930s. It thus reflects a larger slice of Soviet history, all the more so in view of the variety of people and places with which Piatakov was linked.

2 See his autobiography in *Deiateli SSSR i oktiabr'skoi revoliutsii*, in *Entsiklopedicheskii slovar' Granat* 41, pt. 2, 133 (Moscow, 1989; new edition); J. Bushnell, "Pyatakov," in *The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History* (Gulf Breeze, Fla., 1976–1989); V. F. Soldatenko, "H. L. Piatakov: Epizody zhyttia i diial'nosti na Ukraini," *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1989, no. 4; V. F. Soldatenko and M. M. Sapun, "Sekretar pershoho TsK KPbU," in *Pro mynule zarady maibutn'oho* (Kiev, 1989); and the forthcoming M. M. Sapun, *H. Piatakov: Shtrykhy do polytychnoho portreta* (Kiev, 1992). I have published " 'Building the First System of State Industry in History': Piatakov's VSNKh and the Crisis of the NEP, 1923–1926," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* 32, no. 4 (October-December 1991): 539–80.

Lastly, Piatakov's life provides a window onto that European panorama of which I have spoken, not only because of his Ukrainian experience, or because of the special relations he had with Germany, but also because his life is in itself an interesting reflection of the "aberration" of European history after 1914, as well as of some of its roots in the previous period.

Before beginning, it is necessary to mention some of the limitations and some of the biases of this essay. These derive first of all from the fact that this is a work still in progress. I am, therefore, still submerged in its "details"; hence the roughness of many of the generalizations I propose.

Then, though it is true that I have already worked on all of the periods of Piatakov's life and on all the problems of a certain importance connected to it, it is also true that not all of the work is at the same point of completion. There is, therefore, a certain lack of balance between the various parts of this paper; as in the case of the generalizations proposed, I feel that this will not entirely jeopardize its success.

Obviously, the sources used to date also lead to biases. My work was planned and begun before the opening of the Soviet archives, and this is visible in the end product. To fill this gap, in addition to resorting to the available archives (like those of Trotsky or the French ones for the period of Piatakov's stay in Paris), I then decided to be as ecumenical as possible in the collection of sources; I believe I have collected and looked at a significant part of the available material, including Piatakov's edited writings (which number in the thousands, if we consider the *prikazy* he wrote). Eventually, I was able to begin working in the former Soviet archives, whose immense riches I have, however, only begun to exploit.[3]

A particular type of bias derives from the historical period upon which I focus. It is all the more important because using the figure of Piatakov to try to discuss movements, and thus possible periodizations, of Soviet history is at the center of this essay. Therefore, it is necessary to be aware of what we see and what we do not if we detach the period delimitated by Piatakov's life from that history and treat it as though it were an isolated section. To give an example: to end with 1937 means that our history ends with the triumph of despotism. If we had ended in the early 1930s—say in 1932–1933—with a biography of Smilga or of Riutin, for example; or in

[3] I was able to work in TsGANKh, TsGAOR, and the former Central Party Archives (TsPA; now RTsKhIDNI) and found plenty of material. However, while Piatakov's activities as chairman of the TsPKP in the Donbass, of the TsUGProm VSNKh, of the Glavkontskom, and of Gosbank are extremely well documented, most of the NKTP papers were destroyed by fire in 1941. Furthermore, I have not yet been able to see Piatakov's personal fond, if such a thing exists. See also fn. 14.

1953–1954, at the death of the dictator; or again in the early 1960s; then we would have seen things very differently: a terrible crisis in the building of the despotism which we see triumphant in 1937 (think of the famine, the suicide of Stalin's wife, Ordzhonikidze's howl of pain in the fall of 1932 over the state of industry, etc.) in the first case; the serpentine decadence of the "pure" form of despotism in the second; the first serious crisis of the mature industrial administrative system, which followed the Khrushchevian boom of the 1950s that was made possible by the removal of despotic restrictions and by the geographic expansion of the empire, in the third. If, lastly, we had chosen to look back over Soviet history from our times (also possible biographically, since the time span covered by the Soviet system is short enough to be included in the lives of men such as Mikoian, Molotov, or Kaganovich), we should then be dealing with the end of the system that Piatakov helped to create.

Finally, there are limits and biases connected to the perspective imposed by the choice of Piatakov. In studying this man, one inevitably finds oneself producing "traditional" history, a history of elites and of bureaucracies—that is, of a state—in which continuity has a special importance. Ours is also the history of a "true believer," in which ideology and ideas played a role they did not play in reality. In the case of the Soviet Union, which has already been analyzed excessively in an ideological key, this particular bias is especially serious. As Ciliga noted, many of the Stalinists soon took as their motto, and applied generally, that maxim which Lenin coined for the intraparty conflicts and which Trotsky threw at Ordzhonikizde as an accusation in a bitter letter of the 1920s: "kto verit na slovo—tot idiot." Furthermore, given Piatakov's interests and his urban-industrial experience, our history is one which leaves the countryside, whose importance is obvious and well known, in the background.

A few words, in conclusion, about the organization of this essay. Of all the perspectives opened by Piatakov's experiences, I have chosen to concentrate on those which offer a view onto some particular "pieces" of Soviet history. By using the facts connected with his biography, I have tried to compose an account of the movements and developments of these pieces and in this way to follow the evolution of the Soviet system from diverse standpoints. These standpoints are: ideology, psychology, despotism, nationality, the West and, to use Piatakov's own words, "the building of the

first system of state industry in history," something quite different from simple "industrialization."[4]

II. IDEOLOGY

The years from 1915 to 1918 are a good starting point. These were the years of left communism, when Bukharin and Evgeniia Bosh were the people closest to Piatakov. There are two points concerning their positions at that time to which I would like to call the reader's attention.

The first concerns the series of problems linked to state, nation, and World War I. To tackle these problems, in 1916 the trio, in conflict with Lenin and under the influence of the European Left, elaborated a platform of remarkable historical and political blindness. Faced with a war which, particularly in Eastern Europe, revolved around the nationality problem, and from which numerous new, more-or-less national[5] states were to emerge, this platform affirmed that both the question of state and that of nation, and in particular that of the national state, were dead, no longer relevant, no longer on the agenda. With this "theoretical" baggage—we shall return to it in the section devoted to nationality—Piatakov and Bosh went back to the Kiev of 1917, where they at first completely ignored the very visible nationalistic unrest underway, as is confirmed by their decision not to discuss the national movement in the party (only at the Bund's insistence did Piatakov eventually accept discussion of the activities of the Rada).

The second point concerns the impossibility for socialist revolution in the backward tsarist empire. Of this the Piatakov of 1917 was convinced, and in agreement with him were many other Bolsheviks, such as Rykov and, in particular, many leaders of the future Left, such as Preobrazhenskii. This position was partly responsible for the unorthodox line Piatakov followed in Kiev and for the polemicizing with Lenin. And, the position itself was soon contradicted by reality—in this case the welcome reality of

[4] Since I shall deal with the same phenomena from more than one point of view, some repetitions are unavoidable. I have tried, however, to limit them as much as possible.

[5] Actually, the disintegration of the old empires led to the formation of a new multinational state, i.e., the Soviet Union, as well as to the birth of many states that claimed to be "national" but were not—at least in the sense that they included vast territories inhabited by large national minorities (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, etc., come to mind). From this point of view, World War I was just one step forward, though quite an important one, in that tragic process of the formation of nationally "homogeneous" states which has dominated Eastern European history during the past century and a half. The most intelligent contemporary observations on what was happening and on its tragic perspectives are perhaps those of L. von Mises, *Nation, State and the Economy* (Vienna, 1919; reprint, New York, 1983).

October. This appeared to Piatakov as a "miracle," whose performance transformed Lenin, to use Piatakov's words of 1928, into a "miracle man," able to "make the impossible possible."[6] Lenin thus ceased to be simply the most important leader of the party and became its *vozhd'* in a new, literal sense (the word was, of course, already in use to indicate the leaders of political parties), as is demonstrated by the 1920 celebrations of Lenin's fiftieth birthday, which were not dissimilar to the better-known celebrations of 1929, except for the fact that Lenin, unlike Stalin, seems to have opposed them.

Reality thus disclaimed both of the key interpretative categories that the young Piatakov had borrowed from what he had defined as his "orthodox Marxism." He who had rejected both the frame of the "national" state and the possibility of socialism in "Russia" found himself working for a new state that called itself socialist and whose existence could not be theoretically explained and at the same time operating in a context marked by the birth, or attempted birth, of numerous national and non-national states as well as by the confrontation among them. Without bothering to look for an explanation for the evident contradiction between facts and ideas, Piatakov immediately agreed to work for the "miracle" of October as the commissar of the new Gosbank.

What led Piatakov to believe that this contradiction could be ignored was probably a combination of the pressing tasks of the day and his enthusiasm and desire to get things done and, above all, the hope of a European revolution, of whose inevitability and proximity he was firmly convinced (he spoke at the time, and with reason, of an "enormous geological upheaval underway"). In this way the conditions—including the psychological ones—were created for a jump toward subjectivism and irrationality, tendencies which were in fact being announced by the appearance of the *vozhd'* and miracles. Thus began that slide of the Left's theoretical positions, which was soon to bring it to conclusions that contrasted sharply with its aspirations.

At the beginning of 1918, however, everything was still hanging in the balance, as is shown by the contradictory attitude of the Left Communists. On the one hand, they were acutely aware of the precarious nature of the new power, which had been established in an "immature" country and was thus constantly threatened by the danger of a petit-bourgeois *pererozhdenie* that would have opened the doors to the reinstatement of capitalism. They were, therefore, moved by a sense of urgency that inspired them to propose

[6] These words echo strikingly the much more famous and quite similar ones used by Carlyle to introduce his "heroes."

extreme economic and social measures to consolidate the young state. On the other hand, in the name of internationalism and "anti-statism," the same people rejected Brest's "national socialist" option and the slogan of the "socialist motherland in danger" launched by Lenin and Trotsky, thereby showing their willingness to destroy that same creature they anxiously wished to defend.

The second knot of problems is linked to the Ukrainian experience of 1918–1919, to Trotsky, and to Stalin. This was a period clearly divided in two: the first part is marked by the "great revolutionary wave" triggered by the end of the First World War, in which Piatakov saw a confirmation of his previous positions; the second is marked by the subsequent "reflux" of that wave, to use the words of Radek and Piatakov, who, however, consoled themselves with the thought that it was soon to be followed by others. The reflux culminated in the disaster of the late spring and summer of 1919 when, after the high point of the hopes of March, everything precipitated with the almost simultaneous collapse in Bavaria, Hungary, and Ukraine. In the latter, in particular, providing "confirmation" of the fears of 1918, the peasant *stikhiia* "opened the way" for the victory of the Whites, thus strengthening the conviction that the immediate danger to the new power lay in the petit-bourgeois ocean of the countryside.

During the general collapse of May–June 1919, in which reality and the power over it seemed to escape all control, lying "in form and in substance outside the sphere of influence of the party" (I quote here a document of the Ukrainian Central Committee of May 1919), all the leaders of the KP(b)U looked for someone to lean on. In a remarkable reversal, since until a few weeks before he had been part of the military opposition, Piatakov ended up "choosing" Trotsky.

Why he did so is a question which cannot be dealt with here. The answer is connected with Trotsky's personal fascination and his methods, with the profound affinity which Piatakov felt for some of the characteristics of the head of the Red Army, as well as with his aversion to the "Right" of the KP(b)U, closely connected to the "mafia" of Tsaritsyn.

What should be stressed, rather, is that this meeting with Trotsky, and the defeat that led to it, marked Piatakov's "Brest-Litovsk." It was then—and not, for the reasons we have seen, the year before—that he took his first real step toward a national or, better, an "imperial" socialist option, which we could define as "Rakovskian." I do not mean, of course, that this option was first followed by Rakovskii, who indeed was the last to submit to it, but that he was the first to formulate it clearly. I have in mind here the Rakovskii who, from confinement in 1928, remarked that in a social situation marked by serious defeat and by the stagnation of the workers' political

activity, both in the USSR and in Europe, and in a political situation like that in the Soviet Union, in which the only active social force was the bureaucracy, the revolutionaries had no choice but to side with the bureaucracy and, in so doing, go against their ideals or testify to their faith in those ideals from exile or from prison. Of course, 1919 was not yet 1928, and Piatakov then took only the first steps along that path. But the "discoveries" he made at the time, through Trotsky, clearly indicated the direction that path was to take.

In the first place, there was the discovery of "Russia" and the East. After the defeats of the summer had barred the way to Europe, which went through Ukraine and Hungary, Trotsky proposed sending the unemployed "Ukrainian" (in quotation marks because few of them were actually Ukrainian) leaders to the Urals, which were to be transformed into a bastion of the revolution. For Piatakov, who was sent to lead the First Labor Army, his time in the Urals meant his first separation from Europe and, though in a sincerely revolutionary form, his discovery of the imperial, Asiatic dimension of the new (and of the old) state.

In the second place, fresh from a disaster caused partly by the naïveté of the Left, Piatakov discovered, through Trotsky, the value of bureaucracy, of command, and of administrative efficiency—in their harder and more primitive, military versions. After some months, the leader of the military opposition, who loved to dress as a "Ukrainian brigand," was discovered by Liberman in smart uniform and shining boots jumping to attention to answer a telephone call from Trotsky. Trotsky, we might say, had become in Piatakov's eyes a new "miracle man," who personified efficiency, hardness, "culture," and organization and who, with these qualities, was saving the revolution.

Eight years of collaboration and joint reflection followed this meeting. The first four, 1920–1923, were the more intense. The year 1919–1920, marked by debate about militarization and the creation of the Labor Armies, was dedicated to reflections of an almost Weberian savor on bureaucrats and bureaucracy. We will return to these in the last section. Here I wish only to say that the discovery of bureaucracy was without doubt "anti-Marxist" (to be convinced of this, it is enough to recall how simplistic and utopian the theory of the state and of its apparatus is not only in Marx and Engels but also in the Lenin of *State and Revolution*, even though the latter was soon forced to rethink his ideas on the matter). We have here a first example of that process of selection to which ideology was then subjected by the actual situation: those pieces which best fit the needs of the moment were favored and then integrated, where the theory was found lacking, with parts dictated by "common sense."

The third knot is that marked by the beginning of the New Economic Policy. Piatakov, still a "true believer," accepted the new policy without reserve, but in his own way. To do this he appealed to the analyses made in November 1917, when, on the basis of Hilferding, he had admitted the possibility that in a backward country the nationalized commanding heights could coexist for some time with small property, especially in the countryside. Care was necessary, though, to ensure that this compromise work in favor of large industry. In the words of Bukharin, who in 1921 still shared Piatakov's positions, the main danger was the economic *razrukha* and the main task the building of "our great socialized industry." Since, to fulfill the latter, more products were needed, it was right to give more space to those able to guarantee these products (i.e., the petit-bourgeois economic formations) so long as they were used for building large industry.

Paradoxically, then, the NEP did mark a "dangerous" break (due to the openings which it created for the petite bourgeosie), but beneath it there was a continuity embodied by the pursuit of the interests of large "socialized" industry. When this industry, to quote Bukharin again, was once more "v polnuiu boevuiu gatovnost'," the moment would have come to turn the tiller in a new direction (it was on the basis of these arguments that, in 1925, against Bukharin's "betrayal," Piatakov was to demand a *perelom* in economic policy).

The period of the launching of the NEP was also marked by other significant ideological developments. In 1922, for example, Piatakov presided over the trial of the Socialist Revolutionary party, the first of the Soviet "show" trials of international renown. In so doing he expressed on a new level of intensity that fanatic anti-socialism, that mania for "unmasking," and that ferocious sectarianism, which were the birthmarks of Bolshevism. On the one hand, this gives us a measure of the abyss which the years of the Civil War had opened between the Bolsheviks, even the "old" ones, and the humanitarian traditions of European socialism. On the other, it gives us a clue to the variety of materials that were going into the construction of the "Stalinist" ideology, which also fed on the extremization of already existing elements, an extremization that, at least ideologically, was perhaps in the beginning a product of true believers like Piatakov. Here, perhaps, we have a lesser example of Stalin's extraordinary ability, which he showed in the 1920s (and which cannot fail to strike whoever examines that decade), to "listen" to the most widely differing contributions, and then to use them in his own way.[7]

[7] Far more interesting from this point of view are the origins of a substantial part of Stalin's 1928–1929 antiworker "workerism" (whose spell has charmed more than one Western

If, from Piatakov's standpoint, 1921 could be seen in some ways under the banner of continuity, the autumn of 1923, on the other hand, marked a very important rupture, caused by a series of simultaneous events, namely: the failure of the revolution in Germany; the scissors crisis; the formal birth of the opposition; and the first serious conflicts over the direction of large state industry (we should remember that Piatakov was at that time the vice-president of the VSNKh, with executive powers).

After the Ruhr crisis and the explosion of hyper-inflation, all of the Soviet leaders, including Trotsky and his followers, had great expectations for Germany. Piatakov and Radek, in particular, were sent to strengthen the leadership of the German party. In fact, since it was believed that the objective conditions in Germany were "ripe" for socialism, the general agreement was that the seizure of power there was essentially a question of correct "subjective" action and thus necessitated a strong leadership. But the newly arrived Radek and Piatakov found themselves faced with a party unable to organize or manage the insurrection, and thus supported its recall.

The disappointment was great and, given the premises, reflections on the causes for the failure were founded exclusively on subjective considerations. The defeat was explained by resorting, on the one hand, to the subjective mistakes of the Communists and, on the other, to the behavior of the Social Democrats, who at the crucial moment had sided with the "fascists" (this was the term Radek, Piatakov, and Trotsky used to define the new German government in 1923) or had proved to be "fascists" themselves (as, apparently, Zinov'ev stated). After the stage marked by the trial of the Socialist Revolutionaries, the nascent theory of social-fascism thus made a decisive step forward—in the documents of both the opposition and its future allies.

To these motivations Piatakov himself added a profound pessimism about the revolutionary social "subjects"—the Western proletariat in general and the Russian one in particular—which he felt had entered a long season of passivity. This pessimism made him famous: Serge, Pascal, and Mikoian spoke of it, the latter making fun of it; and, formally, it marked the death of the hope that the revolution in Europe would come to justify from outside and *a posteriori* the October miracle. Especially among those who had viewed the latter as theoretical nonsense, awareness of the fragility of Soviet power now reached unprecedented heights. And the sense of urgency, of the "must be done," was now felt more tragically. It gave a particular color to the famous debate on industrialization, sharpening dissent within the Soviet leadership.

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academic) in the theft and distortion of Shliapnikov's ideas.

Piatakov's other personal reaction to the events of the end of 1923—yet another important step along the road taken in 1919—must be seen in this context. The explanation for the scissors crisis that Piatakov, Osinskii, and V. M. Smirnov advanced is a good illustration of this point. Larin denounced the "istericheskii idealizm," the "idealizm eserovskogo gimnazista" which animated it, and, in fact—as in the German case—everything was made to depend on subjective factors. A multiplication of subjective commitment and personal effort was thus the solution also proposed for internal matters. For Piatakov, that translated itself into a renewed administrative effort at the VSNKh, aimed, in his own words, at accelerating as much as possible the construction of the first "sistema gosudarstvennoi promyshlennosti" in history.

These considerations profoundly influenced Piatakov's type of opposition, which became increasingly less political and increasingly tied to the rhythms and directions of "building." This position led him to move closer to whomever might satisfy those needs and, in particular, laid the basis for convergence with Stalin. Certainly, the "socialism in one country" that Stalin proposed was still, in Piatakov's eyes, tainted by Bukharin's influence, which gave it a pacific, moderate, and isolationist content. But there is no doubt that Piatakov was encouraged to distance himself from Trotsky (who always put politics and internationalism first) and to approach the Stalinist group because of his idea of concentrating on building within the USSR, leaving aside international politics (partly because of the pessimism mentioned above) and—why not?—leaving aside internal politics too, since what really counted, after all, was the economy. This convergence was objectively encouraged by the policies Piatakov followed at the VSNKh, which accelerated the NEP crisis and left Stalin and his followers facing the need to make decisions.

What remained, now, of Piatakov's Marxism, or, better still, what had it become? Its humanitarian aspect, linked to socialist traditions, had been swept away, as we have seen, by the Civil War. At a theoretical level, there remained a resistant core of certain categories that were, in fact, so many filters deforming reality. I have in mind, for example, Piatakov's mythical vision of the functioning of the economy—to which we shall return in the last section—which was a major influence in determining the decisions that led to the NEP crisis. On the political plane, one could refer once again to the want of the Marxist theory of the state, which blinded Piatakov in a context characterized by the birth and expansion of a new great state; to the obsession with "class" analysis, which distracted attention from more important phenomena, and to the "theoretical" aversion for the peasants—the great majority of the population.

These and other "residues" were integrated into a cult of the state and its machinery, linked to some pieces of Marxism (for example, nationalization) but "enriched" by the accent on the importance of subjective action and its tools—bureaucracy for one.[8] Significantly, in those years the two terms "sotsialisticheskii" and "gosudarstvennyi" became interchangeable; indeed, before the ideological explosion of 1928–1929, the second term progressively replaced the first in internal economic documents. This interchangeability was perhaps a clue to the fact that the question regarding the nature of the new state born from the Civil War was still unresolved ideologically. And the progressive prevalence of the second term perhaps indicated how reality was in fact resolving the question before the launching of the great ideological operation we have just mentioned confused things again. All of this was increasingly cemented by that subjectivism and voluntarism that we have already seen developing.

The fifth and crucial knot is that represented by Piatakov's own personal crisis of 1927–1928. These were the years of his exile in Paris as *torgpred*, of forced inactivity, while in Moscow the "inept" Kuibyshev, to whom the VSNKh had been entrusted, was letting everything that had been built up over the previous years go to rack and ruin. After the Fifteenth Party Congress (December 1927), Piatakov was sent back to Paris—a clear sign of the "respect" which he was accorded—while his second wife and his old comrades were first imprisoned and then sent into very different kinds of exile. Shortly thereafter, in February, he became the first of the Trotskyites to capitulate, with a statement that his former comrades (Radek first of all) judged a monument of hypocrisy.

What part cynicism and hypocrisy played in this choice is, of course, difficult to assess. I am inclined to believe that the motives behind Piatakov's gesture were much more complicated and that his personal crisis was of a very serious nature (as we shall see in the next section). It is, rather, in Radek's own later "conversion" and behavior that a much purer form of cynicism can be seen.[9] It is undeniable, however, that for Piatakov

[8] In this modified version, Marxism became the heir to Hegelism also as a state-building ideology (in "extreme" conditions). We have here, I believe, one of the reasons for its great success in our century, as an important source of "national socialist" ideologies (which of course had many other components). See also fns. 11 and 12.

[9] In Ordzhonikidze's secret fond are preserved a few letters written at the beginning of 1928 by Radek to the GPU, the TsKK, and to his wife. Whereas in letters to Trotsky written during the same period he posed as a fierce fighter against Stalinism, here he begged for favors and petty privileges, even before being sent into exile. Especially impressive is a letter of 9 March 1928, formally addressed to his wife, but actually written with the knowledge that "others" would read it, as was in fact the case. In this letter, Piatakov is openly accused of hypocrisy. One cannot "sincerely" capitulate too soon, writes Radek, adding that when he himself does, in

too, the moment marked the end of ideology in the traditional sense of the term (in the sense we are usually led to use when speaking of Bolshevik leaders or, at least, of the believers among them). This was also the moment of the "end of politics," again in the sense we usually give the term. In an attempt, no doubt, to justify the betrayal of Trotsky, politics was now seen as a weave of personal squabbles, founded on the personal struggle for power, almost as "something dirty." "Politics" of this sort did not count for much. What counted, as Piatakov repeated in his declarations to the Fifteenth Party Congress, was the actual work of building and, on a personal level, the opportunity of participating in that building.

What we have here is the definitive "Rakovskian" option, which went hand in hand with an increasingly pessimistic vision of the internal and international situations, marked by a defeat "vserez i nadolgo," as V. M. Smirnov wrote. Naturally, it was difficult, on the subjective level, to be or remain pessimistic and still work furiously at the task of building. In the next section we shall see how this contradiction was resolved. Here, I would like to emphasize that the sudden ideological change of 1927–1928 was a phenomenon that did not concern Piatakov alone, and is one to which I feel insufficient attention has been paid.

The type of "ideology" which at that time was gaining ground is fairly well represented by the words with which Kuibyshev celebrated Stalin's victory over the *zagotovki* crisis in February 1928 with his "Urals-Siberian methods" (which triggered the process that later ended in collectivization and famine). "It is undeniable," said Kuibyshev, "that the *administrative pressure*. . . , the *mobilization* of all the forces of the party, the *meddling* in the sphere of action of lower bodies. . . have given indisputable results. . . . *The will of the state has combatted the economic situation, using all the means the proletarian state had at its disposal, and it has won*" (my italics).

Thus, at the end of the 1920s, the foundations for the ideology of the "Stalinists" consisted of a mixture of statism, voluntarism, *grubost'* (the well-known insult thrown at Stalin by Lenin in 1923, now transformed by Stalin and his followers into something to boast of), cult of might, and the delusion that "everything was possible."[10] These elements were embodied

the perhaps not too distant future, he will do so "iskrenno, otkryto" denouncing the errors of the past.

[10] In the short run, by the way, given the intensity of pushing from above, everything became really possible, and Soviet society seemed to come closer and closer to the Stalinists' 1929 ideal, recently defined by one of the best young Ukrainian historians, Oleg Khlevniuk, as a "well-composed mechanism, at the top of which is a directive center that is maximally independent both from society and from the obligation to take into account any socioeconomic laws whatsoever, and at its base—conscious and disciplined masses." Reality, however, started to kick back very soon and, for each "victory" over it, a day of reckoning was to come. Moshe

at first in the party, which concentrated will and power, and only indirectly transferred to Stalin, the party's leader. Soon, however, this transfer was complete: in December 1929, through the mechanism of the celebrations for his fiftieth birthday, Stalin became officially the new *vozhd'*, autonomously endowed with miraculous powers.

It is worth pausing a moment to stress how this new ideology of the Stalinist leadership, founded on the almost unlimited power of the subject over history, on "vozhdism" and on a particular form of "national socialism," distinctly echoed developments taking place in many parts of Europe, though in different ways. Similar ideas were then spreading in widely differing contexts—in Poland, in Germany, in Italy of course, and among the Jewish nationalists (think, for example, of Vladimir Jabotinsky and his dream of achieving the Jewish state in "one sudden, irresistible act of will") and the Ukrainian nationalists, where the phenomenon was particularly interesting because it took on different forms in emigration (according to Roman Szporluk, the pillars of the OUN 1929 ideology were "the primacy of 'will' over 'reason' and the proposal to establish a one-party state headed by an elite with a single leader"), in Galicia and among the National Communists temporarily in power.

From this standpoint, "national socialism" (to be sure, not the extreme Hitlerian variety) and "vozhdism" appear as key categories with which to interpret European history between the two wars. In the USSR, as everywhere else, they of course took on idiosyncratic forms—that of "imperial" socialism,[11] for example—but their diffusion strengthens the hypothesis that unifying factors were at work: the Great War, first of all, the state-building or rebuilding processes which followed it,[12] and certain cultural fashions

Lewin has analyzed the social context or, better, the social "void" that facilitated the spread of similar illusions and offered the Stalinist elite such opportunities.

11 One could think of "imperial" socialism (I resort to quotation marks because there is something paradoxical in the term) as the particular form taken by national socialism in countries possessing a strong imperial tradition, where the dominant nationality is not strong enough to propound a program of "xy" for "xylonians," or is unwilling to do so (the concrete possibility of renewing the imperial bonds may explain this). From this point of view, "imperial" socialism is, at least in its ideology, more palatable than national socialism proper, especially if compared with the version of the latter that emerges after a serious national crisis in countries with a strong national minority. In particular, its Russian variety, thanks to its link with Marxism, remained particularly "agreeable" in spite of the transformations imposed upon it by the Civil War (as such, it was one of the preconditions for the Bolsheviks' victory). See also fns. 8 and 12.

12 The formation of a great number of new states since 1945 has presented us with a new, bigger wave of "national socialisms" of many different kinds. The link between this phenomenon and certain circumstances of state-building has thus been confirmed. Of course, one should not undervalue the aspects of socialism (as well as of Marxism) that are linked to the emancipation of the working classes, nor think that socialism has been the only ideology of

that had spread throughout Europe before the war and that the war had nourished: note, for example, the renewed interest in Carlyle or Spengler's success. It is interesting to note that in 1922 Piatakov devoted an essay precisely to Spengler, attacking him for his glorification of the "velikoe iskusstvo povelevat' stikhiiami zhizni, osnovannoe na proniknovenii v ee vozmozhnosti i na predvidenii ee khoda" that guaranteed the "new Caesar" the "kljuch k gospodvstu nad drugimi" and deriding his hymns to "beton, stal', zheleznye nervy i gosudarstvennykh muzhei." Six years later these same words neatly summed up an important part of both Piatakov's credo and that of his new comrades.[13]

This credo was not, of course, a monolith, and in Piatakov it took rather peculiar forms. In particular, the state of "exaltation" caused by the weight of the past and by that of betrayal meant that the "end of ideology" took on the form of a descent into psychopathology. For example, in March 1928, in an emotional discussion he had with N. Valentinov immediately after his capitulation, Piatakov exalted the miracle party which could do anything and which made anything possible (in Rakovskii's words, which guaranteed "power" to Piatakov and those like him). For the party, Piatakov said, a man must be prepared to do anything—to destroy himself, to betray his own friends, to change his own mind.

Within a few months, for Piatakov, too, this miracle party took on the personal features of Stalin, the new miracle man able to make history jump at his will. The ways in which these jumps were produced—the violence, the administrative pressure, the *grubost'*—took second place to the results. But then, Piatakov, like many others, recognized in these methods important pieces of his own Civil War experience, when he, too, had ordered mass shootings, had been criticized by Lenin for his *grubost'*, and had sent the "mandarinnye etikety" to hell in the Donbass in order to obtain the required results.

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state-building or rebuilding recently at work. It is a fact, however, that in the past one hundred years or so, on an international scale, state-building has been the main component of socialism, and socialism, in its various "national socialistic" forms, has become the most important ideology available to state-(re)builders. See also fns. 8 and 11.

[13] This was a return to the times when, to use Otto Hintze's words, it was believed that "will power, planning, and calculation" explained everything. In this sense, since Marxism had been part of the cultural movement which had fought and defeated these ideas, the new credo was an "anti-Marxist" one. Maxim Gorky's contribution to its birth, as well as to the development of the ideology used to "cover" it (to which Willi Münzenberg also greatly contributed), cannot be overestimated. Gorky's half-baked, third rate "Nietzscheanism," his cynicism, and his great, creative capacities in the field of ideology were extremely appealing to Stalin and the other autodidacts of his inner circle. From this point of view, the recently published Stalin-Gorky 1929 correspondence is quite interesting and revealing.

The characteristics of the new miracle man, though, held many surprises for Piatakov. He was no longer dealing with a leader, like Lenin, whom he could respect and with whom he could enter into discussions (in 1921, for example, Piatakov ironically but harshly reproached Lenin in a private letter for his schematic and simplistic attitude toward the problem of concession). Nor was he adopting a "perfect" model to admire—as Trotsky had been for him after 1919 (in the same year, 1920–1921, Piatakov's letters to Trotsky were much more subservient than those addressed to Lenin). Rather, he had found a boss to serve—and was well aware of this as, once again, his letters of the 1930s clearly reveal (quite often, his letters addressed to Ordzhonikidze or Kuibyshev contain formulaic expressions such as "if I. V. agrees," etc.). And, indeed, those close to Stalin had already nick-named him *khoziain* ("boss"; perhaps the closest translation is *dominus*, the appellation adopted by the "Asianized" Roman emperors after Diocletian). This pattern was already formalized by 1929 when, as Boris Souvarine observed, Piatakov became the first of the Bolshevik leaders "to pay personal feudal homage" to Stalin. In exchange, he asked for the post of "minister for production" in the new state, something he obtained first at the Gosbank and then at the NKTP. However, Piatakov found himself carrying out these functions as a serf-superintendent of the new lord rather than in the hoped-for "civilized" forms.

We have thus come to the sixth and last knot of problems—that represented by the 1930s. The discussion of these problems will of necessity be brief here, because of what I have just said about the growing weight of "psychic" factors over and above ideological ones in Piatakov's case and about the genetic mutation that ideology and politics underwent at the end of the 1920s.

This obviously does not mean that in the 1930s the Stalinist elite and the new social strata that revolved around it possessed no "ideology." On the contrary, they were producing many ideologies, both for internal consumption and for the "masses," that were added to and superimposed upon that which had emerged at the end of the previous decade. For this reason, too, however, the ideology of 1917 can be said to be dead by 1930, at least in the sense that it is of little use in explaining the behavior and decisions of the group in power, even if fragmented parts of its dead body still played roles of a certain importance and even if some persons to a certain degree still believed that they believed in the old ideology. Furthermore, Piatakov is not a good vantage point from which to observe the new and complex ideological production: in the 1930s he published nothing directly connected to culture or politics, and what remains of his activities from those years is a few speeches, a handful of semi-private letters—mostly to

Ordzhonikidze—and, above all, countless *prikazy* about the direction of industry.[14]

The number of these *prikazy*, the variety of the subjects they cover, and the importance and detail of the questions they address are proof of the maniacal nature of Piatakov's dedication to the building of that system of large state industry, which was now perhaps the only thread linking him to the past. Although this construction took place under conditions and at a cost very different from those he had imagined, it did respect some of the principles he had established in the 1920s: the absolute privilege accorded to large state industry; the openness toward the West—now limited to technology alone; the high investment "rhythms," etc. Together with these principles survived some traces of the old beliefs in this process of building. Here and there, in certain of Piatakov's speeches, in the memoirs of some "builders" like Frankfurt, in addition to professions of faith in the superiority of the system of state industry over its capitalist competitors, apparently sincere hopes surfaced that, once the foundations were laid (at the price of the unheard-of sacrifices imposed upon the population), chapters that had temporarily been closed could be reopened.

But more often, at least in those "builders" in whom the ideological matrix had been stronger and especially in many of those who had been of the opposition (one could also refer, for example, to Gvakhariia, Ordzhonikidze's favorite), instead of the old ideology we find an "ideology of fanatical work," of identification with heavy industry, of dedication to the new *gosudarstvennost'*, of building for the sake of building, in which, perhaps, these people buried themselves in the hope of forgetting what they were doing. Victor Krawchenko has some very convincing pages on this. And it suffices to read the last, long, handwritten letter from the Urals sent by Piatakov to Ordzhonikidze the very day before his arrest (which he knew to be imminent, though still hoped to avoid)—a letter packed with technicalities and industrial problems—to realize that for Piatakov, too, work was the magic drug which up to the last minute kept life bearable (and was, perhaps, also a guarantee of physical survival, with the delusion that one would become "indispensable").

[14] After 1932, most of the NKTP *prikazy* were not published. Boris B. Lebedev, the archivist in charge of the NKTP fond (I take this opportunity to thank him for his help and kindness), calculates that approximately 70 to 80 percent remained secret. Happily, these escaped the 1941 fire. Piatakov's letters to Ordzhonikidze can be found in the latter's secret fond in the former Central Party Archives.

Among the things needing to be "forgotten," besides the conditions in which the "building" was taking place, there was that which the day-to-day politics had by now become for Piatakov and many members of Stalin's circle: a succession of servile acts, of blackmail, of fear and desperation. This traumatic experience, for which the super-work at the NKTP could not compensate, contributed to Piatakov's outbreak of "madness" in 1936, which we will discuss at the end of the next section.

III. PSYCHOLOGY

Piatakov's life is striking because of its tragic quality, the dramatic series of ups and downs, of suicides, massacres, insanity, alcoholism, betrayals, and intrigues that dogged its various phases. In this respect, his life is a faithful mirror of the cataclysmic nature of Soviet history between 1917 and 1937 (or even 1953). It also provides a clear window into the life of the "old Bolsheviks," showing us the state of "exhaustion" those few thousand people had reached by 1936–1937. But Piatakov's life is also a mirror, though of smaller dimensions, of European history. We are, after all, discussing the life of an intellectual with a European education and of a European culture, who adhered to a European ideology and whose destiny is deeply scarred by progressive personal regression and progressive barbarization.

To follow the evolution of Piatakov's life from a "psychological" standpoint, we will mainly trust to the chronology outlined in the previous section. But here we must start with events preceding the outbreak of the war, with the anarchist experience of 1905–1907 in Ukraine. This experience was a scarring one, marked as it was by thousands of victims of both terror and repression and by an astonishing level of desperation among its young participants—a desperation that can be felt even today when looking through Russian anarchist newspapers of the time, with their lists of suicides, accompanied by pictures of young, angry men, among whom, as Weizmann says in his memoirs, young Jews were particularly numerous and gloomy.

The young Piatakov took an active part in those desperate events, sharing ideas in which were reflected, though often coarsely, some of the "crisis" ideologies that had emerged in Europe at the end of the nineteenth century (referring to the Russian anarchists of those days, Avrich has spoken of "self-styled Nietzschean supermen," and Goethe's motto, "Im Anfang war die Tat," interpreted in a "heroic" key, was, for example, the masthead of the *Chernoe znamia*). Piatakov joined the group led by Justin Zhuk, a young worker and a hero of anarcho-communism, who was later sentenced to death, then commuted to life *katorga*, for the murder of some guards during a robbery at one of the factories managed by Piatakov's

father (freed in 1917, Zhuk died in the Civil War fighting for the Reds). Thus, Piatakov's privileged education, the "gentility" of his family background, and his "Western culture" were very soon subjected to severe shocks, which exposed the fragility of these influences in a country such as the Russian Empire (and, shortly thereafter, the First World War revealed their fragility on a European scale).

At the time of the robbery, Piatakov, who had broken off relations with the anarchists, was already in St. Petersburg, enrolled at the Faculty of Law in order to study economics. He did not go back to Kiev, except for a brief interval in 1911, until 1917, just in time for the revolution and the Ukrainian Civil War, perhaps the most ferocious one.

For Piatakov, the Civil War was a continual succession of victories and defeats. The Bolsheviks had to seize power three times in Ukraine, since the first two attempts both ended in catastrophy. Moments of exaltation were thus followed by periods of deep depression. Both were linked to and amplified by events in Europe, primarily in Germany and Hungary.

This violent see-sawing between extremes of states of mind was accompanied by the practice of violence *tout court*, of which we will mention only a few episodes: the barbaric murder of Piatakov's brother Leonid in Kiev in January 1918; his service in a machine-gun unit in March and April of that year (Piatakov was thus not spared the key experience of being a soldier in the First World War); and above all, the active part he played in the outbreaks of generalized cruelty over the following months and years. Already at the end of 1918, after the first stage of the Red Terror, Piatakov had argued for mass shootings. In Kharkiv in June 1919, as president of the local Revolutionary Tribunal, he publicly exalted terror, while in the prisons of the city terrible things were taking place (this stance disgusted the old Korolenko, who protested against it). A few months before, in March, Piatakov's former companion, Evgeniia Bosh, had directed the massacres in Astrakhan', and the following year Piatakov, who had participated in the assault at Perekop, was apparently in charge of the even more terrible massacres which took place in the Crimea after the defeat at Vrangel' (it is said that many tens of thousands were shot in a few days). According to Veresaev, even Dzerzhinskii was indignant at Piatakov's and his friend Béla Kun's ferocity.

From a theoretical, Marxist standpoint (and so, for Piatakov, in rational terms), all of the above was taking place within a process which, as we have said, was losing its meaning or, rather, was becoming increasingly difficult to explain in spite of the ever-growing resort to rhetorical and psychological exaltation.

Adding to these sources of irrationality and to the psychic destabilization inevitably caused by such levels of violence, in the spring of 1919 the Bolshevik leaders' already paranoid fear of the peasants reached new heights in Ukraine. The reasons for this were the repeated revolts of the Ukrainian peasants, and the recurrent "betrayal" of the partisan detachments that had allowed the Bolsheviks to take Kiev at the beginning of the year.

A very distinctive psychological trait, which was shared—though somewhat more blandly—by all the party and which also had ideological roots, thus became accentuated, because of "national" reasons, in that part of the new Soviet elite that was being formed on the "southern front." This trait was the strong feeling of being "foreigners in their own land," surrounded by a hostile population—the peasants primarily but also the intelligentsiia (in Ukraine, because of its national aspirations, but note, too, the Bolshevik reaction to the Russian intelligentsiia strikes of 1917–1918). From this point of view, on the southern front a substantial part of the new elite was actually, and not just psychologically or symbolically, that "conquering minority" mentioned by Lenin, that "special race" of which Stalin was later to speak (even though not too much weight should be given to words). This feeling probably peaked among the elite's most ideological members, like Piatakov, since both the supporters of the NEP and the Stalinists eventually found, each in their own way, some important channels of contact with certain sectors of the population, both culturally and as a representation of interests.

The Bolsheviks, and in particular the "old Bolsheviks," were thus deeply affected by the experiences of 1917–1921, especially when these experiences had been endured at the "front" (this was, I believe, the essential difference between Piatakov and Bukharin, who stayed in Moscow, and perhaps the root of their subsequent break). It is well known that the political consequences of the impact of these experiences worried Lenin. Here, however, I would like to underline the physical and moral components: the disease, exhaustion, the remorse for what one had done—factors which certainly existed, and which apparently affected Dzerzhinskii himself, if we can believe what Abramovitch said about the night Dzerzhinskii got drunk and begged to be killed to atone for the blood he had spilt. Certainly there was heavy drinking—it was perhaps at this point that Piatakov had his first brush with alcoholism—and a growing use of drugs, cocaine in particular, especially but not only in the Cheka (according to Anjelica Balabanoff, Béla Kun was an addict; of course, the Whites too had similar problems, as indicated by the case of General Slashchev). The inevitable result of all these pressures was an acute instability, and, indeed, two phenomena we

have already mentioned point to this: the desperate clinging to the force of the will and to subjective action and the need, felt by many, to lean on someone, on a miracle man, on the *vozhd'*.

After experiences and pressures of this sort, the calm of the following period of 1922–1926, however real, could only be precarious. This results quite clearly from Piatakov's life. For him, too, there was a return to stability. His transfer to the quieter Moscow after years in the "violent provinces" and his collaboration with Lenin, his close relationship with Trotsky, and, lastly and above all, his job at the VSNKh and his initial collaboration with Dzerzhinskii were the pillars of this new condition. According to Ipat'ev, during this time Piatakov went as far as to regret the barbaric acts he had committed during the Civil War.

The ups and downs mentioned above persisted, however, and alongside elements of stability, new elements of crisis continually appeared. These included the German defeat of 1923, in which Piatakov had been directly involved, and the pessimism and gloominess which that caused; the birth of the opposition and the conflicts and bitterness accompanying it; the difficulty he had in setting up a new family (a common phenomenon of the 1920s for Bolshevik leaders; Pascal speaks of it); and the suicide of Evgeniia Bosh in 1925, within the context of ruthless internal power struggles.[15]

Despite feelings of remorse, the barbarism of the Civil War continued to surface, as can be seen by the trial of the Socialist Revolutionary party, of which Piatakov was president. And the fears—of *pererozhdenie*, of the peasant *stikhiia*, of being surrounded—were still ever present, as were the sense of insecurity and the paranoia of the elite, especially of that part of the elite which felt more acutely that it was occupying a place to which it was not "historically" entitled.

The few years of the NEP were, therefore—in Piatakov's case, but also in different ways for the whole of the USSR—a short interval of disturbed stability, below whose surface the processes which had begun in the previous years continued to simmer and, occasionally, to erupt. Furthermore, the pillars on which Piatakov's stability rested soon gave way: first there was Lenin's death; then the progressive cracks in Piatakov's relationship with Trotsky—specifically, the loss of an only-too-perfect model that Piatakov had tried to follow (it is well known that, besides being prodigiously able and "intelligent," Trotsky did not drink, smoke, or waste time in frivolity);

[15] A few years later, V. M. Smirnov spoke of Bosh's suicide as one of the many committed in those days by "old Bolsheviks" who found the situation unbearable and were physically (Evgeniia Bosh was herself seriously ill), politically, and, I would add, morally exhausted.

and, lastly, there was the loss of his job at the VSNKh.

As an opposition leader, Piatakov would sooner or later have lost that job in any case. But the way in which he was removed in a sense sums up what we have just said. At the Central Committee of July 1926, Dzerzhinskii, who right up to the last minute had treated Piatakov as his main collaborator, denounced him as the traitor who was leading the NEP to a crisis, profiting from the trust he had been shown. Piatakov frequently interrupted him. A few moments later, Dzerzhinskii fell down dead. For Piatakov, therefore, the brief interval of tranquility offered by the NEP ended tragically somewhat earlier than it did for the rest of the country. A period of profound personal crisis began which, from the point of view of his state of mind, can be said to have continued up to the end of 1930.

The personal crisis revolved around his desertion of Trotsky, which in effect meant deserting his entire circle and, despite all the possible justifications, deserting many of his ideals. That desertion came about at a time when Piatakov hoped that Stalin and his followers would be willing to continue the line he had marked out in the industrial field, and to entrust him with leading it.[16] Alongside this hope, there was already the fear inspired by Stalin—a fear Piatakov disclosed in the words he used in reproaching Trotsky for the accusations he had made to the *gensek* at a Politburo meeting in the summer of 1927: "he will never forget you for this: neither you, nor your children, nor your grandchildren."

Piatakov's desertion of the opposition, complete at the end of 1927, meant, too, the betrayal of his wife Zina who was imprisoned and deported, whereas he returned to Paris. Here, Piatakov was left alone, with his secretary Moskalev, once again an exile in a country he hated. All the witnesses speak of a terrible period, of chain-smoking, of drinking. Some go as far as to speak of *delirium tremens*.

In this state, in February 1928, Piatakov signed his "capitulation" to Stalin. In the following year came the "feudal homage" which we have already mentioned. Both were acts which implied both personal submission ("nasiliem nad samim soboiu nuzhnyi rezul'tat dostigaetsia," said Piatakov at the time to Valentinov) as well as political suicide, as Trotsky rightly remarked when he spoke of Piatakov and others like him as zombies.

16 This was probably what Ordzhonikidze, then the TsKK boss, promised him during the negotiations preceding Piatakov's surrender. It was perhaps in those days that Piatakov started to look at Ordzhonikidze in a new way, as a source of psychological rather than just political support.

On the personal plane, the despair of the first months was followed by a period of true exaltation. This emerges clearly from the way in which Piatakov justified his decisions in his 1928 conversation with Valentinov (quoted above) and from his speeches of 1928–1929. These were illuminated by ideological sparks of the most extreme nature, picking up the threads of ideas of ten years previously, and contained the theme of an appeal to the spirit and to the exertions, especially the personal exertions, of the Civil War.

Thus it was with exaltation, ideological as well as psychological, that Piatakov resolved on the personal level the conflict between pessimism and building. On the economic level, this exaltation was embodied in the credit reform launched in 1930 and inspired by the most naïve ideas of 1917–1918. Its failure was already evident by the second half of that year, marked by the general ship-wreck of the first offensive thrust of the First Five-Year Plan.

This new crisis, which for Piatakov was, again, also a personal one, saw the end of the previous exaltation, in a climate characterized by renewed fear. For example, just before emigrating, Ipat'ev saw the "brave" Piatakov, whom he had admired in the past, mumbling excuses for not intervening on behalf of persecuted *spetsy* whose integrity and competence he well knew. The fact is that Piatakov was already paying the price of his 1928 choices. His second-in-command at the Gosbank, Sher, had been arrested for sabotage because of the damage caused by the credit reform. And insinuations on Piatakov's own account were growing, as was blackmail (proof of his distant Menshevist sympathies were published in Kiev). Stalin, perhaps disappointed by the trust he had placed in one he had thought of as an expert economist, had begun his cat-and-mouse game.

This game, whose preferred victims were the former leaders of the opposition, continued in subsequent years. Piatakov, however, was at first saved from its most devastating consequences, thanks to Stalin's decision to give him another chance, perhaps on Ordzhonikidze's advice. That chance consisted of a job at the VSNKh, soon to be followed by that of conducting economic negotiations with Germany. His enormous success in this field in April 1931 gave Piatakov a new lease on life, built, as we have seen, around the NKTP and around Ordzhonikidze, who was by now also a source of psychological support. And, in fact, expressions of personal devotion—such as "ia, pomimo vsiakogo riada sluzhebnoi subordinatsii, prosto lichno k tebe ochen' khorosho otnoshus' i schitaiu tebia, khotia i starshim, no odnim iz samykh maikh blizkikh tovarishchei"—can be found over and over again in Piatakov's post-1931 letters to Sergo. A certain percentage of adulation, in line with the spirit of the day, and the desire to keep Ordzhonikidze's

protection do not rule out, I believe, an element of sincerity.[17]

We thus come back to the dualism of the 1930s, which we mentioned in the last section. On the one hand there was the NKTP first deputy—in Weissberg's words, a man "of iron will and boundless energy," who "knew personally every important works or factory in the country," who "never seemed to stop working and at three o'clock in the morning could still be found hard at it in his office." On the other, there was Stalin's slave and victim, the fearful "red-haired Judas," to use the words of Trotsky's son, who met him by chance in Berlin and saw him turn and run away (very different behavior, for example, from that of I. N. Smirnov, who promised and gave his old friends information about the crisis in the USSR).

And yet Piatakov, too, must have "seen" what was happening, the conditions in which building was taking place, the famine in Ukraine, the suicides of old acquaintances like Mykola Skrypnyk. And, even if Piatakov was no Bukharin, who reacted with bursts of tears and depression, the events of those years must in some way have marked him. In view of his working rhythms, though, it is hard to believe what Berger, the ex-secretary of the Communist party of Palestine, said of a Piatakov entirely aware of the harm he was doing, of the lie he was living, and who was again drowning these feelings in drink. Perhaps Berger was mixing him up with Preobrazhenskii, who apparently drank, or with Smilga and Smirnov who, in 1931, were, in fact, again of the opposition. But it is certain that Piatakov in those years knew little or no stability, had no private life, and lived through extremely difficult moments psychologically (apart from anything else, it seems that his wife, from whom he eventually separated, had become an alcoholic).

It is not surprising, therefore, that when it became clear that Stalin had also got the NKTP—Piatakov's reason for living—in his sights, Piatakov's crisis reached a new stage. The attack on the NKTP, which began in 1935, became a full-fledged one in 1936. By June of that year, after having tried to defend his creation and having failed, Piatakov was a man ready to do anything.

In line with the above-mentioned dualism, his reactions followed two lines. On the one side, Piatakov put, as never before, his fate in the hands of Ordzhonikidze, renewing up to the last minute his pledges of friendship and personal devotion ("you appear for me not only as a member of the Politburo and a People's Commissar; you are for me the comrade to whom I am personally attached with all my soul") as well as of unselfish dedication to a

[17] See also fn. 16.

common cause, disrupted by unjust accusations.[18]

On the other, Piatakov "spoke" to the boss himself: first, through the insane article he wrote in July exalting the trial against the two "putrid carcasses" (Kamenev and Zinov'ev); and, even more extremely, by going directly to Ezhov and telling him that, in order to demonstrate his fidelity, he was willing to kill with his own hands all those accused in the trial, including his former wife—a proposal whose absurdity even Ezhov derided (a recently published letter of Ezhov to Stalin of 8 August 1936 tells the story).

In both of Piatakov's reactions, as Lel'chuk has pointed out, it is possible to see "politics" at work. Piatakov, like Radek and many others, was trying to save himself, playing his own game. Yet, folly dictated the rules and the "game" itself gives us a good idea of the abyss into which Piatakov had fallen. That process of progressive "barbarization" of which we have spoken had reached its peak.

The following months brought Piatakov's arrest, torture, and trial. At the end of the trial, Piatakov read a declaration, probably written by Vyshinskii and personally revised by Stalin. One sentence, however, could have been his own: "And here I stand before you in filth, crushed by my own crimes, bereft of everything through my own fault, a man who has lost his party, who has no friends, who has lost his family, who has lost his very self." These words aptly describe the situation of the whole group of those "true believers" of intellectual origins who had then reached the end of their parabola. These words are also representative of the failure of the entire group of the old Bolsheviks, sanctioned, we might say, a few days after Piatakov's execution by Ordzhonikidze's suicide.

All this, together with what has been said on Piatakov's "reasonings" during 1927–1928, seems to indicate that there is an anachronism in Arthur Koestler's *Darkness at Noon*. The reflections and considerations which that book attributes to the "old Bolsheviks" in 1936–1938, seem to be rather the reasoning with which *some* (in others, like Radek, cynicism was already

[18] It is interesting that in his last letters to Ordzhonikidze, written in August and at the beginning of September, Piatakov repeatedly underlined his personal devotion to Stalin. The letters, most of them handwritten, were likely written for Ordzhonikidze alone. This leads one to think that, up to that point, Sergo still "believed" in Stalin and lends credibility to the hypothesis that he indeed committed suicide—perhaps as a personal protest against his "leader," once he discovered he had been "betrayed" by him. Of course, the theory of a political murder, which has recently regained ground, cannot be ruled out, though the psychological evidence seems to speak against it.

then quite prominent[19]) of the opposition leaders had "justified" their surrender to Stalin ten years before (reasoning which, by the way, Koestler knew very well, as he had belonged to that circle). For the old Bolsheviks, the actual climate and reality of 1936–1938 were, I believe, completely different.[20]

IV. DESPOTISM

From our standpoint, the evolution of Stalin's personal power appears as the problem of the birth of the Stalinist group, of the progressive formation of the personal following, of the *druzhina* of the new prince. And this last appears as a process of continual superimposition of particular groups, which gradually join the oldest "Caucasian" following—a process in which each new addition, in its own way, marks a new stage in Soviet history. Through Piatakov, we can catch some glimpses of this process.

The first such glimpse is that of the winning over to "Stalinism" of the so-called "Russian" right wing of the KP(b)U, and subsequently of the entire KP(b)U. It brings us to that fundamental question of the relationships—noticed immediately by Trotsky—between the building up of Stalin's power, the Civil War, and the problem of nationality and the Southern front (Ukraine was soon to become part of the latter, also from the standpoint of the formation of the Stalinist *druzhina*). And it indicates that the ascent of Stalinism can be at least partially explained as a special case of that process of formation and consolidation of "reactionary" (extremist) forces in the alien provinces of multinational states, and of the use of these forces against "democratic" (moderate) developments in the center, analyzed by Ludwig von Mises in 1919.

It all started, as we know, in the summer of 1918, with the birth of the Tsaritsyn "mafia," based on the Tenth Army which had been formed in May and June of that year from the Red detachments that concentrated in the Donbass after the German invasion of Ukraine. Among its leaders were Voroshilov and Rukhimovich. Like the core of their troops, they were former workers, members of the multinational proletariat of the Left Bank and of the South-East, where the anti-Ukrainian, "right wing" of the newly born KP(b)U had its basis. As Voroshilov himself stated at the Eighth Congress, it was Stalin who helped them build their "special" army; its leaders thus became his staunch followers.

19 See fn. 9.

20 An ideological justification for what was happening in 1936–1938 was sought rather by some of the imprisoned Stalinists. Their line of reasoning, however (reported in some of the memoirs on prisons and camps), had a quite different content and style.

Stalin's influence upon the Ukrainian party also continued to grow in the following months because of his position as *narkomnats*. In this capacity, he was the boss with whom all the leaders, of the Left and the Right, of the KP(b)U as well as leaders of the other national parties, had to deal. Some may have minimized his importance in those years because of the underestimation of the nationality factors in the Civil War and in Soviet history in general, but the extent of importance emerges clearly in his November 1918 clashes with Piatakov and A. Bubnov. Piatakov, who had known Stalin as a "moderate" in Petrograd in March 1917, and who had perhaps collaborated with him during the nationalization of the banks, now found himself facing Stalin as the leader whose authorization he needed to form the second Ukrainian Bolshevik government (a project that was initially obstructed both by Moscow and by the right wing of the KP[b]U).

From Stalin's interventions in those and the following months, and especially from his intervention in the internal conflicts which lacerated the KP(b)U, it is clear that he was attempting to create a personal following. Thanks to his position, to his contacts with Rukhimovich, Voroshilov (who had returned to Ukraine at the end of 1918, partly to comply with Trotsky's protests, and who had immediately made Piatakov furious by falsifying the latter's signature on a decree appointing himself commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian army), and Ordzhonikidze (who had served in Ukraine as plenipotentiary minister for supplies), Stalin won the trust of Kviring, Lebed', Artem, Chubar, and Petrovskii. Two of the Kosior brothers, who had initially sided with the Left, later associated with this group. Eventually, Bubnov, Zatonskii, and Gamarnik—Piatakov's most faithful friends and collaborators—also "recognized" the leadership of Stalin (who in November 1918 justified to them his reliance on the "Right" during the "retreat" of the previous months with the motto "vsiakomu ovoshu svoe vremiia").

With the exception of this trio, the social, national, and cultural backgrounds of the new adepts were fairly uniform. Like Voroshilov and Rukhimovich, they were members of urban national "minorities" (Russian, Jewish, Polish, etc.), with no formal education and of working class origin, who found it hard to tolerate the birth of a Ukrainian nation, although for reasons other than the "ideological-internationalist" ones Piatakov upheld. The group was united not only by common origins and attitudes, but also by a profound aversion for Trotsky and his methods and style, which had been, at first, a further important meeting ground with the Left.

The problem here is that of the military opposition and of its "souls." We know that Stalin kept formally clear of it and criticized some of its positions. But this "alliance" (in quotation marks because of the inner conflicts

which lacerated it; think, for example, of Piatakov's distaste for Voroshilov) between proto-Stalinists and Leftists, between newly promoted officers of low extraction, with little or no ideological education, and Marxist intellectuals, was an important step both in the evolution of Stalin's power (Piatakov and V. M. Smirnov were among those few of its leaders who were slow to join Stalin's following) and in that of the ideology of Stalinism.

It is interesting to note how this "alliance" was not only founded on conflicts (some of them recent) against "common" enemies (for example, those of the Tsaritsyn mafia on one side and of Piatakov, Bubnov, and Antonov-Ovseenko on the other with Vatsetis and the military specialists of Trotsky's entourage) but was also founded on a series of "misunderstandings" that were transformed into a series of objective convergences. We have already mentioned how both groups, though starting from different positions, reached a common position of intolerance for "nationalism." As the recently published minutes of the closed session of the Eighth Congress show, the same phenomenon also applied to military questions. Here, too, the points of origin were distant. On the one side were those, often ex-NCOs of the tsarist army, who had recently achieved positions of great power, who would not tolerate submitting once again to their old officers (or to "alien" people in general, including "intellectuals"), and who would not accept any criticism of their work or methods (which, we should remember, consisted from the beginning of brutality and abuse; as Okulov reported, in the fall of 1918 the whip and corporal punishment reigned in Voroshilov's army). On the other side were the intellectuals, blind to that whip, but once again worried by the trend toward resorting to the use of tsarist officers because of the "denaturing" of the social composition of the Red Army that was a result of the conscription of the *seredniaki*. But aversion for the peasants (as, first, refractory subjects of command and, second, as refractory social and ideological material) and for the "bourgeois specialists" unified the two groups.

The crisis of the spring and summer of 1919 in Ukraine, and, more generally, in the South, marked the definitive consolidation of Stalin's personal hold on the group of the "Ukrainian" leaders. While Piatakov was being won over by Trotsky, Artem, who was perhaps the most authoritative member of the group and who had also served at Tsaritsyn, was writing in his letters that the only hope for the situation could come from Stalin, who thus emerged from the crisis as a third *vozhd'*, though a minor one. This process was facilitated by Trotsky, who went to Ukraine in May 1919 to eradicate the "Ukrainian peculiarities—both those linked to the methods of the Left and the military opposition and those embodied in the real *partizanshchina* of the Ukrainian peasants. In his pitiless struggle against the

latter, Trotsky found in the former some rather useful instruments,[21] and wrote laudatory reports to Lenin about Voroshilov's seriousness and determination in eradicating the peasant "bands." And yet, by taking harsh measures also against local bolshevik potentates, without any concern for the impact this might have on his own "popularity," that is, without any political or personal considerations, Trotsky made himself the target of much hatred (Piatakov, always an "unpopular" leader, was to inherit this trait from him).

Stalin's conquest of the "Russian" right of the KP(b)U laid the foundations for his subsequent conquest of the entire party, which passed through the repression of its *detsist* majority at the Fourth Conference of March 1920 (Stalin then represented the Russian CC) and was sanctioned at the end of 1920 by the nomination of Molotov, and not Piatakov, as party secretary. And, in 1921, Stalin was already harvesting the first fruits of his conquest, with the success of the anti-Trotskyite "intrigues" in the Donbass. Piatakov had become the dictator of this crucial economic region, the place of origin of many leaders of the "Russian" right of the KP(b)U, at the end of 1920. Despite his successes and Lenin's opposition, a year later Moscow was forced to sanction his removal, loudly requested by the Ukrainian party which was orchestrated by Stalin (the episode is particularly interesting because, in their attack against an entrenched bureaucracy, the "Stalinists" resorted for the first time to that mix of populism, *spets*-baiting, workerism, and appeal to other bureaucracies' offended honor and revanchist desires that re-emerged, again in the Donbass but in much more refined forms, in 1928 with the Shakhty affair and in 1935 with Stakhanovism).

Of course, the conquest of the KP(b)U by "Stalinism"[22] was facilitated

[21] There are many meanings for the term *partizanshchina*, still used today—improperly—to cover different and conflicting phenomena, such as Voroshilov's detachments, the Ukrainian *jacquerie*, and such a variegated political phenomenon as the 1919 military opposition. Precisely the example of Voroshilov's enthusiasm and pitilessness in the fight against the Ukrainian partisans suffices to prove how misleading the use of the term may be. Therefore, it would probably be more correct to reserve the term for the Ukrainian peasant insurgents, who, from this point of view, were among the first examples (another being represented by their Mexican counterparts) of a popularly based partisan movement in a semi-developed country of the twentieth century. It may be added that in 1918 Piatakov thought of using such a movement in order to take power, thus anticipating one of the most important political phenomena of our century. In 1919, of the Bolshevik leaders, only Antonov-Ovseenko, in denouncing Trotsky's and Voroshilov's policies, in some ways continued to defend "true" *partizanshchina* (given the conditions and the times in which his memoirs were written, although extremely interesting, they are not completely trustworthy on this subject). On the continuity between the 1919 partisan movement and the 1930 resistance to collectivization, see fn. 33.

[22] This term took on, over the years, a number of meanings. With this caveat, I believe it is possible to use it.

by the fact that, until 1922, the KP(b)U was, as Bohdan Krawchenko has written, an "urban military bureaucratic non-Ukrainian apparatus." As early as 1919–1921, however, certain elements had emerged that foreshadowed the reasons for that alliance between Stalin and the Ukrainian wing of the leadership of the KP(b)U, reached in 1923 after the great clashes of late 1922 (to which we will return in the next section). I have in mind, for example, the polemics surrounding the KP(b)U's agreement with the "Soviet" Ukrainian parties, the Borotbists first of all, opposed by Piatakov and the Left but supported by Artem and approved by Stalin. Another contributing factor was fear of the militarist Trotsky and his hypercentralism—a fear confirmed in the eyes of Ukrainians when Piatakov became one of Trotsky's followers and behaved as he did in the Donbass. Here, to quote accusations of the time, Piatakov acted like "a conquistador among the Papuans," uniting the front of his adversaries (Russian workers, local bureaucracies, Ukrainian leaders et al.). As Trotsky had done in 1919, Piatakov thus paved the way for the victory of his enemies and served as confirmation to the majority of local leaders that the centralist danger lay in Trotskyism, against which Stalin might be the antidote, however bitter.

These conclusions, paradoxical in the light of later developments, must at the time have seemed sensible to many republican and local leaders. What Sergo Mikoian has called Stalin's 1920s "reasonableness" can be seen at work here, in the ability with which the network of alliances was woven which led to Piatakov's removal, in the contradictions and "barter" at the *narkomnats* with the "republican powers," and, above all, in the pact with the strong nationalities of 1923. It is probable that Stalin already wore this reasonableness as a mask, but it is certain that it convinced many and that it was one of the tools that enabled him to take power. This reasonableness, the willingness to reach agreement even with those who represented interests he actually despised and was later quick to crush, shows us, I believe, one reason for Stalin's superiority over other contenders during the years of the power struggle. I have in mind his "freedom,"— meaning his lack of principles—in the fields of both ideology and behavior ("vsiakomu ovoshu svoe vremiia" was indeed Stalin's motto), which contrasts sharply with Trotsky's many ideological constraints and close friendships and differs, too, from Kamenev's and Zinov'ev's more circumscribed cynicism.

In the early 1920s, as we know, the group that had emerged from the Civil War was joined by the "secretaries," Kaganovich first of all (he, too, by the way, was a "Ukrainian" and an old friend of Voroshilov and Kviring), who helped Stalin in his conquest of the party apparatus. Studying Piatakov we see little of it. But from the history of the spread of Lenin's "Testament," in which, as we have said, Piatakov was cited as one of the six

main leaders of the party, it clearly emerges that in January 1923 Stalin was already, in Fotieva's expression, the "Big Stalin," to whom everything was referred, even against Lenin's instructions. Piatakov was aware of this, and, despite his ties with Trotsky (politically, a finished man at the very moment of Lenin's death), he was already beginning to fear and respect Stalin. He knew, by the way, that at least in terms of respect, Stalin and his group returned the sentiment: for example, during the "intrigues" to remove Piatakov from the Donbass, Ordzhonikidze, even while attacking him stressed his great administrative abilities in the economic field. These contradictory sentiments perhaps emerged already during Trotsky's replacement as Commissar of War by Frunze, when Piatakov behaved ambiguously.

In the following years, this mutual appreciation grew perceptibly if not openly. As we have said, the Piatakov who was preparing the great fixed capital investments plan for industry at the OSVOK (the Conference for Investments in Fixed Capital) was looking carefully at Stalin's socialism in one country. And perhaps the fact that Piatakov was left at the VSNKh until July 1926, one of the few opposition leaders who kept any great executive powers, shows that the other side, too, was looking "carefully" at his work.

Between 1926 and 1929, as we know, "Big Stalin"'s personal power increased enormously, entering a new phase at the end of that period. Piatakov's life gives us only some glimpses of the first part of this evolution: of the convergence of vast sectors of the party around a new version of socialism in one country; of the last stages of Trotsky's marginalization, linked partly to his insistence on the importance of international questions (which by now even people like Preobrazhenskii were putting in second place); and of the growth in the party, even at its highest levels, of fear for the *gensek*.

Glimpses of the genetic mutation of 1928–1929 however, are more interesting. As we have seen in the previous sections, Stalin was then "crowned," through a pre-arranged operation, as the new *vozhd'* of the party and of the country. This involved, and was made possible by, a significant enlargement of his following, which, for example, the majority of the ex-Trotskyites, including Piatakov, now joined. Stalin thus found himself at the head of a much larger and more varied group than that of a few years previously, temporarily united by that ideology of the will, of the party and the state as that will's tools, and of the leader as its embodiment.

But if the Stalin of 1929 was a *vozhd'* and a *khoziain* for everyone, he was not these things in the same way for everyone. And he did not embody state and party in the same way in the eyes of all of his followers. This can be seen, for example, in the relationship between Stalin and Ordzhonikidze and in that between Stalin and Piatakov in the early 1930s. For Ordzhoni-

kidze, an exponent of the group that had helped him seize power, Stalin was, if not a *primus inter pares*, an authoritative "older brother" to respect and admire, but with whom it was also possible to quarrel (in a 1933 letter to Ordzhonikidze, whom he was trying to appease over the reduction of the NKTP resources, Kaganovich, while calling him "drug," reserved for Stalin the term "nash glavnyi drug"). For Piatakov, Stalin was already the master to whom one had to pay absolute obedience as a personal vassal who knew he had a past to be forgiven.

Among the older Stalinists, too, there were important differences. Despite all the ideological mutations, at least some of them—perhaps Kirov, Mikoian, and Ordzhonikidze himself— still thought they were building something "socialist." For Molotov, Kaganovich, Poskrebyshev, and others like them, the situation was different. For these, the word *khoziain* took on yet another meaning.

The Stalinist group that launched the assault of 1928–1929 was thus held together by common ideological traits and by certain shared characteristics of behavior and temperament, and was united by the figure of Stalin, in whom each in his own way recognized his own master. But, like all stratified groups, it was also fractured by fault lines, which Piatakov's evolution and personal ties help us to see more clearly. And the "despotism" of the early 1930s, though an undeniable reality, was a still immature phenomenon.

The terrible trials of those years changed everything. At the end of 1932, in a climate in which even proposals of tyrannicide circulated among the country's top leaders, the above-mentioned fault lines emerged more clearly. They also became more and more complex, with those gouged out by the events in progress superimposed on those resulting from the variegated nature of the stratification of the Stalinist group.

The fault lines brought about by events were deeply influenced by the division of tasks during the "assault," in its turn determined by chance, by the dictator's calculations, by the "preferences" of his followers, etc. The fundamental distinction, substantially respected despite the many cases of overlapping, was between those who took over industry and the cities and those who had the real "dirty job"—the breaking of the peasants and the nationalities.

The victories of the end of 1933 did not heal these fractures, and, as we know, at the Congress of the "Victors," agreement was not complete. For some, the victory had been achieved despite Stalin (even if, at the end of 1932, perhaps for fear of falling with him, they had not the courage to remove him). For others, victory could and would be translated into a lessening of the hold: they hoped for a return of the "reasonable" Stalin.

But Stalin, too, had "changed." The trials the country had gone through had transformed him into a master in the full sense of the word in the eyes of many people: his immediate followers at the personal secretariat, the members of his recently renewed intimate circle, many of the intermediate cadres of the party, the majority of the "organs'" officers (to whom he guaranteed immunity for the crimes committed during collectivization and the famine), and even in the eyes of a considerable segment of the population at large.[23]

Those same trials, as Stalin himself had experienced them, had accentuated and transformed his "wickedness." Soviet history has proved once again the existence of that "repulsive imperial madness" of which Burckhardt had spoken and proved, too, the truthfulness of Montesquieu's observations about the importance of the personal character of the despot, once one has been produced. The new depths to which Stalin's malevolent style as a "master" had sunk were again in evidence in his relations with former opposition leaders such as Preobrazhenskii, Zinov'ev, and Kamenev. With them, Stalin's game became increasingly wicked, proving that Trotsky's 1928 forebodings about the future of the "capitulationists" were, if anything, too optimistic.

However, as in the early 1930s, it seemed that Piatakov would manage to avoid the worst consequences of this new turn of the screw. His services were still precious and, unlike the other ex-opposition (except Bukharin), he could count on powerful protectors. Things soon began to go differently, however, and the last two years of Piatakov's life saw the rapid rise of what Moshe Lewin has called "high Stalinism." The affirmation of this coincided with, and was made possible by, the destruction not only of Piatakov and of the "last-minute followers," but also of a large part of the original Stalinist *druzhina*, in a process in which a prince and his train were substituted by a despot and his circle. The years 1936–1938 thus saw not only the rupture of the continuity represented by the old Bolshevism but also the partial rupture of the subjective continuity of the Stalinist group. It was the triumph of a new personal despotism, a phenomenon quite rare in history but one that the twentieth century—age of the formation in "particular" conditions of innumerable new states—has allowed us to observe quite frequently.

[23] This was a by-product of the upheavals of those years. Then, a new social stratum was raised to new heights by the same wave that was submerging the great majority of the population. Furthermore, the very seriousness of the crisis led many to grasp hold of everything they could, including the icon of an infallible leader, in order to stay afloat. Needless to say, this was also a measure of the success of the "cult" campaign launched in 1929.

V. NATIONALITY (UKRAINE)

Ukraine was the crux of the nationality question, especially before World War II. Through Piatakov's connections with Ukraine, his life clearly shows us the importance of that problem in the formation and development of the Soviet system. In so far as is possible from Piatakov's experiences, I will try to outline the main phases through which the nationality question passed during his life span. Given the perspective adopted, this outline will be constructed from a centralist viewpoint, as a piece of the "unitary" history of a renewed plurinational system, such as the Soviet one was. And, perhaps it is here that the interest lies: in spite of well-known and important exceptions—Richard Pipes first of all—Soviet historiography, even its Western component, has sometimes denied and more often downplayed or ignored the nationality question, possibly so as not to "complicate" things too much, thus delegating the problem to national historiographies.[24]

Piatakov's father was, in Kostiuk's words, a "predstavitel' russkogo krupnovo kapitala" in Ukraine; at least, this is how he was considered in nationalistic circles, and not without reason (born in St. Petersburg in 1846, he had moved to Ukraine to administer one of the country's largest sugar mills, which belonged first to Prince Vorontsov and was later inherited by the widow of the imperial *ober-egermeister*, Countess Balasheva; later, he founded his own industrial companies). *Mutatis mutandis*, the son was to be judged even more harshly. Paradoxically, it was his adherence to Marxism as an internationalist ideology which facilitated Piatakov's transformation, to use Lenin's expression, into a champion of Great Russian chauvinism. Two ideological tenets paved the way for this.

The first was the already-mentioned conviction that, since the confrontation was to be directly between finance capital and socialism, the national state was an out-of-date phenomenon. In these conditions, the slogan of national self-determination made no sense, indeed, was "reactionary," and had to be replaced by that of "down with frontiers."

The second was Piatakov's adherence to the ideas with which the Austro-Marxist Karl Renner—much more respectful than Piatakov of minority rights—had tried to defend the existence of a resurrected Austro-Hungarian state. These ideas, sharply criticized by von Mises from both the economic and national standpoints, were based on the concept of the "large

[24] To historians of the national problems, and especially to those of Ukraine, the following section will thus seem obvious and perhaps quite superficial. Nonetheless, I decided to include it because I believe that without taking into account the national question it is impossible to write—or to understand—the history of the USSR as a *historically unitary phenomenon*, something which the USSR had undoubtedly been for seventy years.

economic region," more often than not plurinational, which was held to be the only economically viable entity. In Piatakov they took a particularly extreme form, to the extent that Lenin defined him as a theoretician of "imperialist economism."

Piatakov's Marxism thus contained the premises whereby it could be transformed into a particular version of the imperial ideology shared by many Russian intellectuals, especially those living in Ukraine. If peculiar because of the forms it took, Piatakov's anti-Ukrainianism was thus fairly typical. As Gol'denveizer wrote in his memoirs, after the February Revolution the Kiev intelligentsiia considered "grubaia beztaktnost' " any attempt to raise the Ukrainian problem. This ill-feeling was particularly acute among those of the Left, Mensheviks and *esery* included, as demonstrated by the anti-Ukrainian stance of the Kiev Soviet and Duma or by Murav'ev's behavior. In this sense Piatakov's Marxism was ready to be transformed into one of the factors which later made possible the particular type of state (empire) building that took place during the Civil War[25] (think, for example, of the new significance that could be taken on by the slogan "down with frontiers").

This transformation did not come about in a linear way, however, and its tortuous steps can be seen in two phenomena. The first is the role played by the acceptance of the October "miracle," also in regard to the nationality question, in the slide of some Marxist intellectuals toward positions that were a grotesque caricature of those they had previously held. Before that happened and despite his theoretical positions, a Piatakov convinced of the impossibility of socialism in "Russia" collaborated, for example, with the Rada and the other Ukrainian socialist parties and was reprimanded by Moscow for it.

This collaboration points to the second phenomenon, which brings us back to the reasons the new plurinational state organism being formed took on the peculiar and novel structure of a "union" of republics at the moment of its birth and which has already been analyzed, for example, by Frank Sysyn in connection with Nestor Makhno's evolution. This phenomenon is the relative independence of the revolutionary process in Ukraine (a Ukraine that at first seemed not to include the Donbass).

[25] In spite of the recurrent polemics on the subject, I think it can be said that the late 1918–early 1919 Bolshevik victory in Ukraine—which prevented the consolidation of a Ukrainian national state and thus opened the door to the rebirth of a multinational state formation—was in fact the result of an "adventure" conducted by a small group of Leftist leaders, motivated by ideology and headed by Piatakov, who often defied the center, putting it in front of the fait-accompli.

In fact, Piatakov's activity both in 1917 and, in spite of the rupture which the October Revolution marked in this field too, during the Civil War offers a good measurement of the progress in the development of a Ukrainian national-political frame of reference, to which at first he undoubtedly belonged (as shown by the fact that, unlike Voroshilov or Kviring, before his Trotskyite option he was recognized by the Ukrainians as the representative of a tendency which, though hostile, was internal to their world).

After the Brest-Litovsk peace, for example, like all the leaders of the Left, Piatakov resigned from his post. But, unlike the others, he left straight away for Ukraine, to continue the war against the Germans and, with the volunteer units of the "Red Cossacks," to keep alive the flame of the revolution in Europe.

The enemy of nationalism was thus transformed into the defender of the independence and the specific nature of Ukraine. And, as such, he was the ally of Mykola Skrypnyk against the "Russian" Bolsheviks of Kharkiv, Katerynoslav, and Luhans'k in the building of an independent KP(b)U, of which he became the first secretary. Naturally, behind his pro-Ukrainian stance, which went as far as to sustain the new party's complete independence from the Russian one, there were divergences with Moscow over the peace, with attempts to get around its effects, beginning with those in Ukraine, doubts about the new power's "independent" ability to survive, and hopes for a European revolution. But, Piatakov's behavior in fact confirmed Ukraine's relative *otherness* compared to Russia and showed that Kiev was still one of Piatakov's centers of action.

The rapid defeat at the hands of the Germans did not substantially alter anything, and, indeed, by the summer of 1918 Piatakov went so far as to set himself up as the theoretician of the revolutionary potential of the Ukrainian peasants, on whom he "gambled" in August, despite the violent opposition of Kviring and his group, proclaiming an insurrection, which immediately aborted. At the Second Congress of the KP(b)U (October 1918) the Right criticized him and, thanks to the support of Moscow, gained the majority in the Central Committee. Despite the "truth" of some of Kviring's observations about the Ukrainian peasants—revolutionaries, to be sure, but certainly not of the Bolshevik line—Piatakov's position immediately seemed to be vindicated by the defeat of Germany and the rapid expansion of the peasant insurrection in Ukraine.

It was at this time that Piatakov, after having overcome the opposition from Moscow, became for a few weeks the premier of the new Bolshevik government. He was quickly removed from that position, for a series of reasons that cannot be analyzed here. What is of interest here, rather, as in the previous sections, is the defeat and ship-wreck of the Bolshevik power in

Ukraine between April and June 1919. Kviring's position was now vindicated by the great peasant *jacquerie* (partly stimulated by the insane agricultural policies implemented by that alliance between the Left and the proto-Stalinists that held power in Kiev). The assault launched by the "peasant ocean" on a Bolshevik power whose local composition was, as we have just seen, rather interesting from the standpoint of later developments, confirmed to Piatakov, Voroshilov, Rukhimovich, Kosior et al. that the most dangerous enemy of the new power was the "ukrainskaia krest'ianskaia stikhiia," the militant spear-head of the only social force still present in "Russia" that could open the way for the restoration of capitalism.

Paradoxically, then, the lesson that the experience of those months taught to the leaders of the Southern front—and to Stalin as their head—was the opposite of that which the nationalist leaders learned. The latter saw the peasants as the weak point of the national movement; for the former, the Ukrainian countryside became instead the symbol of and the breeding ground for hostile "nationalism."[26]

The crisis of the second Bolshevik Ukrainian government coincided with Piatakov's definitive move to a hypercentralist position: already at the Eighth Congress, although siding with Smirnov on military matters, he had exalted centralism against the national demands. In April, once again secretary of the KP(b)U, he opposed negotiations with the Ukrainian Soviet parties (i.e., those favorable to the new power). Between May and June, he accelerated negotiations with Moscow to centralize most of the Ukrainian commissariats' powers in the Russian ones. Soon after, his collaboration with Trotsky began. Thus Piatakov's Rakovskian, bureaucratic-"imperial" option, mentioned in the second section above, has also been corroborated on the "national" plane.

After the second half of 1919, except for the interval in the Donbass during 1921, Piatakov was no longer in Ukraine and he no longer dealt directly with the nationality question. His experiences, however, can be used for some other reflections on the evolution of the nationality question in the USSR.

In the section on "Despotism," we mentioned the coalition of Stalin and the leadership of the KP(b)U in opposition to the Trotskyites and the first signs of a possible alliance between the Stalinists and the "national" wing of the Ukrainian party. In 1921–1922, these signals were contradicted first by the purges directed by Lebed' and then, and above all, by the great clashes at the end of 1922 over the nationality question, which saw the defeat of

[26] See also fn. 34.

Stalin's position by a composite front under Lenin, of which the Ukrainians led by Skrypnyk were a strong component. With the birth of the USSR, this front imposed a solution that, at least from the formal standpoint (the creation of a federal structure founded on national republics), had enormous and long-term importance. In the short term it represented the second of the fundamental compromises that went into creating the essence of the NEP: aware of its own weakness, the new state center that had emerged from the Civil War now made a pact not only with the countryside but also with the "strong" national leaderships.[27] And, just as in the case of the pact with the peasants (or of that with the *spetsy*), the pact with the nationalities showed a certain vitality, also of content, in the years immediately following.

Paradoxically, this vitality took the form of an alliance between some of the winners and the defeated Stalin—an alliance that surfaced already in 1923, at the Twelfth Congress. As is well known, in the first months of that year, Trotsky had rejected Lenin's request to lead, in his place, "a fight to the death" against "great Russian chauvinism" for the supremacy in the party. As Danilov has told us, it was, above all else, considerations of his "Jewish origins" that stopped Trotsky (that is, factors, again, connected with "nationality"). In addition, he may have been concerned over the discontent that a battle of this sort would have caused among his closest collaborators—primarily Piatakov, who was then, according to Souvarine, the most authoritative Trotskyite after Trotsky himself, and who, at the end of 1922, was close to the position held by the *gensek* on the nationality question.[28]

Under the impetus of defeat, and because of the need to find allies in the struggle against Trotsky and in the struggle planned against Kamenev and Zinov'ev, the *gensek* radically changed direction during the same months, giving proof of his great ability at political maneuvers, fruit of his "freedom" from principles.

Taking good care to expose the menace of Trotskyite hypercentralism, he offered the leaders of the strong nationalities not only decisive support for their policies of *korenizatsiia*, but also the prospect of industrialization policies in tune with their needs (we shall return to this later).

27 In smaller and weaker republics (Georgia is the obvious example), the central powers from the beginning showed a quite different face.

28 From this point of view, 1922–1923 marked the beginning of yet another rift in the relationship between Trotsky and Piatakov. This rift grew in the following years, when Piatakov found himself more and more in agreement with Stalin, and especially with his "private" thoughts, on the national question. Trotsky followed a different path, which in the 1930s led him to recognize Ukraine's right to independence.

The offer was accepted. It soon produced a general reshuffling of the top offices in the republics, followed by the arrival in Ukraine of a Kaganovich who promised to carry through the Ukrainization of the party in forced stages (it is probable that, in spite of the general aversion which soon surrounded him and the conflicts with Shumsky, Kaganovich's energy and art of "pushing"—an ability at which the Stalinists excelled—inspired the admiration of Ukrainian leaders who were soon to become its victims).[29]

In return, the entire leadership of the KP(b)U (not just its old Stalinist core) guaranteed its support of Stalin in the struggle first against Trotsky and then against his other adversaries. This bargain must have seemed extremely advantageous to the Ukrainians, since their part appeared to consist of collaborating with a "reasonable" though authoritarian partner in the defeat of a common enemy. In fact, as had already happened in the Donbass in 1921, it was now the Trotskyites who in day-to-day life appeared to be the most consistent supporters of central power and its "rationality," attacking the interests of the "local bureaucracies." For example, in the 1920s Piatakov conducted a fierce battle at the VSNKh to remove resources and powers from the Ukrainian SNKh, which on various occasions he accused of "particularism," inadequacy, and corruption.

Here we return to the difficulties that Trotsky's entourage caused him in his attempt to take over the reins of an anti-Stalin front based on the nationalities. Despite the "universally esteemed" Rakovskii and his orientation in favor of Ukraine, it was rather Piatakov's behavior in the 1920s that provided the model for the attitude with which an important part of the opposition treated the nationality question at that time.

One might recall, for example, the way in which Vladislav Kosior,[30] in the Vorkuta of the 1930s, described to H. Kostiuk the feelings of scorn and annoyance that the Left, the youth, and the intellectuals in particular had felt ten years previously for the nationality question, its "provincialism," and narrow-mindedness. Similar feelings also surfaced in the opposition's official documents. For example, in the 1927 platform, the section dedicated to the nationality question began by attacking both Great Russian chauvin-

[29] Kaganovich was already in the 1920s Stalin's "special mission" man, capable of pushing efficiently for Ukrainization as well as for the extermination of Ukrainians. It is difficult to avoid the impression that Stalin modeled his relationship with Kaganovich on the successful Lenin-Trotsky one—interpreted, however, according to his primitive ("Asiatic," "feudal") *mentalité*. Kaganovich thus became the most important of *his* "court Jews" (among whom the Radek of the 1930s must also be counted, though in a different way).

[30] Of the three Kosior brothers, Vladislav was the only one who remained a member of the opposition.

ism and "nationalism in general."[31] It continued by defending the multinational proletariat in the towns, denouncing the NEP for having encouraged the development of private capitalism and nationalism in "backward regions," and criticizing the "natsionalizatsiia mestnogo apparata" conducted at the expense of the "national minorities" (even though, in principle, the platform was in favor of *ukrainizatsiia, turkizatsiia,* etc.—if properly conducted—and demanded bigger investments in the more backward republics).

Of course, this attitude of the Left was not without its own logic. It was true that the *korenizatsiia* policies often took crude, provincial, even "mafioso" forms and that, in consequence, the quality of the bureaucratic machinery often deteriorated and unpalatable new leadership groups emerged; it was also true that these policies gave rise to petty disputes and nourished rancor among the nationalities. But the republican and local leaderships understood perfectly well that they were objects of scorn and reacted accordingly, looking for a dialogue with Stalin.

Such a dialogue was made easier by other characteristics of the local powers that likewise irritated the opposition. At the republican level, in fact, forms of power were evolving which to some extent retraced the central developments and pointed to the diffusion of mentalities similar to those of the elite in power in Moscow. An example of this is the growth in the practice of the leaders' "cults," already widespread by the mid-1920s at the *obkom* as well as at the republican level (in Ukraine, for example, Skrypnyk's "cult" was launched).

It is not surprising, therefore, if at the Fifteenth Congress in 1927 the leadership of the KP(b)U once again sided with Stalin (who, incidentally, had agreed to recall Kaganovich to Moscow) in the final struggle against the opposition. Nor if, in the two following years, the leadership sided with Stalin in opposition to Bukharin and in the launching of the "great offensive."

It is noteworthy that in 1929, in order to criticize Bukharin, Skrypnyk brought out of the closet his ten-year-old friendship with Piatakov, who was elected as a symbol of centralism and anti-republicanism. But Piatakov was by now a supporter of Stalin, and it is not easy to understand the reasons for the political blindness shown by the Ukrainian leaders. To the reasons listed above, however, must be added an interesting phenomenon of the end of that decade that, as far as I know, was first described in reference to the

[31] From a certain point of view, the 1920s ideology of the Left can thus be seen as a special case of that "good imperial ideal" analyzed by Ronald Grigory Suny, among others. For its *rossiiskaia* (in contrast to *russkaia*) form, the *sovetskaia* one was substituted.

Karelian leadership. The hope spread among the national leadership that the Stalin-led *perelom* would also be the key to the rapid economic development of their republics and hence to an increase in their power through the strong activation of state initiative. From a certain standpoint, then, the fact of the leaders of the republics joining in the Stalinist offensive can be seen as the first instance of that fortune which the Soviet model of development was to have with the political and intellectual elites of the "backward" countries: the Soviet model promised them enormous opportunities and at the same time satisfied their penchant for large projects and their interest in keeping growth in the hands of the state (that is, in their own hands).

Furthermore, to the Ukrainian leaders—though probably not exclusively to them—the prospect of rapid industrialization and urbanization promised a solution to a fundamental problem: the building of that "base" necessary for real statehood, the lack of which had determined the partial failure of the efforts of 1917–1919 (Orest Subtelny's "missing Ukrainians" of the previous tsarist modernization and the already-mentioned problems created for the Ukrainian national movement by having to find support primarily in the countryside).

In this vein, Stalin's warning, "You won't get far with Ukrainizing the schools only.... You must introduce industrialization to succeed," was now received with favor—the more so since, thanks also to Piatakov's removal from the VSNKh in 1926, in the First Five-Year Plan at least, in confirmation of the "pact" of which we have spoken, the volume of industrial investments destined for Ukraine was satisfactory (it became even more so thanks to the "populist" policy in favor of the local economic bureaucracies adopted between 1927 and 1930 by the new Stalinist leadership of the VSNKh,[32] which included many of Piatakov's old adversaries from the KP(b)U, such as Kviring, Rukhimovich, and I. Kosior).

Similar factors concur to explain the Ukrainians' adhesion to other Stalinist policies of the period: to the extremes of pushing from above, for example, in which, as we have said, the Ukrainian leaders had already found a useful tool to implement Ukrainization on the basis of "regulations, laws, rules, and threats of dismissal;" or to the hunt for the "bourgeois" *spetsy*, launched in 1928 and which soon culminated in the Donbass. It is well known that the top leadership and the *spetsy* of the all-Union enterprises—often encouraged by Piatakov, who was their natural leader both in the 1920s and in the 1930s, and who still defended them publicly in 1929—were adamant in their opposition to Ukrainization. And, as the data about the national composition of mining engineers between 1926 and 1929

32 See my " 'Building the First System of State Industry,' " cited in fn. 2.

demonstrates, many of the young men who participated in the attack and benefited from it were Ukrainians.

In the long term, especially, some of the Ukrainians' hopes were fulfilled: although there were shortcomings (which we will return to at the end of this essay), the urbanization and the industrialization of the 1930s really did change the faces of Ukrainian cities and factories. From the political point of view, however, Ukrainians were disillusioned immediately. The assault triggered by the center and the crisis it provoked brought about a dizzying growth of centralism that first dented and then completely destroyed the informal "pact" between Stalin and the leaders of the republics; the more general compromise between the new state and the republics thus fell with the others, that with the peasantry first of all.

By the end of 1929, the NKZem of the republics were already centralized. Shortly thereafter, with Piatakov's return to the leadership of industry, the claims put forward in the industrial sphere against the republican SNKh began to be satisfied while, already in the Second Five-Year Plan, the percentage of investments destined for Ukraine dropped. At the same time the tragedy was unleashed that, through collectivization and famine, was very rapidly to wipe out self-government and national leaderships, starting with Ukraine.

From our viewpoint, only some aspects of this catastrophe and of its consequences can be mentioned.

In the first place, the catastrophe appears as the final settling of accounts still open between the old leadership group of the "Southern Front" (including the 1919 Bolshevik Ukrainian government) and the "ukrainskaia krest'ianskaia stikhiia." In February 1930, and then once more at the end of 1932, this had again provoked, though in very different forms, that "loss of control" already lamented in 1919 and denounced eleven and thirteen years later in almost identical words in official documents (Balitskii's 1919 and 1930 secret reports on the Ukrainian peasants' revolts provide yet another, and quite impressive, document of this continuity, in reality as well as in the elite's mind[33]).

[33] Balitskii's 1919 reports describe the revolt of German colonists and Greek, Russian, and Ukrainian peasants in the areas surrounding Odessa, as well as the situation in the city. They can be found in the TsGAOR. The 1930 reports are in Ordzhonikidze's secret fond in the former TsPA. Though written with an eye to the official line (Balitskii himself was by 1930 afraid of telling the naked truth, as he had done in 1919), the reports prove beyond a doubt that the Ukrainian peasants' "massovye volneniia" against collectivization (as well as events in the Caucasus) were one of the main factors behind Stalin's March retreat. These "volneniia," particularly strong along the borders and in the *okrug*, which in 1919 had been "platsdarmom povstancheskogo dvizheniia," also continued after Stalin's article. Only at the end of March was the situation relatively calm. The peasants' slogans were "Doloi kollektivizatsiiu," "Voz-

This time, to be certain of the *stikhiia*'s elimination, the powers-that-be stopped at nothing and decided to do the job properly, liquidating as well the "superstructure"—the elite of the Ukrainian republic—and proceeded to its de-Ukrainization.[34]

The process of de-Ukrainization was entrusted to Postyshev; in January 1933 he was given the extraordinary powers needed. The concession of these powers—the Italian diplomats spoke at the time of a Ukraine "granted in fee" to Postyshev—suggests, though, that the annulment of Ukrainian independence was not a one-step process. In other words, the difficulty of the goal meant that it was necessary to go through an intermediate phase, in which Ukraine was transformed from a subordinate but largely independent republic into a vice-royalty of sorts.

This vice-royalty was indeed governed by a viceroy with a mandate from the center who, for the most part, had no jurisdiction over important sectors such as industry (with the creation of the NKTP in January 1932, the process of centralization hoped for by Piatakov had taken another step forward and, in 1934, the most important traces of local power in this field were eliminated). But it was still a vice-royalty with a viceroy, a phenomenon which obstructed the birth of the personal despotism discussed in the previous section.

Stalin's distaste for "arrogant feudal lords" and his intent to "put them in their place" (I use his own words) emerged openly at the Seventeenth Congress. As Stalin himself added, he was also referring to those who in the past had rendered "great services." We may rightly include in this category those who had "won" in the preceding years on the key fronts of the great offensive and who had been able to do so thanks to the exceptional powers they had been granted and which were now accumulated in their hands.

The most glaring examples of these "feudal lords" were Kirov in Leningrad, Ordzhonikidze and Piatakov at the NKTP, and Postyshev in Kiev. Their liquidation was necessary for the transition to high Stalinism, in part because—and we go back to the intricacies of the divisions produced in the early 1930s in the original Stalinist *druzhina*—this very situation with

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vratite nam khleb i inventar'," "Doloi sovetskuiu vlast'," "Da zdravstvuet svobodnaia torgovlia," but also "Da zdravstvuet samostiina Ukraina." To repress them, between 1 February and 15 March, 25,000 people were arrested and 650 were shot (without counting deportations and the victims of dekulakization).

[34] In the long run, however, the weaknesses of Stalin's analysis of the national question emerged. The liquidation of the "peasant base" did not solve the problem. Far from it, as today's events seem to prove, and as Ukrainian nationalists had realized during the Civil War, the countryside was actually a rather precarious support for a national movement, to which urbanization and industrialization, on the other hand, gave new life.

regard to Stalin meant that they could find common understanding, overcoming the great divide between those who had dealt with city and industry and those who crushed peasants and nationalities. And, indeed, with Kirov's death and Ordzhonikidze's suicide, Postyshev, who had perhaps thought of an alliance with the latter, was the head of the last opposition of any importance of the 1930s. His elimination, as well as that of most of the leadership of the KP(b)U, which we have seen fighting Piatakov and joining Stalinism in 1918–1919, marked the end of yet another phase in the relationship between the center and Ukraine.

VI. THE WEST (GERMANY)

I will try now to outline the evolution of the significance of the term "the West" and of relations with the West as they appear to us through the stages of Piatakov's life. I have already defined Piatakov's education and culture in a general way as "Western." Looked at closely, however, the environment in which he grew up was, to be specific, part of that German-centered system which then existed, demarcated by very clearly defined boundaries, within the Western universe and which was so important before the Great War and also, to a lesser extent, after it.

To the young Piatakov the West was "Germany" (in its widest sense), and he was influenced by it through various channels: the musical activity of his mother, for example, who also taught him to play the piano ably; the business of his father, an *inzhener-tekhnolog* whose work was regulated by the Ukrainian sugar cartel and its links with its German counterpart; and his studies at the Kiev *real'noe uchilishche* (*real Schule*). Later on, this "German" influence was strengthened by his years at the Faculty of Law at St. Petersburg University and, above all, by his adherence to Marxism, mediated by the works of Kautsky, Renner, and Hilferding.

Even during his years in exile spent, after a brief stop-over in the United States, in Switzerland, Sweden, and Norway, Piatakov continued to move within this German-centered galaxy. This remained true in 1917–1918, which he spent looking toward Petrograd but also toward Berlin, Vienna, and Budapest.

From a certain standpoint, therefore, Piatakov may also be considered a protagonist—though a lesser and marginal one—in the crisis of that system which had Germany at its center. This crisis, triggered by the First World War but which dragged on over the following decades, was in fact acutely felt by Piatakov, who often summed it up in the expression "Evropa—eto vulkan," where by "Europe" he meant the above-mentioned system. If that is so, then, the expression, in addition to revealing the limits of Piatakov's vision, gained an irresistible ring of truth, although clearly it was not to be

the expected "socialist" lava that would pour forth from that volcano.

Piatakov's first, meaningful contact with a different and wider Europe and West came at the end of 1917 when, called to Petrograd, he took over the direction of the Gosbank and worked to nationalize the banks and to annul the foreign loans taken out by the tsarist government (the decree regarding the annulment appears to be his). This decision was clearly inspired by the conviction that they were on the eve of a "European" revolution, but it also reveals the limits of Piatakov's perception (and that of many like him) of Europe and the West.

Despite the fact that he fascinated foreign creditors with his cultured persona, "speaking Italian with the Italians, Danish with the Danes, Swedish with the Swedes," Piatakov did not in fact understand that the catastrophe would not have involved the whole of Europe equally. Nor did he want to listen to friends such as the Frenchman Sadoul or the Swedish banker Aschberg (the son of a Russian Jew), who warned that annulling the debts was a *geste maladroit* which would later be regretted, as it made that part of the West which was less affected by the crisis even more hostile to the new state.

A few days after the decision not to recognize the foreign debts, the hopes for a "European" revolution received a first blow from the Brest-Litovsk peace. From the standpoint of relations with the West and Germany, however, and of the idea of them that was gaining ground, this blow did not mark a breaking point. In fact, Piatakov judged the peace to be a transitory phenomenon even though, like all Left Communists, he worried about the stability which that peace gave to Germany and about the "national socialist" dangers which the new state faced.

These "dangers," at least in the ideological field, took a particularly interesting form. Probably through the mediation of Larin, who had studied the German war economy and had tranformed it into a myth and who had just been promoted to the leadership of the VSNKh to replace the Left Communists who had resigned, Lenin now put forward his own version of "state capitalism" and entered into a polemical debate with the Left. "The most concrete example" of state capitalism—he wrote—was Germany, "the last word in the contemporary techniques of large capitalism and of planned organization," placed, however, at the service of imperialism. In 1918, then, there were "two equal parts of socialism," unfortunately divided between two different countries: in Germany was to be found the economic organization, in Russia the political revolution. The latter's duty was thus to "study" the German example and to "introduce it with maximum energy, and without being afraid of dictatorial methods, so long as they speed its application" in "barbaric Russia."

The quotation certainly does not sum up Lenin's thought; the Left opposed this program and it was soon dropped. And yet, it helps us, I think, to see more clearly the path that the Bolshevik leadership was taking. First, to take the German war economy as a model meant adopting a socioeconomic program that involved a move backward toward the reduced social differentiation caused by the war, which everywhere imposed a return to the "state" as the core foundation in a moment of crisis. On the theoretical plane, this operation was made easier by the mediation of the socialist and Marxist traditions, which recognized in statism a superior form of handling the economy. But these traditions took on new forms, which were better suited to the Civil War—the reference is to its interpretations as a challenge to state (re)builders—and which made it possible to cope with it.

The lack of understanding of what "capitalism" was, as shown by Lenin's words, was also significant. Following Sombart rather than Marx, Lenin identified capitalism with modern large industry and its organization rather than with a self-renewing system. This identification implied, and fed, the delusion that capitalism had reached the limit of its possibilities and that it would be enough to copy its "last word" to ensure far superior development on the basis of the more advanced form of social organization created in the USSR.

A similar design inspired Piatakov's proposals and decisions during the following decades, but in March 1918 he was not thinking this way. In order to fight against "state capitalism" and "socialist patriotism," Piatakov moved to Ukraine to combat the Germans, in the hope of keeping the conflict alive and again involving "socialist" Russia in it. Piatakov thus gambled on the fragility of the central empires and on the imminent explosion of the European volcano.

A period marked by ups and downs now began also with regard to relations with the West (again identified with "Germany," in 1918 the main crater of the volcano). These upheavals, closely connected to the psychological ones we have discussed, were gradually to quell the hopes on which the initial gamble had been based.

The first defeat, in April 1918, did not alter Piatakov's convictions: although the volcano's eruption was close, no one could predict its exact moment. And, indeed, in August, when he again believed the moment had come, Piatakov took the initiative once more, proclaiming the insurrection in Ukraine. It was another defeat. Finally, in November, the long-awaited moment seemed to have come. Piatakov, "in sheepskin cloak and pointed fur cap with a revolver at his side," celebrated the German revolution at the Kremlin and then rushed to Ukraine where, among other activities, he

conducted negotiations with the soviets of the German and Austro-Hungarian soldiers who were trying to get home.

With the landing of the Entente troops in the Black Sea ports, Piatakov, now the prime minister of the Ukrainian Government, again found himself facing a broader "West." His reactions of this time lay bare his lack of understanding of the real characteristics of the crisis triggered by the war to the west of Germany. Misunderstanding the meaning and the scope of the mutinies in the Allied troops, he enthusiastically greeted their landing, feeling that it opened the door to war with the Allies and thus to the revolution in the West (in its widest sense now). The line he followed during those days certainly contributed toward convincing Lenin of the need to remove such an irresponsible man from his post.

In March, news of the revolution in Hungary, headed by his friend Béla Kun, and soon thereafter of revolution in Bavaria seemed to confirm Piatakov's hopes and changed the situation once more. To Piatakov, again secretary of the KP(b)U, the road to "Europe" (which had again become Central Europe) now seemed wide open. But it soon closed anew, disastrously, and the time had come for the two discoveries mentioned above: that of the need to come to terms with what could be done in the new, isolated state; and that of the new state's "Asiatic" dimension. Hopes for the "West" were again fueled briefly during the war against Poland, in which Piatakov participated, only to be dampened again by a defeat that marked, objectively if not yet subjectively, the beginning of a new phase.

During the following year, for the first time we come across a Piatakov who looks with different eyes toward the West, as to a "technical" model to imitate. This was an obvious consequence of the needs of reconstruction in the Donbass but also a first step in a new direction. At the subjective level, however, hopes for revolution in Germany were still alive, and the West was not yet reduced to a simple technical-industrial model. As we can see from articles Piatakov wrote at the time—for example, the one on Spengler—or from his collaboration with some journals of the era that published writings by important Western economists, he still viewed the West, in particular Germany, as a more general cultural reference point.

The events of the next months, however, accelerated the progressive reorientation of his attitude toward the West and toward Germany. In April 1922 the Treaty of Rapallo was signed. Shortly after, the negotiations concerning foreign concessions were entrusted precisely to Piatakov. In December, in the interests of quicker industrial development, he announced that he himself was in favor of widening economic relations with the West, thus siding with those who proposed a modification in the monopoly of foreign trade.

In any case, the conscious step toward a new phase in the conception of the West and of relations with it came about later, coinciding with the defeat of the German revolution of October 1923 that formally sanctioned the closing of the era begun in 1917.

This defeat represented, once and for all, the dashing of any hopes for an *a posteriori* and *ab externo* justification of the events of October, and, as discussed earlier, Piatakov emerged marked by a pessimism that took the form of a growing subjective commitment to internal matters. As he repeated in numerous articles, it was now time to build in the USSR, quickly and well. But, build what? The answer to this question, which Piatakov never asked directly, was, as we have said, the "first system of state industry in history"—a system that would take as its models the technical and organizational high points of the West, that is, of Germany and, in part, of the United States (the 1921–1922 reorganization of industry into trusts and syndicates, or cartels, was a clear indication of this), but that would differ from them in one essential element: the means of production would be state property (this difference, or better, this "superiority" was soon embodied in an organism Piatakov himself created at the end of 1923, the TsUGProm—more on this in the last section). The echo of Lenin's 1918 position (and of Hilferding's theories) is, I believe, undeniable, and in this we can find the roots of that "confusion" between *gosudarstvennyi* and *sotsialisticheskii* in the 1920s.

From the standpoint of relations with the West, this was the decisive step that transformed the West into a technical-industrial prototype, into a point of reference that was not cultural in a broad sense but was rather strictly economic (and, indeed, the decision to put internal matters first was now increasingly accompanied by a sense of superiority over the "decadent" West). But Piatakov still rejected isolationism: he maintained the necessity for Soviet industry to test itself on the world market, to become the equal of whatever was best in the most developed countries (a need that implied, obviously, rapid modernization of industry). From this stance, Piatakov criticized his former friend Bukharin and Bukharin's socialism in one country based on cooperation and gradualism—ridiculous tools for a man who wanted to build a state industry on the standard of Germany.

During his three years at the VSNKh, Piatakov did everything possible to apply this program. In his speeches, for example, we find quotations from German accounting manuals, from Anton Weber's writings on the *raionirovanie* of industry, and from Henry Ford's memoirs. The American debates of those years on corporative planning are echoed in his vision of the plan, to which we will return.

In October 1925, these options were embodied in the first important economic German-Soviet agreement. The date is significant: for Piatakov, who at that time still controlled Soviet industry, and who had planned its expansion on this basis, the years between 1925 and 1930 were to have been the years of the First Five-Year Plan. The agreement signed with Germany at the beginning of this period thus implicitly underlined the decision to take Germany as the compass by which to steer Soviet industrial development.

In July 1926, however, Piatakov was forced to leave the VSNKh. Sent as a trade representative to a city he despised, he again had to deal with that part of the West least touched by the crisis and was faced once more with the problems unleashed by the decision to annul the foreign debts. In 1927, in fact, he belonged to the Soviet delegation that negotiated with France (which he called a "painted whore") to obtain new funds in exchange for a partial recognition of the old debts. Piatakov and the opposition supported this plan, at least under certain conditions, since it was necessary in order to regain access to the international capital markets. This position, dictated by the desire to accelerate investments in industry as much as possible, again gave proof of the fact that the Left recognized the importance of keeping up relations with the developed world, which was still its beacon, though to a lesser and ever diminishing extent.

Internally, the removal of the Trotskyite group from the responsibility for directing industry and industrial policy, and its substitution with leaders who had had less exposure to or contact with foreign countries, marked the beginning of an interval which was to last about three years. At least superficially, this period was characterized by a decrease in German influence (which never entirely disappeared: think, for example, of the 1929 reform of industry and of the introduction of the *obedinenie*, inspired by the *konzern*) and by a growth in the influence of other Western experiences. Of the latter, though, many of the Stalinist leaders had a "mythical" vision, fruit of superficial knowledge and of intellectual shallowness, as is shown by their relations with the United States between 1928 and 1930. The great fascination with "American methods," which left highly visible traces in the literature of the time and which has deceived more than one historian, is yet another index of the diffusion of a mentality, that of "miraculism," which we have already mentioned. But this mentality also allows us a look at some of the reasons for the crisis in industry of 1931–1933.

The "American model" at first seemed to offer the solution to some of the most pressing problems of industrialization. Everyone knew that the "American methods" consisted in mass production carried out by unskilled labor. The former was what was needed in the USSR, which was rich in the

latter. Thus it was self-evident that it was necessary to "do as they do in America." Within a couple of years, however, when the moment came to start up the first large "American" factories, unforeseen problems came to light (for example, the greater the desire to streamline production and entrust it to unskilled labor, the greater the need for a larger and more solid technical-administrative structure). Thus, in the end, the *osvoenie* of mass production showed itself to be one of the most difficult problems the leadership of Soviet industry was called upon to solve in the 1930s.[35]

When Piatakov rejoined that leadership at the end of 1930, these problems appeared as part of the more general crisis of the five-year "plan." He was at first entrusted with importing machinery for the chemical industry, which enabled him to renew contact with Germany. Immediately afterward, he was charged with negotiating a new, important economic agreement with Germany. Under the pressure of Soviet needs, as well as those of German industry, hard hit by the crisis, negotiations were completed by April 1931 with the signing of the *Pjatakow Abkommen*, which was to be a decisive document in the salvation of industrialization.

Thanks to Piatakov's efforts and to those of his friend Rozengol'ts, who in the 1920s had been responsible for the application of part of the "secret" military-industrial German-Soviet agreements and who was now the commissar for foreign trade, Germany became once again the model for Soviet industrialization. Through Piatakov, who had remained a few months in Germany as the VSNKh plenipotentiary, in July, Soviet industry had placed orders for almost a billion deutsche marks, posing the basis for its re-equipment. By the end of the year, while imports from other countries had rapidly fallen, the German percentage of total Soviet imports had jumped from 23.7 to 37.2 percent and reached 46.7 percent in 1932.[36]

The "West" was at this point reduced to Germany alone. But Germany, too, was now a model only on the technological plane. The 1929 crisis helped Piatakov to look down on Germany and on the entire West and reassured him of the rightness of his decisions. Indeed, this crisis confirmed to him that Europe—and, above all, Germany—was still a *vulkan*. The fact that, "despite its technology, its engineers and its skilled workers," German industry was languishing, whereas Soviet industry was "flying"—as Piatakov declared in January 1932 when the critical phase of industrialization seemed to have been overcome and no one yet expected the catastrophe of 1932–1933—was in his eyes confirmation of the superiority of the Soviet

35 This is an interesting example of technology "that looks transferable" but "may not be as easily copied as it looks," a phenomenon perceptively analyzed by A. O. Hirschman.

36 These shifts are even more dramatic if machinery alone is considered.

socioeconomic forms. Total state property and the "plan" as expression of the will of the state worked. And, indeed, these policies were envied and admired by the great German industrial magnates, one of whom told Piatakov that "it would be good if, just as your Central Committee is doing, Brüning presented us with his five-year plan and led the struggle for that five-year plan."

These desires were soon to be in some way satisfied by the advent of Nazism, which caused Germany to make another jump forward in that process of "parallel aberration" (but with different content and forms) of which we have spoken. Piatakov's evaluation of Nazism is not known. It is probable that the content of this new eruption of the "volcano Europe" amazed him. It is certain he had to adapt to it to take into account the Soviet *raison d'état*. In the years immediately following 1933, in fact, Stalin used the old left-wing leaders to launch his message to the new German powers and to maintain relations with them *a latere* of Litvinov's policies. Hilger speaks of a Radek sent in 1934 to express admiration for the dedication of the Nazi youth and the organizing talent of the National Socialists. The less unpalatable job of continuing to look after economic relations between the two states was assigned to Piatakov.

From 1933 on, these relations suffered a swift decline. In the short term, this was caused not so much by Hitler's advent to power, the impact of which, at least in 1933, was not noticeable (the German percentage of imports for that year remained at 43.5 percent, and in February Hitler consented to the salvaging of Soviet foreign credit), as by the terrible crisis that struck the USSR in the autumn of 1932, forcing it to reduce foreign trade to a minimum.

This decision to reduce foreign trade, imposed by circumstances, was later confirmed on the basis of the "victory" reached through industrialization. The "latest word" on the capitalistic technology had by now been introduced in the USSR, and so it was possible to establish economic self-sufficiency. Thus, the phase ended in which the West and Germany in particular were, for the USSR, reference points in the technical-industrial field.[37] The economic isolationism that had characterized the first version of socialism in one country reemerged in a new form. Piatakov, who was convinced of the superiority of the Soviet economy and who felt that it should be open, continued to disagree with this choice.

[37] This stage was to be reopened in the 1960s, due to the difficulties the Soviet system met in the field of innovation. The phenomen is briefly discussed in the last section of this essay.

It is worth pointing out that autarky extended to the economic field an isolationism that, as Hilger has observed, was already present in the political field at the end of the 1920s, barely covered by the renewed propagandist fervor.[38] Taken as a whole, this phenomenon is in line with what Hintze wrote of isolation as a condition for the development of "imperial" systems, which desire to be the whole and cannot tolerate the notion of a society of equal states. It would almost seem that Stalin, busy with the building of his own "empire," remedied the lack of this isolation, which their geography guaranteed to empires of the past, by building through ideology and through all the other means at his disposal an artificial isolation that, in fact, succeeded in holding firm for some decades.

In the three following years, Piatakov continued, with Rozengol'ts, to follow what was left of the USSR's economic relations with Germany. There were still the old debts to renegotiate or to pay, especially those contracted in 1931–1933. The first gold to arrive from the camps in Siberia (Kolyma included) was used for this, and it was also this gold that enabled Schacht to overcome the currency crisis of 1934. Then, in December 1935, Piatakov went to Germany one last time to negotiate the concession of new loans.

One year later, Vyshinskii used this trip to "prove" Piatakov's contacts with Trotsky (whom Piatakov had supposedly met in Norway) and with the German secret services, of which he was accused of being an agent. Even Piatakov's demise, therefore, was marked by that interweaving of Soviet and German experiences that had dominated his life.

VII. THE INDUSTRIAL ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM

As we have said, Piatakov's cultural background, right from his childhood, was basically German and we have seen how, starting from his father's experience with the Kiev sugar cartel and his adherence to Marxism, this was particularly true of his economic culture. We also know that the central point of the nineteenth-century German economic experience was the relationship between state and economy, on which both List's "national" school (and later the historical school) and the Marxist approach concentrated their attention, theoretical as well as practical. The appearance of industry and its rapid development as an indispensable prerequisite of the independence of any state, to say nothing of a great power, "forced" the German state to tackle the problem of industrialization. By taking responsibility for this, even though only indirectly, Germany added a new dimension to that

[38] Litvinov's 1933–1935 political initiatives only partially and temporarily altered this trend.

"harnessing of all the military and financial power of the country" by states that wanted to become "independent political powers," which, for Hintze, had been the nucleus of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century state-building.

From this standpoint, Piatakov's experience as organizer of Soviet industrialization was a further step forward along this path, marked by the direct handling of industry and of industrialization by the state.

This extremization of the relationship between state and economy had multiple roots—for example: Marxist economic theory; the traditional economic interventionism of the tsarist state, which in this area had already "reached and overtaken" Germany in order to compensate for an even more serious backwardness and to satisfy an equally great ambition for power; the Great War, which everywhere had reinforced state intervention in the social and economic fields at the expense of society; the accentuation of this process in the former Russian Empire, due to the Civil War; the psychological characteristics of the new Soviet elite, with its international ambition, its aspirations to modernity, its sense of urgency, and its feeling of being surrounded; and, lastly, the fact that this elite found itself at the head of a state that was weak, backward, and isolated in such a volatile arena as Europe was in the first half of the twentieth century.

But these (and other) factors did not operate in a linear, predetermined way, and through the life and activities of Piatakov we can see some of the stages of the process which, in the USSR of the 1930s, brought about the birth of the first state economic system founded on industry that history remembers.

As in the previous sections, we will begin here with 1917, with Piatakov's experience at the Gosbank. Together with other young intellectuals, such as Osinskii, who were close to him, Piatakov discovered his administrative talents and a taste and capacity for command. And like them, he fell for the first time into the "trap" consisting of the apparent possibility of directing the economy through decrees, a possibility made very credible by the institutional and social void left by war and revolution.

These decrees were inspired by what was for these young men "the last word" on the subject of economic theory, Hilferding's version of Marxism. The aim, expounded by Piatakov in a series of articles that appeared in *Pravda* and were much appreciated by Lenin, was to transform the banking system, reduced to a single central bank, into an organ of government and general accounting of the nationalized economy.

Here again we find that, in reality, the final goal of such a policy could only be a step back. The new guise taken on by this policy, aiming at involution, is worth noting since it was to reappear several times over the following years and is typical of the way in which some intellectuals reacted to

economic and social development. The differentiation produced by this development (in our case, for example, the multiplication and specialization of banks, of accounts and of forms of finance) was judged to be a useless and expensive complication, to be rationalized through a process of "simplification." This process in turn was an indispensable prerequisite for leading the entire economy from a single center, so that, by "simplifying," Piatakov and the Bolshevik leadership were also building the foundations for their own domination (as well as bringing themselves into line with the trends of the time, triggered by the war, and unconsciously preparing themselves to tackle the Civil War).

This centralist program of reducing society to one large firm was mitigated, though, at the end of 1917 by two factors. First, as we have said, Piatakov, following Hilferding, recognized that in "backward" Russia, centralized government of the economy would have to be limited at first to the commanding heights (banks, large industry, transport, etc.). Second, centralism was in open contradiction with other positions held by the Left Communists. For example, their program of April 1918 strongly stressed localism, the election of organs of leadership from the grass roots, collegialism and, while admitting its necessity, expressed strong reservation over the use of the *spetsy*. Unlike the considerations linked to the analysis of the Russian situation, and thus by their very nature contingent, these were "principles." But reality, *sub specie* of civil war, operated on them that process of selection of which we have spoken and which made Marxism an even fitter ideology for state-building in backward conditions.

In Piatakov's case, the first important step of this process of "selection" was the 1919 defeat of the second, partly left-wing, Ukrainian Bolshevik government. We have seen how Piatakov came through this by linking himself to Trotsky, and we have mentioned the "discoveries" he made at that time, in the first place the realization of how indispensable it was for any power, and in particular for a newly born power struggling to affirm itself, to have a stable and efficient bureaucratic system.[39] This was what triggered Piatakov's reflections about bureaucracy (mentioned above in the second

[39] Recognition of the value and importance of the bureaucratic apparatus was, of course, general, as was resorting to it. In going through the former Soviet archives, it has been impossible not to be impressed by the speed with which that apparatus and its rules developed, as well as by the gigantic dimensions of the Bolsheviks' efforts to make it work. By early 1919, every meeting, even of small, local organizations, was recorded in *protokoly* that were later carefully preserved. Each organization had its own legal office, which prepared elaborate documents for use in relationships with other bureaucracies. It could be said, therefore, that, especially given the conditions and the times, the Bolsheviks' bureaucratic effort, which absorbed an enormous amount of energy, was extraordinarily successful. This may help explain why such a paradoxical system as the one they created could live on for so many decades.

section), which had some points in common with Lenin's thinking but which differed in important aspects.[40] Piatakov's reflections developed to some extent in contrast with the forms and dynamics of the nascent Soviet bureaucratic system, which was growing chaotically. Through criticism of what was to be called "war communism," some typical negative traits of all bureaucratic systems were determined: for example, the tendency to give rise to a sort of "centralized feudalism," if a strong central power is lacking. This economic feudalism became known then as *glavkizm*, but it was to appear again and again in Soviet history under different names (for example, as "ministerialism").

Trotsky and Piatakov elaborated a complex strategy to deal with the bureaucratic chaos. The military experience—the only successful one—convinced them that one possible solution was to extend it. Hence the proposal for "militarization" (another case of adopting a movement "backward" as a goal, since the army is one of the "original" bureaucratic systems). Locally, this took the form of the Labor Armies, which centralized power at the level of large economic "regions" (the Urals, Ukraine, etc.). The armies were created in order to get the local economies moving again, in military-style, and to combat the paralysis caused by the conflicts between the "plenipotentiaries" of the various central organs.

These experiences have not been studied extensively. Having become the chairman of the First Labor Army in the Urals (February–May 1920), Piatakov championed *edinonachalie* and clashed violently with the local powers and with the workers, in this case the Cheliabinsk miners. The latter clash is particularly interesting because it sheds some light on that interplay between Russian "traditions," contingencies, and ideology which presided over the rapid appearance within the new elite of a rather strong antiworker bias and which soon hardened into a model for the consideration and treatment of labor. For Piatakov, traditions were represented by his childhood, spent in a company "town" of the Russian type, strongly influenced by the heritage of serfdom and "modernized" by his father's progressive

40 True to their analytical consistency (or logical extremism), Trotsky and Piatakov went as far as theorizing the necessity for a "good" bureaucracy and of its progressive expansion. Lenin, instead, reluctantly admitted that "in a peasant country" it was indeed possible "to throw out the tsar, the landowners and the capitalists" but not, unfortunately, the bureaucracy, which "could only be reduced by slow and stubborn effort." This position was of course quite unrealistic, since one cannot reduce bureaucracy while increasing its tasks. This theoretical inconsistency was one of the sources of the recurrent, Sisyphean efforts led in the 1920s and 1930s by well-intentioned Bolshevik leaders. One might think, for example, of Ordzhonikizde's tenure at the RKI, spent pruning an apparatus which grew stronger with each cut (as well as less efficient because of the havoc wrought by the pruners' efforts).

benevolence;[41] contingencies by the pressing needs of the moment; and ideology by the idea of planning (which leaves little or no room for the independent actions of "subordinates") and, above all, by Marxism's labor theory of value which, unlike other theories of value, makes the exploitation of the workers the source of all riches and the intensification of such exploitation the royal way to cope with economic difficulties and to allow for accumulation. On the strength of these convictions, Piatakov first appealed to the "honor" of the workers and then, deluded by the miners' response, decided to resort to other means of bringing pressure to bear in order to increase production (means represented by a combination of harsh, military-like discipline and a rigid "paternalism" that ruled out any "autonomous" behavior by the workers), suscitating indignant protests.

Trotsky and Piatakov completed their reflections on bureaucracy and its workings by elaborating a new conception of the "plan," which in time strongly influenced Lenin himself. The birth of this new notion of planning was regulated by two factors: military experience, filtered by contact with the General Staff, and the failure of previous attempts at planning caused by the crisis of those years. Trotsky criticized the naïveté of the idea, typical of the socialist tradition, of a general plan "worked out on paper" by economists and statisticians and then "applied" to reality. He proposed a "single" plan to be built piece by piece, progressively enlarging the experience of centralized direction, established first in some key sectors of the economy, and building and extending on a parallel level the necessary administrative apparatus. At the root of this proposal was, of course, the application of *udarnichestvo* in the economic field—the idea of choosing the "decisive fronts" on which to concentrate and from which to begin anew when faced with difficulties. This way, that administrative conception of the plan which, as Zaleski has shown, was later to constitute the essence of the Soviet "planning" experience, came to life together with the use of the *udarniki* methods in the economy, which was in later years to be the standard way in which the Soviet leadership reacted to economic troubles.

[41] The factory was the Mariinskii sakharnyi zavod (in Kiev guberniia, Cherkassy uezd), built in 1876 and located on the Right Bank, on the Moshnogorodishchenskoe estate, which extended for more than 42,000 desiatins (8,000 of these reserved for growing beets), inhabitated by approximately 75,000 male "souls" at the beginning of the twentieth century. The majority of them were Ukrainian peasants (called *malorossy*, in a publication edited by Piatakov's father), seasonally employed by the factory, whose stable, skilled work force was Russian. Jews and Poles lived in the two small towns of the estate. Piatakov's father soon made the factory a model one, raising salaries and providing free heating and electricity, decent housing (wooden *kazarmy* for the less skilled men, wooden and stone houses for *masterovye* and technicians), and a hospital that could also serve as a library and a tea room for the work force.

The ideas and conceptions elaborated in 1919–1920 were not abandoned with the beginning of the NEP. As we have seen, Piatakov and most of the Left, including Bukharin, accepted the NEP as a necessary retreat to make it possible to concentrate efforts and resources on large industry in crisis (that is, as a particular grand case of economic *udarnichestvo*). At a lower level, there were also very strong elements of continuity in the administration of large industry, for example, the Donbass in 1921, led under the banner of "the dictatorship of coal." There, Piatakov devoted himself to the building of a *moshchnyi apparat* of administration, made great use of the local Labor Army to obtain and organize labor (which he continued to consider as *skot* and to treat accordingly, but in the best possible way since he was a good *khoziain*[42]), tried despite the crisis and the famine to import Western technology, and, as we know, again came into conflict with trade unions and local organizations.

The continuity in the methods of directing those "commanding heights" retained by the state also surfaced in the following year, when Lenin, partly convinced by Trotsky's ideas, invited Piatakov to proceed to the *podtiagivanie* of the Gosplan apparatus. This is another example of the impact the Civil War had on the selection of ideas and methods of the former Leftists. In April 1918, the "tovarishchi uvlekaiushchiesia podtiagivaniem" had been attacked in *Kommunist.* In 1922, Piatakov, who had become a "prominent and strong-willed administrator" (in the words of Mikoian), was perhaps the greatest Soviet "specialist" on the subject.

In 1923, the same methods were applied to industry in general, as Piatakov, who had become vice-president of the VSNKh, took over its leadership, as witnesses say, "s tiazheloi rukoi." In time, however, the NEP began to influence even Piatakov's style and methods, both through Trotsky who, at the beginning of 1923, was entrusted with the elaboration of the program for the organization of industry, and, above all, because of the rapid appearance of new powers and new ideas, with which Piatakov was forced to come to terms. He then came to recognize, though in his own way, the role of the market and of accounting, maintained good relations with the *spetsy*

42 In his 1921 correspondence with Lenin, as well as in his various reports as chairman of the TsPKP of the Donbass, Piatakov made clear that he considered the control of food in particular and of *rabsnab* in general the essential tools of "management." It was precisely over this control that he clashed with the trade unions, which he considered at this point as obstacles to a "correct" utilization of the work force. And, it was because the Americans would have treated their workers better than his "company" that Piatakov opposed the granting of concessions in the Donbass, as he openly wrote to Lenin on 8 April 1921. In those same months, he ordered mass evictions of people from industrial and mining townships in order to better their "social composition" and improve the workers' "attitudes."

(of whom he became a champion), and did his utmost not to come into conflict with workers and trade unions, leaving labor relations to others.

Although his day-to-day practice and style of work changed, his principles did not. Piatakov remained true to the programs expounded by Bukharin in 1921, and maintained that the NEP should be used to build "the first state system of industry in history," the first step in the methodical building of that "system" of the entire nationalized economy which the Bolsheviks had "naïvely" attempted to attain within a few months during the Civil War.

Piatakov thus dedicated the four years spent at the VSNKh to the organization of this "sistema gosudarstvennoi promyshlennosti."[43] Using a specially created organism, the *Tsentral'noe Upravlenie Gosudarstvennoi Promyshlennosti* (which, as I said, was to exemplify Soviet "superiority," that is, state ownership of the means of production, over the German model), he soon managed to transform the trusts, initially endowed with the capacity to act independently on the market, into organs of the central administration, though still autonomous ones. This reorganization, intended to turn industry into a single organism, agile but centralized, was in Piatakov's view the indispensable prerequisite for the launching of a great investment plan for technological modernization, to be worked out centrally and not left to the vagaries of the market.

Having finished the first job in 1924, Piatakov dedicated 1925 to the second job—creating and leading a new body, the OSVOK, which was charged with drawing up this plan. The transformation of the original planning conceptions thus took another step forward; now to take shape alongside the ideas worked out in 1920 was the notion of the plan as a long-term investment program of an industry effectively reduced to a single "corporation."

Because of this "single" character and because of the conception of the USSR as a "large integrated economic area" to be built by concentrating certain types of production, specializing in each "region," and installing relations of mutual interdependence, the investment plan outlined under Piatakov's leadership clashed with the interests of many of the republican leaders as well as with those of the working classes. The conflicts with the Ukrainian SNKh of the 1920s are to the point here: appealing to what he believed to be abstract concepts of economic "rationality," Piatakov found himself representing the interests of the high economic bureaucracy, which was one of the main forces locally opposing *korenizatsiia* (Lenin's prophesy about Piatakov's "imperialist economism" thus came true in new forms). With regard to the working classes, as a recently published 1925

43 See my "'Building the First System of State Industry,'" (fn. 2 above).

letter to Dzerzhinskii makes clear, at this point Piatakov already seriously considered employing forced labor—"rationally" treated of course—on a large scale to open the new economic regions envisioned by his plan.

It is interesting to note the effect of the residue of Marxism on Piatakov's years at the VSNKh. We have just spoken of the effects of his contempt for the nationality question. In addition to this, there was a conviction of the superiority of the plan over the market, especially regarding investments, and of state industry over private industry. On the basis of these tenets, not only was the private sector prevented from developing but the use of the "market" to decide state industry's capital investments was also barred, thus aggravating the imbalance between demand and supply as well as inflation. At the same time, the labor theory of value deformed the image of the production process and its costs, obstructed the adoption of modern accounting practices, and encouraged, as we noted, the adoption of anti-worker practices, especially during a period in which "accumulation" appeared to be the most important task.

Thus, Piatakov's job at the VSNKh, though conducted with a maximum of seriousness and competence, did in fact accelerate the crisis of the NEP, and Dzerzhinskii's accusations of 1926 were more than justified. And yet, from another standpoint, Piatakov's work of the 1920s had its justifications and can be seen as yet another variant of a very common phenomenon and, in a certain sense, as inevitable. I have in mind here the substitution of the state for a "market" which in backward countries does not really exist or, in any case, is not able to shoulder those tasks with which the need to "exist" saddles the state. We come back to what we said at the beginning about the relationship between state and industrialization, of which the USSR of the 1920s is yet another example. The NEP, in fact, embodies one of the many state-market mixes in which the history of our century abounds. What made it different was the ideology of an important part of the elite which, at least in industry, immediately led to a particularly extreme version of those mixes and which, above all, in the name of exasperated statism, took a dogmatic stance toward mixes in general, as to stages to be overcome on a path already marked out.

Again, we are dealing here with the version of "Marxism" that emerged from the Civil War and with the latter's socioeconomic effects. These elements combined pathologically at the end of the decade, when Piatakov launched his credit reforms as part of the Stalinist offensive. This reform was inspired, as we have said, by the theories of 1917, and it proposed to concentrate the entire credit activity in the Gosbank, to reduce relations between the bank and economic bodies to a single type, and to introduce automatic mechanisms of financing regulated by the plan. This was a new

illustration of the simplification–moving backward bipole, and it was Piatakov's personal contribution to the chaos of the First Five-Year Plan. In fact, the reform gave new energy to the inflationary impetus and caused already primitive accounting practices in the factories to be abandoned so that, despite the "plan," the factories found themselves operating in the dark. The disaster brought about a further selection of the official economic theory, which then abandoned the dream of a rational, centralized government of the economy through a single banking center. The inability of "Marxism" to function as a general economic theory was thus implicitly admitted, as was the Soviet state's inability to govern the whole economy under those conditions.

This inability and this retreat were embodied by Piatakov's return to large industry, on which he now concentrated as he had in 1921, but under different conditions, as a war against the peasantry was now being waged.

The following period, which extends from 1931 to the beginning of 1934, can be divided into two segments. The first segment ends with the early months of 1932, when the retreat begun the previous year was completed with the launching of the NKTP and the pull back from a unitary direction of industry. It was a time of reforms, among them the well-known reforms of 1931, inspired by banal common sense rediscovered after the senselessness of the previous three years; the treaty with Germany and the subsequent re-equipping of Soviet industry; and the adoption of the *udarniki* methods of "planning" inside industry itself, which meant concentrating on certain large projects and on certain "fronts."

At the end of 1931, the attempts to make up for the false start of 1929–1930 appeared to be bearing fruit. A few months later, however, industry was overwhelmed by the great disaster of 1932–1933, which involved the whole country. The year from the autumn of 1932 to that of 1933 was thus a very difficult one for the leadership of the NKTP, which came through the trial thanks to its subjective efforts and to unheard-of pressures on workers, technicians, and cadres, and thanks to the privileges the state granted to heavy industry. At the end of 1933, Ordzhonikidze's commissariat could, in any case, count itself among the "victors."

As was evident from the collection of NKTP *prikazy* and is now confirmed by the correspondence between Piatakov and Ordzhonikidze, Piatakov played a decisive role in this victory. At the beginning of 1932, Ordzhonikidze appointed Piatakov first deputy of the new commissariat, in charge of "general and financial affairs," in other words, of overseeing the entire undertaking. Thus, it was Piatakov who prepared almost all the measures taken by the NKTP center (in spite of the 1941 fire which destroyed the majority of the NKTP papers, it is still possible to find in Russian

archives many letters from Sergo to Stalin and the CC, accompanied by notes from Piatakov that ask Sergo to write, adding "esli mozhno, ia proekt pis'ma sostavil"). It was Piatakov who chose much of the higher echelons of the commissariat, on the basis of merit, competence, and devotion (in this regard, it is striking to read what Barmine writes about the difference between Piatakov's and Voroshilov's collaborators during those years).[44] It was he who made the NKTP into a "reactionary" structure, as some American authors have written, grotesquely commenting on the prevalence of people with higher education and of "dubious" social origin in its leadership. It was he who perfected the cultivated version of those methods to keep the bureaucratic machine under pressure, later described by Bek in *Novoe naznachenie*. And it was he who decided, in general terms at least,[45] which factories were to be built and where, following the plans eleborated at the OSVOK during the previous decade and brought up to date by the large conference on the *raionirovanie* of industry in the Second Five-Year Plan.

Piatakov was inspired by the same idea of the 1920s: to build a large modern system of state industry, this time limited to heavy industry, because of the retreat we have mentioned. This program was facilitated by the physical existence abroad of the blueprints to follow, which made it possible for the "planners" to give themselves definite goals for industrial investments. But the amount of effort required should not be underestimated: it can be judged by thinking of the difficulties involved in the simultaneous creation of whole interdependent sectors of industry.

The results of this effort were surprising. By the middle of 1934, the long-desired, modern "system of state industry" existed and functioned. But its productivity was low and this clashed with the tenets of its creators, Piatakov and Ordzhonikidze in particular. They believed such a system to be far superior to its "capitalist" competitors; thus, in their eyes, low productivity could only be some sort of teething problem to be speedily overcome by forcing the cadres and the work force of Soviet industry to make great strides, at the same time taking measures to better their living conditions—something made possible by the previously won victories (Piatakov then defended, in opposition to M. Kaganovich, a "paternalistic-progressive"

[44] The quality of the upper echelons is one of the fundamental variables in the working of all bureaucratic systems, which are basically "subjective" systems. Its importance increases with these systems' degree of "purity," i.e., with the increasing lack of social and economic counterweights to the bureaucracies' actions.

[45] Stalin and the "little Stalins" had, of course, their "favorite" projects, their hobby-horses, like Karaganda or the great canals. This was yet another cause of both changes in the plans and waste of resources.

style of management, strongly reminiscent of his father's, which was, perhaps, also to be extended to forced labor).

Beginning with the end of 1934, on the basis of these self-delusions, the leaders of the NKTP began to push for rapid increases in productivity. But the well-known difficulties of the Soviet system, primarily those connected with the organization of supplies, frustrated their efforts. Increases in productivity were obtained, such as those any system can give, especially if it is "new," well-directed, and under pressure, but these increases were well below expectations. A perverse mechanism was thus created inside the commissariat, whereby its leadership no longer trusted the intentions and abilities of its subordinates. This lack of trust took on various forms, and alongside Piatakov's "rational" doubts and his attempts to elaborate policies to reverse the situation, the psychological mechanisms, methods, and the faith in "miracles" of 1928–1930, which had appeared to be overcome, now resurfaced in Ordzhonikidze.

It was in this climate that, in the autumn of 1935, Stakhanovism appeared (in the Donbass, which was, as in the Civil War, in 1921, or in 1928, the natural breeding ground for Stalin's initiatives). The phenomenon of Stakhanovism and its origins are complex, but it is certain that Stalin and his circle were quick to seize it as a tool to attack the NKTP. Because of the state of mind just described, for long months its leaders (and especially the naïve Ordzhonikidze) not only did not answer this attack, but took part in it, actively collaborating in their own destruction.

The liquidation of the NKTP was, partly for this reason, a relatively rapid affair. In June 1936 the battle had already been won. In July Piatakov lost his post as first deputy commissar. In September he was arrested, and then, in swift succession, tortured, tried, and shot at the end of January 1937. A few weeks later, after a violent quarrel with Stalin, Ordzhonikidze committed suicide.

Thus, another important obstacle to the affirmation of pure despotism, another of the great "vice-royalties" created in the first half of the 1930s, was liquidated. That this is what was in fact happening is confirmed by the rapid crumbling of the commissariat itself, which had already begun during the last weeks of Ordzhonikidze's life. In December 1936, the war industry was detached from the NKTP and constituted as an independent commissariat. A year later, most of the leadership of the old NKTP had been purged, and in the place of one single large body there were three independent commissariats. By 1941, the total number of commissariats created from the destruction of the NKTP had reached seventeen.

The Soviet system's entrance into an acute despotic phase thus also involved a change of phase for its "modern" industrial sub-system, as is shown, for example, by the "biography" of Piatakov's substitute as first deputy commissar of the NKTP. In March 1937, before the commissariat's definitive liquidation, this post was entrusted to Avraamii Pavlovich Zaveniagin. A young man from a working class family, he, too, came from the Donbass, had served on Piatakov's staff in 1921 (siding against him during the "intrigues" of those days), and in the 1930s had been the head of the metallurgy sector of the NKTP and the *nachal'nik* of Magnitogorsk. From our standpoint, however, his later career is far more significant in that it is connected to the NKVD, to Beriia, to forced labor. Zaveniagin was first sent to "build" Noril'sk. Then, promoted to deputy commissar for the interior, in 1941 he was entrusted with the economic administration of the Gulag.[46]

Beneath the undoubted fracture marked by the shifting of power, including economic power, toward the "organs" (according to recently published data, the NKVD percentage of capital investments reached 14 percent in 1941, more than doubling the 1937 figure) and by the fragmentation of the NKTP, there were, however, important elements of continuity. From the organizational point of view the new commissariats were often none other than the old *glavnoe upravlenie* of the NKTP, so that, despite the re-explosion of *glavkizm* and the difficulties connected with the liquidation of the coordinating center (difficulties aggravated by the purges), the system set up between 1933 and 1935 was essentially still intact. Also still intact was the technological and productive structure of heavy industry.

On the basis of these elements, Piatakov's work in industry can be measured from the standpoint of the Soviet regime, leaving aside its human, social, and environmental costs, which, incidentally, were greatly enlarged by decisions that were not directly functional or necessary to the type of industrialization chosen.

In the short run, the "victory" of 1931–1934, and the industrial apparatus built during that period by competent and devoted leaders, contributed to the victory in the Second World War. The Soviet system then demonstrated the fitness of an administered economy, not burdened by an irremediable technical and productive imbalance, to wage war (after all, the war economy had been one of the models that had inspired the Soviet leadership).

[46] Under Khrushchev, Zaveniagin became once again a "regular" minister, in charge of machine building. This change is yet another indication of the sudden shift in the nature of the Soviet system that followed Stalin's death. Zaveniagin died in 1956.

In the intermediate run, the ability of Soviet industry to remain competitive with Western industry in some key sectors for several decades (until the West made a new technological jump forward) bears evidence of the fact that "the latest word" in Western technology had indeed been introduced in the 1930s and, thus, of Piatakov's seriousness and competence (among other things, it was he who drew up the investment plan for the second half of the decade, implemented after his death). In the light of other state efforts in the industrial field in other countries, this result is not at all a poor one; indeed, there is no doubt that, together with the territorial expansion of the following years, it constitutes one of the objective bases that ensured the survival of fragments of the Stalinist myth.

But in the long run, the limitations of the building of the 1920s and 1930s emerged and the success we have spoken of was transformed into a disaster, even from the standpoint of the most privileged sector, that of heavy industry. It was a disaster that compromised the very survival of the regime. The reasons for this are naturally complex, and I will mention only one of them, linked to the type of building carried on at that time.

Despite the fact that it was "things"—factories, dams, roads, schools, canals, that is, the material aspects of building—that were privileged, it would be a mistake to believe that only "things" were being built. Soviet industrialization was not a "simple industrialization" (if such a thing exists) but something more and something different. Along with factories, a system was being built, that "first system of state industry in history" of which Piatakov had dreamt (recently, in the USSR, this system has been termed "administrativnaia sistema"; this expression is acceptable, but to distinguish the Soviet situation I would add the adjective "industrial," as history is rich in examples of administrative systems based on agriculture).

Like all systems, the Soviet one, too, was able to do certain things better than others. As we have seen, some of its abilities and some of its limitations included the mobilization of short-term available resources in emergency situations, the imitation of models already in existence elsewhere and their introduction in forced stages; or troubles with the organization of supplies and with productivity.

There were other things it was unable to do. Some, such as the inability to take into account, at least partially, the impact of industrialization on the environment, were not disastrous for the regime, except, perhaps, in the very long term. But others were, among them the inability to get underway an independent development of the "intensive" type that would allow spontaneous innovation on a large scale, without relying upon imported models (one thinks immediately of the lack of understanding shown by Lenin in 1918 of what capitalism was all about, and of what Hirschman has written

about the inner contradictions, *voire* the impossibility of "creative" planning). This inability was all the more complete because the Soviet system built in the 1930s was, unlike that of the 1920s, of the pure type.

We conclude by coming back to what we said at the beginning. Starting from the nineteenth century, industrialization has been a task "imposed" on many states by the fight for survival. But state-led industrialization has its price, not only in the short term (borne essentially by the population), but also in the long one. The price in the long run is paid partly by the regime; how high the payment is depends on the extent of state involvement, on the ideology which governs it, and on the degree of openness to other economies. This has been witnessed by many countries with experiences we could define as mixed, which have had to come to terms, sooner or later, with the inheritance left by this type of "industrialization." In an extreme case, such as the USSR, or in the states emerging from its collapse, this inheritance is heavier, involves and complicates national questions, and has to be liquidated all at once.

Its purity and its degree of isolation have, in fact, granted to the system created in the 1930s a long life, supported by the presence of enormous resources and by victory in the Second World War. The Soviet industrial administrative system has thus managed to complete its cycle, begun at the time of the First World War, to the very end, reaching the threshold of sudden collapse.

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DOCUMENTS

New Evidence on the 1630 Zaporozhian Cossack Uprising

B. N. FLORJA

The 1630 Zaporozhian Cossack uprising led by Taras Fedorovyč was an important event in this period of Ukraine's history. It has constantly drawn the attention of authors of general works on the history of Ukraine and the history of the Zaporozhian Cossacks;[1] it has also been the subject of a number of specialized studies (Žukovič 1912; Tomkiewicz 1930; Ščerbak 1980). Information on the uprising can be found in a whole range of sources, which, it is important to note, describe the events from various points of view. These sources contain material connected with the actions of the authorities of the Commonwealth; reports from the insurgents' camp (the description of the uprising in the Lviv Chronicle is based on these); and a narration by Hryhorij Hladkyj, a spy from Putyvl' (then under Muscovite control). However, a scarcity in the sources of descriptions of the entire series of episodes and the discrepancies between the sources regarding the interpretation and treatment of the same events make the task of broadening the scope of sources on the uprising a timely one—particularly so since some important materials known to scholars of the first half of the twentieth century (such as the correspondence between King Zygmunt III and Grand Crown Hetman Stanisław Koniecpolski and the report on these events presented by Koniecpolski to the Diet of 1631) apparently were lost during the Second World War.

It is hoped that the information presented here will help introduce one more piece of evidence into scholarly circulation. The document under consideration is an account made by an eyewitness to the events (an eyewitness who was also, to some extent, a participant); furthermore, it is an account that comes from a faction not yet represented in the extant body of information. This new testimony, which sheds light on some of the murkier aspects

[1] The description of the uprising by M. Hruševs'kyj (1913) is the most detailed of this type of general study and is based on an independent study of sources. For the most recent description of the uprising, see Serczyk 1984, pp. 303–6.

of the history of the uprising, consists of "statements under interrogation" (*rassprosnye rěči*) obtained from Andreas, "servant" of Patriarch Theophanes of Jerusalem, and recorded at Putyvl' on 10/20 May 1630. Koniecpolski's report of late August 1630 has long been known to scholars. In it, he reported that information had reached him of the intention of the Cossacks, who had gathered beyond the Dnieper, to ask the tsar for help and to surrender the entire Trans-Dnieper area to the tsar's authority (Hruševs'kyj 1913, p. 108; Tomkiewicz 1930, p. 116). It is also known that, when a peace was reached with the Cossacks, Koniecpolski demanded that Taras Fedorovyč be surrendered to him, accusing him of having betrayed the Commonwealth. The Cossacks, however, rejected his demand and stated that "nie on jeden jest winien, ale wojsko wszystko" ("it is not he alone who is to blame but the entire Host") (Hruševs'kyj 1913, p. 114; Tomkiewicz 1930, pp. 121–22). The testimony presented here—"statements under interrogation" obtained from Andreas—provides an explanation of the actual events behind the rumors of the Cossacks' intention to put themselves under the subordination of Muscovy and "Taras's betrayal."

The Cossack camp, under the leadership of Taras Fedorovyč, was visited by a "servant" (*služebnik*) of the patriarch of Jerusalem who brought a "letter" (*list*) in which the patriarch "blessed" (*blagoslovljal*) the Cossacks, urging them to "stand for the faith" (*stojat' za věru*) and to change their allegiance to Mixail Fedorovič. One can assume that this proposal was discussed in the Cossack "circle" (*kolo* 'general council'). An analysis of Andreas's statements makes it possible to establish when these contacts may have taken place. Andreas went from Taras's camp to Pryluky, where he spent four weeks before leaving for Muscovy. Since (as noted above) he arrived in Putyvl' on 10/20 May, his visit to the Cossack camp must then have occurred in late March or early April. It was precisely after that visit that rumors reached Koniecpolski of the Cossacks' intention to surrender the Trans-Dnieper area to Mixail Fedorovič.

From I. Kryp''jakevyč's well-known work devoted to the role of the Cossacks in the international political programs of the 1620s and 1630s (Kryp''jakevyč 1913), we know what prompted Theophanes's appeal to the Cossacks. As revealed by the sufficiently comprehensive and diverse materials collected by Kryp''jakevyč, the question of establishing contacts with the Cossacks was raised more than once already in the 1620s in connection with plans to depose Zygmunt III of Poland-Lithuania and to establish Prince Bethlen Gábor of Transylvania on the Polish-Lithuanian throne.

It was assumed that promises to discontinue the policy of imposing religious union and to grant various "liberties" to the Cossacks would attract them to the claimant's side. Those plans were of particular interest in 1629 when support from the Ottoman Empire and Muscovy in favor of Bethlen's claims seemed likely. In the spring of 1629, Bethlen's envoys, Charles Talleyrand and Jacques Roussel, arrived in Constantinople to enlist the assistance of Patriarch Kyrillos Lukaris of Constantinople in influencing the Cossacks in the appropriate direction. While promising to support the Transylvanian mission at the Muscovite court, Lukaris nevertheless dodged the request concerning the Cossacks (Kryp''jakevyč 1913, pp. 83–85). As can be seen from Andreas's report, his refusal was not accidental. In the imminent international conflict, the Greek clergy, while supporting Bethlen Gábor against Zygmunt III, at the same time apparently wanted the lands of the Commonwealth—with an Orthodox population subordinated to the jurisdiction of Constantinopole—to come under the Orthodox Muscovite state. Why the proposal to the Cossacks came, therefore, not from Lukaris but from Patriarch Theophanes of Jerusalem is quite understandable if one considers the role this Greek hierarch had played in the restoration of the Orthodox metropolitanate of Kiev in 1620. Theophanes's letters of February 1630 to the tsar and to the patriarch of Moscow, with a plea to give alms to his courier who had suffered at the hands of the "Hagarites" (Muslims), are in the same archival folder in which Andreas's "statements" are preserved.[2] Apparently, it was at this time that the patriarch of Jerusalem, who was then in the Moldavian principality, decided to turn to the Cossacks with such a proposal. Either the patriarch knew that the Zaporozhian Cossacks were preparing for an uprising or he acted because of other factors which cannot be established at this time.

The "statements under interrogation" also contain a number of other reports of the uprising that partly confirm and partly supplement the data from other sources. Andreas's traveling companion, the elderly monk Melentios, who had traveled from Pryluky to Perejaslav on 2/12 May, was an eyewitness to the hostilities which broke out in the area of Perejaslav between the Crown army and the Cossacks. According to the reports made by Melentios, the Crown troops were unsuccessful in the initial clashes; this supports the conviction that the similar testimonies of Hryhorij Hladkyj and

[2] The Central State Archives of Early Acts (CGADA), Moscow, fond 52 (Russia's relations with the countries of the Balkan Peninsula), op. 1, 1630 g., no. 24, fols. 6–9.

the Lviv Chronicle can be deemed trustworthy. The "statements" also supplement in a number of details the account in the Lviv Chronicle of the capture by the Cossacks of "a German captain" (*kapitana nimec'koho*) (Bevzo 1971, p. 106). This is, apparently, a reference to the German officers from Gdańsk who came to negotiate the recruitment of additional troops for Koniecpolski's army. It is also further evidence of the measures taken to mobilize troops to quell the uprising. The report (absent from other sources but whose reliability is not in doubt) that the khan's son Šāhīn Giraj sent a Nogay detachment to help the rebellious Zaporozhian Cossacks also coincides with the known history of interrelationships between the Cossacks and this member of the Giraj family. At the same time, it speaks of the Cossacks' search for allies in their struggle against the Commonwealth. Another unique report in our source—about the Zaporozhian Cossacks' expectation of receiving help from the Don Cossacks—also agrees with what we know about the interconnections between the Don and the Zaporozhian Cossacks;[3] furthermore, this information supplements our knowledge of the diplomatic activity of the insurgents.

Finally, the terminology used in the "statements under interrogation" to describe military activities deserves attention. A difference is made in the "statements" between "moneyed people" (*groševye ljudi*; Polish, *groszowi ludzie*)—the regular "quarter" army (*wojsko kwarciane*), paid for by a quarter of the royal revenues—and the "levy en masse" (*pospolitoe rušen'e*; Polish, *pospolite ruszenie*), the nobility's landsturm. Whereas the moneyed people, together with Hetman Koniecpolski, crossed the Dnieper and engaged the Cossacks in battle, the arrival of the levy en masse to Perejaslav was still awaited in May 1630. The circular letters (*uniwersały*) calling the levy en masse, which the hetman issued from Bar before setting out on the campaign, were, apparently, ineffective and prompted him to reissue circular letters, this time from his camp near Perejaslav.[4] By juxtaposing these testimonies, one concludes that those detachments of "soldiers" (*žolnery*; Polish, *żołnierze*), which the Cossacks attacked and prevented from crossing the Dnieper and reaching the hetman's camp, were the very same levy en masse which, according to Andreas's testimony, Stanisław

[3] It is known, for example, that in March 1630 a detachment of Zaporozhian Cossacks arrived at the river Don; later, they joined the Don Cossacks in a naval expedition against the Crimea (*Istoričeskoe opisanie*, vol. 1 (1869): 216–17).

[4] For the texts of the circular letters see *Arxiv Jugo-Zapadnoj Rossii*, pt. 3, vol. 1 (1863), nos. 80, 84.

Koniecpolski "was awaiting" (*ždal*) near Perejaslav.

The formal reply of the voevoda of Putyvl', with the record of Andreas's "statements under interrogation," make up the initial part of an archival unit concerning the arrival of Andreas.[5]

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[5] CGADA, fond 52, op. 1, 1630 g., no. 24, fols. 1–5). The margins of the report are torn in several places; in the following transcription, the missing portions are provided hypothetically and placed in square brackets.

Transcription

(CGADA, fond 52, op. 1, 1630 g., no. 24, pp. 1-5)

<л. 1>Государю, царю и великому князю Михаилу Федоровичю всеа Русии и великому государю святейшему потриарху Филарету Никитичю Московскому и всеа Русии холопи ваши, Михалка Бутурлин, Володька Ляпунов челом бьют.

Нынешнего, государь, 138-го году маия в 10 день приехол к путивльской заставе к Железным Кольцам из Литовские земли греченин. В роспросе сказался иерасалимъского потриарха Феофана слуга Ондреи, а послал, де, ево, Ондрея, потриарх Феофан из Волоские земли к вам, государем, с листами. И как он, Ондреи, с патриарш[ими листы] приехал в Киев, и те, де, листы взял у нево в Киеве киевъск[ои ми]трополит Иев Борецкои и, взем, послал, де, он те листы к вам, государем, к Москве с старцом своим с Ыосифом протосингилом. А он, де, Ондрей, з другим листом ездил с Киева к гетману козацкому и ко всему войску Запорожскому, что он, потриарх Феофан, их, козаков, благословил стоять за веру хресть<л. 2>янскую и быть под вашею государевою державою. И тот, де, государи, потриархов лист он, Ондрей, гетману отдал и, отдав, поехал в Прилуки для сыску погромной рухляди, что в нынешнем во 138 году в осень литовские люди в Прилуках пять митрапалитов погромили. И как, де, он, Ондрей, приехал в Прилуки, и ево, де, Ондрея в Прилуках литовские люди задержали и задержан, де, был четыре недели.

А вестей он, Ондрей, сказал. Ездил, де, ис Прилук старец потриархов Мелентеи, которой с ним, Ондреем, от потриарха послан в литовскои город в Переяславль Офонасьева дни Олександрейского нынешнего 138 году. И как, де, он, старец, был в Переясловли, черкасы, де, запорожские с гетманом все в зборе в Переясловли, а собралось, де, черкас тысечь с сорок и больши. Да к тем же, де, государи, черкасом прислал на помочь Шин-Гирей пятьсот человек нагайских татар. Да к ним же, де, государи, идут з Дону три тысечи человек. А собрався, де, черкасом стоять всеми людьми против поляков. А гетман, де, Конецъполскои с поляки хочет козаков побить и веру крестьянскую разорить, и ге<л. 3>тман, де, Конецполской реку Днепр с поляки перевезся на сю сторону Днепра. А перевезлося, де, государи поляко...грошевых людей двенатцать тысечь, а посполитое рушенье идет за ним же, гетманом, на козаков. И как, де, государи, гетман Конецполскои перевезся реку Днепр и у нево, де, с черкасы был бой после Егорьева дни, и черкасы, де, поляков побили и убили тысечу человек и болши. А на другой, де, государи, день у них же бой был, и козаки, де, поляков побили тысечи з две и живых взяли человек с сорок и поляков осадили. И ныне, де, гетман Конецъполскои с поляки сидит от козаков в окопе, а ждет к себе вскоре посполитого рушенья. Да он же, государи, гетман писал от себе ко Гданским немцом, чтобы оне пришли к нему на помочь тысечь з десять. И те, де, немцы прислали к нему в обоз трех человек, будет, де, гетман, учнет им, немцом, за службу давать гроши, и оне, де, к нему на помочь придут. И как, де, государь, те немцы, быв у гетмана Конецполского в обозе и поехали назад, и их, де, на

Днепре на перевозе козаки поимали и привели к гетману козацкому. И те, де, посланцы им, черкасом, сказывают, как немецким <л. 4> боем промышлять над поляки. Да гетман, де, государи, Конецьпольскои писал от себе к гетману козацкому к Тарасу, чтобы он козаков выбрал шесть тысеч, а болши бы шести тысечей козаков не было. И черкасы, де, государи, про то сведали и уменшитца не хотят, а хотят все за веру крестьянскую помереть.

Да он же, Ондрей, сказал у себе два листа, один лист к вам, государем, от ерасалимъского портриарха Феофана, а другой лист к нам, холопем, вашим, от киевского митрополита Иева Борецкого, писан об не[м], Ондрее. И как, де, государи, старец [Мелен]теи ис Переясловля приехол в Прилуки, и он, де, Ондрей, с теми вестьми поехал в Путивль. А болши, государи, тово вестей он, Ондрей, не сказывал.

И мы, холопи ваши, распрося тово гречанина Ондрея и дав ему корму и подвод и ли<л. 5>ст иерасалимъского потриарха Феофана запечатав в бумагу своею печатью, послали к тебе, государю царю и великому князю Михаилу Федоровичю всеа Русии и к тебе, великому государю святейшему потриарху Филарету Никитичю Московскому и всеа Русии с путивльцом сыном боярским с Олексеем Некрасовым. А велели ему, приехов к Москве, про того греченина обвестить и лист и отписку подать в Посольском приказе твоим государевым дьяком думному Ефиму Телепневу да Моксиму Матюшкину.

ESSAY*

Ukraine between East and West

IHOR ŠEVČENKO

І зрозумій, який ти Азіят мізерний.
—Pantelejmon Kuliš (1882)

Да, скифы – мы! Да, азиаты – мы,
С раскосыми и жадными очами!
—Aleksandr Blok (1918)

In Kiev it is easy to illustrate the topic of my paper.[1] Thus, to give an example, those among us who have had the time to visit the Cathedral of St. Sophia have again realized that the eleventh-century church, with its Byzantine mosaics and Greek inscriptions in the interior, is almost totally covered on the outside by architectural accretions in the style of the Western Baroque. To give another example, when we open the latest book by Hryhorij Nikonovyč Lohvyn concerning the etchings in early Ukrainian printed books of the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries,[2] we will find there an etching from Počajiv, dating from 1768; that etching represents the Apostle Luke in the act of painting the portrait of the Virgin Mary. The Virgin Mary is depicted as a purely Byzantine icon, while the evangelist is sitting in a Western, Baroque and dramatic, attitude. These two examples should suffice here to show that in Ukrainian culture—at least in the artistic one—influences coming from the East and from the West followed upon one another or coexisted between the eleventh and the eighteenth centuries.

Here, however, a certain difficulty arises: Byzantium, or, if you will, Constantinople, lies not east but south, or even south-west, of Kiev. It follows that in the case of Byzantium we should not speak of the influence

* With this essay, the editors of *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* initiate a section of the journal in which broad topics will be discussed with a minimum of scholarly apparatus. The editors invite further contributions of this nature.

1 This essay is a slightly enlarged text of a paper read at the First Congress of the International Association of Ukrainianists, held in Kiev in August 1990. Except for its postscript and an occasional allusion in the text, the English version does not attempt to take full account of the rapid changes that have occurred in Eastern Europe and in the Balkans since late 1990.

2 *Z hlybyn. Hravjury ukrajins'kyx starodrukiv XVI–XVIII stolit'* (Kiev, 1990).

exerted upon Ukraine by the East but by a part of the Mediterranean civilization. For all that, we feel instinctively that East means Byzantium and West means "Europe." How did such a perception arise?

The antithetical notions "East" and "West" came into being a number of centuries before Ukraine entered the confines of civilization. In literary terms, leaving Homer aside, we first encounter these notions in Herodotus, who aimed at describing the conflict between the Greeks, that is, the West, and the Persians, that is, the East. In administrative terms these notions entered the historical consciousness of late antiquity owing to the administrative division of the late Roman Empire into eastern and western parts. The frontier between the two passed east of today's—or, rather, yesterday's—Yugoslavia; it follows that almost all of former Yugoslavia belonged to the West once upon a time. The wedge that the invading Slavs drove into the Balkan peninsula in the sixth century contributed to the feeling of separation between East and West. Church administration, which was organized along the lines of the civil one, made a distinction between Western ecclesiastical units and the Eastern ones, which were called *ecclesiae orientales*. This differentiation implied no "anti-Eastern" bias: on the contrary, among the early Christians of the Mediterranean basin, the East enjoyed a special reverence, being the birthplace of the Savior. All this was understandable from the geographical point of view that obtained in the ruling centers of the time: Constantinople (that is, the city of Byzantium) was in fact situated east of Ravenna, the latter being one of the capitals of the Western empire, and of Rome, the seat of the principal Western patriarchate. The division of the churches that occurred in the eleventh century and, even more so, the attack perpetrated by the Western crusaders against Byzantium in 1204, made things worse because from that time on "the East" is endowed with a negative connotation in the eyes of the ecclesiastical West, and the Latin West came to be intensely disliked by the Byzantines.

The rebellion—some historians say usurpation—of Charlemagne and his coronation in 800 as a person who "ruled the Roman Empire"—mind you, not yet as a "Roman emperor"—were anti-Byzantine actions which created the foundations for the formation of modern Europe. It is perhaps for that reason that, starting with the tenth century and ending with the fifteenth, texts can be quoted from which it may be deduced that the Byzantines themselves did not consider their capital to be a part of Europe, even though they knew full well—for they both read and edited antique geographers—that the frontier between Europe and Asia passed through the Bosporus and the river Don. In such a way, when Volodimer's Kiev adopted Christianity, it entered a cultural sphere which was considered to be the East in the eyes

of the West and which on occasion did not consider itself to be a part of Europe. This attitude has survived until our own time. Even today, not only people who live in Sofia, Belgrade, Istanbul, or Bucharest but also people who live in Moscow and Kiev travel "to Europe" although they know from their school days that Europe ends at the Ural Mountains and that, therefore, they themselves are Europeans in the geographical sense of the term. The modern Ukrainian striving "toward Europe," as represented by the writers Xvyl'ovyj and Zerov, can be considered a reaction against this attitude of long standing. The same can be said about the declaration I read in 1990 in Kiev that the geographical center of Europe is to be found in Carpathian Ukraine. Of course, this rejection of "the East" reflects the attitude of modern Eastern European educated classes, although not of all of them, as evidenced by the lines of Aleksandr Blok that constitute the second of the two quotations introducing my paper. On the level of the Eastern European folklore, on the other hand, the notion of "the East" has preserved its positive connotation; the latter was inherited from late paganism and continued in early Christianity: you have to pray with your face turned toward the East, the abode of the gods, later of God, while the West is the dwelling place of the demons, later of the Devil.

If the notions "East" and "Europe" require an explanation within the framework of our subject, the notion of the West is in no need of such an explanation, because in it the geographical and the cultural contents are identical. You will excuse me if in this brief survey of the rôle played by the West in Ukrainian culture I do not discuss single early events, such as the relations between Princess Ol'ga and Emperor Otto I in the tenth century or the peregrinations of Princes Izjaslav and Jaropolk to Rome in the eleventh; if I do not point to the great numerical superiority of marriages between the members of the Kievan dynasty of the eleventh and twelfth centuries and their partners from Poland, the Scandinavian lands, Hungary, Germany, and France over marriages with partners coming from Byzantium; and if, finally, I do not dwell upon such facts as the western military campaigns and the western coronation (1253) of Prince Daniel I of Halyč, who, mind you, was also a vassal of the Golden Horde. These omissions are to be condoned on account of my purpose: I intend to turn your attention to phenomena of long duration, especially in the area of cultural history.

From the vantage point of a cultural historian, the West's influence on parts of the Ukrainian territory began before 1340, acquired considerable intensity after 1569, and continued over the vast expanse of the Ukrainian lands until 1793. When we take into account the impact of Polish elites in the Western Ukrainian lands and on the Right Bank of the Dnieper, this influence continued until 1918 or even 1939. This West was, for the most

part, clad in the Polish *kontusz*[3]—the later Habsburg impact was limited in space and time—and its principal cultural message in the decisive turning point between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was carried by the Polish variant of the Counter-Reformation. The Jesuits were introducing Latin and new pedagogical methods and the Orthodox were taking these over. Even the new interest in Greek was merely a reaction to the inroads made in Ukraine by Latin and by Latin ways. One result of all this was that, in the first half of the seventeenth century, for the first time in the history of the Ukrainian elites a possibility arose to establish a direct contact with the sources of antique culture. This was so because the Rus' of Kiev knew very little Greek. Still, in practical terms, high culture was reaching the Ukrainians not through Latin and Greek but through Polish; the victorious campaign waged by this language had as a result the emergence of a *suržyk*[4] of sorts that was used in writing, and perhaps in speech as well, by the local Orthodox and Uniate elites in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

This offensive coming from the West called forth in part an adaptation and in part a hostile reaction by the threatened Ukrainian elites. We call this movement the rebirth of Rus' faith. This rebirth found its expression in the polemical literature and in the creation of the Ostroh and Mohyla colleges as well as of other schools stemming from these two institutions. The struggle against the seemingly invincible West was waged officially in the name of the Greek faith of the forebears, but, in fact, it was waged with the help of the same weapons to which the West owed its success—that is, the Jesuit instructional methods, Catholic scholarship, and Catholic belles-lettres.

In such a way the West, more than the Greeks, provided most of the Ukrainian elites with stimuli and the means with which Byzantine cultural values could be defended. This defense of the Ukrainians' "own" East with the help of Western panoply was not a unique phenomenon in the Europe of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Parallel mechanisms functioned along another frontier area between the cultures of the Western and Byzantine varieties respectively. They operated on territories which were Greek-speaking but which had been conquered from Byzantium by Venice after 1204. This phenomenon was especially pronounced on the island of Crete. To be sure, on that island no Greco-Venetian *suržyk* emerged; something similar occurred instead, however, namely, the heavy penetration of

[3] This word (a borrowing from Hungarian or Turkic) came to denote a Polish nobleman's national dress (an upper garment with slit sleeves).

[4] A mixture of wheat and rye; hence, a mixture of Ukrainian and Russian, still used by a part of the working-class population in urban centers such as Kiev. A mixed language. Here, a language composed of Polish, Ukrainian-Belorussian vernacular, and Church Slavonic elements.

Venetian elements into the Greek vocabulary. What is more, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Greek subjects of the Venetian Empire, too, were rejecting the union and creating a literature of their own—the so-called Cretan literature—but they were creating it on the basis of straight translations or borrowings from Venetian, partly Jesuit, works.

The West's offensive in the Ukrainian lands carried with it a danger: that of the loss of the unity of the Ukrainian nation. Here a comparison with the Croats and the Serbs comes to mind. Among these two nations a linguistic identity (roughly speaking) did not secure a national unity, because these two groups had been divided by faith and frontiers from the eleventh century on. Three factors contributed to the preservation of the Ukrainian national unity: first, the long period of time during which the major part of the Ukrainian territory remained under the sway of one, that is, the Polish-Lithuanian, state; second, the relatively short period of time during which this same territory was ruled by several states (1772–1945); third, the absence of complete Catholicization in the Western Ukrainian lands.

In spite of the Western penetration into Ukrainian lands—a penetration that lasted for several centuries—Ukrainians became "the East" in Western eyes at a relatively early date, even before the partitions of Poland. This came about not only because the majority of Ukrainians professed "the Eastern faith" and were subordinated to an oriental patriarch down to the very last quarter of the seventeenth century (after all, the Uniates were subordinated to a Western patriarch); this also came about because the Polish-Lithuanian state itself (that as late as the sixteenth century was perceived by the West as a component of the West), starting with the middle of the seventeenth century and well into the eighteenth, was perceived—by the way, unjustifiably so—as something connected with the East. This new perception, in fact, took root even earlier. Take the painting by Rubens, now in the Boston Museum of Fine Arts, as an example. It dates from about 1625 and, following a story in Herodotus, depicts Tomyris, the sixth century B.C. queen of the Scythian Massagetae who lived in the area of the Caspian Sea. In Rubens's picture the members of the queen's entourage appear in the dress of Polish noblemen. Not only the orientalizing dress of Polish noblemen and of their Ukrainian counterparts contributed to the reputation of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In the eighteenth century, the Jews of the Commonwealth (so many of them living in the towns of Ukraine) also contributed to it, for their fox fur hats and their long capotes were repugnant to the tastes of the enlightened observers in their short coats and their white powdered wigs.

Under the impact of events of the last half-century, at least one pessimistic Polish critic subscribed to the idea of his country's cultural displacement toward the East and put his compatriots of 1992, "Europeans, after all," smack in the middle between Asia and Europe. To my regret, he also implied that Asia began east of the river Bug, that is, at the present Polish-Ukrainian frontier.[5]

No wonder, then, that the success of Jurij of Drohobyč in Bologna—the only Ukrainian to become rector of a great Western university—was possible in the fifteenth century when Poland was considered to be an unequivocal part of the West. When we adopt this perspective, it is easier to understand why in the Ukrainian consciousness the inclusion of a part of the Ukrainian territory into the unambiguous West dates from 1772 when *Galizien* and *Lodomerien* ceased to be part of orientalized Poland and were included into the empire of the Habsburgs.

I shall introduce the next section of my paper with an example from 1990; it may no longer be operative today, but it retains its validity in the larger scheme of things. When, in the Kievan hotel "Moskva"—note the prestigious name—Aeroflot advertised a flight *Kiev-Afiny-Kiev*, it used the Russian—originally Byzantine and Modern Greek—form for the city of Pericles and Plato. If a Kievan of today also flies "v Afiny" instead of flying "v Ateny" or even "do Aten," a usage that would mean following the Western traditions of the Kiev Mohyla College, he does so because his ancestors were subject to a counteroffensive by the byzantinizing East. This counteroffensive has lasted since the 1650s, although its progress has varied in time, depending on the area of the Ukrainian territory.

Again, a difficulty arises at this point. We saw at the beginning of this paper that the primary influence of the Byzantine "East" came to Ukraine from the South, both from the Byzantine capital itself and through the byzantinized Balkans; now, it is worth pondering that the secondary influence of the Byzantine "East"—and more—came from the North, to a certain extent from the Muscovite tsardom but, mainly later, from the Russian Empire. To be sure, in the very first stages of cultural relations between Muscovy and Russia, on the one hand, and Ukraine on the other, the counteroffensive of the North was preceded by the defense of the North's indigenous originality of the Byzantine type. This went along with a skillful exploitation both of Ukrainian achievements and Ukrainian manpower: let us recall the dispute that took place in the residence of the patriarch of

[5] Cf. Smecz in *Kultura* (Paris), 537 (June 1992): 73. By thus siding with Pantelejmon Kuliš—see the first motto at the beginning of this paper—Mr. Smecz, like Kuliš, failed to do justice to Poland's past achievements as messenger of the West in Ukrainian lands.

Moscow with the unlucky Lavrentij Zyzanij in 1627; let us recall Patriarch Nikon's "purification" of religious texts, ostensibly with the help of Greek, but, in fact, largely of Kievan, models; or the edition of the Moscow "Anfologion" of 1660, in which Kievan texts appear in a different, local, orthography; let us, finally, recall the Moscow career of Ukrainian hellenizing scholars, such as Epifanij Slavynec'kyj.

This situation lasted until the last quarter of the seventeenth century. Soon afterwards, a turning point occurred. It is known to all. Neo-Byzantinism, the cultural mainstay of the tsardom of Moscow, lost out, not without rearguard battles involving both learned Greek visitors or immigrants and learned natives, such as Evfimij of the Čudov Monastery. After a lapse of less than fifty years, the new Russian Empire began to import its culture from the West on a large scale and it was that empire that soon provided its Ukrainian dominions with Western values. In the 1730s and 1740s the Italian Rastrelli and the German Johann Gottfried Schedel built or drafted edifices in Kiev (the High Belltower, the Church of St. Andrew); these men came to Kiev not from Italy or Germany, however, but, in one way or another, from St. Petersburg.

The example of Rastrelli reminds us of an important general characteristic of Ukrainian cultural contacts both with the "East" and with the West. This characteristic is the lack of direct access to original sources during long stretches of Ukrainian history. Ukrainians received cultural values from abroad through intermediaries. I already mentioned that the Rus' of Kiev barely knew Greek—they received Byzantine literature mainly through Bulgaria; when it comes to the culture of the Counter-Reformation (which we sometimes imprecisely call the Renaissance and the Baroque), Ukrainians received it mainly through Poland; Classicism in architecture they got through the Russian Empire. Even the literary neoclassics of the twentieth century turned toward French symbolist poets not without receiving a stimulus from the Russian writers of the "Silver Age." It is true that we can quote parallels to this "secundarity" from elsewhere, for instance, from among the Bulgarians, for the Baroque and the Rococo of the Bulgarian rebirth have some of their roots in the art of Ottoman Istanbul. These parallels, however, are not very helpful; the fact is that the Ukrainian secundarity involved a certain weakness.

I am not going to deal here with the "real" East and its cultural coexistence with Ukraine: with the Cumans, the Black Hats (in the language of the chronicles, *černye klobuki*); with their alliances with the Rus' princes, including the alliance of 1223 before the Kalka Battle; with their marriages with the families of Kievan princes; or with the Turkic graffito in the Church of St. Sophia. Nor will I deal, when we come to later times, with the

Turkic elements in the institutional structure of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, with the Crimean Khanate and its Ukrainian population—that khanate that at times was Ukraine's ally, her enemy, and the subduer of Ukrainian lands; nor, finally, will I deal with the Ottoman Porte that Ukrainians plundered, against which they waged war as auxiliaries of Poland, and of which they were occasionally vassals. This is not my field.

I shall merely venture one general guess: that early Ukraine's cultural contacts with the "real" East are underrepresented or filtered out in our literary sources—because of the sometimes subliterary level of the contacts themselves and because of the confessional bias of the sources; and I shall limit myself to two remarks concerning that "real" East. On the top floor of Kiev's badly restored Golden Gate, one could see in 1990 an exhibit of the weaponry of Old Rus'; a visitor could easily realize that the "real" East provided Rus' with military technology. He learned there such Turkic or Mongolian names of weapons as *kujak*, *kolontar*, *jušman*, *tegagljaj*, *baxterec'*—he could find there only one Slavic *zercalo*, but even this "mirror" may have been a calque coming from the East. Again, as had been the case with Byzantium, the "real" East was, to a large extent, the South. Let us think for a moment about the location of Bahçesaray and of Istanbul.

Generally speaking, we historians have concentrated so much of our attention on the axis East-West, so important for the Ukrainian cultural development today, that we have paid less attention to the axis North-South. And yet, as I repeatedly stated, this is the axis on which lie Moscow, Byzantium, and its heir, the Ottoman Empire. On its own territory, the latter was a defender of Orthodoxy against the threats coming from the West. Cultural contacts with Orthodox centers that lay within the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire occurred along the axis North-South, and here Ukraine was not only the receiving territory but also a place from which influences penetrated southward.

In the first place, we should mention here the representatives of the post-Byzantine Eastern Church: oecumenical and other patriarchs, bishops, and even simple *daskaloi* (teachers), most of whom were Greeks. They either stayed for some time in Ukraine, where they helped the Orthodox cause of the fraternities and of Prince Ostroz'kyj and made money by teaching, or they passed through Ukraine on their way to Moscow. In Moscow there was power and money, but, according to the often-quoted testimony of one of them, the Syrian Paul of Aleppo, in Ukraine you could breathe freely. Secondly, we must mention the mutual influences that existed between the Ukrainian-Belorussian area and the Balkan lands in the wide sense of this term: the Kievan metropolitan Peter Mohyla supported the printing presses in Moldavia and Wallachia and in the seventeenth to

eighteenth centuries we can follow the impact that modern Greeks, Bulgarians, and Moldavians (who, in part, were trained in the West) exerted upon Kievan hymnographical works.

On the other hand, Kievan early printed books, including the works of Simiaon Połacki, found their way to Serbia and Bulgaria: an eloquent testimony to this is a considerable number of well-preserved copies of these early printed books that are being kept today in the library of the Bulgarian national and religious shrine, the monastery at Rila. Finally, in the eighteenth century Myxajlo Kozačyns'kyj, the graduate and later professor of the Kiev Academy, taught in Serbia and wrote on Serbian subjects.

I come now to my final remarks. A cultural historian describes; he does not dispense advice. There is a way, however, to give advice under the guise of description, and I will yield to this temptation. First, a cultural historian who has crisscrossed the territory of former empires, the Ottoman, the Austro-Hungarian, and the Russian (I am limiting myself to empires which collapsed in 1917–1918), knows that the elites of nations that were component parts of these three entities—the ruling nations clearly excepted—were condemned to cultural provinciality, which often was compensated by exaggerated or even unfounded assertions concerning cultural originality. Second, between the end of the seventeenth century and the first half of the eighteenth, the Russians decided that it was more advantageous for them to turn to the West, not through Ukrainian mediation, but directly, and this decision stood them in very good stead indeed. The unprecedentedly rapid flourishing of the Muscovite and later Russian culture between the times of Aleksej Mixajlovič and Alexander I, under whom the young Pushkin was writing, is to be explained to a great extent by direct contacts with the West. Among their eighteenth-century wandering scholars, the Russians count Lomonosov, who was taught at Marburg University, while Ukrainians have Hryhorovyč-Bars'kyj, who was a teacher on the island of Patmos.

In Ukraine, during the period of Soviet domination, ideas concerning the need for direct contacts with the West were prevalent in the milieu that brought forth Xvyl'ovyj and Zerov: we all recall the proposal to renounce the mediation of the North. We also all know the fate that this proposal met in the 1930s. Today, we are living in new circumstances, and this idea can become reality if one approaches the task at hand calmly and without polemics. This time the term "West" should be understood as the wide world at large. In this wide world, the modern Hryhorovyč-Bars'kyjs may not elicit the interest of such highly situated personalities as the ambassador of his Russian Imperial Highness at the Sublime Porte who questioned Bars'kyj in Istanbul about what the latter had seen in his travels; instead, the

interested parties will consist of compatriots who live in the wide world.

When we get around to putting the idea about direct contacts with the wide world into action, we should take a look at the Bulgarians and the Serbs—incidentally, peoples much more "peasant" in character than are Ukrainians. Their young elites begin their preparation with the mastery of several foreign languages as a prelude to study in the West. But, above all, Ukrainians have to hurry when they go about establishing direct contacts on an appropriate level. Otherwise, the "wide world" which they will quickly absorb without languages, travel, and effort will consist of imitations of jeans, of hip packs, of Pepsi-Cola, and of rock music groups.

* * *

The genre of this article—a short, general outline—does not require footnotes. Still, for the purposes of example and contrast, I shall mention two works which are close to its subject-matter: Eduard Winter, *Byzanz und Rom im Kampf um die Ukraine. 955–1939* (Leipzig, 1942) (the author is mostly interested in problems of ecclesiastical organization); and Ivan L. Rudnytsky, "Ukraine between East and West," in the collection of essays by the same author, *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History* (Edmonton, 1987), pp. 1–9 (the text first appeared in 1963; Ukrainian translation, 1976; Polish translation, 1988; the author considers the rôle the West and the two Easts—the nomadic and the Byzantine one—played in the formation of Ukrainian national character). Finally, in a number of articles that appeared in the periodical *Sučasnist'* between 1963 and 1991, a number of authors (such as George Luc'kyj, Omeljan Pritsak, George Shevelov, Vasyl' Stus, and George Tarnavs'kyj, to mention the most prominent ones) discussed—mostly prescriptively—Ukraine's choice between Eastern and Western orientations, with Byzantium usually getting bad marks, and jeans and electric guitars, occasionally good ones. Cf. also Bohdan Strumiński, "*Sučasnist'* (1961–1991)," *Kultura* (Paris), 536 (May 1992): 120–32, esp. pp. 128–31.

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Postscript, June 1992: The recent rapid and spectacular changes in Ukraine do not dispose of problems discussed in the present paper. Such changes do tend to turn the attention of local elites and of Ukrainians abroad toward the West and the future—a good thing—but at the risk of foreshortening and blurring the historical perspective. The Byzantine heritage of both Greek-Orthodox and Greek-Catholic Ukrainian populations and more recent long-range developments—the latest of which is the Russian cultural impact upon a large part of Ukrainian lands—can recede into the background in the heady atmosphere of change, but their effects will not disappear overnight.

REVIEW ARTICLES

A Bibliographic Key to Ukrainian Studies

MARTA TARNAWSKY

UKRAINE: A BIBLIOGRAPHIC GUIDE TO ENGLISH-LANGUAGE PUBLICATIONS. By *Bohdan S. Wynar*. Englewood, Colo.: Ukrainian Academic Press, 1990. xiii, 406 pp. $85.00 within the U.S., $102.00 elsewhere.

Ukrainian studies have come of age in North America. A decade or two ago, most scholarly activity was centered in and oriented toward the Ukrainian community and most publications were in Ukrainian. Today, Ukrainian studies have moved into the scholarly mainstream, to American and Canadian universities. At the present time there are two Ukrainian research centers (at Harvard University and at the University of Alberta) and two scholarly university journals in English (*Harvard Ukrainian Studies* and the *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*). A score of scholarly publications have been published by American and Canadian university presses. International scholarly conferences and workshops are a common occurrence (including a regular annual conference at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign). Now, finally, there is a bibliographic key to all this scholarly output published in the English language.

Wynar's *Ukraine: a Bibliographic Guide to English-Language Publications*[1] is obviously modeled on such classics of American bibliography as Mudge,[2] Winchell,[3] and Sheehy.[4] It is an essential, an indispensable tool for scholars, researchers, students, and journalists. With interest in Ukraine rising not only in scholarly circles but also in the press and in the population at large, Wynar's guide will be a reference book frequently sought in libraries and newspaper editorial offices. It is an important pioneering effort and, like the original Mudge, it is destined to be but the first edition in a series that, hopefully, will be regularly revised, updated, and improved.

Only a man of Wynar's vision, industriousness, and experience could have attempted a task of such magnitude. Bohdan S. Wynar (born in Lviv, Ukraine, in 1926 and a U.S. citizen since 1957) has a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Munich and an M.A. in library science from the University of Denver. He taught for a number of years in graduate schools of librarianship and is the author of a number

1 Cited hereafter as Wynar, *Guide*.
2 Isadore Gilbert Mudge, *Guide to Reference Books*, 6th ed. (Chicago, 1936).
3 Constance Mabel Winchell, *Guide to Reference Books*, 8th ed. (Chicago, 1967).
4 Eugene Paul Sheehy, *Guide to Reference Books*, 10th ed. (Chicago, 1986).

of scholarly monographs on economics and library science, published in Ukrainian or English. Most importantly, however, in 1970 he founded Libraries Unlimited, a publishing house for academic textbooks of library science and bibliography, and started the *American Reference Books Annual*, a critical bibliographic survey of the year's most important reference publications. It is these last two roles—as president and owner of Libraries Unlimited (and its small subdivision, the Ukrainian Academic Press) and as editor of the *ARBA*—that made it possible for Wynar to embark on such a major enterprise as *Ukraine: A Bibliographic Guide*.

Like his models Mudge, Winchell, and Sheehy, Wynar's guide is a critically annotated bibliography of reference materials on a variety of subjects, a bibliography that is meant to lead the user to the most important sources available. Wynar's guide to Ukraine covers general reference books, such as bibliographies, library catalogs, and encyclopedias, as well as books, articles, and unpublished doctoral dissertations on a variety of subjects: art and architecture, economics, education, ethnic studies, folklore, geography and travel, history and political science, language, literature, performing arts, philosophy, sociology, demography and statistics, and religion. Some subjects, obviously, are covered more extensively than others, reflecting the current state of English-language scholarship in these areas. Wynar's guide contains 1,084 entries for books, articles, and dissertations on Ukrainian topics. Each listing is under either the author's name or another main entry and includes full standard bibliographic data. Each entry has a descriptive annotation, with bibliographic references to related sources. Some annotations are full-fledged critical reviews. Entries for books usually end with a short listing of selected book reviews of the particular title. Entries are numbered consecutively throughout the book, facilitating cross-referencing and indexing. Most materials date from the early 1950s to mid-1989, with some exceptions for important early imprints. All titles, according to the author's claim, "were examined *de visu*,"[5] and most annotations were prepared by Wynar himself. The guide has a general introduction that gives a clear statement of the author's goals and methodology and provides an additional listing of recent titles not covered in the bibliography. Furthermore, there are separate introductions for each subject area covered in different chapters. These subject introductions are short bibliographic essays on the state of scholarship in the particular subject area or discipline. Chapters are further subdivided into more specific subject or chronological divisions.

There have been prior attempts to provide a listing of English-language publications on Ukrainian topics, among which are A. Sokolyszyn's *Ukrainian Selected and Classified Bibliography in English*[6] and R. Weres's *Ukraine: Selected References in the English Language*,[7] but Wynar's is the first bibliographic guide with a thoroughly professional and critical approach, a universal scope, and a well

5 Wynar, *Guide*, Introduction, p. xi.

6 A. Sokolyszyn, *Ukrainian Selected and Classified Bibliography in English* (New York, 1971).

7 Roman Weres, *Ukraine: Selected References in the English Language*, 2nd ed. (Chicago, 1974).

thought-out and practical organization of material. The fact that the book is nicely produced and distributed by a recognized and experienced American publisher assures a wide distribution to academic and large public libraries in North America.

No pioneering effort of such scope can escape problems, errors, and omissions. The most serious problem with Wynar's guide is the index. A note at the head of the index reads: "References are to entry numbers. Subsumed entries are indicated with an 'n' preceding the entry number. Variances in spelling of names are indicated as appropriate. Subject entries are in boldface type."[8] This note raises expectations that the index will provide retrievability by subject; that, in addition to the 1,084 main entries, one could, by using the index, find authors and titles discussed in annotations; and that cross-references are provided to forms of names not adopted. This is not the case. The boldface entries for subjects that do appear in the index are usually to broad categories that appear as headings of subchapters and are listed in the table of contents (e.g., Agriculture, Archaeology, Chernobyl Disaster, Communist Party, Famine). True subject retrievability, however, is not provided. Let me give a few examples. Tuhan-Baranovsky, a Ukrainian economist of international renown, is the subject of two separate entries;[9] there is an additional bibliographic note listing a number of other studies of Tuhan-Baranovsky;[10] an additional article on Tuhan-Baranovsky is included in a collection of papers edited by I. S. Koropeckyj, which has a separate entry.[11] In the index, however, no subject entry is provided for "Tuhan-Baranovsky." The only listing in the index is for "Tuhan-Baranovsky's Theories of Markets. . . ," a title of a work mentioned in the text of an annotation.[12] This example is not an aberration; it is typical. You will not find in the index any entries under "Andrusiw," "Levytsky, Myron," "Cymbal," "Kriukow," "Krychevsky, Vasyl," or "Lassovsky, Volodymyr," even though monographs about these artists are given separate entries, some with biographies and extensive annotations.[13] Archipenko and Hnizdovsky are not given subject entries in the index, despite several entries and extensive references to their work and to studies about them.[14] What does appear in the index are titles of publications. Thus, you will not find "Andrusiw" or "Cymbal," but you will find the title "Peter Andrusiw" and "Victor Cymbal" and, of course, many titles beginning with the name Archipenko: *Archipenko, International Visionary* and *Archipenko, Fifty Creative Years*, etc. Wynar's index was, obviously, never really intended as a subject index; the claim made in the preliminary note is a positive disservice to the guide's user. The index, however, would be judged a failure even if it did not pretend to provide access by subject. While the authors and titles of main entries are retrievable, a substantial proportion of authors and titles listed in annotations is not. A couple of examples will suffice to

8 Wynar, *Guide*, p. 365.
9 Ibid., nos. 105 and 106.
10 Ibid., note under no. 106.
11 Ibid., no. 102.
12 Ibid., note under no. 106.
13 Ibid., nos. 61, 63, 64, 69, 75, 72.
14 Ibid., nos. 65, 66, 67, 80.

prove the point. The work *Selected Contributions of Ukrainian Scholars to Economics*, edited by I. S. Koropeckyj,[15] can be found in the index under its title and the name of the editor. Individual analytical entries, however, are not provided and the authors of individual papers in the book (S. Amato, L. Smolinski, R. S. Clem, M. A. Turban, and F. I. Kushnirsky), not to mention the subjects of their studies (Tuhan-Baranovsky, Slutsky, Ptukha, and Rosdolsky), cannot be retrieved through the index. One could cite hundreds of examples where names and titles discussed in annotations are not represented in the index and are consequently retrievable only by accident. Neither does the index provide cross-references to connect different spellings of the same name, such as Tuhan-Baranovsky and Tugan-Baranovsky, Cymbal and Tsymbal, Hohol and Gogol, Xvyl'ovyj and Khvyliovyi, etc.

Most annotations, as stated in the introduction, were done by one person, i.e., the author himself. In the majority of cases they are highly informative, well written, concise. It is obvious, however, that they were written over a period of many years (some originally perhaps for *ARBA*?) and that not all were revised for final publication in Wynar's guide. Consequently, there are unnecessary repetitions, outdated statements, and a lack of connecting references between related materials. For example, the entry under *The case of Leonid Plyushch*, edited by T. Khodorovich (1976),[16] includes a long annotation with a description of the book's contents, personal information on L. Pliushch, several references to other materials about him, and two reviews of Khodorovich's book, but there is no mention of *History's Carnival*, Pliushch's autobiography published in English in 1979 that is given a separate entry a little further on in the guide.[17] There are two separate entries for M. Kuropas's Ph.D. dissertation:[18] they not only have different annotations but also slight variations in bibliographic description. Myroslava Mudrak's *The New Generation and Artistic Modernism in the Ukraine*[19] is a monograph based on a dissertation[20]—both are given as main entries with no connecting references between the two. *Letters From the Gulag* is given one entry under history[21] and another one under literature.[22] In one, the author's name is given as Dray-Khmara Asher, Oksana, and in the other as Asher, Oksana Dray-Khmara; the annotations and additional references (including reviews) differ substantially. John Fizer's 1960 Ph.D. dissertation[23] and his 1982 article on Potebnja published in *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*[24] are given separate entries, but his monograph on Potebnja published by the Harvard Ukrainian

15 Ibid., no. 102.
16 Ibid., no. 757.
17 Ibid., no. 761.
18 Ibid., nos. 242 and 266.
19 Ibid., no. 860.
20 Ibid., no. 853.
21 Ibid., no. 633.
22 Ibid., no. 902.
23 Ibid., no. 948.
24 Ibid., no. 798.

Research Institute in 1987[25] is mentioned as being "still in preparation."[26] Also outdated are comments about "a projected ten-volume encyclopedia in dictionary arrangement,"[27] the Ukrainian-language *Entsyklopediia ukrainoznavstva*, the last volume of which (volume 10) was published in 1984/89.

Have all titles been examined *de visu*, as is claimed in the introduction? If so, how do we explain listing Slavutych's poetry collection, *The Conquerors of the Prairies*, among the ethnic studies of Ukrainian-Canadians?[28] Or the separate entry, with annotation, for an anthology of Ukrainian poetry in Canada edited by Slavutych,[29] which in fact was published not in English but in Ukrainian?[30] Or a statement about D. Struk's writings on *shestydesiatnyky* in *Four Ukrainian Poets*[31]—a title which is, in fact, a collection of poetry, with D. Struk as one of the translators?[32] Or a note about a non-existent "translation of a Ukrainian work" of D. Dontzov entitled "Two Aspects of the Ukrainian Literature of Our Age," the second edition of which was supposed to have been published by Ukrainian Echo in Toronto in 1958?[33]

In a volume of such magnitude, with thousands of authors and titles listed, typographical and printing errors are probably unavoidable. While they are not numerous enough to be distracting, a few are especially irritating. The second sentence of the annotation for Dzyuba's *Internationalism or Russification* reads: "The original Ukrainian text, *Lykho z rozumu* was published. . . ."[34] The previous entry is *Chornovil's Papers*, where the sentence probably belongs, but its misplacement will confuse and mislead the uninformed reader. Emma Andievs'ka, a prominent Ukrainian émigré writer, is consistently referred to as "Andrievska";[35] even the title of an article about her that begins with her last name has been "corrected" to the wrong spelling.[36] In one case the annotation lists among the additional recommended literature the very same main entry which it is annotating![37] Several factual

25 John Fizer, *Alexander A. Potebnja's Psycholinguistic Theory of Literature: a Metacritical Inquiry* (Cambridge, Mass., [1987]).

26 Wynar, *Guide*, note under no. 798.

27 Ibid., no. 37.

28 Ibid., note under no. 186.

29 Ibid., no. 879.

30 *Antolohiia ukrainskoi poezii v Kanadi, 1898–1973*, uporiadkuvav Iar Slavutych (Edmonton, 1975). The book has an added title page in English: *An Anthology of Ukrainian Poetry in Canada, 1898-1973*, compiled and edited by Yar Slavutych.

31 Wynar, *Guide*, note under no. 858. The note reads: "Dr. Danylo Struk wrote on the same subject in *Four Ukrainian Poets*. . . ."

32 *Four Ukrainian Poets: Drach, Korotych, Kostenko, Symonenko*, ed. G. S. N. Luckyj (Montreal, 1969).

33 Wynar, *Guide*, no. 847. What is meant is probably the Ukrainian edition: Dmytro Dontsov, *Dvi literatury nashoi doby*, 2nd ed. (Toronto, 1958) (=Biblioteka vydavnytstva "Homin Ukrainy," ch. 8).

34 Wynar, *Guide*, no. 755.

35 Ibid., Table of Contents, p. ix; no. 896; Index, p. 365.

36 Ibid., no. 896.

37 Ibid., no. 106.

misstatements are also the consequence of poor editing. For example: "For numerous *articles in the Ukrainian language*, the reader is advised to consult such journals as *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, *Ukrainian Quarterly*, *Ukrainian Review*, and *Suchasnist*";[38] ". . . the Ems decree, which simply *abolished the use of Ukrainian language* in the Russian empire";[39] "Yurii Yanovsky also *has done several translations*. . . ";[40] or ". . . the *late* Dmytro Chub"[41] [Italics mine—M.T.].

The organization of materials and the length of individual chapters is determined by materials available. One might question, however, the decisions to provide subchapters for individual writers but not for artists; to place the material on dumy under music rather than literature or folklore; or to place Jewish-Ukrainian and Polish-Ukrainian relations twice—in two different chronological periods under history.

Whenever the selections and critical annotations are the work of one person, there is always a question of objectivity. Why are certain materials selected as main entries while others are mentioned in annotations only? One would hope that the more important titles are given a fuller treatment. Are they? There is a separate entry for *Boundaries of Flame*, translations of Olena Teliha's poetry,[42] for example, but Soviet translations of Tychyna, Ryl's'kyi, Honchar, and Ianovs'kyi are mentioned only in an annotation.[43] English-language materials published in the former Soviet Union are not, as a rule, treated seriously: they are conspicuous by their absence among the main entries of Wynar's bibliography. While in some instances such an approach may be justified, certain Soviet publications, especially those on art, music, literature, even law, ought to be treated more fully, with critical annotations, since they frequently represent the only treatment of the given subject in English.

Even though Wynar's critical annotations are usually supported by quotations from relevant book reviews, there are occasions when a personal bias may be detected: an emphasis is placed on negative reviews, while positive reviews are dismissed or omitted altogether. Such a bias seems visible in the treatment of G. Grabowicz's *The Poet as Mythmaker*[44] and his *Toward a History of Ukrainian Literature*,[45] while the omission of the latter work from among the reviews of Chyzhevs'kyi's *A History of Ukrainian Literature*[46] is conspicuous. The fact that the entry on Grabowicz's critique follows that for Chyzhevs'kyi's *History* is no excuse: bibliographic reference books like Wynar's guide are not for consecutive

38 Ibid., note under no. 862.
39 Ibid., introduction to chap. 1, p. 1.
40 Ibid., note under no. 972.
41 Ibid., note under no. 875. As of this writing, Dmytro Chub is alive and well and living in Australia.
42 Ibid., no. 971.
43 Ibid., note under 972.
44 Ibid., no. 956.
45 Ibid., no. 828.
46 Ibid., no. 827.

reading and the reader should have found either the review listed or a cross-reference to the next entry.

Wynar himself has listed in his introduction a number of recent titles that, for a variety of reasons, were omitted from the guide. This list could be extended much further. There is, for example, an extensive literature on the case of John Demianiuk[47]—at least two books (too recent, perhaps, to be included?) plus a score of earlier law review articles—which is not mentioned. Among the other titles that should have been covered either as main entries or at least in annotations are: the 1985 edition of V. Vasilenko's *Legal Aspects of Participation of the Ukrainian SSR in International Relations*,[48] the English translations of the constitution of the Ukrainian SSR,[49] the criminal code of the Ukrainian SSR,[50] and other legal documents;[51] T. Hewryk's *Masterpieces in Wood*;[52] Olena Saciuk's three articles on

[47] Cf. Willem A. Wagenaar, *Identifying Ivan* (Cambridge, Mass., 1989); Tom Teicholz, *The Trial of Ivan the Terrible: State of Israel vs. John Demjanjuk* (New York, 1990); Edward Morgan, "Retributory Theater," *American University Journal of International Law & Policy* 3, no. 1 (Spring 1988): 1–64; Borys Y. Dackiw, "Denaturalization of Suspected Nazi War Criminals: The Problem of Soviet-Source Evidence," *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 24, no. 2 (1986): 365–96; Rena Hozore Reiss, "The Extradition of John Demjanjuk: War Crimes, Universality Jurisdiction, and the Political Offense Doctrine," *Cornell International Law Journal* 20, no. 2 (Summer 1987): 281–315; Suzanne Lutnick, "Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky," *Suffolk Transnational Law Journal* 10, no. 2 (Fall 1986): 607–19; Francine R. Strauss, "Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky: An Analysis of Extradition," *Maryland Journal of International Law and Trade* 12, no. 1 (Fall 1987): 65–81; Fania Domb, "The Demjanjuk Trial," *Israel Yearbook on Human Rights* 18 (1988): 229–41.

[48] Vladimir Vasilenko, *Legal Aspects of Participation of the Ukrainian SSR in International Relations* (Kiev, 1985).

[49] "Constitution (Basic Law) of the Ukrainian SSR," *Collected Legislation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Constituent Union Republics*, compiled, translated and with introductory materials by William E. Butler. (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., 1979–), Constitutions, vol. 2 (loose-leaf) [August 1980].

[50] "Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR," *Collected Legislation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Constituent Union Republics*, compiled, translated and with introductory materials by William E. Butler. (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., 1979–), Union Republic Legislation, vol. 1 (loose-leaf) [June 1982], pp. 1–139.

[51] E.g., "Soviet State Symbolism: Flags and Arms of the USSR and its Constituent Parts, 1917–1971. Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic," *Soviet Statutes and Decisions* 8, no. 1/2 (Fall-Winter 1971–1972): 197–204, illus. [excerpts from the constitution, administrative code, etc.]; "Soviet Citizenship Law. Union Republican Legislation and Normative Acts: 1917–1923. Ukrainian SSR," *Soviet Statutes and Decisions* 7, no. 1 (Fall 1970): 61–73, and 7, no. 3 (Spring 1971): 308–17; "International Treaties, Agreements, and Diplomatic Correspondence: 1917–1923," *Soviet Statutes and Decisions* 7, no. 1 (Fall 1970): 74–116, and 7, no. 4 (Summer 1971): 361–470 [a number of documents pertaining to Ukraine]; "Law Reform in the Soviet Union. Ukrainian SSR," *Soviet Statutes and Decisions* 12, no. 2 (1975–1976): 218–32, and 12, no. 3 (Spring 1976): 315–32 [full texts or excerpts of decrees].

[52] *Masterpieces in Wood: Houses of Worship in Ukraine*, Titus D. Hewryk, guest curator, Ukrainian Museum (New York, 1987).

Berdnyk[53] and her article on Ukrainian writers in Argentina;[54] and Maxim Tarnawsky's 1986 Harvard dissertation on Valeriian Pidmohyl'nyi,[55] to name but a few. The omission of the last-named Harvard dissertation also raises a methodological question: was it overlooked because it was presented in the Department of Comparative Literature rather than the Slavic Department? If so, how many other comparative dissertations on Ukrainian topics fell through Wynar's bibliographic net?

Wynar's guide is an extremely important publication; these detailed and extensive comments are offered in the hope that they will help in the revision of the second edition. And that second edition—because of the need for a proper index—should be published as soon as possible.

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[53] Olena H. Saciuk, "The Forbidden Vision of Berdnyk," in *The Scope of the Fantastic—Culture, Biography, Themes, Children's Literature. Selected Essays from the First International Conference on the Fantastic in Literature and Film*, ed. Robert A. Collins and Howard D. Pearce (Westport, Conn., 1985), pp. 43–49; idem, "Oles Berdnyk: A Biographical Sketch," *Studia Ucrainica* 2 (1984): 249–50; idem, "The Sky Blue Blacksmith: Genre and Motif in Berdnyk," *Studia Ucrainica* 2 (1984): 13–23.

[54] Olena H. Saciuk, "Ukrainian and Spanish Exile Writers in Argentina," in *Latin America and the Literature of Exile: A Comparative View of the 20th Century European Refugee Writers in the New World*, ed. Hans-Bernhard Moeller (Heidelberg, 1983), pp. 277–302.

[55] Maxim David Tarnawsky, "Valerijan Pidmohyl'nyj, Guy de Maupassant, and the Magic of the Night" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1986).

The Captivated Mind: Two Studies of Miłosz in English

HAROLD B. SEGEL

THE ETERNAL MOMENT: THE POETRY OF CZESLAW MILOSZ. By *Aleksander Fiut*. Translated by *Theodosia S. Robertson*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 1990. 226 pp. $29.95.

THE POET'S WORK: AN INTRODUCTION TO CZESLAW MILOSZ. By *Leonard Nathan* and *Arthur Quinn*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991. xi, 178 pp. $29.95 cloth, $9.95 paper.

Since Czesław Miłosz has reached the age of eighty, and has been at the University of California at Berkeley since 1960, it may seem surprising that book-length studies of his works have not appeared in English before now. This is not to suggest a dearth of literature in English on Miłosz. Quite the contrary. There has been a great deal of periodical writing as well as the publication of a few collections of essays reflecting a fine knowledge of the body of Miłosz's work and the ability to situate it within various contexts. Yet, as Leonard Nathan and Arthur Quinn remind us in their own book—the first by American critics—Miłosz's recognition as a poet in the English-speaking world came relatively late. Whatever interest he had begun to attract as a young poet in Poland before and during World War II was limited to Polish readers. His international postwar reputation was acquired initially through his authorship of two prose works of patent political content, *The Captive Mind*, which still remains Miłosz's best-known book, and the novel *The Seizure of Power*. Both these works were published in English in the 1950s—*The Captive Mind* in 1953 and *The Seizure of Power* in 1955. For at least fifteen years after, these remained the only works of Miłosz available in English. Even such engaging, and revealing, prose works as *Native Realm* and *The Issa Valley*, which were also products of the early émigré years in Paris after Miłosz's defection from the Polish diplomatic service in 1951, were translated into English only much later—*Native Realm* in 1968 and *The Issa Valley* in 1981. In 1980, when Miłosz received the Nobel Prize in literature (which greatly enhanced his stature as a poet), it had only been a few years since his first book of poetry—*Selected Poems* (1973)—appeared in English. And, again, it was not until fifteen years after the appearance of *Selected Poems* and eight years after the award of the Nobel Prize that a substantial collection of Miłosz's poetry—*The Collected Poems, 1931–1987* (1988)—was published in English. In light of this chronology, it may seem less surprising that it has taken so long for a monograph on his work to appear in the country in which Miłosz has made his home for over thirty years.

Aleksander Fiut's *The Eternal Moment: The Poetry of Czeslaw Milosz*, which was published a year before Nathan's and Quinn's *The Poet's Work: An Introduction to Czeslaw Milosz*, enjoys the distinction of being the first book-length study of Miłosz's poetry in English. This distinction, as Nathan and Quinn lose no time in pointing out, is qualified by the fact that the Fiut book is a translation of a Polish study published originally in 1987 and, as such, was obviously written with the Polish reader in mind. If one wonders why it took so long for a study of Miłosz's poetry to appear in Polish, given the much greater recognition among Polish readers of his achievements as a poet, the political realities have to be taken into consideration. As a former defector and as the author of such anticommunist and anti-Soviet works as *The Captive Mind* and *The Seizure of Power*, Miłosz was denied official recognition in Poland until the time of the Solidarity movement. In 1981 he returned to Poland for the first time since his defection thirty years earlier. The year 1981 marked, in fact, a kind of watershed in Miłosz's career. His return to Poland within a year of receiving the Nobel Prize, which catapulted him to international fame, paved the way for the publication of successive volumes of his poetry in that country. Before then, few of his works were allowed to be published and he was relegated to the status of a former defector-émigré writer dependent on émigré presses in England and France for publication. It was also in 1981 that his *Nobel Lecture* was published and that Miłosz was invited to give the Charles Eliot Norton Lectures at Harvard University.

The crackdown on Solidarity and the imposition of martial law in Poland not long after Miłosz's visit in 1981 again raised obstacles to the further dissemination of his oeuvre in the country. However long it may have taken Mr. Fiut to write his book, it was published only in 1987 and then, significantly, not in Poland but in Paris, by the Polish émigré house Libella. Open access to Miłosz's works in Poland came again only with the collapse of the communist regime. Thus, circumstances largely beyond his control conspired to delay the appearance of substantive studies of his literary work, in Polish as well as English, for a relatively long period of time. The paucity of translations of his poetry denied American critics that most important dimension of his career, while in Poland the obstacles were primarily of a political nature.

Time has now rectified the situation. Only initiative stands in the way of Miłosz scholarship in Poland, and the bulk of his published work—prose and poetry—is available in English translation. The appearance in 1990 of Aleksander Fiut's book, in English translation, and publication the following year of the work of Leonard Nathan and Arthur Quinn at last bring Miłosz the next logical stage of recognition due him.

As critical introductions to Miłosz's work in English, the Fiut and the Nathan and Quinn books cover much the same ground, albeit from different perspectives and in different ways. Both are fairly small books: Fiut's offers 189 pages of text, Nathan's and Quinn's, 163 pages. Moreover, Fiut deals only with Miłosz's poetry; Nathan and Quinn encompass the prose as well, although their interest in poetry is definitely keener. Both books read well. Nathan and Quinn, as American critics intent on introducing Miłosz to the literary-minded American reader who has heard of Miłosz but

may never have extended his acquaintanceship much beyond *The Captive Mind*, write in a style appropriate to their presumed audience. The Fiut book, originally written in Polish for a highly educated Polish reader with a rather thorough knowledge of Miłosz's work, might not seem the best candidate for translation. The surprise here is that the book has been translated so splendidly into English by Theodosia S. Robertson that it reads remarkably well and, from the point of view of style, loses nothing in comparison to that of Nathan and Quinn.

Aleksander Fiut's book not only holds its own stylistically against that of Nathan and Quinn, it far surpasses it in scholarship. It is an intellectually impressive analysis of Miłosz's poetry along topical lines. The chapters are divided accordingly: "The Traps of Mimesis" deals primarily with Miłosz's treatment of time and space, a subject of fundamental importance for a writer who has spent so much of his life in emigration and yet has remained unswervingly loyal to his native language; "Love Affair with Nature" deals with the poet's attitude toward the world of nature which, like all great passions, is inevitably bitter-sweet; "Facing the End of the World" focuses on the well-known themes of catastrophism and Manichaeanism in Miłosz's poetry; "In the 'Interhuman Church' " examines Miłosz's views on the individual within the nation and the individual within mankind and, where germane, draws comparisons with the outlook of a fellow Polish writer such as Witold Gombrowicz; "In the Grip of Eros" is an exploration of a persistent current in Miłosz's poetry; "The Identity Game" is a lucid probe into one of the most complex yet interesting aspects of Miłosz's poetry, his polyphony or use of multiple voices; and, finally, in "Palimpsest," Fiut examines yet another important dimension of Miłosz's poetry—his relationship to other individuals, past and present, and especially to other poets and literary cultures, Polish and non-Polish, from the Bible to the American poet Robinson Jeffers and the Hindu philosopher Raja Rao.

For all the acumen of Mr. Fiut's analyses of recognizably paramount aspects of Miłosz's poetry and thought, from the viewpoint of the American reader his book suffers from two flaws. Taken on its own terms—as a first study of Miłosz's poetry in Polish for the knowledgeable Polish reader—the book is sophisticated and impressive. It would be ludicrous to lament its publication in English at this time, but it is the kind of study that would have made more sense in translation at a more advanced stage of Miłosz's recognition as a poet in the English-speaking world. As it is, the book presumes a very high level of familiarity with Miłosz's poetry that would have to be regarded as rare among anglophone readers. To his credit, Mr. Fiut illustrates points he makes with quotations from a number of Miłosz's poems, in English as well as Polish. There are, however, not really enough quotations given the nature of the study; in many instances references are made simply to titles, as if the reader had so firm a grasp of Miłosz's oeuvre that he could at once relate to the works mentioned.

Chronology, or the lack of it, represents a greater problem for the non-Polish reader. Given his strategy of isolating and then analyzing key topics in Miłosz's poetry, Mr. Fiut is under no obligation to explore Miłosz's career in any evolutionary way. Unless the reader is already familiar with Miłosz's biography and the development of his writing, he may find himself adrift in sophisticated but often needlessly

abstract analysis. For all its virtues as a work of scholarship, Aleksander Fiut's *The Eternal Moment* remains a Polish study intended for the well-informed Polish reader. In its English edition, it can appeal only to the specialist on Miłosz's poetry, of whom there are few.

The Poet's Work: An Introduction to Czeslaw Milosz, by Leonard Nathan and Arthur Quinn, in a sense complements the Fiut book. *The Poet's Work* was written by two of Miłosz's American colleagues at Berkeley. Their goal is to provide the educated American reader who may know something of Miłosz's career with an introduction to his poetry and prose that neither presumes a great deal of prior knowledge nor is intellectually condescending. The book is more readable and more accessible than Mr. Fiut's. But it, too, has its drawbacks. Its brevity and scope are mutually disadvantageous. Discussion of such prose works as *Visions from San Francisco Bay*, *The Captive Mind*, *The Seizure of Power*, *The Issa Valley*, *Native Realm*, and *The Land of Ulro*, while made relevant, for the most part, to the development of Miłosz's literary career as a whole, leaves less space for treatment of the poetry, which is discussed far more descriptively than analytically. It is in the area of analysis, above all, that a comparison of the Fiut and Nathan and Quinn books is odious. But comparison, while unavoidable, is unfair: the books were written with different readers in mind and serve different purposes.

Since they are writing for the American reader, Nathan and Quinn are more concerned than Fiut with situating the development of Miłosz's thought and writing within the context of his life in Europe and, subsequently, the United States. The concern is laudable but the execution faulty. To begin with, the authors know too little about Poland and Polish culture to do justice to that fundamental aspect of Miłosz's development as a writer and thinker. Leonard Nathan has cotranslated (with Miłosz) a number of Miłosz's poems, but since Miłosz has collaborated extensively on translations of his own poetry with native English speakers who do not know Polish, Mr. Nathan may not necessarily be very familiar with Polish or Polish culture. Be that as it may, Nathan and Quinn cannot hold a candle to Fiut in any consideration of the formative role or roles of Polish culture and literature in Miłosz's intellectual and literary development. As a result, their book, while certainly an intelligent critical introduction to Miłosz, conveys a distinct superficiality. This is, at times, apparent in curious ways. When discussing the profound impact of World War II on Miłosz's consciousness and creative writing, Nathan and Quinn speak of Stanisław Ignacy Witkiewicz (Witkacy) as "this ghost [that] haunted all Polish writers during the war and continued to haunt Miłosz long after." The catastrophist "dialogue" with Witkiewicz's hopeless visions is explored for a few pages. Nathan and Quinn have obviously read the prose of Witkacy available in English, although no mention is made of the plays. However, when it comes to the hardly less resonant issue of Miłosz's relationship to the Polish Romantic legacy—which requires a more specialized knowledge—the shallowness is evident. The émigré environment in which Miłosz's *The Issa Valley* arose, the Polish nineteenth-century émigré antecedent tradition, or the figure of Adam Mickiewicz figure not at all in the discussion of the novel in chapter 3 ("Paris"). Mickiewicz does appear later on in a very brief discussion of his poem "The Romantic," which is introduced as epitomizing a

Romantic outlook toward science and formal learning that Miłosz rejected as "defensive." "For Miłosz," write Nathan and Quinn, "the error of romanticism was what he calls its 'insufficient corporeality.' " Thus, the whole intricate matter of Miłosz's relationship to the Polish Romantic heritage is reduced to a single negative observation. Juliusz Słowacki's *Król-Duch* (*King Spirit*), only fragments of which are available in a largely inaccessible English translation, is mentioned on one page within the context of a discussion of Miłosz's attitude toward the Polish past. Miłosz, Nathan and Quinn inform us, "is continually reminded of lines from. . . *King Spirit* that recount the emergence of the Polish spirit in the middle ages and the rekindling of Polish nationalism in the nineteenth century." Nathan and Quinn are certainly under no obligation to explore in depth the ramifications of a work such as Słowacki's *King Spirit* for the complex of Miłosz's attitudes toward the national past. But they would appear to have no direct knowledge of one of the more important works of the Polish Romantic canon and so can bring it up in their discussion of Miłosz's views of Polish history only in a simplistic way. Tellingly, on the only other page on which Słowacki's name is mentioned, it is rendered both times as Slovaki.

As if in compensation for their inability to deal seriously with the Polish aspects of Miłosz's writing, Nathan and Quinn tend to overstress by now well-observed influences outside the Polish context: the Catholic mystic, Simone Weil, whose uncompromising asceticism to a certain extent displaced Witkacian catastrophism; Manichaeanism, a long-standing interest of Miłosz's, which is palmed off a bit too glibly at one point as a critique of "Weilian metaphysics"; the eighteenth-century Swedish scientist and philosopher Emanuel Swedenborg's concepts of heaven and hell, particularly as they shed light on the writings of Dostoevsky; Russian writers and thinkers, including Dostoevsky, on whom Miłosz has lectured at Berkeley and on whom he has written essays, and the philosopher Lev Shestov, with whom Miłosz has shared an interest in Dostoevsky; and the visionary, guru-like "uncle" (actually distant cousin) Oscar de Miłosz, who became (we are made to understand from a variety of sources, not just Nathan and Quinn) a decisive influence in the shaping of the younger Miłosz's views and from whom, Nathan and Quinn inform us, he learned the way out of William Blake's fearsome Land of Ulro.

Since Miłosz has taught and written on Dostoevsky, there can be no question of his fascination with the Russian writer. But, in their effort to relate Miłosz as much as possible to his American environment, Nathan and Quinn go overboard on the parallels between rebellious American students in the 1960s and the young Russian intelligentsia in Dostoevsky's time. The more widespread and virulent American antiestablishment sentiment became, the greater the relevance Miłosz presumably discovered in Dostoevsky. Without actually compromising the depth of Miłosz's interest in the great Russian novelist, Nathan's and Quinn's description of Miłosz's Berkeley lectures on Dostoevsky reads like an acolyte's recounting of the teachings of the Master to the uninitiated. Rather than confront a certain (and perhaps understandable) naïveté in Miłosz's views on American society and culture and on the campus rebellions of the 1960s, as expressed in *Visions from San Francisco Bay* and

elsewhere, Nathan and Quinn stop just short of presenting those views as oracular utterances.

Leonard Nathan's and Arthur Quinn's disposition toward their subject is not appreciably different from that of Aleksander Fiut, and, in a certain sense, represents a weakness shared by both books. Strangers for the most part to Polish culture, Nathan and Quinn happen to be colleagues of Miłosz's at Berkeley and also claim the distinction of having spent much time discussing his poetry with him and of being "thoroughly familiar" with everything he has written. Leonard Nathan, moreover—as noted previously—is a cotranslator of a number of Miłosz's poems, which necessarily brought him into very close contact with the poet. Fiut, too, has spent considerable time talking with Miłosz and, as a sometime visiting professor in the same department as Miłosz, has had the opportunity to acquire a firsthand knowledge of the American setting in which so much of Miłosz's poetry has been written since he joined the University of California faculty in 1960. Both these studies were written, in fact, by men who have been quite close to Miłosz, have acquired an intimate knowledge of his works, and have enjoyed the privilege of spending many hours discussing these works with him. The nature of their authorship is in itself revealing, however unintentionally, and reflects on the status of Miłosz's recognition, at least in this country.

Once secure in his faculty position at the University of California at Berkeley and doubtless concerned about his reputation *as a poet* in his adopted country, Miłosz took on a direct role in the translation of his own poetry. The pattern for this had already been established with the publication in 1965 of *Postwar Polish Poetry*, which Miłosz edited and translated himself. By the time the first slim volume of his own poems in English (*Selected Poems*) appeared in 1973, Miłosz had already been at Berkeley some thirteen years and had published several volumes of poetry and prose in Polish. Yet, to all intents and purposes, his international fame rested on a single political work, *The Captive Mind*. Regarding himself above all as a poet and understandably anxious to alter his image as a political émigré renowned for a widely acclaimed "exposé" of the communist seduction of artists and intellectuals (*The Captive Mind*), Miłosz undertook a program of collaboration on translations of his poetry with Berkeley colleagues and students, as well as with poets elsewhere in this country. Since he knows English well, and given his great concern with language in general, such collaboration made sense.

The positive outcome of such collaboration was the publication in the 1970s of two volumes of Miłosz's poetry in good English translations. Miłosz the poet could at last gain equal footing in the English-speaking world with Miłosz the prose writer (by this time four volumes of prose, together with *The History of Polish Literature* and *Postwar Polish Poetry*, had already been published). The availability of these volumes of poetry in English, along with the prose works, clearly enhanced his candidacy for the 1980 Nobel Prize in literature. The negative side to this collaboration, presided over by Miłosz himself, has been the emergence of a coterie of former students, colleagues, and others involved in the undeniably worthwhile project of making Miłosz the writer as well known as possible in the anglophone community. It is from the ranks of this coterie that not only translations of Miłosz's poetry and prose

have come, but also the only book-length studies of his works in English. Alexander Fiut, too, because of his closeness to Miłosz, his past teaching at Berkeley, his collaboration with Ewa Czarnecka (another longstanding member of the coterie) on a book of conversations with Miłosz (*Conversations with Czeslaw Milosz*, 1987), and, finally and not insignificantly, the publication of the English version of his monograph on Miłosz by the University of California Press, must be seen in this same light. While such proximity to Miłosz hardly diminishes the value of studies such as Fiut's or Nathan's and Quinn's, it does explain a certain lack of distance in these books and, if not precisely a lack of objectivity, a perceptible admiration that precludes virtually any negative criticism. Miłosz is an intellectually interesting if sometimes exceptionally complex and demanding poet whose work brims with ambiguities, contradictions, and no small degree of self-absorption and self-torment. It is splendid that his writing—above all, his poetry—has been made the subject of two intelligent studies that to a great extent complement each other. Critical introductions of this type in English are timely. But these studies, rooted in a considerable personal familiarity with their subject, are in essence adulatory in nature. Both, and especially Fiut's more acute work, are fine for the present, but there is still room for balanced, less reverential studies of Miłosz the poet and prose writer originating outside the magic circle.

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REVIEWS

UKRAINIAN-ENGLISH/ENGLISH-UKRAINIAN DICTIONARY. By *Leonid Hrabovsky*. New York: Hippocrene Books, 1991. 432 pp. $8.95 paper.

Leonid Hrabovsky and Hippocrene Books are to be commended for undertaking the task of producing a usable, concise, and practical Ukrainian-English/English-Ukrainian Dictionary. It is much needed. The result of their undertaking is, unfortunately, completely unsatisfactory. Mr. Hrabovsky's professional and intellectual endeavors are listed in the front matter of the dictionary; none of them indicate special training for such an undertaking, and the dictionary shows it. The appearance of this dictionary should serve as a wakeup call for Ukrainian-language specialists: someone with proper training should have undertaken this much-needed project.

First, about the dictionary. The major reason for its unsatisfactory nature is the seemingly arbitrary manner in which lexical items have been selected for inclusion. In the "Foreword" (which an English-language editor at Hippocrene should have cleaned up but didn't) Hrabovsky does not state an underlying principle by which words were selected. The only hint as to such a principle is the statement: "It [the dictionary] is a useful tool for travelers, business people, and students." If geared toward travelers, then the absence of words like "bill," "bus," "hotel," "taxi," and "toilet" might prove disconcerting, although some comfort might be afforded by the presence of "bikini," "harem," "tatter," and "tingle." In the realm of business, the absence of words like "computer," "contract," "factory," and "plan" are telling; more problematic here—and a general problem throughout—is the systematic failure to provide synonyms in lexical entries to distinguish the different meanings for a word, or at least to differentiate them numerically. For example, the glosses for "plant" are "*n* рослина, саджанець, устаткування," with no differentiation between the first two words and the third; "завод" and "фабрика," which rightly belong to the entry, even in a smaller dictionary, are missing. The lack of further clarification is seen in the gloss of "fan" as "фанат." Even Ukrainian-Americans accustomed to "уболівальник" or "болільник" might think twice about this one. The consequences for a businessman or woman in Ukraine using this dictionary to set up a plant to manufacture fans might be absurd.

There is little that this dictionary can offer students. None of the verbs includes conjugated forms to orient students as to verb types. Even a brief guide to Ukrainian grammar is missing. The pronunciational guides are problematic, as is the choice of neologisms versus more conventional terms. The compiler states in the foreword that he has chosen "literary norms of the contemporary Ukrainian language of the central region," which is understandable, but given the aggressive move that Lviv has taken to stimulate student exchanges in the United States, any serious dictionary geared toward American students should make an attempt to address the lexical differences between Lviv/Galician Ukrainian and Kiev/Central-Dnieper Ukrainian.

The number of entries (approximately 3,600 Ukrainian entries and 4,400 English entries) is also limiting for anyone other than a first-year student. One final peeve: the absence of "український" or "україн-ець/-ка" from the Ukrainian-English section.

Finally, the question arises whether or not this dictionary might be useful for Ukrainians who have recently arrived in the United States. Mr. Hrabovsky says that his pronunciation guides have been geared specifically to American English. I would have transcribed about 40 percent of the entries that I analyzed differently, but I believe that a non-English speaker using Hrabovsky's transcriptions would be understood, though often corrected. Aside from that, all of the drawbacks that apply to the English-Ukrainian section apply equally to the Ukrainian-English section. The only recommendation for this dictionary is its convenient size. But that is a small recommendation in the face of its many drawbacks.

In conclusion, I hope that the publication of this dictionary forces us to realize that the need for a new Ukrainian-English/English-Ukrainian dictionary should be ignored no longer. The problems with Podvesko and Andrusyshen are well known, and the anachronisms there continue to grow each day. Oxford University Press's foreign language dictionaries would serve as an admirable example for such a new dictionary.

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FILOLOGIA E LETTERATURA NEI PAESI SLAVI. STUDI IN ONORE DI SANTE GRACIOTTI. Edited by *G. Brogi Bercoff, M. Capaldo, J. Jerkov-Capaldo*, and *E. Sgambati*. Rome: Carucci Editore, 1990. 966 pp.

It is never an easy task to review a Festschrift, and this book is no exception, since it contains no less than seventy-nine contributions, written in many cases by some of the most outstanding scholars in Slavic studies, on many different subjects, and in eleven different languages, ranging from Russian and English to French, German, Bulgarian, Polish, Italian, Ukrainian, Czech, Croatian, and even Latin. This diversity reflects not only the extremely numerous contacts which Sante Graciotti has had with many personalities from different countries, but also the wide range of interests of his own research activity. He already held a doctoral degree in Italian literature, with a sound background in classical and theological studies, when he began to devote himself to the Slavic languages and cultures. As is evident from the list of publications presented at the beginning of the volume, the relationship of Italian and Latin (Medieval and Renaissance) culture with the literatures of Slavic peoples (Poles and Croatians primarily) has always been a focus of Graciotti's research, although he dedicated himself to problems of the Eastern Slavic tradition as well. The writings presented by the authors of this Festschrift reflect this large scope of

interests and, at the same time, his peculiar philological approach, based on the precise analysis of each text within the context of its linguistic, historical, and cultural problems.

The first section of the volume is dedicated to Old Church Slavonic and medieval philology. A. Djurova and V. Pucko discuss problems of miniatures, in the Russian manuscripts of the Roman libraries and in the "Čudov" Psalter, respectively. Specifical linguistic problems are dealt with in the contributions of A. Davidov (who analyzes twenty-eight compound words from the "Šestodnev" of Ioann Ekzarx of Bulgaria and compares them with the Greek and OCS tradition), of L. Moszyński (on the Cyrillo-Methodian translation of the Greek construction "Pater ēmōn o en tois ouranois"), and I. Toth (neuter nouns in -es in Old Russian manuscripts). Codicology is represented by I. C. Tarnanidis with the description of a Glagolitic Canon to SS. Peter and Paul, from Sinai, by A. Nazor on an apocryphal Glagolitic text on Abraham's death, and by M. Matejć with an Office for S. Sava, also from Sinai. F. V. Mareš brings evidence of the diffusion of Cyrillo-Methodian toponyms, mainly in Moravia, and of their connection with the dynasty of the Slavnikids, the rivals of the Premislids. Through a multifaceted analysis (paleographical, philological, literary, and historical) O. Pritsak "revisits" the expression "xodina" in the Igor' Tale, and offers a more precise interpretation ("k xoti syna") of a passage he had already tried to emend in a previous paper. V. Kyas gives the text and a synthetic analysis of the "Prologue" to the first Czech translation of the Bible, from the age of Charles IV. The "Vision of St. Paul" in Romanian and Bulgarian manuscripts is the subject of the refined and subtle philological observations of the eminent scholar E. Turdeanu.

One wonders why the section entitled "Cirillometodiana" is located at the end of the volume, since it would appear more linked to the first section (which also contains the "Cyrillo-Methodian" paper by Mareš). If we do not want to believe in the hypothesis of an odd "technical," editorial reason, we could explain this choice of the editors by the fact that the papers of this section, though all related to Cyrillo-Methodian problems, are rather heterogenous. Two of them are strictly philological: V. Peri, a well-known scholar of Byzantine studies from the Vatican Library, gives precise interpretations for two terms of "Vita Methodii" ("amermniino" and "rim'sky") and for the expression "Ex parte missas" of "Conversio Bagoariorum et Carantanorum"; in M. Capaldo's sophisticated analysis of the controversial inscription on Solomon's Chalice in "Vita Constantini," the text in the hagiographical work is compared with other extant sources and leads to a new calculation of the date of the prophecy (1019 instead of 909). Other works of this section deal with broader cultural and historical problems: B. Koneski makes important observations on the fifteenth-century "Solunska legenda," which presents traces of a contamination of Cyril the Philosopher with Cyril from Aleksandria and is connected, in his opinion, with unionist milieus from Ukraine or from Mt. Athos; S. Wollman applies to the poetics of the Cyrillo-Methodian tradition his profound knowledge of theory and history of literature, while J. Pogačnik focuses on the historical and sociological aspects of the mission of the two brothers from Salonica.

The richest part of the book is dedicated to Polish literature and culture. Subjects range from the Middle Ages until the twentieth century (the latter being represented by J. Heistein's paper on the futurist Bruno Jasieński), with a major emphasis on the Renaissance and Enlightenment, the periods to which S. Graciotti himself dedicated the greatest part of his investigations. C. Backvis uses his refined philological skills and solid classical background to illuminate the well-known, controversial passage on the "targ" of Frydrusz from M. Sęp-Szarzyński's "Pieśń VI." A rigorous philological methodology also guides L. Marinelli, who stresses the value of an intuition of Bohomolec' concerning the correct editing of one verse in Kochanowski's "Treny" (II, 26). P. Buchwald-Pelcowa analyzes two variants in the editions of Kochanowski's "Elegies" and "Foricoenia." The papers by J. Pelc and B. Otwinowska are devoted to the poet of Czarnolas as the author of "Fraszki" and as a sensitive personality who acted in and reacted to the political ideas of his time. Contributions to a better knowledge of political ideology and literature are made by H. Rothe, who traces the origin (back to, among others, the Bible) and the development of the topical power formula "a mari ad mare," and by E. Sgambati's precise analysis of some political terms used in Renaissance Poland.

The Italian and European background plays a major role in the other papers devoted to Polish culture. Many peoples have claimed the right to the heritage of Rome: a less known, but not less interesting, cultural phenomenon is the identification of Cracow with Rome, presented by T. Ulewicz. The tradition of the "Anno Santo" is investigated by A. Sajkowski: one more chapter to be added to the many works the scholar has written on Poles traveling abroad and on their mentality. T. Michałowska makes a courageous and erudite attempt to reconstruct some connections of the Medieval chant "Dusza z ciała wyleciała" with the Latin, patristic and apocryphal, tradition. The delicate balance between the weight of Italian literature and the original elaboration in Polish poetry is well represented in the articles by M. Bokszczanin (on the connection between Pontanus, Grochowski, and the "kolędy" of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries), by J. Śląski (on Jan Smolik), by W. Roszkowska (on the first translation of B. Guarini's "Pastor Fido"), and by A. M. Raffo (on Morsztyn's "Amintas"). Using the example of the knowledge of the Italian poet M. Cesarotti and of his "Ossianism" by W. Ostrowski, P. Marchesani shows that French influences were not exclusive for the developement of Polish Illuminism and Pre-Romanticism and that international connections were strongly interwoven. Poland's connections to the cultures of other European countries are discussed by H. Dziechcińska ("Les deux relations que fit J. Sobieski de ses voyages en Europe"), T. Kostkiewiczowa ("I. Krasicki o książkach"), M. Klimowicz (I. Krasicki and Rabelais), W. Edgerton ("I. Krasicki and W. Penn"), Z. Libera ("Obraz Włoch w oczach Pamiętnika Historyczno-Politycznego"). Quite original is the theme of M. Ciccarini's paper on the image of the Turks in B. Georgijević. R. Kaleta publishes unknown letters by St. Konarski. Three papers focus on Polish linguistics: M. Enrietti's on Polish and Common Slavic, L. Gebert's on the language of P. Skarga, and H. Leeming's, which considers Italian loanwords in sixteenth-century Polish.

A number of papers in this book are devoted to the influences or connections between Slavic and Italian culture. Some of them have a historical character, as, for example, the ones by A. Tamborra on the Bulgarian Catholic P. Parčević, D. Caccamo on the brothers Magni in Bohemia, K. Prijatelj on the painter Sebastiano Devita, and C. Vasoli on the Croatian J. Dragišić. G. Brogi Bercoff presents J. S. Assemani, the discoverer of the famous Glagolitic Codex, as the author of a voluminous history of the liturgical calendars and as an ideologist of the church union. S. Bonazza publishes some letters of P. J. Šafařík, and J. Křesálková reviews the impact of Pirandello on Czech culture.

Russian literature is also represented in its relationship to Italian culture by the considerations of D. S. Lixačev on Sergij of Radonež and Francis of Assisi and by R. Xlodovskij's article on Goldoni and Stanislavskij. The other papers are most diversified as to subject and methodology. Muscovite literature is represented by the problem of "Judaizers" and Hebrew culture (D. Cavaion) and by the idea of the continuity of the Moscow-Third Rome theory from the sixteenth century to Peter I. In my opinion, the best articles in this section are G. Dell'Agata's study on the Russian translation of M. Orbini's "Regno degli Slavi" and I. Serman's "Carev kabak i ego otraženie v russkom literaturnom tvorčestve 17 stoletija." However, specialists in other areas will find interesting observations by well-known scholars of several countries: on Dostoevskij (J. Catteau), on Old Believers' calculations, Old Believers' Antichrist interpretations, and a possible echo from Dante (C. De Michelis), on Pushkin's "André Chénier" (V. Strada), on P. Florenskij (N. Kauchtschischwili), on Moscow's intellectual life during the period of Romanticism (J. Lothe), on Alexandr Turgenev (G. Ziegengeist). A. van Holk makes use of a sophisticated textual-linguistic methodology to unveil the "deep structure" of Lermontov's character Pechorin.

Other Slavic cultures are not neglected. G. Dierna, M. Kopecký, and A. Wildová Tosi deal with J. A. Komenský and Czech Baroque poetry; T. Klaniczay and P. Sárközy investigate some aspects of Hungaro-Slavic relationships in the Renaissance and Enlightenment; on Croatian literature and language the reader will find articles concerning M. Begović (A. Flaker), I. Andrić (D. Nedeljković), L. Dolce (M. Zorić), and the tradition of B. Castiglione in Ragusa (F. Čale). Such peculiar aspects of Bulgarian culture as the local Catholic traditions are the object of the papers by P. Dinekov and J. Jerkov-Capaldo, while G. Dimov presents broad considerations on Slavic-Bulgarian literary connections. A paper by F. S. Perillo is devoted to some Slavic toponyms in Southern Italy. A. E. Tachiaos focuses on the "unconventional reaction to Kievan theology" of P. Velyčkovs'kyj and H. Skovoroda. Slovak literature is represented by A. McMillin with a fresh analysis of Z. Biadula's prose. We will close this review by mentioning the works of N. Tolstoj and D. Worth, who discuss two difficult issues in folklore, and V. Rusanivs'kyj, who deals with problems of stylistics and linguistics in Ukrainian.

It is not possible to give more details here. This volume shares with many other Festschrift volumes that have been published in recent years both the advantages and the difficulties inherent in a collection of such a broad scope of subjects and specialists. The quality of paper and the general presentation is good, in spite of a certain

amount of printing errors: but this, too, is a common plague in our time! What makes this volume valuable is the good—in many cases excellent—quality of the papers, most of which are dedicated to serious and original investigation, generally far from a merely "celebratory" and "occasional" writing of already known subjects, and which, in some cases, offer the publication of previously unknown texts from medieval and modern literature. For these reasons, the volume should be present in all the major Slavic libraries.

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THE ICON, IMAGE OF THE INVISIBLE: ELEMENTS OF THEOLOGY, AESTHETICS, AND TECHNIQUE. By *Egon Sendler*. Trans. by *Steven Bigham*. Redondo Beach, California: Oakwood Publications. 1988. v, 288 pp. + 76 illust., 36 color plates.

The last five years have witnessed a spate of publications designed to introduce the Eastern Orthodox icon to the nonspecialist reader. From weighty and expensive albums to modest booklets, these works testify to an enduring interest in the holy image and its place in Eastern Orthodox spirituality. The 1988 translation of Egon Sendler's *L'Icône, image de l'invisible...* (1981) is thus timely, part of a larger attempt in the United States and Europe to reintroduce the icon, to clarify its spiritual function and set right the misconceptions that many Westerners have inherited from uninformed and prejudiced witnesses to Orthodox life over the centuries. The text is generously supplied with seventy-six black and white illustrations and figures and thirty-six colored plates. Nearly all represent panel painting; Sendler's book in general does not address the special problems and techniques of fresco painting, relief sculpture, and carving.

The various elements of iconography are parts of a comprehensive spiritual unity for Sendler: the dimensions of scientific knowledge, artistic value, and theological vision must always be kept in mind when one deals with the icon. Accordingly, he divides the book into three parts: 1) the genesis and theology of the icon; 2) aesthetic elements; and 3) the technical aspects of icons.

In the first five chapters (Part 1), Sendler traces the history of the religious image from its Jewish and early Christian background through the defeat of Iconoclasm. The landmark Byzantine councils and the major participants are all given their due, with a number of textual citations to help anchor the positions of the Iconodules, most notably Saint Germanus, patriarch of Constantinople, and Saint John of Damascus. Sendler provides a brief overview of Byzantine society and correlates the Orthodox image and liturgy before turning to a more detailed account of the icon itself. He presents the iconographic typology based on four model types introduced by Onasch (1968): the panegyric, the epic, the dramatic, and the theological. The end of Part 1 is devoted to the inductive Aristotelian and deductive Neoplatonic approaches to an understanding of the holy image and its relationship to the divine.

In Part 2 (six chapters) Sendler begins with the findings of Tits, Gusev, Raushenberg, and Zhegin to introduce the geometrical principles underlying the structure of the image, the interaction of the circle, triangle, cross, and grid in determining proportion and position within the frame. He devotes considerable space to perspective, contrasting the more familiar linear and isometric perspectives with Byzantine inverted perspective, according to which the vanishing point or points of logically parallel lines are to be located in the eye of the beholder and not the pictorial horizon of the picture plane. When discussing various theoretical approaches to inverted perspective, Sendler underscores the artist's apparent attempt to represent ideas, not nature. Coverage of the aesthetic elements of the icon concludes with a general account of color and light symbolism in icon painting and the profound influence of the works of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite in the Byzantine formulation.

The four chapters that comprise Part 3 seem primarily intended for contemporary icon painters. The brief descriptions of physical icon construction soon give way to technical instructions and hints at achieving the best results with various glues, grounds, varnishes, and color sources. The author reviews the stages of icon painting (first layer, redrawing, highlighting, finishing process, varnishing), provides a chart of the most common Greek and Slavonic alphabet styles and abbreviations, and concludes the final part with notes on the color palette and painting technique.

Sendler's book is remarkable for its broad approach to the icon. There are a number of introductions that present a much more detailed and nuanced history of the image and its theology in Eastern thought (e.g., Belting 1990, Barasch 1992), but none since Onasch (1968) explicates as many of the structural and physical aspects of the icon so frequently ignored. Nonetheless, the book would be improved with the inclusion of a detailed section on the cosmic organization of Byzantine church decoration (cf. Demus 1948), the development and meaning of the Orthodox iconostasis, and a characterization of the icons of the major feasts and the saints of the Eastern Church (cf. Ouspensky and Lossky 1982). Furthermore, although most of the images presented and discussed are Russian, Sendler is silent on the role of the icon in Slavic Orthodoxy in general, leaving the naïve reader with the erroneous identification of Byzantine and Russian social, political, and religious structures. This same reader would profit from the addition of maps of the Byzantine world, a glossary of names and technical terms, and a historical and cultural chronology. The inclusion of images other than Greek and Russian would also be helpful, along with a general upgrading of the quality of the reproductions.

With few exceptions Bigham's translation from the French is fluid and exact. The original *la perspective inversée*, for example, is better translated *inverted* or *inverse perspective* than Bigham's *inversed perspective*. The French *La cène* should be rendered *The Last Supper*, not *The Mystical Supper*. Transliteration of Russian names ought to be in an English or American system, instead of the French, thus *Ushakov* or *Ušakov*, not *Uchakov*; *Zhegin* or *Žegin*, not *Zheguine*. Some of the Russian-language entries in footnotes and the bibliography are badly mangled and inconsistently transliterated, e.g., *Teofan, real'novo, živopis'novo, postroenia, iazyk* instead of correct or consistent *Feofan, real'nogo, živopisnogo, postroenija, jazyk*. Epiphanius the Wise (p. 181) becomes Epiphane Premoudri (p. 193), in keeping

with the original French text, but only the former merits an index reference, leaving the uninitiated to register two different personages. Despite these problems, the translation of Sendler's book is a welcome addition to the growing body of introductory material on the the Eastern Orthodox icon, its structure, function, and historical development.

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SKARBY DAVN'OHO UKRAJINS'KOHO MYSTECTVA. RELIHIJNE MYSTECTVO XVI–XVIII STOLIT'. TREASURES OF EARLY UKRAINIAN ART: RELIGIOUS ART OF THE 16TH–18TH CENTURIES. By *Stefanija Hnatenko*. Suppl. Engl. trans. by *Maria Skorups'ka*. New York: The Ukrainian Museum, 1989. 44 pp. + 40 plates.

As part of a continuing program to acquaint the general public with artifacts of Ukrainian culture, the Ukrainian Museum in New York held an exhibition in 1989 featuring Ukrainian iconostases, individual icons, manuscripts and early printed books from the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries. The publication under review provides a factual and interpretive overview of the exhibition with background information and selected illustrations of the works displayed, all of which were lent by private individuals and institutions in the United States and Canada. The icons and iconostases were presented through photographs and twenty-two colored transparencies. The written and printed materials included twenty-one printed books (sixteenth–eighteenth centuries) and, somewhat incongruously, two folios from a Galician manuscript attributed to the twelfth century (Gospels of Luke and John), antedating the time period of the exhibition by some four centuries. Stefanija Hnatenko's catalog consists of a brief introduction, two separate sections on the

visual and verbal components of the exhibition, and entries for all items, including ecclesiastical paraphernalia (crosses and textiles). In this review I will briefly comment on specific items featured in the exhibition before turning to serious matters concerning Hnatenko's scholarly analysis.

The section on visual art focuses on three rare iconostases that have apparently survived intact from the time of their creation. The text (p. 15) mentions the controversy over the dating of the iconostasis of the Church of Saint Paraskeva-Pjatnycja in Lviv, either to the late sixteenth–early seventeenth centuries or to 1644–1645. Those of the Church of the Dormition in Žovtanci (near Lviv) and the Church of the Holy Spirit in Rohatyn are dated to 1638 and 1650, respectively.[1] The three are interesting studies in contrast, stylistically as well as thematically. The Lviv iconostasis embodies Renaissance restraint as opposed to the more definitively Baroque exuberance of those from Žovtanci and Rohatyn, the former with two central spiraling columns reminiscent of Bernini's *baldacchino* in St. Peter's Cathedral in Rome. The royal doors of all three iconostases are decorated with stylized, intertwined grapevines containing pear-shaped or ovaloid insets of the Annunciation and the four Evangelists, features associated with Mannerism and the Baroque.

Although we have no early Ukrainian icon screens, the Lviv and Rohatyn iconostases show interesting differences from most major Russian models. The Deësis is compacted into a single, central composition with Christ flanked by the Mother of God and John the Forerunner, and portraits of the Archangels Michael and Gabriel on either side of Christ's head. By freeing up spaces on either side of the Savior, the artist has been able to include all twelve Apostles (customarily the only Apostles depicted in a Russian Deësis tier are Saints Peter and Paul). Consequently, the Doctors of the Eastern Church are not represented. Of particular interest in the Lviv iconostasis is the distinctive tier devoted to individual scenes of Christ's passion, all but one apparently painted in the restrained style of the sixteenth century, evidence that seems to support the earlier dating of the iconostasis. The one exception depicts Christ before the high priest Annas, who is dressed in the vestments of a Catholic archbishop, probably meant to be Jan Solikovs'kyj. According to the catalog (p. 17) the icon is easily read as an anti-Catholic statement stemming from religious turmoil in Ukraine following the Union of Brest in 1596.

The style in many of the Žovtanci and Rohatyn icons is later than what we see in the Lviv icons, more naturalistic, influenced by Western models. Nonetheless the images from Lviv are not without innovation. The Entry into Jerusalem is noteworthy not only for its fine draftsmanship and use of white highlights, but also for its aggressive depiction of Christ riding on the back of the ass toward the gates of Jerusalem with both hands outstretched to encounter the elders of the city. The Baptism of Christ has the Savior modestly wrapped in a towel, a departure from the

[1] In 1767 the Žovtanci iconostasis was transferred to the village of Velyki Hrybovyči, at first to a wooden church and then, in 1897, to a stone church (V. A. Osvijčuk, *Ukrajins'ke mystectvo druhoji polovyny XVI–peršoji polovyny XVII st. Humanistyčni ta vyzvol'ni ideji* [Kiev, 1985], p. 137).

traditional naked Christ standing in the midst of the River Jordan.

The second section presents a brief account of the history of books on Ukrainian territory, from the Ostromir Gospelbook of 1056–1057 to Lessons for Sundays and holidays printed at the Počajiv Monastery in 1794. Among the items displayed at the exhibition were a copy of the Ostrih Bible from 1581, Pamvo Berynda's *Leksykon slavenorosskyi* of 1653 (2nd ed.), and various liturgical books from the press of the Stauropegian Brotherhood dated between 1644 and 1772.

There are places in the text that require correction and addition. In part 1, *Vvedenija do xramu*, the Presentation of the Mother of God in the Temple (p. 3), is incorrectly translated as the Presentation of Christ in the Temple (*Stritennja*). The Vladimir Mother of God (p. 8) is also known as the Vyšhorod Mother of God, in reference to the first location of the famous icon at the palace of Jurij Dolgorukij outside of Kiev. The iconostasis of the Church of the Dormition in Žovtanci is dated 1638, not 1648 (pp. 14–15) or 1637 (p. 21). The beating of Christ is customarily called the Flagellation, not the Flogging (p. 16). The apostle Simon (*Symeon*) is incorrectly identified as Samuel (p. 18). In part 2, Slavic *Časoslov* is better translated *Horologion* (Book of Hours) rather than *Anthologion* (p. 26), a more general term. The oldest manuscript of the *Tale of Bygone Years* is not from the fifteenth century (p. 26) but the fourteenth: the Laurentian copy of 1377. A mistranslation (pp. 26–28) identifies the Radziwiłł copy (late 15th c.) as containing the oldest descriptions of the life of the court, the prince's retinue, and the cities, whereas the Ukrainian text correctly refers to oldest *illustrations*, viz. miniatures. Concerning the earliest written language in Rus', all books in Kievan Rus' were not initially written in the Old Church Slavonic language used by Saints Cyril and Methodius (p. 28); we have no manuscripts from the ninth century and cannot be certain of the language's precise form. Moreover, the ecclesiastical language of the Orthodox Slavs already reflects regional differences in the earliest texts extant (late tenth?–eleventh centuries). The eleventh-century Ostromir Gospelbook, for example, the oldest dated East Slavic manuscript, contains patently East Slavic linguistic features and is better described as being written in Rusian Church Slavonic.

Having provided a brief overview of the exhibition catalog, I must report that significant portions of Hnatenko's text have been appropriated from the published materials of other scholars without proper attribution. A few examples will suffice to illustrate this very serious problem.

Hnatenko cites *Ukrajins'kyi seredn'ovičnyj žyvopys* by Hryhorii Lohvyn et al. (Kiev, 1976) on one occasion, to support the claim that few icons survived from the early period of Kievan Rus', fifteen in all, including such well-known works as the Vladimir Mother of God, the Great Panagia, and the Golden-haired Angel (p. 9). Three paragraphs later, she discusses the technical aspects of the icon without indicating her source of information:

Hnatenko, pp. 9–10

Ікона має свою технологію: її малювали на липових дошках, які, для міцности склеювали і скріплювали на торцях шпугами. В заглибленні (ковчезі) розміщували основну композицію. На дошку наклеювали тканину-паволоку, щоб міцніший був зв'язок із ґрунтом. Перехід від ковчега до полів мав назву лузги. Відповідно до ґравійованого рисунка (граф'ї), який наносили на ще мокрий ґрунт, ікону малювали яєчною темперою. Закінчену ікону покривали оліфою.

Lohvyn et al., p. 5

Ікона як станковий вид малярства мала свою технологію. На Русі ікони малювали переважно на липових дошках, які для тривкості склеювали з кількох частин і закріплювали на торцях шпугами. На лицевому боці, в заглибленні (ковчезі) розміщували основне зображення, облямоване полями. Перехід від ковчега до полів мав назву лузги. На дошку наклеювали стару тканину (паволоку), щоб міцніший був зв'язок із гіпсовим чи крейдяним ґрунтом (левкасом), на якому малювали яєчною темперою відповідно до гравійованого рисунка (граф'ї), нанесеного попередньо по ще мокрому ґрунту. Закінчену ікону покривали оліфою.

Hnatenko borrows extensively from Volodymyr Osvijčuk's *Ukrajins'ke mystectvo druhoji polovyny XVI–peršoji polovyny XVII st.* (see fn. 1 above), usually without attribution, so that the reader cannot distinguish his ideas from hers. The excerpt below, for example, patently based on his introductory commentary, does not mention his name:

Hnatenko, p. 13

Немає сумніву, що на розвиток української культури великий вплив мав европейський ренесанс. Але не менш важливим було й те, що джерела античного мистецтва, які живили епоху ренесансу в Европі, проникли на наші землі через Візантію набагато раніше і підносили творчу думку в багатьох ділянках життя. Про це читаємо в З. Копистенського „Палінодії": „для наук в краї німецькії удаємося, где як своє власноє знаходим от греков на час короткий поверенноє отбираємо, с расторопностью єднак сметьє откидуємо, а золото виймуємо."

Osvijčuk, p. 6

Вплив європейської ренесансної культури на українське мистецтво є фактом незаперечним. Джерела античної мудрості й мистецтва, які живили ренесансну Європу, набагато раніше через Візантію проникали на Русь, підносячи і підтримуючи творчу думку в багатьох ділянках духовного життя. Про це яскраво сказав З. Копистенський на сторінках „Палінодії": „...для наук в краи немецкие удаемося, где як своє власное знаходим, от греков на час короткий поверенноє отбираємо, с расторопностью єднак сметье откидуемо, а золото выймуемо."

Hnatenko's actual references to Osvijčuk's work can be misleading. In her treatment of the iconostasis from the Church of Saint Paraskeva-Pjatnycja in Lviv, for example, she reviews the controversy over dating and authorship. The entire discussion and much of its language are based on Osvijčuk, pages 137–42, but her footnote cites only Holubec', the first scholar to suggest the earlier dating. The reference is identical to the one in Osvijčuk's book (p. 137, fn. 61):

Hnatenko, p. 15

М. Голубець перший висунув версію датування кінцем XVI століття.* Дослідники історії та мистецтва відносили його до середини XVII ст. М. Голубець звернув увагу на чіткість ренесансної архітектоніки, стиль живописної манери і різьби, яка відповідає художнім канонам початку XVII ст. Він припускав, що іконостас створювався ще для старої церкви св. Параскеви П'ятниці, про яку є згадка під 1607 р.

* fn. 13 = Holubec' citation

Osvijčuk, p. 137

Але висувалась інша версія. Першим, хто рішуче відніс цю пам'ятку до межі XVI–XVII ст., був М. Голубець. Він правильно звернув увагу на чіткість ренесансної архітектоніки і стиль живопису та різьби, відповідних художнім канонам початку XVII ст., припускаючи, що іконостас створювався ще для старої „крилошанської" церкви св. Параскеви П'ятниці, про яку є згадка під 1607 р.*

* fn. 61 = Holubec' citation

Two paragraphs later she credits Osvijčuk with a second line of argumentation helpful in dating the iconostasis: the presence of the Passion cycle and the style of the painting thereof (p. 15), but her footnote refers the reader to page 137 instead of the correct page 138. From this point on the reader will have a difficult time determining the source of the ideas advanced—Hnatenko or Osvijčuk—although the language used is clearly patterned on his text (pp. 138–42). It turns out that it is Osvijčuk (p. 138), not Hnatenko, who has identified the high priest Annas as Jan Solikovs'kyj in the Lviv Passion scene noted earlier.

When Hnatenko switches to the topic of authorship (p. 17), she informs the reader that the painting style represented throughout the Lviv iconostasis indicates the work of two equally talented masters of different generations. The statement is without footnote, but the idea of two authors—one elder, one younger—based on stylistic considerations actually belongs to Osvijčuk (pp. 139–42). As for their identities, seven paragraphs later Hnatenko notes the similarity between the styles of the younger author and Fedir Sen'kovyč, one of the authors of the Žovtanci iconostasis, and assumes them to be one and the same person. Whose idea is this? At the end of this seventh paragraph we learn that certain Lviv art historians are inclined to claim Fedir Sen'kovyč as the younger author of the Lviv iconostasis. The accompanying footnote (fn. 15, p. 24) informs us that a Lviv art historian, V. Vujcyk, has identified the signature of a master Fedir on two of the icons from the Žovtanci iconostasis. Consequently, the Lviv art scholar V. Osvijčuk has studied master Fedir's style and has "expressed the conjecture in his lectures that the younger author of the St. Paraskeva [Lviv—MSF] iconostasis was Fedir Sen'kovych." There is no direct reference to pages 141–42 of Osvijčuk's book where this view is clearly stated. Without his original text, the reader might very well think that the theory of two authors and the identification of the younger are the work of Stefanija Hnatenko, with corroborating evidence provided by Vujcyk and Osvijčuk.

A concluding paragraph in this section, also without footnote, further complicates the picture. Hnatenko seeks to identify the elder author of the Lviv iconostasis as well: Lavrentij Puxala, the teacher of Fedir Sen'kovyč. An original idea, surely, but once again not Hnatenko's; Osvijčuk had already expressed his opinion on this issue four years earlier (p. 141) but has received no credit for his effort. Without

attribution, this conjecture would seem to belong to Hnatenko alone.

Given these examples (and many more could be cited), I am obliged to state that Hnatenko has seriously misled the reader by presenting without proper credit the thoughts and ideas of other scholars in an identical rendering or close paraphrase of their very own idiom. That fact casts an unfortunate shadow on the catalog and, indirectly, on the good work of the Ukrainian Museum.

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FOLKLORE FOR STALIN: RUSSIAN FOLKLORE AND PSEUDOFOLKLORE OF THE STALIN ERA. By *Frank J. Miller*. Foreword by *William E. Harkins*. Armonk, New York and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1990. xiv, 192 pp. $39.95.

Picture Lenin and Stalin fighting off their enemies with magic swords or Red Army soldiers flying on magic carpets. These are among the images from Soviet pseudofolklore described by Frank J. Miller in his *Folklore for Stalin: Russian Folklore and Pseudofolklore of the Stalin Era*. The cult of specifically Russian folklore was, William E. Harkins suggests in his foreword, hegemonic during much of the period. It affected dance and popular music as well as film. Rather than an expression of popular creativity, however, it was largely the product of individual talents. In his study, Miller demonstrates, for the first time, how a folklore "cottage industry" was established to disseminate Party propaganda throughout the Soviet Empire in the 1930s and how scholars collaborated in this endeavor.

Miller begins with an overview of folklore research and collection from the seventeenth century onward. Paradoxically, while folk traditions were declining in popular appeal by the Revolution of 1917, folklore had become a thriving field of inquiry among scholars. By 1934, Harkins points out, the leading folklorist, Iurii Sokolov, argued that Russian folklore was a branch of literary scholarship and a weapon of class conflict. In that same year Maxim Gorky, praising the artistry found in folklore, claimed that it drew its inspiration from "concrete life" rather than from mythic or religious notions and expressed the true aspirations of the masses. Folklorists, Miller shows, were henceforth assured of official support for their work. By 1937 this support involved direct Party supervision. Not only were traditional genres reinterpreted by scholars to accord with Marxist-Leninist dogma, but even the collecting of folklore was determined by ideological criteria. A new folklore began to appear. It eulogized Lenin, Stalin, and the October Revolution and was disseminated in newspapers and journals as well as through performances. The best known performer, Marfa Kriukova, coined the term *novina* to distinguish her work from the traditional *starina*. In this pseudofolklore created by individuals versed in traditional genres, Lenin and Stalin were given the traits of *bylina* figures, *bogatyry* or knights. Other heroes, like Chapaev, were seen as martyrs and saints who had sacrificed their lives for the motherland. The authors of these "epics" had acquired much of their

craft from books rather than from contact with "the masses." They were regarded officially as literary artists on par with other writers.

In his second chapter on the *noviny* and funeral laments, Miller proceeds with a textual analysis of the work of Kriukova and other, lesser-known performers. In his reading he isolates the ways in which traditional imagery and versification are used to portray the "heroics" of Soviet history. He goes on to describe the arrogation of funeral laments for propagandistic purposes but points out that this tradition did, in fact, experience a limited though genuine revival in North Russia during the Second World War—each lament containing a curse on Hitler and a "patriotic maternal exhortation" (p. 72).

The chapter on Soviet tales deals with the work of I. F. Kovalev, G. I. Sorokovikov, and others, who, like the authors of the *noviny*, often displayed a real talent in their depiction of Party leaders—notably Stalin—as traditional heroes.

Miller's final chapter on the fate of pseudofolklore is focused on the role folklorists played as collaborators as well as resisters in the process of undermining their field. Indeed, even before the death of Stalin, folklorists were showing signs of discomfort with the state of scholarship. The *noviny* and tales were being examined for their artistic merit and sometimes criticized for their inauthenticity. The publication of *Studies in Russian Folklore of the Soviet Period*, which had been compiled a year before Stalin's death and which had focused on the representation of the dictator as hero, became, after 1953, the focus of discontent. Such prominent scholars as V. S. Bakhtin, E. V. Pomerantseva, A. N. Nechaev, and N. Rybakova wrote critical essays. Some even admitted to their role in the perpetration of pseudofolklore. In the 1960s V. Ia. Propp led the reaction to officially sanctioned views of folklore. However, as Miller points out, folklorists continued to publish *noviny* and Soviet tales in anthologies dating from the Brezhnev era. Furthermore, he concludes, if the image of Stalin has been de-emphasized and new theories have been allowed to emerge, the goals of folklore to the present have not differed markedly from those of the 1930s: the promotion of loyalty to the country, Lenin, and the Party.

Miller's three indexes contain useful synopses of *noviny* and Soviet tales discussed in the body of the text. The last index reproduces a few well-chosen texts in full.

Miller's study, an outgrowth of his Ph.D. dissertation, is solidly researched, well organized, and clearly written. It provides the English-speaking reader with a glimpse into yet another aspect of Party control over the peoples of the Soviet Union during the Stalin era. However, because Miller tends to describe rather than analyze the role of myth and folklore in popular life prior to the 1917 Revolution, the reader is left to wonder what has been the reaction to and the effect of this patronizing pseudofolklore—particularly in light of the waning interest in folk traditions on the part of an increasingly urbanized and literate population.

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RUSSIA OBSERVED: COLLECTED ESSAYS ON RUSSIAN AND SOVIET HISTORY. By *Richard Pipes*. Boulder, San Francisco, and London: Westview Press, 1989. 240 pp. $34.95.

As a rule, American publishers do not like to put out collections of previously published articles by scholars. This is a pity for two reasons: first, given the parlous state of even good university libraries, the original publication, more often than not, is hard to locate. Second, when gathered between two covers, the articles demonstrate not only the scholarly development of their author but also afford glimpses into his workshop. Fortunately, Westview Press overcame this reluctance and republished ten important articles from the pen of Richard Pipes, whose major efforts have been a ground-breaking history of the *Formation of the Soviet Union*, a challenging interpretation of *Russia under the Old Regime*, a biography of *Peter Struve*, and the impressive *Russian Revolution*.

The volume under review shows the range of Professor Pipes's scholarly interests: from the Muscovite to the Soviet periods; from Great Russia to the non-Russian frontier territories. It also documents the historian's duty to subject all evidence to critical examination—which also means paying close attention to the vocabulary used in the sources and its implications for a better knowledge and understanding of those ideas that have shaped political decisions or responses in the past. Quite naturally, such a methodological orientation leads to critical discussions of opinions held by earlier historians, so that the articles also make a contribution to the historiography of their subject matter.

Far from being occasional pieces or extended notes on some trivial issues that found no place in a major monograph, the articles in this collection are interesting and self-contained explorations. They may be arranged in several broad topical groups. The first deals primarily with Russian domestic politics and political ideas. The introduction to a republication of Giles Fletcher's classic description of late sixteenth-century Muscovy, *Of the Russe Commonwealth* (1966), provides a useful *tour d'horizon* of Russian historiography of foreign travelers' accounts and a concise statement of the major features of Ivan the Terrible's realm. Much more original, even pathbreaking in its approach, is the article entitled "Catherine II and the Jews: The Origins of the Pale of Settlement." It is pathbreaking for its examination of the "Jewish Question" in Russia from the point of view of the Russian government in its imperial, expansionist context. Pipes concludes that far from being purposefully oppressive (as they were to become eventually), the measures adopted by Catherine II with respect to the newly incorporated Jewish population were, for the age, the most liberal and progressive. The acts restricting the activities and rights of residence of the Jews resulted from pressures put on the government by conservative merchants and artisans fearful of Jewish competition. Since the appearance of the article, several monographs on the Jews in Russia from similar perspectives have contributed significantly to a fruitful revisionist interpretation of the question. Since the main territory where the Jewish question was of significance is now part of Ukraine and Belorussia, Pipes's article has important contemporary implications and should be of particular interest to readers of *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*.

A similar, albeit less radical, revisionism informs the article "The Russian Military Colonies, 1810–1831." In it Pipes argues quite convincingly that the notorious colonies of peasant-soldiers established by Alexander I and put under the control of Count Arakcheev were not, as has often been claimed, merely an aspect of the emperor's reactionary turn after 1815, but in fact originated before the conflict with France as a plan for a rational and enlightened solution to the peasant question. This scheme failed not because of the cruel and oppressive manner with which it was implemented but because it was a telling illustration of the evil which results from any social engineering that, disregarding their customs and *mentalité*, tries to force people into happiness (or prosperity) as understood by the governing elites. This scholarly study illustrates the "liberal-conservative" stance that Professor Pipes has displayed more recently in his scholarly and political activities.

Pipes's own political beliefs may also be identified in his "Karamzin's Conception of the Monarchy," in which he analyzes the political philosophy of N. M. Karamzin, the well-known historian and author of Alexander I's time. In Professor Pipes's view—which I find find quite persuasive upon rereading the article—Karamzin's idea of monarchy as the necessary foundation for Russia's greatness and prosperity was a combination of paternalistic, but essentially progressive, and moderate conservative notions. While rejecting any effort at "rational constructivism" (to use von Hayek's felicitous phrase) and socioeconomic activism on the part of a bureaucracy, Karamzin was committed to a respect for tradition, for the individual's free expression of opinion, and for freedom of action in the private sphere, within the limits permitted by a benevolent law—a law safeguarded and applied by the firm but benign authority vested in the person of the sovereign and landlord. Naturally, such a political conception would hardly have proven adequate for an industrializing and "modernizing" Russia in the late nineteenth century, but—applied conscientiously—it might have provided a workable guide during a period of transition and might have spared the country much sociopolitical turmoil.

Pipes believes that the turmoil and suffering in the last decades of the imperial regime were in no small measure caused by an irresponsible intelligentsia reacting to the imperial government's blindness to the country's many economic, social, and cultural problems. In studying the relationship between the state and the revolutionary intelligentsia during his work on the two-volume biography of Peter Struve, Professor Pipes had to clarify a semantic tangle and to account for Lenin's early political development. The article, "*Narodnichestvo*: A Semantic Inquiry," shows how the original, rather vague signification of *narodnik*, "popular" in the sense of democratic, was turned by the early Russian Marxists into a polemically charged term to denounce those who saw in the peasantry and its institutions the point of departure for a special, Russian way of avoiding capitalism and its socioeconomic consequences. Lenin, in turn, gave the word a dismissive edge in order to refuse any alliance or compromise with the peasantry or the liberal bourgeoisie. Closely tied to this semantic investigation is the piece "The Origins of Bolshevism: The Intellectual Evolution of Young Lenin." This evolution took the future founder of the Soviet Union through populism (in its original democratic sense) to radical jacobinism and the project of ruthlessly gaining control of a party in order to have complete power

to initiate total social engineering. In telling the story of this aspect of Lenin's early life, Pipes also reveals the roots of his dislike for Lenin as a person—a dislike that will become the loathing that colors his picture of the Russian Revolution.

In our century, the intellectual has come to play an influential role in the formation of public opinion and in this manner has had, and still has, an impact on political decisions made by both government and society. Reading Max Weber's analysis and conclusions about the 1905 Revolution and its "constitutional" aftermath, Pipes, in the piece "Max Weber and Russia," endeavors to discover and describe the ambiguous relationship between social science methods, political morality, and existential and emotional *engagement* with nationalism. In my opinion, this is the most subtle and illuminating article in the volume and does not bear summarizing. Suffice it to say here that Pipes reaches the conclusion that Max Weber's ultimately false diagnosis of the events in Russia was largely due to an unresolved tension between his objective sociological analysis and his emotional *parti-pris* for German nationalism.

A correct understanding of the past does not necessarily guarantee a reliable prediction of the future, as the last three essays unintentionally illustrate. They deal with the crucial problem of the nationalities in the Soviet Union, more specifically of its Central Asiatic and Muslim context. The articles on Bashkiria ("The First Experiment in Soviet National Policy: The Bashkir Republic, 1917–1920") and the Muslims of Central Asia ("Muslims of Central Asia: Trends and Prospects") are very informative and provide interesting historiographic insights. Written as they were, however, long before *glasnost'* and before even limited access to the Soviet Union and its libraries, they suffer from a limited documentary basis of published sources and personal interviews with exiles. The reconstruction of events is very well done and in the process not a few clichés and false claims of the Soviet propaganda machine and disinformation are put to rest. But any extrapolation to today's situation will prove quite hazardous, as shown in the last essay, "'Solving' the Nationality Problem"—the only one that is publicistic rather than scholarly.

The historian, while fully aware of change in the past, cannot extrapolate into the future without assuming some permanences or "laws" in history—something that Pipes, quite wisely, refuses to do. Under the circumstances, Karamzin's approach may be a better guide than the lures of social science in Max Weber's tradition. It should be said, though, that Professor Pipes has the courage to accept the lessons and the unexpectedness of history, while loyally adhering to his moral and political convictions. The younger generation of historians will read these essays to great profit and will obtain valuable insight into their discipline by observing a master craftsman at his workbench.

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PEASANTS WITH PROMISE: UKRAINIANS IN SOUTH-EASTERN GALICIA, 1880–1900. By *Stella Hryniuk*. Edmonton, Alberta: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1991. 299 pp., index, map, illustrations.

Stella Hryniuk originally set out to study the causes for the massive emigration of Ukrainian peasants from Eastern Galicia to Canada at the turn of the last century. The general presumption was that Ukrainian immigrants came to Canada to escape hopelessness, ignorance, and a static society. She focused on immigrants to Manitoba, and noticed that the pre-1900 emigration had been from five Galician counties—Borshchiv, Chortkiv, Husiatyn, Terebovlia, and Zalishchyky. In preliminary interviews, Hryniuk found that both the level of literacy and the quality of life of the Galician-Ukrainian peasants was higher than had been generally supposed. Intrigued, she set out to investigate the life the Canadian immigrants left behind, postponing her original topic, the study of "the 'why' of emigration" to a later time.

This book focuses on the material and social culture of the peasants—on the economy of the village and the modernity that impinged on peasant life in the form of school, community enlightenment projects, and programs in agricultural improvements and public health. Hryniuk wisely avoids the discussion of the development of national consciousness and political awareness, stories that other historians have investigated.

The author mined Austrian government reports on cattle breeding, road building, schools, churches, and finances in the area; she perused statistical data and parliamentary proceedings; she poured over Canadian and American immigration reports; she plowed through journals and newspapers and read much of what was published on the area. She supplemented these sources by travel to Western Ukraine and by interviewing the few immigrants in Manitoba who still remembered "the old country." She looked at known fact with fresh eyes. For instance, the little Galician horses were always trotted out as proof of the poverty of the area. Hryniuk discovered that the Galician horse, which owed its pedigree to Mongolian, Arabic, and English horses, was hardy, even tempered, and cheaper to maintain than the larger horses preferred in Western Europe. From these varied sources Hryniuk wove a tapestry depicting the life of Ukrainian peasants from southern Podillia. The narrative is supplemented by selective tables on the population of the area, taxes paid, prices for necessities and major cereal grains, land use, farm animal ownership, and schools and the languages in which the children were taught.

Whereas other works have tried to illustrate the Western influence on Ukraine, Hryniuk tackles the actual life of the Galician village. She provides solid information on the work of the Galician Agricultural Association, on the practical advice on agriculture and husbandry that was always included in Ukrainian newspapers, and on the crafts of the area. She marshals evidence of the husbanding and agricultural activities of the clergy and details how that information was disseminated to the peasants through community organizations. She traces the impact the building of the railroads had upon the peasant economy and elaborates on the equally dramatic impact formal schooling, even if limited to a few years, had on the village. The

networks of informal education, especially the work of the Enlightenment society and of the various Ukrainian newspapers, helped to change the life of the peasants, and not only to make them nationally conscious.

What emerges from her story is a picture of a large, dynamic community devising means to help itself, using whatever government resources it could. What remains unsaid is precisely the issue that should be studied: the policies aimed at improving the life in the village for peasants and for the clergy. It was the practicality inherent in the aims of the Ukrainian movement that explained its popularity and not the ideology in which it became clothed. In other words, nationalism in Galicia was not an ideological movement; rather, it was aimed at making life better for the residents of the area.

Hryniuk, whose first exposure to Galician Ukrainians was through secondary written sources and the written work of the intelligentsia, discovered, on the basis of painstaking primary research, that the true story of at least one section of Galicia could not be placed into the procrustean bed of predetermined notions of backwardness and development. She documents the beginning of modernity, of the "change from adherence to timeless tradition to courageous innovation, from a peasant economy geared to local markets to one which was integrated by railways into European economy, from throwing off of old fears of authority to the exercise of political rights, as well as expansion of knowledge of the wider world which literacy and education brought with them and the acceptance of new ideas and techniques" to the period of 1880. The next twenty years marked "a tremendous leap" for Southern Podillia. While this book itself may not mark a "tremendous leap" in scholarship, it does provide yet another badly needed step in the study of the history of Ukraine as the people there lived, not as they were perceived by others. As such, it should be warmly welcomed by teachers and students of Eastern European history.

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BEYOND NATIONALISM: A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE HABSBURG OFFICER CORPS 1848–1918. By *István Deák.* New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990. xiii, 273 pp.

Sixty years ago Oscar Jászi analyzed the dissolution of the Habsburg monarchy in mechanical terms of competing centripetal and centrifugal forces. Preeminent among the centripetal forces, among Jászi's "pillars of internationalism" which held the multinational monarchy together, was the Habsburg army. The officers, he argued, were molded by their military education, and moved from land to land, so that they "represented a certain spirit of internationalism confronted with the impatient and hateful nationalism of their surroundings," and "constituted something like an anational caste." István Deák, in *Beyond Nationalism*, has written a social history

of that officer corps which, far more than simply supporting Jászi's thesis on the army, succeeds in understanding and explaining what that thesis actually means when removed from the realm of sociological generalization and endowed with the substance of social history. Deák concludes that "an enormous number of Joint Army officers had, for all intents and purposes, no nationality," but it is above all his approach to the question—through a complex methodology which combines the statistical analysis of official records with a more impressionistic synthesis of personal memoirs—that makes this book such an innovative and important contribution to understanding the Habsburg monarchy as a multinational entity.

Deák begins with the interesting, semi-paradoxical formulation of the monarchy as both essentially "militaristic" and yet fundamentally "unwarlike." Through the book he uncovers the related paradoxes of an army overglorified and underfinanced, an officer corps whose fictional paragons were celebrated in operetta while its actual members wrestled with problems of pay and promotion. On the one hand, Deák takes a broad view of the complete corps, employing statistical samplings to analyze issues of class and confession, as well as the supremely problematic issue of nationality. On the other hand, he takes an intimate view of the officers' lives, considering such subjects as homoerotic friendship at the military academy and the conversational complications of using *Du* as the mandated mode of address between officers.

The chronological scope of the book reaches back to the early efforts toward a professional Habsburg army in the reigns of Maria Theresa and Joseph II, and forward to the post-Habsburg careers of the officers inherited by the twentieth-century successor states of Central and Eastern Europe. The heart of the book, however, focuses on the army created by the military arrangements and reforms of 1868, following the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867. Deák considers the nature of the joint army in the dual monarchy, and the evolving balance between Cis- and Trans-Leithania in an army conceived as a central institution. The place of the Hungarians in the officer corps is analyzed with great subtlety, as is that of the Jews.

Considering the apparent underrepresentation of Galicia's Ukrainians among Habsburg officers, Deák suggests that their presence may have been masked by the identification of Ruthenians as Poles, all the more likely in an army which generally deemphasized national identification. Ukrainian was one of the languages which the multilingual officers were supposed to use with the relevant rank and file, though Deák also makes the interesting observation that Czech may have come to serve generally "as a language for communication with all Slavic soldiers." Galicia emerges from the officers' memoirs as an undesirable posting, perceived as "a place to get drunk and to stay drunk; to spend the night in shabby cafés, gambling and whoring; to long for civilization; and to make pilgrimages to the railroad station to watch the passing through of the Lemberg-Cracow-Vienna express."

Such a passage might remind one of the fictional world of Joseph Roth's *Radetzky March*, and in fact there is a special relation between Deák's history and Roth's novel—also of sixty years ago. Deák is fully aware of the special significance of the Habsburg officer in Austrian literature, and he refers to Robert Musil's *Young Törless* on military schooling and Arthur Schnitzler's *Lieutenant Gustl* on military

honor, with the qualification that both involve a certain amount of literary overstatement. The author Deák uses most effectively, however, is Roth, for it was Roth who best appreciated the figure of the Habsburg officer as a fulcrum for supporting a complete representation of the lost world of the multinational monarchy. Deák's historical achievement is to recover the full importance and complexity of the Habsburg officer corps, and the proof of his success is how brilliantly his focus serves to elucidate the twists and turning points of Habsburg history, from the revolution of 1848 to the compromise of 1867, from the occupation of Bosnia in 1878 to the outbreak of war in 1914. *Beyond Nationalism* is a masterful work in which skillful methodology, forceful writing, subtle analysis, and intelligent engagement with really important questions challenge us to put the subject at the very center of historiographical reconsideration of the Habsburg monarchy.

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CULTURE OF THE FUTURE: THE PROLETKULT MOVEMENT IN REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA. By *Lynn Mally*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 1990. xxxix, 306 pp. $37.50.

By focusing on the history of one organization, Proletkult, Lynn Mally has tackled one of the most complex problems of the Russian Revolution—the problem of culture. Was culture propagated from above by Bolshevik intellectuals who called themselves the vanguard of the proletariat, indeed, the culture of the future? Was it at all a culture of the workers? Lynn Mally also addresses the problem of the cultural gap between the educated worker upstarts and the masses of still uneducated workers lacking "consciousness," who were left behind on the factory floor.

Mally's is a straightforward institutional history, richly documented with archival documents, beautifully organized, and well presented. She tells us the story of an organization of worker-enthusiasts and Bolshevik intellectuals who dreamed of creating a proletarian culture, a proletarian art, a proletarian identity, and a proletarian science. They set up the Proletarian Culture organization—hence Proletkult—in the fall of 1917, on the eve of the Bolshevik seizure of power. It was then a truly voluntary grass roots organization, like so many others at that time. Lynn Mally follows its quick rise to what she calls a movement, or a national network of organizations well funded by the state and engaged in all kinds of cultural activities—opening studios, making posters, organizing theaters and processions. Part of that cultural activity, Mally perceptively points out, was not particularly "proletarian." It was simply educational and explicitly propagandistic, geared to imbue the masses with a socialist consciousness.

The artistic production of all these groups was truly innovative and experimental. In the conditions of the Civil War, when the Communist party's attention was preoccupied with survival, cultural organizations had a great deal of freedom as long as

they remained pro-Bolshevik.

Lynn Mally attentively examines the membership and the leadership of this Proletkult and its structure and debates. She points out that it was never a homogeneous organization and that it included a variety of people in its ranks who interpreted the meaning of culture and, specifically, proletarian culture. What emerges from her portrait of the organization is that its identity was closely linked to workers' autonomy, self-affirmation, and self-definition. Proletkult leaders tried very hard to define a separate role for themselves within the context of what was called the "proletarian" state. In the end, they failed. The author shows that as soon as the immediate danger of the Whites receded, the Bolshevik leaders tightened control and stamped out any calls for autonomy—and not only in the realm of culture, one might add.

My primary criticism of this book is that it takes uncritically the claim of the Proletkult leaders that they, in fact, represented proletarian culture. The author mistakenly interprets the growth of the organization as an indication of a grass roots support and refers to it as a movement. Yet, as she herself admits (p. 66), one local organization "allowed participation" of such-and-such laborers. So the grass roots "movement" was shaped from above. The self-appointed Communist cultural elite decided who was and who was not a "conscious" proletarian. Could that dogmatic, ideological propaganda machine be called a popular movement? The author's evidence also clearly shows that the "movement" had begun in Moscow, existed on state funds, and then collapsed when state funds were withdrawn.

Second, the author assumes as something quite natural, and not in need of explanation, that worker-proletarians were necessarily socialist and that Proletkult was their organization. In fact, "proletarian consciousness" was a mental creation of Moscow intellectuals and their worker upstart students. During the Civil War the true workers exhibited all kinds of cultural and political preferences; most of them had probably never heard of Proletkult. Most Russian workers, by Bolshevik terminology, exhibited petty bourgeois cultural traits and tastes. Large categories of workers, such as railroad workers and metal workers, were explicitly anti-Communist. Other workers such as those in Tula, often referred to in the book, were staunchly and continuously pro-Menshevik and anti-Bolshevik. Still others, for example in Orel, joined in the anti-Semitic pogroms under the Whites. By focusing only on the Bolshevik cultural organization which claimed to be of the workers, one receives a distorted view of the workers' real cultural needs and real political dispositions.

Lynn Mally clearly demonstrates that Lenin and the Bolsheviks stamped out cultural autonomy in 1921. Yet, the issues she raises in the book beg a broader view. The author correctly shows that the intellectual origins of Proletarian Culture went back to Bogdanov's dreams during the 1910s of a proletarian identity and a proletarian culture that would supersede bourgeois culture. From here, it followed as an axiom that proletarian culture was necessarily a socialist culture. Intolerance and doctrinairism were a part of Bolshevik cultural thinking from the very beginning. The Bolshevik intelligentsia's mission was to educate the proletariat and to lead it to socialism. Why is it so surprising, then, that in 1921 Lenin decided that this task

could not be left to some self-proclaimed cultural vanguard, a state subsidized organization claiming autonomy from the "vanguard of the proletariat?" The demise of Proletkult was rooted in the very essence of Leninism.

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THE GENERATION OF POWER: THE HISTORY OF DNEPROSTROI. By *Anne D. Rassweiler*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. viii, 247 pp., index, bibliography. $32.50.

Dneprostroi was the paradigm of the ambitious construction projects that were the hallmark of Stalin's First Five-Year Plan. In her history of its implementation, Anne Rassweiler gives a minutely detailed description of the transfiguration that accompanied the project and turned it into something of a caricature of its intended character.

The construction of a giant hydroelectric station across the Dneiper was conceived as the lever of modernity that, grasped by conscious and enthused proletarians, would turn peasant Russia into an urban and industrial power. Instead, it became the model for mass mobilization of manual laborers, refugees from the murder and famine of the collectivization of agriculture, poorly fed, poorly housed, and endlessly chivvied to set new records that would be the next day's norms. Rather than showing the way for scientific organization to compensate for technical backwardness, Dneprostroi became a demonstration of how politics could dominate and silence technical critiques. Graduates of the period, having learned to maneuver and manipulate in an environment of chronic shortage, disequilibrium, and wasteful campaigning, became the Khrushchevs and Brezhnevs, the "generation of power" of senescent Stalinism who eventually led the USSR into exhausted decline. In detailing the processes of labor recruitment and training, of management's battle with impossible plans and scarce resources, and the Communist party's inadequacy as a directing force, Professor Rassweiler has made her point strongly.

Despite its detail, the book comes to life only in a few places. In great measure this is the fault of the writing and editing. There are endless unnecessary repetitions. One section of the introduction is repeated verbatim in the epilogue (cf. pp. 10–11 and 188). On the other hand, we are promised a discussion of the Stakhanovite movement (p. 125) that never materializes. In the midst of a political analysis of the attack on "bourgeois specialists" as part of the internal party struggle against trade union independence and Bukharin's right-wing group, we find the simplistic sentence: "Engineers and specialists became the special objects of antagonism, whipped up by Stalin, who did not trust them." Statistics are shoveled in like concrete poured by Zhenia Roman'ko's brigade—but too often without reference points that would help the reader judge their significance (housing space, p. 150; absenteeism, p. 164; nutritional intake, p. 152—though here, additional figures with a proper base of

reference are given on the following page, but with no connection made between the two passages.)

A number of important questions are hinted at and never developed. The question of Ukrainian politics and the role of industrialization envisioned by the Ukrainian Communist leadership is mentioned in passing but not developed. In a similar vein, there is no organized discussion of any effects of change in the ethnic structure of the work force and of the Communist party membership as Ukrainians come to be the majority ethnic group at Dneprostroi. The Millar-Nove debate on the "contribution" of collectivization to the First Five-Year Plan is included in the bibliography but is never introduced into the discussion.

The volume began as a Ph.D. dissertation completed in 1980. The sources are those that were available at the time: newspapers, journals, memoirs, even interviews, but no archival materials. Though the sources have been well used, there can be little doubt that were the book to be rewritten today, it would be richer and better fleshed out in content. In addition, the oppressive weight of Lenin—his "initiatives," directives, conceptions—apparently absorbed unconsciously from the Soviet secondary literature, would be much less, and a more critical understanding of the intellectual and political currents that underlay Dneprostroi would emerge.

In many ways, this volume may be compared to Dneprostroi. After all, the dam and power station were completed—however wastefully and at whatever human price—produced the electricity that powered the region's industrialization, and were the first collecting point for a dispossessed peasantry in its transition to urban, industrial life. Anne Rassweiler has made her point, and, if her method is regrettably faulty, her focus on a significant case study is bold and well-conceived and will help later historians of Soviet industrialization analyze other key developments that may shed light on the formative years of the Soviet system.

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KO-OPS: THE REBIRTH OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE SOVIET UNION. By *Anthony Jones* and *William Moskoff*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991. 154 pp. $12.95.

This book was written as an account of contemporary reality. It comes to us, the readership, as an essentially historical essay. With the fall of Gorbachev and the break-up of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, the world of *perestroika* fell apart, the credo of Soviet socialism/communism was finally abandoned, and the peculiarly Soviet constraints on entrepreneurship (even in the context of "radical reform") which had given birth to a "new" cooperative movement were abandoned.

Yet, just as the Jones and Moskoff volume sheds considerable light on the essential tensions and contradictions of earlier attempts to introduce elements of independent entrepreneurship into the Soviet system of central planning (especially in the late 1960s and early 1970s), so also it illuminates the central difficulties of transition to a market economy in Russian conditions, difficulties that have if anything been brought more clearly into focus with the final jettisoning of the baggage of the Soviet era.

The most general of these is the absence of a "market culture" (see chapters 6 and 8). Closely allied to a petty and obstructive egalitarianism (" 'I don't want to live like her [a rich neighbor]. I want her to live like me' "; p. 96), the culturally conditioned ability to understand the role of prices, the nature and ethics of exchange, and the value of competition is making things just as difficult for Yegor Gaidar's economic transformation team, now at the center of power, as it did for the vulnerable and often isolated cooperatives of the *perestroika* period. Entrepreneurs have, of course, often been as wanting in this basic understanding as the masses, and the problem of the "get rich quick" mentality (reinforced by policy instability) is as critical in the post-Soviet conditions of 1992 as it was in the period covered by Jones and Moskoff. Partly because of these attitudinal problems, partly because of "objective" economic difficulties, the cooperatives failed to produce the kind of powerful supply-side response to shortages that might have started a market cultural revolution. It seemed at the time that these economic difficulties were largely a function of the shortcomings of central planning. The brief experience of the Yeltsin government in Russia suggests that they are much more deep-seated, and that the story told in the volume under review will continue to have relevance to current preoccupations for longer than the authors themselves might wish.

Ko-ops raises one methodological issue that is of critical importance for all social scientists working on the Soviet and post-Soviet world. The approach is very much the tried and trusted "Sovietological" approach, based on massive documentation, wide use of anecdote and other forms of "significant detail," and a certain amount of reporting for reporting's sake in the context of the general unavailability of many of the sources commonly used. My own feeling is that as we move into the post-Soviet world, in which the (Russian, at least) informational dimension is converging with what we are used to in the West, the Sovietological approach may become largely redundant, at least in its "pure" form. What will never become redundant is the kind of incisive comment that graces page 93, viz.:

> If crime becomes endemic to the movement, it will corrupt the entire process of building a civil society in the economic sphere; civil society implies a market culture in which there is the implied entitlement to honesty in exchange. That does not now exist.

That is as true of the transformation movement of 1992 as it was of the cooperative movement of the late 1980s.

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THE NATIONALITIES FACTOR IN SOVIET POLITICS AND SOCIETY. Edited by *Lubomyr Hajda* and *Mark Beissinger*. Boulder, San Francisco, and Oxford: Westview Press, 1990. 331 pp., with tables, figures, notes, index. $19.95 paper.

This book provides a solid basis for a better understanding of the sovereign republics that have emerged from the former USSR in the wake of the failed coup of August 1991. Let it be said at the outset that this important overview of the Soviet nationalities picture should not be dismissed because the research predates the coup. As S. Frederick Starr remarked during a panel discussion at the annual convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies in November 1991, much of the work that could have contributed to our knowledge of the republics prior to their emergence as independent players remains to be done. Reams of literature, especially that in the local languages, are yet to be tapped by scholars. Attention to this resource, however belated, can yield important new insights. The present volume helps to fill the gap and to discern the forces which inform the republics' national existence today.

Roman Szporluk's introductory essay on the "imperial legacy" sets the stage for the coming breakup of the USSR. Szporluk suggests that Lenin's statement about the "tendency of every national movement. . . toward the formation of *national states*" was not limited, as Lenin said it was, to capitalist systems. He recalls Ladis K. D. Kristof's delineation of the "dichotomy between *narod* and *gosudarstvo*" which characterized the Russian Empire even in its final stages, observing that this same tension between state and society carried over—in the case of Russians and, even more so, the non-Russian nationalities—as part of the heritage with which Gorbachev was forced to deal during the *perestroika* period. What ultimately defeated Gorbachev's efforts to hold the Union together were the acceptance of linguistic autonomy and the espousal of the national-territorial principle, which, early on—Szporluk quotes Richard Pipes on this point—were conceded to the nationalities as a "purely formal feature of the Soviet Constitution": hence, the involuntary enshrinement of nationalism at various levels of the federal structure that has now produced states within states like the contents of a *matryoshka*. Szporluk, naming some names, is critical of those who were unable or unwilling to see this looming phenomenon, accepting instead official claims that the nationality question had been "solved."

There are chapters on various thematic aspects: the role of the national elites, the economy, the military, language policy, literary politics, and religion. Gertrude Schroeder, dealing with the economic sphere, points to a key centrifugal factor: "the persistence of substantial development gaps and disparities in living standards among national groups." She makes the prescient observation that the declared intent to manage the economy from the center while giving the republics more authority in managing their own development was "a contradiction in terms" that could lead to "bitter wrangles, unavoidably with an ethnic coloration." As for future economic cooperation among the republics, her finding that the "small republics are much more trade dependent than the larger ones" suggests that the former will have

a special interest in continuing ties.

There are also chapters on regional topics: one on Ukraine, Belorussia, and Moldavia, others on the Baltic republics, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia, and one dealing with the problem of Russian nationalism.

One of the book's strengths is that nearly all of its contributors are persons who have brought to the general nationalities question some special familiarity with at least one of the component peoples and cultures, and who are thus able to look at the picture "from the ground up." At the same time, each chapter is a work of solid scholarship, without special pleading or advocacy—a tribute to the editors who were also organizers of the series of Olin Seminars on Critical Issues, held at the Harvard University Russian Research Center, on which the book is based.

In the final chapter, the editors conclude with an observation that now, with hindsight, seems like a masterpiece of caution: "In an era of reform, the nationalities problem presents Soviet leaders with their most serious challenge, one that virtually guarantees that Soviet political evolution will be neither smooth nor simple."

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A MENNONITE IN RUSSIA: THE DIARIES OF JACOB D. EPP, 1851–1880. Translated and edited by *Harvey L. Dyck*. Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 1991. xiv, 456 pp. $60.00.

Harvey L. Dyck has provided a thoughtful and highly readable edition of an important primary source, the diaries of a Mennonite schoolteacher, farmer, and minister living in Novorossiia (Ekaterinoslav *guberniia*) from 1851–1880—a period of great upheaval in Russian society and life. The history of Mennonite communities in Russia—outsiders to the mainstream of Russian society, yet closely tied to imperial policy and local conditions—gives insight into the interplay between communitarian religious ideals, political issues in St. Petersburg, and the reality of village life. Even the diarist's name, Jacob Davidovich Epp, reveals the inside/outside relationship of these Mennonites to Russian society through its mix of traditional German and Russian forms.

Epp recounts the daily struggles of a poor farmer, including bouts with drought and storm, good and poor harvests. His entries often concentrate, however, on the spiritual and educational state of his fellow Mennonites since he acted as both minister and schoolteacher. These are the meat-and-potatoes of the *Diaries* and show Epp's concern over the lives of his coreligionists. Deeply conservative in his own dealings, Epp consistently acted to integrate changes and innovations to Mennonite life that did not strike to the core of its religious or social character. The *Diaries* show Epp to be a moderating force in debates over the use of the ban (especially for adultery) and in relations with the Brethren, a sectarian Mennonite group. Entries

amply discuss, for example, public punishment for personal sins—used to maintain discipline and harmony within the community.

The *Diaries* illustrate the heterogeneity of the countryside during this period: Mennonites often served as "model farmers" for resettled Jews under imperial and provincial tutelage and lived alongside Russians and non-Mennonite Germans as well. Epp took his task as model farmer seriously and often upbraided Mennonites who worked on Sunday as a bad example to the Jews, who held the Sabbath as sacred. Although forced to interact with one another in areas of mutual concern, such as common herding and grazing, Mennonite and Jew viewed the world differently, seemed not to trust each other, and consequently got along but poorly.

Concerned with the spiritual, educational, and physical well-being of his own flock, Epp rarely mentions any interaction with members of other religions (except for the Jewish settlers). On occasion, he notes holidays as times when the local Orthodox population would not work in the fields, but on only one occasion does he write of a Mennonite man who decided to convert to Orthodoxy (p. 327). At no point do the journals recount a Russian becoming a Mennonite. Furthermore, Epp (usually a keen observer of the local and provincial scene) never mentions interaction with the Old Believer or sectarian populations, which were quite large in that part of the empire. These omissions show that, while in a Russian world, the Mennonites never became "of the world." They had received guarantees to live in freedom from imperial army service and other duties, and the Mennonites tried to retain their independence from the rest of Russian society. Epp himself distrusted such gifts as the Mennonite Charter of Privileges, and his entries chronicle the erosion of those "perpetual" liberties.

The *Diaries* thus provide material for the study of communitarian groups in Russia during this period. More broadly, the book can be used to aid research on interfaith relations as well as for more mainstream economic and social history. Each year's entries include, for example, detailed data on harvests, birth and death rates, and other pertinent raw source material.

Epp's prose (and Dyck's translation) make for a good read: the stream of religious activities, notable events, and the rhythm of rural life follow easily from day to day, year to year. His prose even becomes lyrical when recounting moments of particularly strong emotion. He describes seeing his first wife, just deceased, in a dream:

> It was past midnight when I dreamed that my dear, dear wife was standing at my side in a very familiar dress and saying to me that I should accompany her through all of this life. I was so happy. We walked hand in hand together towards our house, but we had to pass through deep water that reached up to our chins. . . . I took my dearly beloved Maria in my arms and carried her through the water, and on reaching home we sat down together in heartfelt love, just the two of us, and with a passionate kiss sealed our reunion forever. (pp. 180–81)

Indeed, the cycle of life and, especially, early death comprises a leitmotif for the book. Both scholars and students would do well to read the scores of entries detailing the early death of Epp's family and parishioners. The journals remind those studying the social conditions of the Russian countryside that the endemic danger of life in these times was an untimely death.

Dyck's introduction, which follows Jacob Epp's life chronologically, ably follows relevant features of Mennonite practice and history so that the *Diaries* may be put in proper context. In addition to describing Epp's life in detail, the introduction analyzes his views on technological change, morality, sexuality, and the relationship of Mennonite communities to the imperial government. The introduction is clearly written and documented. Because it follows a chronology and does not use subject headings, however, finding information about specific topics is difficult. A reader interested, for example, in Dyck's analysis of the administrative organization of Mennonite communities cannot turn to a specified part of the introduction. The index helps only a little in this matter. Although it is a valuable aid to genealogists because of the exhaustive listing of proper names, the index gives scant subject references. For example, the introduction of "cipher singing" from Germany into Russian Mennonite services appears throughout the *Diaries*, illustrating the way in which Mennonite communities responded to forces of change, yet this subject receives no heading (nor do "singing," "music," or "liturgics") in the index. While "Ukrainians" and "Jews" have headings, neither "Russians" nor "Orthodox" are covered. These discrepancies make an important source difficult to use for research. Good maps, illustrations, and family trees round out the reference material.

The physical production of the book is of particularly high quality. Page design and text layout, as well as a set of color plates showing "primitive evocations" of Russian Mennonite life, are uniformly excellent. The University of Toronto Press has produced a handsome volume of a useful primary source.

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BE-VO HA-AYMA: YEHUDEI LVOV TAKHAT HA-KIVUSH HA-GERMANI (DFI EDUT, YUNI 1941–APRIL 1942). DAYS OF HORROR: JEWISH TESTIMONIES FROM GERMAN OCCUPIED LEMBERG, 1941–1943. By *Bella Gutterman.* Publications of the Diaspora Research Institute, 75. Tel Aviv: The Centre for the History of Polish Jewry, The Diaspora Research Institute, 1991. 216 pp., illus.

Bella Gutterman has assembled in this work an interesting collection of primary sources written by Jews during the German occupation of Lviv. These diaries and datebooks, originally written in Polish and German, have been translated into Hebrew for this publication, where they appear for the first time. Gutterman has added a short introduction on the history of the Jewish community during this tragic era as well as brief biographical remarks on the authors of the original manuscripts, which are now held in the Diaspora Research Institute of the University of Tel Aviv.

Two of the diaries chosen for this collection are by Jewish academics at the University of Lviv: the anthropologist Shmuel Czortkower and the legal expert M. Allerhand. With terse, precise language, these professors describe the entrance of the Germans into Lviv and the destruction of the Jewish community. Two other selections, both written by officials of the Lviv Judenrat (German-sponsored Jewish Council), provide a fascinating contrast as these Jewish functionaries of the Nazis attempt to steer a course between resistance and collaboration, with little success. A theme which runs through all the selections is the antagonism between Poles, Ukrainians, and Jews during the German occupation. In her introduction, Gutterman cites the bitter Hebrew limerick of the day:

> For the Jews—famine (*ra'av*),
> For the Poles—gold (*zahav*, from Jewish blood money),
> For the Ukrainians—militia (*militzia*, i.e., collaboration),
> And for all their bones—Galicia (*Galitzia*).

Gutterman has added several appendices to this collection, including some poor reproductions of photographs and Nazi decrees in the original. One nagging problem with the work is the difficulty of transliteration; she has solved this to some degree with a liberal use of the Polish alphabet. Ukrainian names are transliterated into Polish rather than Cyrillic, however, and first names are rarely transliterated at all. Despite this minor technical difficulty, this work represents a significant contribution to the scholarship on the German occupation in Galicia, a topic which has been receiving renewed interest in recent years.

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LVOV GHETTO DIARY. By *David Kahane*. Translated by *Jerzy Michalowicz*. Foreword by *Erich Goldhagen*. Amherst, Mass.: University of Massachusetts Press, 1990. x, 162 pp. $24.95.

The Nazi murder of Western Ukrainian Jewry was nearly total: Aharon Weiss has calculated that only 2 percent survived in Eastern Galicia and Volhynia (17,000 of 870,000 Jews), and Philip Friedman has estimated that the survival rate in the city of Lviv was closer to one percent.[1] Rabbi David Kahane and his wife and child were among the few who lived to tell this terrible tale of destruction. Like dozens of others, the Kahane family owes its existence to the humanitarian aid of the saintly Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts'kyi, head of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, who

[1] Aharon Weiss, "Jewish-Ukrainian Relations in Western Ukraine during the Holocaust," in *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, ed. Peter Potichnyj and Howard Aster (Edmonton, 1988), p. 409; Philip Friedman, "The Destruction of the Jews of Lwów," in *Roads to Extinction: Essays on the Holocaust*, ed. Ada Friedman (New York, 1980), pp. 244–45, 317.

sheltered them in his network of Studite monasteries and convents. This memoir, written while Rabbi Kahane was in hiding, is an important source for this horrifying chapter in the centuries-long history of Jews in Lviv.

The bulk of the work is concerned with Rabbi Kahane's experiences in the Lviv ghetto and in the Janowski labor camp. Rabbi Kahane is sparing in his prose and recounts horror after horror in a dry, emotionless tone that somehow reveals a glimpse of the nature of human existence in what Alexander Donat has called "the Holocaust Kingdom." For example: "He [a German officer] was standing in front of Jewish women, counting them with a blow of the whip on the face. Among the women I recognized those who had been seized with us that morning. . . . Several days later I learned that all of them were shot" (p. 92). Kahane concludes by providing the simple reason for these murders: "At that time no camp for women existed." Another disturbing example:

> In the kitchen the unconscious woman still lay on the floor. She was bleeding and her child, blissfully unaware, kept playing with her thick hair. My eyes met with his blue pure and smiling eyes. They were joyous, these child's eyes, radiant and full of vitality, despite the death everywhere around us. (p. 81)

In the summer of 1943, Rabbi Kahane escaped the Janowski camp and fled to Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi's residence. Months earlier, the remnants of the Lviv rabbinate had successfully petitioned the metropolitan to shelter their most precious possessions: hundreds of Jewish children and the Torah scrolls, both of which were prime targets of the Nazi destruction process. With the children was Kahane's three-year-old daughter as well as his wife, who entered a Studite convent. The metropolitan quickly took Rabbi Kahane under his care and, disguised as Brother Mateusz, he worked in the library cataloguing Judaica and teaching Hebrew. The last third of his memoirs concern his concealment by the metropolitan and contain many reflections on Ukrainian-Jewish relations, such as:

> How difficult it is to reconcile the two sections of the Ukrainian people. On one hand, all the national Ukrainian heroes. . . and every national reawakening or uprising were always connected with spilling rivers of Jewish blood. The Ukrainians have always vented their wrath against the Jews. On the other hand, there are the noble figures of the metropolitan, his brother the abbot. . . and others. How is this possible? How can one reconcile these two opposites? (p. 136)

Jerzy Michalowicz's translation from the original Hebrew publication (*Yoman geto Lvov* [Jerusalem, 1978]) is generally quite readable, with the occasional malapropism, such as "the light of projectors" (p. 97) rather than "searchlights" (*ha-zarkorim*). The editing of the text, however, is terrible, and the translation is riddled with errors from the very first line to the last appendix. While most of these are minor, some involve names and dates; thus, the English version cannot be considered authoritative for the serious scholar. The English text is also not identical to the Hebrew. Erich Goldhagen's interesting but brief foreword is no substitute for the original's longer scholarly introduction by Dov Sadan, and the English version has replaced the short but useful historical overview of the Holocaust in Lviv with two tangential appendices of lesser importance. The Hebrew version also includes a

short biography of the author—mysteriously omitted in the English version—as well as an epigram and dedication.

Rabbi Kahane's memoir, not surprisingly, contains many references to the Bible and the Talmud. The original usually does not provide the citation of chapter and verse, assuming that the Hebrew reader would be familiar with these quotations or allusions. The English version remedies this omission, although not consistently and all too often erroneously. This applies not only to Rabbi Kahane's memoirs proper but even to the scriptural citations in Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi's famous pastoral letter, "Thou Shalt Not Kill" (provided as Appendix 3). These errors, which, quite unfairly, reflect poorly on both Rabbi Kahane and Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi, are not present in the Hebrew original.

Finally, it is unfortunate that this English version—which, given the changes mentioned above, really constitutes a new edition—has not taken advantage of the considerable scholarship on the topic written since the Hebrew original appeared over a decade ago. Hansjakob Stehle, for example, has published some of the censored parts of the metropolitan's pastoral letter,[2] yet *Lvov Ghetto Diary* provides the old, faulty text. Combined with the lack of a critical introduction, this limits the usefulness of the work for the non-specialist. Nevertheless, the memoirs of Rabbi Kahane constitute an exceptionally significant contribution to the historiography of Jews in Lviv during the Holocaust and the English translation is most welcome.

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OLD WOUNDS: JEWS, UKRAINIANS AND THE HUNT FOR NAZI WAR CRIMINALS IN CANADA. By *Harold Troper* and *Morton Weinfeld.* Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1989. xxxv, 434 pp., 1 map. $29.95.

In 1985, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney ended decades of government inaction by establishing a commission to investigate the presence of war criminals in Canada. The Deschênes Commission was ordered to search for war criminals in Canada and to recommend legal measures that might be taken against them. *Old Wounds* tells this story, but it is not a book about war criminals. It is about ethnic politics, about the way in which the war criminals issue became the focus of conflict between two of Canada's leading ethnic groups—Ukrainians and Jews.

The authors take a long view of their subject, since "the origins of Jewish-Ukrainian mistrust, so evident during the Deschênes enquiry, begin well outside of Canada and well before the tragic events of World War II. . . ." Their overview of

2 Hansjakob Stehle, "Sheptyts'kyi and the German Regime," in *Morality and Reality: The Life and Times of Andrei Sheptyts'kyi*, ed. Paul Robert Magocsi (Edmonton, 1989), pp. 135–36, facsimile following p. 230.

the European past helps us understand how East European Jews and Ukrainians arrived at opposing views of a shared history.

Historical moments symbolizing the national aspirations of Ukrainians were tragic moments for Jews. While Khmel'nyts'kyi and Petliura may be national icons for Ukrainians, they recall suffering for Jews. Khmel'nyts'kyi's rebellion against Polish domination inspired horrifying pogroms. During the Ukrainian National Republic (1917–1920), despite innovative efforts at inter-ethnic cooperation, Petliura's government failed to save Jews from pogroms in which thousands died.

The collective memory of Ukrainians also emphasizes successive victimization. Moreover, the authors argue, Jews are seen as accomplices in the foreign domination—Polish, Russian, or Soviet—and the Ukrainian suffering that punctuate Ukrainian history. The participation of some Jews in Soviet rule (which still appeared unshakable when *Old Wounds* went to press) is a particularly sore point, especially when Ukrainians recall the man-made famine of 1932–1933.

The Nazi period deepened each group's sense of victimization and widened the gulf of mistrust separating Ukrainians and Jews. Resentment of Soviets increased during the brutal Soviet annexation of much of Western Ukraine. Ukrainians welcomed the Nazis as liberators when they swept into Ukraine in mid–1941. Ultimately, of course, the Nazis brought not liberation but subjection. While Ukrainians initially preferred the invading Nazis to the Soviets, Jewish preferences were reversed. As the Germans advanced, the Jews fell victim to *Einsatzgruppen* but also to attacks by their Ukrainian neighbors. Jewish historical memory holds that Ukrainians facilitated the Nazi Holocaust, through a deadly mix of collaboration and indifference.

Troper and Weinfeld's approach, focusing as it does on conflicting interpretations of the same events, highlights the subjective nature of historical memory. But a weakness of their method is that it seems to resolve disputes simply by balancing claims, by "splitting the difference." The distortions of group memory are sometimes cited too uncritically. Still, their account is a careful and sensitive one (especially compared with the stridency common for this subject) that explains the explosive potential of Ukrainian-Jewish relations, even when transplanted in Canada.

The authors provide a detailed account of each community's development in Canada. The bulk of Ukrainian and Jewish immigration occurred in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Ukrainians settling mostly in the rural West, Jews settling chiefly in the urban centers of Quebec and Ontario. With a tradition of minority self-sufficiency, Jews were quick to establish communal institutions. Ukrainians developed a communal infrastructure more slowly. Later Ukrainian immigrants were more politicized, educated, and urbanized than earlier arrivals. Post-1945 arrivals came largely from the ranks of DPs and brought a nationalist commitment far greater than that which they found in Canada. Many settled in Toronto, shifting the focus of Ukrainian communal life eastward, closer to the centers of Jewish life. The Jewish community also absorbed a large number of immigrants after the war. Canada began to revise discriminatory immigration policies which had barred Jews during the Nazi period. Most new arrivals were

Holocaust survivors from Eastern Europe, "including Ukraine, and especially eastern Ukraine."

Recent decades have seen similarities emerging in the character of the two communities. Both are older, well-organized, white, middle-class communities. Both groups stress successful involvement in Canadian life, but emphasize ethnic survival as well. The Canadian Ukrainian community is about the same size as its counterpart in the United States, numbering some 700,000; but proportionately it is ten times as large. The clout of Ukrainians in Canada is enhanced by their heavy representation in the less populous western provinces. Many Ukrainians have held provincial or federal office. Canadian Jews number only about 300,000, but their rate of ethnic affiliation is exceptionally high, exceeding that of Ukrainians (and of Jews in the United States). According to Troper and Weinfeld, both experts on ethnicity in Canada, "[i]f the Jewish community in Canada can be considered to have the most developed polity—a set of community organizations which link leaders to group members in common cause to achieve the goals or objectives of the group—then the Ukrainians are second" (p. 45).

Nonetheless, the notion of "two solitudes" has continued to characterize Jewish-Ukrainian relations in Canada.[1] Contacts have been sporadic and sometimes hostile, as in the post-war dispute over admission to Canada of the Galicia (Halychyna) Division of the Waffen SS. Relations remained cool during the 1950s and 1960s, occasionally erupting in insult and accusation. Members of each group mistakenly perceived the other community as monolithic. Moderates were thus often blamed for the excesses of extremists. Efforts at bridge-building occurred during the 1970s but were largely unsuccessful.

The Liberal governments which dominated Canadian politics until the 1980s were not disposed to see the war criminals issue as a question of justice and human rights, rebuffing requests for action as Jewish special pleading. Officials were aware that Canada had admitted Europeans of various nationalities who were involved in "crimes against humanity" during World War II. But leaders such as Pierre Trudeau considered the issue a political minefield. Jewish groups pressed the matter to no avail.

Efforts accelerated during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Events in the United States, where action finally had been taken, were an impetus. A concentration camp guard—who entered the U.S. from Canada—was extradited to Germany to stand trial. The 1977 Holtzman Amendment empowered immigration officials to expose criminals who falsified their past in order to enter the United States. In 1979, the Justice Department established the Office of Special Investigations (OSI) to continue such work. Officials of the Canadian Jewish Congress (CJC), realizing that the language of human rights had gotten them nowhere, decided to lobby for similar

[1] The term "two solitudes" is borrowed from Howard Aster and Peter J. Potichnyj, *Jewish-Ukrainian Relations: Two Solitudes* (Oakville, Ontario, 1983). See also: Aster and Potichnyj, eds., *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective* (Edmonton, 1988). The latter was reviewed by Ezra Mendelsohn, *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 14, no. 1/2 (June 1990): 179–82.

legal remedies. Their efforts met with little success, although pressure for government action was mounting.

Public awareness of the outrages of the Holocaust increased. The television mini-series "Holocaust" contributed to this. So did the 1982 publication of *None Is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe, 1933–1948*, Harold Troper's own contribution to the history he and Weinfeld describe. The book, detailing Canadian indifference to the fate of European Jewry, helped create a climate in which action against war criminals could no longer be deferred. In the same year, a German extradition order prompted the arrest of Albert Helmut Rauca, a Toronto resident accused of direct involvement in the murder of thousands of Lithuanian Jews.

Late 1984 saw the election of a Conservative government led by Brian Mulroney. Years of Liberal party indifference gave way to swift action. On 7 February 1985, the government announced that Justice Jules Deschênes had agreed to conduct an inquiry into the presence of war criminals in Canada.

The Jewish community saw the commission as a long overdue, official indication that the presence of war criminals in Canada was a wrong yet to be righted. Community leaders were privately concerned that the Conservative government was acting without consulting them. Journalist Sol Littman, who made sensational charges about the extent of the war criminals problem, seemed to have the prime minister's ear. The CJC was not consulted; nor was the Ukrainian community.

Reactions from Ukrainians were defensive and vehement. Fears were raised that the entire community would be besmirched, even though 90 percent were Canadian-born. Some decried a KGB plot, and named the Jews as co-conspirators. Decisive action was demanded. In this atmosphere, the Toronto chapter of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC; headquartered in Winnipeg) seized the initiative, establishing the single-issue Civil Liberties Commission (CLC).

Justice Deschênes convened his commission in April 1985. His task was twofold: to set straight the post-war historical record on the war criminals issue; and to recommend legal action against war criminals, should any be uncovered. Deschênes decided to grant official "standing" to only two interested ethnic groups: Jews and Ukrainians. This gave these groups access to the commission, and both groups did their best to affect the commission's recommendations. While achieving standing was a triumph for those organizations seeking it, was it actually helpful? Standing may have served to "ethnicize" the issue further. Indeed, Jewish-Ukrainian tensions were dramatically inflamed throughout Canada. Moreover, legal questions may have fallen prey to the inter-ethnic feud. Still, neither community was willing to risk a commission result in which it had no input.

Ukrainians concerned with the commission were fearful of an ethnic smear campaign. They issued apologetic accounts of recent European history. This surprised Jewish officials, whose briefs to the commission made no mention of Ukrainian criminality in Europe. Ukrainian groups opposed various legal remedies: the creation of a Canadian OSI; extradition for trial abroad; the use of any evidence provided by the Soviet Union (though forensic experts attest to the authenticity of such documents). Ukrainian recommendations seemed to discourage war crimes prosecutions and narrow the commission's set of options.

Jewish organizations, on the other hand, hoped for a large slate of possible solutions: denaturalization, deportation, extradition to Europe or Israel; use of all evidence meeting the standards of Canadian courts (including documents from Soviet archives); and establishment of a Canadian version of the OSI. Troper and Weinfeld do a fine job of presenting most points of law, though *Old Wounds* is not a legal treatise and some legal terms—especially "war crimes" and "crimes against humanity"—require further clarification.

The announcement of the completed report caught ethnic leaders off guard, but did a good job of satisfying everyone. With less than twenty-four hours notice, ethnic leaders were called to a confidential briefing in Ottawa. There, on 12 March 1987, they learned the content of the *Report of the Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals*. Judge Deschênes put forth a variety of legal options. Jewish and Ukrainian leaders expected a policy debate over which options to make law. Before they could collect their thoughts, however, government policy was declared. Just as they left their briefing, the minister of justice rose in Parliament to state the government's chosen course: trials in Canada.

Jews were pleased. The commission had investigated some eight hundred suspects. Twenty serious cases were identified. Another two hundred cases required further study. Changes in the criminal code were proposed that would allow trials to be conducted in Canada for war crimes committed abroad. The report also clarified, once and for all, the unfortunate complicity of government officials by whose connivance war criminals settled in Canada. As early as 1948, some Canadian officials agreed to overlook such criminality. Scandalously, this policy remained in place as late as 1982; but no more.

Ukrainians were also pleased. The government appeared to heed their objections, and the made-in-Canada solution was acceptable. A Canadian OSI would not be created. Ukrainian nationalist organizations, including the Galicia Division, were cleared of suspicion. Nor were any Ukrainians said to be among the top twenty suspects. Soviet evidence remained a concern, but standards for its use were strict. Ukrainians had gone to battle with the "legendary" Jewish lobby, and emerged successful. In the process, the Ukrainian polity grew in strength. Its improved organization and fundraising could be brought to bear on future tasks.

Years of ethnic wrangling subsided. Appropriate changes were made in the Criminal Code, the Immigration Act, and the Citizenship Act. Finally, for the first time, war criminals living in Canada found themselves in the dock.

A reviewer's summary cannot do justice to Troper and Weinfeld's intricate and revealing narrative of ethnic lobbying and governmental vicissitudes. They relate these complex developments with clarity and authority, making excellent use of a range of sources. They often cite the general and ethnic press (relying on translations and digests of Ukrainian-language papers). Government documents are also used, though sometimes government conduct receives less scrutiny than ethnic organizations. The authors, who are both Jewish, raise the possibility that they might not be objective. They seem, however, to have established their *bona fides* with Ukrainians and Jews, since organizations and individuals from both communities opened their files to them. Extensive use of this material is combined with over ninety interviews

to produce a richly detailed account. Though this narrative fullness seems to have limited theoretical elaboration, this fine book raises important questions—questions, about ethnicity and politics, and about the burden of our tragic past—that we cannot escape.

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NARYS ISTORII UKRAINS'KOI AVTOKEFAL'NOI PRAVOSLAVNOI TSERKVY u VELYKII BRYTANII 1947–1987. Edited by *S. Bohatirets'* and *S. Fostun*. London: Diocesan Council of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Great Britain, 1988. 616 pp.

Although the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the diaspora has been in existence in the United States for seventy years, in Great Britain the church has had a history of only some forty-five years. *Narys Istorii* is the first step in documenting the history of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Diocese in Great Britain.

Issued to commemorate the millennium of Christianity in Ukraine, the volume is divided into two sections: general history of the eparchy (pp. 7–288) and histories of individual parishes and communities (pp. 289–556). The book features several lengthy appendices, one of which is a list of all of the deceased faithful of the entire diocese. Included are some 258 photographs of historic gatherings and liturgical celebrations, of individual priests and churches.

Narys Istorii opens with the portrait of and a pastoral letter from His Beatitude Metropolitan Mstyslav (now patriarch of Kiev), who is recognized as the founder of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Diocese in Great Britain. The first section sets forth reports—actual minutes almost—of various historical events including: minutes and resolutions of diocesan *sobors*; minutes and communiqués of diocesan council meetings; hierarchical visitations; communiqués from the chancellery; pastoral hierarchical letters issued on the occasion of church holy days; obituaries and eulogies of clergy and faithful; diocesan constitutions; jubilee reports; and portions of Bishop Volodymyr's daily diary of pastoral visitations within the diocese.

The final pages of this section provide a history of related church organizations, such as the women's group known as the Sisterhood of St. Olha; publications of the diocese; lists of each diocesan convention with names of the board members elected; lists of hierarchs and clerics who served the church in Great Britain, as well as each parish and community of the diocese. (The distinction between a parish and a community is that a parish owns a particular building where liturgical services and other community activities take place.)

Section two of *Narys Istorii* contains histories of each parish and community of the diocese. A sub-section within this part of the book gives the history of the parish choirs of the eparchy.

While *Narys Istorii* contains a wealth of information on a portion of the Ukrainian emigration to Great Britain, the full history of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Great Britain remains to be written. Although obviously a labor of love, the book is, unfortunately, not very well organized. Exhibiting little analysis or synthesis, the book reads like a collection of "newspaper clippings," meeting minutes, and photographs. For example, one section presents, consecutively, the following three reports: Resolutions of the Seventh Convention of the UAOC in Great Britain (p. 75); Father Molchanivsky retires (p. 77); and Communiqué of the Diocesan Council concerning the Fiftieth Anniversary of the *Sobor* in Kiev (p. 78).

In addition, no commentaries or analyses of the reports are provided. The same subheadings are frequently used without any indication of the appropriate year in the heading of the text or in the index. For example, "Bishop Mstyslav in Great Britain" (p. 70) refers to a visit in 1971; on page 122, the same heading refers to a 1976 visit. This heading is also used on pages 141 and 210 to refer to visits in 1980 and 1984, respectively.

Notwithstanding the above criticisms, the editors and writers of the volume are to be congratulated for their efforts in gathering into one volume source materials that will provide future historians of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in the diaspora with a basis for a more analytical work. One hopes that such a volume will be forthcoming.

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ERRATA

In volume 15, number 3/4, of *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, I published a review article "What Makes a Translation Bad? Gripes of an End User," in which I pointed out errors in Serge Zenkovsky's translation of the Nikon Chronicle. It is my duty to report that there is such a thing as cosmic justice. My article contained some egregious errors in the presentation of Cyrillic passages. These errors were no one's fault but my own. The editors of this journal have graciously consented to allow me to include in this volume an errata list for that article.

Donald Ostrowski

	reads	*should read*
p. 432, line 19:	Рус˜ and рус˜ский	Русь and русьскии
p. 439, fn. 28, l. 3:	Косо	Косой
p. 439, fn. 28, l. 5:	Косо	Косой
p. 440, l. 2:	О руска земле, уе за ,оломнем& еси!	О руская земле, уже за шоломянемъ еси!
p. 440, l. 7:	,оломнем&	шоломянемъ
p. 440, l. 20:	О руска земле, уе не ,еломнем& еси!	О руская земле, уже не шеломянемъ еси!
p. 440, l. 26:	,[о/е]ломнем&	ш[о/е]ломянемъ
p. 440, fn. 32, l. 2:	соломнем&	соломянемъ
p. 441, l. 5:	Рус˜ска земл,	Русьская земля,
p. 441, l. 12:	,оломнем&	шоломянемъ
p. 441, l. 27:	рослав&. . .собра писц мноюы и прелаюąе от& Грек& на	Ярославъ. . .собра писцѣ мноюы и прелаюаше отъ Грекъ на
p. 441, l. 28:	Словн˜ское писание, и спи,а	Словѣньское писание, и спиша
p. 442, l. 17:	Грек&	Грекъ
p. 442, l. 20:	Грек&	Грекъ
p. 442, l. 21:	Grek&	Грекъ